Truth/Facts About Pakistani Claim Over Siachen Glacier

[VCheng]

i'll try to get back to the source on the next working day and get a hard copy of the remainder of the chapters.

Thank you for this extra effort in indulging my questions. It is appreciated. This additional information might just make the critical difference in proving the case.

While you are at it, please see if these additional agreements related to the ceasefire directly between the two military High Commands are available as they are also needed to complete the picture:

QUOTE:"H. Except as modified by Paragraphs II-A to II-G, inclusive, above, the military agreements between the two High Commands relating to the cease-fire of 1 January 1949 shall continue to remain operative. I. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan will station Observers where it deems necessary."/QUOTE

Edit: Found it here:

Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13
August 1948.

Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948.
(Document No.1100, Para. 75, dated the 9th November, 1948).

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which islikely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavoursto assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation,

Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART I
CEASE-FIRE ORDER

[A] The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.

The High Commands of Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures
that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (For the purpose of these proposals '-forces under their control" shall be considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides).

[C] The Commanders-in-Chief of the Forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.

[D] In its discretion, and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint
military observers who under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both
Commands will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.

[E] The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective
peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

A.

(1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of
Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its
troops from that State.

(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the
State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein
who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered
by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

B.

(1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and
Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the
situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having
occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that
the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the
Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in
stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

(2) Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the
moment of cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the
Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and
order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.

(3) The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that
peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be
guaranteed.

C.

(1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the
principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be
made public.

PART III

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

The UNCIP unanimously adopted this Resolution on 13-8-1948.
Members of the Commission: Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia and U.S.A.

 

[VCheng]

Additional information:

Resolution adopted at the meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and
Pakistan on 5 January, 1949.

Resolution adopted at the meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January, 1949.
(Document No. 5/1196 para. 15, dated the 10th January, 1949).
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan in Communications, dated December
23 and December 25, 1948, respectively their acceptance of the following principles which are
supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948;

1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be
decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;

2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce
arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, have
been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed;

3.

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission,
nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing
and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the
Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the
powers he considers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring
the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff or assistants and
observers as he may require.

4.

(a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948,
and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State,
the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the
Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be
with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

(b) As regards the territory referred to in A 2 of Part II of the resolution of 13 August, final
disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the
Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.

5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of the State will
be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for and the holding of
the plebiscite.

6.

(a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited and
be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating
repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India
and the other of nominees of Pakistan.
The Commissions shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The
Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir
will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision to effect.

(b) All persons (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August 1947, have
entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State.

7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure in collaboration
with the Plebiscite Administrator that:

(a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters
in plebiscite;

(b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects
of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in expressing their
views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There
shall be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State,
including freedom of lawful entry and exit;

(c) All political prisoners are released;

(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection; and

(e) There is no victimisation.

8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
problems on which he may require assistance, and !he Commission may in its discretion call upon
the Plebiscite Administrator 1o carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has
been entrusted;

9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite., the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result thereof to
the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify
to the Security Council whether the Plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial;

10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will be
elaborated in the consultation envisaged in Part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August
1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations;

Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in ordering a cease-fire to
take effect from one minute before midnight of first January 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived
at as provided for by the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948; and Resolves to return in the
immediate future to the sub-continent to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the
resolution of 13 August 1948, and by the foregoing principles.

The UNCIP unanimously adopted this Resolution on 5-1-1949. Members of the
Commission: Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia and U.S.A.

 

[Xeric]

Meanwhile i also found refernce to the same statement in a book namely "Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990" by P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P Cohen:

The Compound Crisis of 1990 by Khakiate, on Flickr

Here's a preview of the page: Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 - P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P Cohen - Google Books

May be it can help.

 

[VCheng]

Meanwhile i also found refernce to the same statement in a book namely "Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990" by P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P Cohen:

The Compound Crisis of 1990 by Khakiate, on Flickr

Here's a preview of the page: Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 - P R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P Cohen - Google Books

May be it can help.

Thank you. This is definitely helpful, but it is a secondary source nonetheless. Given the importance of the issues being discussed, nothing less than the primary sources should be sought in order to ensure robust conclusions. Perhaps seeking out the Reference #70 quoted would help?

 

[Abingdonboy]

All this is well and good but the ground realties are this- India controls the high ground and the PA has zero presence on the Glacier itself. Having the moral high ground is one thing (I'm not even convinced Pakistan has this)but, and to put it bluntly, so what? Do you think the UN or any other international arbiter is going to be allowed into this matter by India? Even if they are, do you think India would pack up and vacate the glacier if any such arbiter ruled against India?

Trouble with this region is too many are rooted in the past, one needs to look at the present day scenario and accept it for good or for bad- it is what it is.

Unless Pakistan is willing to send troops to dislodge the Indians in a 10-1 fashion (the number needed when fighting against an enemy who controls the higher ground in an environment like this) and risk a full-scale war over the matter then all these slides are really immaterial and some members discussing the ins and outs of certain bilateral agreements is a waste of time.

 

[Xeric]

Thank you. This is definitely helpful, but it is a secondary source nonetheless. Given the importance of the issues being discussed, nothing less than the primary sources should be sought in order to ensure robust conclusions. Perhaps seeking out the Reference #70 quoted would help?

Yeah, i tried to get the reference # 70 but the damn google books wont show it in the preview.

You know, f**k it.

Just a month ago, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema was in a conference which i was attending, had i known that this would become such an issue i would have asked him there

Still, last i heard he was a professor or head of department or something at the National Defence University. i can right now just pick up my PASCOM telephone and call him to ask about the reference. But then me being a fauji and he being a civilian who is around faujis alot, i dont want to sound 'insulting.'

Moreover, knowing him, i know what he's going say; 'Sir, why dont you buy the book'

Oh, i can already 'hear' his Amercanized accent.

May be next time i would visit NDU, i can go ask him personally. Yep, this goes in my To Do list.

 

[Bang Galore]

Kashmir and Siachen Issue: Backdrop from Indian Standpoint

This is an interesting interview by Claude Arpi, with the Jammu and Kashmir Governor Lieutenant General S K Sinha (retd).
Lt General Sinha discusses the Kashmir and Siachen issues from Indian standpoint in clear military and legal terms.



In your book, you mention the briefing you received before leaving Delhi from Sir G S Bajpai, secretary general, Ministry of External Affairs. It seems to me that it brings some clarity to the Siachen issue.

There is a background to it. Let me explain in detail. Our contention has been that Kashmir’s accession to India was legal and in accordance with the Independence Act passed by the British parliament.

This Act makes a distinction between the provinces directly ruled by the British called British India and the princely states which were under maharajas or nawabs which had entered into an agreement with the British recognising their paramountcy. Ceding defence and foreign affairs to the British, they retained autonomy on all other subjects.

That was the legal position and the British knew that once paramount power left the subcontinent, the paramountcy was gone. It was left to the princely rulers to decide the future of their state.

Interestingly enough Jinnah supported this while the Congress wanted the people of the states to decide their future, because it was more democratic.

Jinnah had a special reason for supporting (the British scheme). He wanted Hyderabad to accede to Pakistan. It was the largest state in India, the size of France, with its own resources; its population was 10 per cent Muslim or even less, maybe 92 or 93 per cent were Hindus.

Jinnah thought that by applying this rule (the princes decide), the Nizam would opt for Pakistan and Hyderabad would become Pakistan territory.

As far as Kashmir is concerned, Jinnah was also sure that it would fall like a ripe plum in his hands, because geography was in his favour. It is a different story that he got neither.

At the time of Partition, he went to the extent to ask the maharajas of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to accede to Pakistan. He offered them anything that they wanted, but these ‘chaps’ did not take the bait and did not sign. That was the (legal) situation.

Given these conditions, when Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India in October 26 1947, the legality of the Accession could not be questioned. To get around it, Pakistan started the propaganda that Hari Singh had not acceded and that it was only after the army went there on October 27 that he was forced to accede.

During our briefing in 1949 Sir G S Bajpai said the cease-fire Line is being drawn on the basis of ‘as is, where is’. The position of the opposing armies on the day of the cease-fire (January 1, 1949) should be allowed to remain undisturbed and the Cease-Fire Line, CFL, be drawn in between the two armies at that basis. Of course, in Karachi during the negotiations, there was a lot of controversy and it took us 7 days to sort them out.

Bajpai gave us an interesting argument. In areas of no man’s land, where neither side has been in occupation, we should say that these no man’s lands should be inclusive of India because legally Kashmir is India territory. This was accepted by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan after we presented our arguments.

Now in the case of the Tillai Valley (200 sq miles, east of Guraiz), it was a complete no man’s land, no Indian Army, no Pakistan army. As the result of the cease-fire agreement and on the basis of this principle, Tillai was given to us. Today, it is part of Indian territory.

We delineated the CFL on 700 km till Point 9842. Neither side visualised at that time that there could be some operations at those heights. In any case, the CFL was visualised as a temporary arrangement till the case is decided.

From Point 9842, we just wrote ‘and thence north to the glaciers’ without defining the line.

The Pakistan contention today is that they want a straight line from Point 9842 to the Karakoram Pass.

But a line from Point 9842 to the Karakoram is not straight, it goes eastwards.

I mean a direct line to the Karakoram Pass. Our view is that it has to follow the contour of the mountains, and if one follows this concept then Siachen is with us.

What about Bajpai’s principle?

Yes, you can extend this principle (to the Siachen).

The West likes to say that Kashmir is disputed, that the matter is under dispute between India and Pakistan, but if you read the August 13th 1948 Resolution on which the cease-fire is based, there is a recognition of the fact that Kashmir has legally acceded to India.

Otherwise, why would Part II (about the truce) of the 1948 Resolution have said that during the period of truce all Pakistani forces should withdraw from Kashmir, while the Indian forces could remain in Kashmir. The Resolution did say that and Pakistan accepted it only because of the legal consideration (that Kashmir has legally acceded to India).

General SK Sinha participated in the Karachi negotiations as the ADC to General Shrinagesh, the head of the Indian delegation

Kashmir and Siachen Issue: Backdrop from Indian Standpoint

 

[VCheng]

Yeah, i tried to get the reference # 70 but the damn google books wont show it in the preview.

You know, f**k it.

Just a month ago, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema was in a conference which i was attending, had i known that this would become such an issue i would have asked him there

Still, last i heard he was a professor or head of department or something at the National Defence University. i can right now just pick up my PASCOM telephone and call him to ask about the reference. But then me being a fauji and he being a civilian who is around faujis alot, i dont want to sound 'insulting.'

Moreover, knowing him, i know what he's going say; 'Sir, why dont you buy the book'

Oh, i can already 'hear' his Amercanized accent.

May be next time i would visit NDU, i can go ask him personally. Yep, this goes in my To Do list.

Lemme see if I can get hold of a copy and try to dig out the references too. This is too important to let go, I think.

 

[VCheng]

@Xeric Sir, if I may, as I search for the primary references for this discussion, an important question came to my mind:

Is Point NJ9842 actually ON a glacier?

 

[Xeric]

@Xeric Sir, if I may, as I search for the primary references for this discussion, an important question came to my mind:

Is Point NJ9842 actually ON a glacier?

A or the?

 

[VCheng]

A or the?

A. Not the. Question.

How precise is the location of NJ9482? Is it actually ON a glacier?

 

[Xeric]

A. Not the. Question.

How precise is the location of NJ9482? Is it actually ON a glacier?

Yeah, it's a grid reference and quite precise.

It's the point from where the glaciated area begins and hence was considered unapproachable.

 

[VCheng]

Yeah, it's a grid reference and quite precise.

It's the point from where the glaciated area begins and hence was considered unapproachable.

If it is precise, that is good. Is the point itself physically ON a glacier or is it a ridge or other feature?

 

[Xeric]

If it is precise, that is good. Is the point itself physically ON a glacier or is it a ridge or other feature?

It's a feature.

 

[VCheng]

It's a feature.

I thought so. This fact might be more important than many realize, but I will say something about that only after digging up the references above, and going from there as the evidence indicates. As always, forming a conclusion after fairly evaluating all the evidence is the correct way, and trying to look for evidence that only selectively supports a preformed conclusion is bound to be self-defeating, as a general comment.