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Top 10 Most Significant Battles in the History of the Subcontinent



Very valid point baker. There are many such battles which we miss which could have turned the history into another way. The middle east and Arabia is split into so many countries just because they had so many different colonial powers ruling them. Same with Africa. By fortune or design India escaped that tragedy. We were lucky to have a single master and the master being the world super power of the time. Other wise we would be like mexico speaking some latino language as third language which is totally fine by me, but we would have trouble even getting the mediocre science and technology we have today. Imagine Indians speaking Dutch as their second or third language :rofl:. What a tragedy that would have been!
 
Battle of Nedumkotta - The beginning of the end of Tipudate:December 28, 1789
significance : Heavy defeat for Tipu who was at that point at the height of his power and reputation as brilliant commander. Lost a major part of his force and guns. Set him up for British.
force :
Tippu: Total 30000 infantry ,5000 horse,20 cannons
deployed for battle: 14,000 select infantry (his commando version) and 500 pioneers ,guns , some cotton
Travancore:2000 infantry, guns one wall and snakes and a dam trick

Nedumkotta: a small wall of Kerala
-------------------------------------
Travancore is the only portion of India which was never under direct mohammaden or British rule. The rajas used a mix of diplomacy and warfare to keep them all out. Tipu eyed it for the immense wealth of these kingdoms.
The Nedumkotta was a defence fortification constructed along the northern borders of the erstwhile Travancore State. It passed through the territories of the then Cochin State.
It was built by de Lannoy who had surrendered in kulachal battle. It was erased by Tipu Sultan in an act of revenge for having defeated his attempt to subdue Travancore in 1789. It had a length of 40 km . Just before returning to Mysore after his failed attempt, he spent six days to demolish the Lines which he called 'the Contemptible Wall'. He had sworn to demolish it earlier after his failed attempt to breach it on December 28, 1789, and lost 2000 soldiers in that single night, due to the spirited defence by just 20 Nair soldiers of Travancore.
The Nedumkotta was built primarily to resist the invasion under Hyder Ali Khan against Travancore State. It was raised mainly with clay and mud, and reinforced with stones, laterite and granite at strategic places. It started from the Krishan Kotta on the west coast, above Kodungallur, and stretched up to the Annamalai Hills on the Western Ghats. It was about 48 km long, twenty feet wide and twelve feet high. Its alignment was along the Periyar river on the west coast up to Chalakudy from where it went along the Chalakudy river up to the Annamalai Hills in the east. There were underground cells to store gunpowder and other war materials, special chambers for soldiers to live, and look-outs and mounted field-guns all along the fortification. Besides, on the north side of the fortification, ditches were dug twenty feet wide and sixteen feet deep, and filled with thorny plants, poisonous snakes, and hidden weapons. On the south side as well as on the top of the fortification, wide roads were laid for the convenience of military movements.
It started from Pallipuram Kotta near the sea, touches kottamukku, krishnankotta and extended till the Foot hills of the Anamalai in the Western Ghats. The Chalakudy river and lagoon which falls on the alignment was left alone as they themselves were a barrier. A trench 20 feet (6.1 m) deep and 16 feet (4.9 m) wide was built along the northern side of the wall for the full length. At some places the wall reached 50 ft (15 m) in height. Hollows were made inside where about 100 soldiers could hide and make an ambush. A company of soldiers was stationed about every kilometer with ammunition store house at strategic points. There were also caves in the nearby wells to hide in the possibility of an unannounced attack.

Tippu's attack on the lines

Tippu not satisfied with these replies sent, on the 24th December 1789 A. D., another embassy with two caparisoned elephants ostensibly meant for taking the two Rajahs of Cochin and Travancore, and on the night between the "28th and 29th of December encamped at a place six miles distant northward from the main entrance to the lines. Leaving most of his forces to manoeuvre at daybreak in front of the principal gate, Tippu marched with 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers by a roundabout way at 10 o'clock" in the night being guided by a native of the country. Before day-break he found himself in possession of a large extent of the rampart on the right flank of the lines. His aim was to gain the gate about nine miles from the point of entrance, to open it to the division of his army placed to manoeuvre in front of it and to place his whole force within the lines in one day. About 9 o'clock in the morning the Sultan had come three miles along the water in the inner side with his whole force without any opposition, and he at once commanded his pioneers to level down the rampart into the ditch which was there 10 feet wide and 20 deep and thus make a road for him to pass. This was found rather difficult and so he advanced along the rampart in one column, the Travancoreans retreating from successive towers until finally they made a stand in a small square enclosure within the works employed as a magazine, storehouse and barrack, and having drawn a small gun inside they poured grape upon the advancing Mysoreans. The Sultan at once issued orders to take the place at the point of the bayonet. But as they were advancing to execute this illadvised order, a parly of twenty Travancoreans at once poured in a heavy fire which killed the commanding officer and created a panic and inextricable chaos.
"The relieving corps awkwardly advancing along the tame Hank was met and checked by an impetuous mass of fugitives; the next corps caught the infection, the panic became general and the contusion irretrievable. The Sultaun himself was borne away in the crowd; the rear, now become the front, rushed into the intended road across the ditch, which had been no farther prepared than by cutting down the underwood, and throwing a part of the rampart on the berm; the foremost leaped or were forced into the ditcli: and such was the pressure of the succeeding mass, that there was no alternative but to follow. The undermost, of course, were trampled to death ; and in a short time the bodies, by which the ditch was nearly filled, enabled the remainder to pass over. But a small number Travancore soldiers managed to change the course of events by opening fire on the 14,000 Mysore infantry from a close cover that killed the Mysorean officer leading a bayonet charge.The Mysorean column, hemmed in by the confines of the wall, retreated in confusion and Tipu Sultan himself was carried away by the crowd. His palanquin, seals, rings, sword and other personal ornaments fell into the hands of the Travancore armies .Tipu fell back into the ditch twice before scrambling out and the occasional lameness which he suffered until his death was due to the contusions suffered by his fall into the ditches of Travancore.

He then made the best of his way out with very great difficulty and was soon carried in a dhuli unperceived to his tent. In an intense lit of rage and humiliation he swore that he would remain in that camp until he took what he described as ' this contemptible wall'.
According to the English despatches the ditch was said to have been filled with bales of cotton by the Mysoreans for the purpose of passing in and an accidental inflammation of the cotton made them seek another passage. Mr. Powney in his account written from Parur on the first of January 1790 states:—
Tippu has met with a repulse from tho Raja's troops. Ho breached a weak part of the lines and filled the ditch with bales of cotton and earth for his cavalry to enter. He made the attack with seven thousand men. They carried it and possessed the lines for three miles in extent, but reinforcements of the Raja's troops coming from the right and left, the enemy were hemmed in lietween two fires and were drven out with great slaughter. Near a thousand were left dead within the lines, some horses and prisoners were taken. Zemaul Beg, commander of a cussoom was killed, likewise another person of consequence; it is said to be a son of the late Meer Saib. The enemy as soon as he fell, cut off his head and carried it with them. About two hundred of the Raja's people were killed and wounded. By all accouuts they behaved very gallantly. A Brahman of some consequance is among the prisoners; he says that Tippu was at the attack, and had a horse shot under him. We apprehend he is meditating some grand attack. Report says he has crossed thp Chitwa river and is advancing a'ong the sea-side with the intention of attacking Cranganore and Ayacotta. T think we shall bo prepared for him at these places. He has certainly drawn oil' his army from the lines."
The account of bales of cotton having been used for the purpose of passing over the ditch is not corroborated by other accounts, though it is affirmed by all that the mass of bodies in the ditch were consumed by fire after the retreat, fuel being supposed to have been added for the purpose by the Travancoreans. Tippu's palanquin, his seals, rings and personal ornaments, sword &c, fell into the Dalawa's hands as trophies, which were duly forwarded to the Nawab of Arcot at his request. Several officers and men were taken prisoners ; of the former five were Europeans and one a Mahratta.
The attitude of the Madras Government. The Government of Madras, who were apprised of the intended attack on Travancore, were still slow to act. In a letter dated 3rd January 1790, they "deprecated the policy of committing the honour of Government by taking part in the defence of places furtively obtained", and even went the length of criticising the arguments supporting the cause of Travancore. In another letter written to the Maharajah of Travancore even after the attack on the lines, Mr. Holland gave little hopes of assistance and support. Addressing the Madras Government about 15th January 1790, Tippu gave a singular account of his defeat. He antedated it fifteen days and stated that while his troops were employed in search of the fugitives, the Rajah's people fired and his troops retaliated and carried the lines, but that on the first intimation of the affair he ordered his troops to desist from the attack; and finally he requested the Governor to advise the Rajah to observe the treaty. In reply to this, Mr. Holland wrote to him proposing the appointment of commissioners for the adjustment of the points at issue. He even spoke to Lord Cornwallis on the occasion of his departure for England his own conviction of Tippu's amicable intentions.
A second attack is daily expected; and if the King is left alone, all his exertions against a power so superior can delay but for a short time his ruin. The English battalions were behind the lines, but not at the place attacked; and it is said that they have orders not to act, even on the defensive. If such be the case, the Bajah ought to dismiss them with scorn; for the present is the only moment in which the aid of such a handful of men can be effectual. The barrier once forced, orders for them to act will arrive too late. All their efforts will then avail but little against the numbers of their enemies, and will only serve to draw a heavier vengeance on themselves and the unfortunate Bajah." *
Tippu enters Travancore. The Maharajah requested the Madras Governor (Mr. Holland) to issue orders to the British contingent to co-operate with him in case of an attack from Tippu which was expected every moment. Aid was promised but not rendered. On the second of March Tippu again commenced hostilities by a skirmish outside the wall and on the sixth he ordered his artillery to work. The wall resisted the heavy fire of the artillery for nearly a month but at last yielded, a breach three quarter of a mile long having been effected. The Travancore army finding that resistance was useless retreated and the Mysoreans entered Travancore. The two battalions of the Company's sepoys remained passive spectators without giving any aid to the Travancore army on the plea that no orders had been issued to them to march. Tippu next appeared before Cranganore, his army being commanded by Lally. The garrison at Cranganore was defended by the Maharajah's troops under Captain Flory who however had to abandon the fort, resistance being useless. The fortifications were soon o dercd to le demolished. The army of Tij^pu
While Tippu was carrying on his destructive warfare, a large force consisting of the 75th regiment, two battalions of sepoys and one company of artillery were sent under the command of Colonel Hartley with orders to co-operate with the Travancore army, but it arrived too late, however, to be of service in saving the lines.

Tippu retreats. About the 15th of April, the enemy were in possession of the lines near Ayacotta; 6,000 of his horsemen having opened assault on them, the Travancore army withstood it for some time but had soon to give way. The Travancore commanders had arranged that they should reassemble at Vypeen, but this arrangement was lipset bv the con» sternation of their sepoys who immediately retreated to the Wood*. Colonel Hartley's firm resolve to take pest at Ayacotta encouraged the Eajah's troops. On the 8th of May the garrison stationed at Crangafiore was removed to Ayacotta which was the only place not touched by Tippu. With the combined troops it was clear that Tippu could not effect any considerable forward movement into Travancore. Tippu then committed various atrocities in the districts of Parur and Alangad where he desecrated the Hindu and Christian places of worship and burned the bouses of the rich and poor alike. After establishing his head-quarters at Trichur, he marched southward with his army to Alwaye When his progress was obstructed by natural causes.

The Dam trick:
Tipu saw the water level at the edge of the wall was low , the mysore army camped on river bed with all its guns . Tipu ordered a night attack his superior war strategy. The actual reality was the water was controlled by a dam at the hill. Travancore forces destroyed the dam and Tipu lost all his guns and a major chunk of his army was swept away in the flood. He had to turn back.

His army suffered a great deal for wi.nt of prop<r ;he t r and ail the ammunition and accoutrements became damaged. Many perished by disease. His position had became one of danger and anxiety; the rivers were all full, the Cranganore bar rose high with a swift current going seawards and there were no means of communication except by boa,ts. All this necessitated his return to his native country. Moreover the military preparations of the English assisted by the Nizam and the Mahrattas began to disturb his mind. Further a French officer named Macnamara who about this time touched this coast, while paying his respects to the Sultan by whom he was kindJy received, repeatedly assured him of the formidable preparations that were being made by the English against Tippu. These quickened his departure from Travancore. He divided his army into two divisions and ordered one to march via Annamanadai and Chalakudi to Trichur and thence to Palghat, and the other via Crangancre and Chowghat to Talghat. But before finally leaving Travancore he ordered the complete demolition of the lines which was effected as a sort of public ceremony.
"The whole army off duty was regularly paraded without arms, and marched in divisions to the appointed stations; the Sultaun, placed on an eminence, «et the example of striking the first stroke with a pick-axe; the ceremony was repeated by the courtiers and chiefs, the followers of every description, bankers, money-changers, shop-keepers and the mixed crowd of followers were all ordered to assist the soldiers, and the whole was razed to the ground in six days."*
Tippu thus left Malabar destined never to return again
 
The middle east and Arabia is split into so many countries just because they had so many different colonial powers ruling them. Same with Africa. By fortune or design India escaped that tragedy. We were lucky to have a single master and the master being the world super power of the time.

The British wanted to leave a divided India ... they succeeded only partially. There were some 500 princely states each of which had the right to remain independent. Sardar Patel played a pivotal role in ensuring that whatever was left over was not further fragmented.
 
The British wanted to leave a divided India ... they succeeded only partially. There were some 500 princely states each of which had the right to remain independent. Sardar Patel played a pivotal role in ensuring that whatever was left over was not further fragmented.

This thread is about significant battles in the history of the sub-continent, not about sub-continental politics. Please respect the integrity of the thread and refrain from going off topic. In any case, the states were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan, as Mountbatten painstakingly explained to them, and their own notion that on the cessation of the paramountcy of Britain, they would then be free to seek independence on their own account, was not accepted by anyone but themselves.

Please recall that this situation was created by the fact that there was an individual treaty between each principal state and Great Britain, and the cessation of this treaty made the paramountcy null and void. There was a considerable body of legal opinion that major states did indeed have the right of independence; this opinion was based on international law and was not a British machination.

Can we now please return to the topic? Please feel free to start another thread on the integration problem, as it is sure to attract considerable attention.
 
Battle of Nedumkotta - The beginning of the end of Tipudate:December 28, 1789
significance : Heavy defeat for Tipu who was at that point at the height of his power and reputation as brilliant commander. Lost a major part of his force and guns. Set him up for British.
force :
Tippu: Total 30000 infantry ,5000 horse,20 cannons
deployed for battle: 14,000 select infantry (his commando version) and 500 pioneers ,guns , some cotton
Travancore:2000 infantry, guns one wall and snakes and a dam trick

Nedumkotta: a small wall of Kerala
-------------------------------------
Travancore is the only portion of India which was never under direct mohammaden or British rule. The rajas used a mix of diplomacy and warfare to keep them all out. Tipu eyed it for the immense wealth of these kingdoms.
The Nedumkotta was a defence fortification constructed along the northern borders of the erstwhile Travancore State. It passed through the territories of the then Cochin State.
It was built by de Lannoy who had surrendered in kulachal battle. It was erased by Tipu Sultan in an act of revenge for having defeated his attempt to subdue Travancore in 1789. It had a length of 40 km . Just before returning to Mysore after his failed attempt, he spent six days to demolish the Lines which he called 'the Contemptible Wall'. He had sworn to demolish it earlier after his failed attempt to breach it on December 28, 1789, and lost 2000 soldiers in that single night, due to the spirited defence by just 20 Nair soldiers of Travancore.
The Nedumkotta was built primarily to resist the invasion under Hyder Ali Khan against Travancore State. It was raised mainly with clay and mud, and reinforced with stones, laterite and granite at strategic places. It started from the Krishan Kotta on the west coast, above Kodungallur, and stretched up to the Annamalai Hills on the Western Ghats. It was about 48 km long, twenty feet wide and twelve feet high. Its alignment was along the Periyar river on the west coast up to Chalakudy from where it went along the Chalakudy river up to the Annamalai Hills in the east. There were underground cells to store gunpowder and other war materials, special chambers for soldiers to live, and look-outs and mounted field-guns all along the fortification. Besides, on the north side of the fortification, ditches were dug twenty feet wide and sixteen feet deep, and filled with thorny plants, poisonous snakes, and hidden weapons. On the south side as well as on the top of the fortification, wide roads were laid for the convenience of military movements.
It started from Pallipuram Kotta near the sea, touches kottamukku, krishnankotta and extended till the Foot hills of the Anamalai in the Western Ghats. The Chalakudy river and lagoon which falls on the alignment was left alone as they themselves were a barrier. A trench 20 feet (6.1 m) deep and 16 feet (4.9 m) wide was built along the northern side of the wall for the full length. At some places the wall reached 50 ft (15 m) in height. Hollows were made inside where about 100 soldiers could hide and make an ambush. A company of soldiers was stationed about every kilometer with ammunition store house at strategic points. There were also caves in the nearby wells to hide in the possibility of an unannounced attack.

Tippu's attack on the lines

Tippu not satisfied with these replies sent, on the 24th December 1789 A. D., another embassy with two caparisoned elephants ostensibly meant for taking the two Rajahs of Cochin and Travancore, and on the night between the "28th and 29th of December encamped at a place six miles distant northward from the main entrance to the lines. Leaving most of his forces to manoeuvre at daybreak in front of the principal gate, Tippu marched with 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers by a roundabout way at 10 o'clock" in the night being guided by a native of the country. Before day-break he found himself in possession of a large extent of the rampart on the right flank of the lines. His aim was to gain the gate about nine miles from the point of entrance, to open it to the division of his army placed to manoeuvre in front of it and to place his whole force within the lines in one day. About 9 o'clock in the morning the Sultan had come three miles along the water in the inner side with his whole force without any opposition, and he at once commanded his pioneers to level down the rampart into the ditch which was there 10 feet wide and 20 deep and thus make a road for him to pass. This was found rather difficult and so he advanced along the rampart in one column, the Travancoreans retreating from successive towers until finally they made a stand in a small square enclosure within the works employed as a magazine, storehouse and barrack, and having drawn a small gun inside they poured grape upon the advancing Mysoreans. The Sultan at once issued orders to take the place at the point of the bayonet. But as they were advancing to execute this illadvised order, a parly of twenty Travancoreans at once poured in a heavy fire which killed the commanding officer and created a panic and inextricable chaos.
"The relieving corps awkwardly advancing along the tame Hank was met and checked by an impetuous mass of fugitives; the next corps caught the infection, the panic became general and the contusion irretrievable. The Sultaun himself was borne away in the crowd; the rear, now become the front, rushed into the intended road across the ditch, which had been no farther prepared than by cutting down the underwood, and throwing a part of the rampart on the berm; the foremost leaped or were forced into the ditcli: and such was the pressure of the succeeding mass, that there was no alternative but to follow. The undermost, of course, were trampled to death ; and in a short time the bodies, by which the ditch was nearly filled, enabled the remainder to pass over. But a small number Travancore soldiers managed to change the course of events by opening fire on the 14,000 Mysore infantry from a close cover that killed the Mysorean officer leading a bayonet charge.The Mysorean column, hemmed in by the confines of the wall, retreated in confusion and Tipu Sultan himself was carried away by the crowd. His palanquin, seals, rings, sword and other personal ornaments fell into the hands of the Travancore armies .Tipu fell back into the ditch twice before scrambling out and the occasional lameness which he suffered until his death was due to the contusions suffered by his fall into the ditches of Travancore.

He then made the best of his way out with very great difficulty and was soon carried in a dhuli unperceived to his tent. In an intense lit of rage and humiliation he swore that he would remain in that camp until he took what he described as ' this contemptible wall'.
According to the English despatches the ditch was said to have been filled with bales of cotton by the Mysoreans for the purpose of passing in and an accidental inflammation of the cotton made them seek another passage. Mr. Powney in his account written from Parur on the first of January 1790 states:&#8212;
Tippu has met with a repulse from tho Raja's troops. Ho breached a weak part of the lines and filled the ditch with bales of cotton and earth for his cavalry to enter. He made the attack with seven thousand men. They carried it and possessed the lines for three miles in extent, but reinforcements of the Raja's troops coming from the right and left, the enemy were hemmed in lietween two fires and were drven out with great slaughter. Near a thousand were left dead within the lines, some horses and prisoners were taken. Zemaul Beg, commander of a cussoom was killed, likewise another person of consequence; it is said to be a son of the late Meer Saib. The enemy as soon as he fell, cut off his head and carried it with them. About two hundred of the Raja's people were killed and wounded. By all accouuts they behaved very gallantly. A Brahman of some consequance is among the prisoners; he says that Tippu was at the attack, and had a horse shot under him. We apprehend he is meditating some grand attack. Report says he has crossed thp Chitwa river and is advancing a'ong the sea-side with the intention of attacking Cranganore and Ayacotta. T think we shall bo prepared for him at these places. He has certainly drawn oil' his army from the lines."
The account of bales of cotton having been used for the purpose of passing over the ditch is not corroborated by other accounts, though it is affirmed by all that the mass of bodies in the ditch were consumed by fire after the retreat, fuel being supposed to have been added for the purpose by the Travancoreans. Tippu's palanquin, his seals, rings and personal ornaments, sword &c, fell into the Dalawa's hands as trophies, which were duly forwarded to the Nawab of Arcot at his request. Several officers and men were taken prisoners ; of the former five were Europeans and one a Mahratta.
The attitude of the Madras Government. The Government of Madras, who were apprised of the intended attack on Travancore, were still slow to act. In a letter dated 3rd January 1790, they "deprecated the policy of committing the honour of Government by taking part in the defence of places furtively obtained", and even went the length of criticising the arguments supporting the cause of Travancore. In another letter written to the Maharajah of Travancore even after the attack on the lines, Mr. Holland gave little hopes of assistance and support. Addressing the Madras Government about 15th January 1790, Tippu gave a singular account of his defeat. He antedated it fifteen days and stated that while his troops were employed in search of the fugitives, the Rajah's people fired and his troops retaliated and carried the lines, but that on the first intimation of the affair he ordered his troops to desist from the attack; and finally he requested the Governor to advise the Rajah to observe the treaty. In reply to this, Mr. Holland wrote to him proposing the appointment of commissioners for the adjustment of the points at issue. He even spoke to Lord Cornwallis on the occasion of his departure for England his own conviction of Tippu's amicable intentions.
A second attack is daily expected; and if the King is left alone, all his exertions against a power so superior can delay but for a short time his ruin. The English battalions were behind the lines, but not at the place attacked; and it is said that they have orders not to act, even on the defensive. If such be the case, the Bajah ought to dismiss them with scorn; for the present is the only moment in which the aid of such a handful of men can be effectual. The barrier once forced, orders for them to act will arrive too late. All their efforts will then avail but little against the numbers of their enemies, and will only serve to draw a heavier vengeance on themselves and the unfortunate Bajah." *
Tippu enters Travancore. The Maharajah requested the Madras Governor (Mr. Holland) to issue orders to the British contingent to co-operate with him in case of an attack from Tippu which was expected every moment. Aid was promised but not rendered. On the second of March Tippu again commenced hostilities by a skirmish outside the wall and on the sixth he ordered his artillery to work. The wall resisted the heavy fire of the artillery for nearly a month but at last yielded, a breach three quarter of a mile long having been effected. The Travancore army finding that resistance was useless retreated and the Mysoreans entered Travancore. The two battalions of the Company's sepoys remained passive spectators without giving any aid to the Travancore army on the plea that no orders had been issued to them to march. Tippu next appeared before Cranganore, his army being commanded by Lally. The garrison at Cranganore was defended by the Maharajah's troops under Captain Flory who however had to abandon the fort, resistance being useless. The fortifications were soon o dercd to le demolished. The army of Tij^pu
While Tippu was carrying on his destructive warfare, a large force consisting of the 75th regiment, two battalions of sepoys and one company of artillery were sent under the command of Colonel Hartley with orders to co-operate with the Travancore army, but it arrived too late, however, to be of service in saving the lines.

Tippu retreats. About the 15th of April, the enemy were in possession of the lines near Ayacotta; 6,000 of his horsemen having opened assault on them, the Travancore army withstood it for some time but had soon to give way. The Travancore commanders had arranged that they should reassemble at Vypeen, but this arrangement was lipset bv the con» sternation of their sepoys who immediately retreated to the Wood*. Colonel Hartley's firm resolve to take pest at Ayacotta encouraged the Eajah's troops. On the 8th of May the garrison stationed at Crangafiore was removed to Ayacotta which was the only place not touched by Tippu. With the combined troops it was clear that Tippu could not effect any considerable forward movement into Travancore. Tippu then committed various atrocities in the districts of Parur and Alangad where he desecrated the Hindu and Christian places of worship and burned the bouses of the rich and poor alike. After establishing his head-quarters at Trichur, he marched southward with his army to Alwaye When his progress was obstructed by natural causes.

The Dam trick:
Tipu saw the water level at the edge of the wall was low , the mysore army camped on river bed with all its guns . Tipu ordered a night attack his superior war strategy. The actual reality was the water was controlled by a dam at the hill. Travancore forces destroyed the dam and Tipu lost all his guns and a major chunk of his army was swept away in the flood. He had to turn back.

His army suffered a great deal for wi.nt of prop<r ;he t r and ail the ammunition and accoutrements became damaged. Many perished by disease. His position had became one of danger and anxiety; the rivers were all full, the Cranganore bar rose high with a swift current going seawards and there were no means of communication except by boa,ts. All this necessitated his return to his native country. Moreover the military preparations of the English assisted by the Nizam and the Mahrattas began to disturb his mind. Further a French officer named Macnamara who about this time touched this coast, while paying his respects to the Sultan by whom he was kindJy received, repeatedly assured him of the formidable preparations that were being made by the English against Tippu. These quickened his departure from Travancore. He divided his army into two divisions and ordered one to march via Annamanadai and Chalakudi to Trichur and thence to Palghat, and the other via Crangancre and Chowghat to Talghat. But before finally leaving Travancore he ordered the complete demolition of the lines which was effected as a sort of public ceremony.
"The whole army off duty was regularly paraded without arms, and marched in divisions to the appointed stations; the Sultaun, placed on an eminence, «et the example of striking the first stroke with a pick-axe; the ceremony was repeated by the courtiers and chiefs, the followers of every description, bankers, money-changers, shop-keepers and the mixed crowd of followers were all ordered to assist the soldiers, and the whole was razed to the ground in six days."*
Tippu thus left Malabar destined never to return again

And this was a significant battle?
 
siginificance is if Tipu had won
1. He would have at his disposal a very big war chest. Kerala was at that time like the oil fields of modern world. Arabs and British were fighting for the trade in Kerala and the feudal lords were rich from the gold brought by pepper trade.

2. The entire southern india would have come under islamic rule. I would have been a muslim.
3. He could have used this force against British and brought them to their defeat.Hyder was very close to expelling British. This was Tipus chance had he not ventured out. Even after loosing half of his force and guns in Kerala ,the British won against Tipu after considerable struggle.

4. And for sure it created a major social impact as masses flood and settled in south fearing the invasion which is visible even now. The major muslim dominated areas end near kodungalloor.

just my few cents... If still not significant we can move on and discuss another one
 
siginificance is if Tipu had won
1. He would have at his disposal a very big war chest. Kerala was at that time like the oil fields of modern world. Arabs and British were fighting for the trade in Kerala and the feudal lords were rich from the gold brought by pepper trade.

2. The entire southern india would have come under islamic rule. I would have been a muslim.
3. He could have used this force against British and brought them to their defeat.Hyder was very close to expelling British. This was Tipus chance had he not ventured out. Even after loosing half of his force and guns in Kerala ,the British won against Tipu after considerable struggle.

4. And for sure it created a major social impact as masses flood and settled in south fearing the invasion which is visible even now. The major muslim dominated areas end near kodungalloor.

just my few cents... If still not significant we can move on and discuss another one

Several comments:
  1. Anyone posting should be able to stand by his post and defend it; packing it in at the first sign of opposition doesn't speak well of the preparation and groundwork done. If you have thought about this particular battle and think you're right, you should defend it - as long as it is defensible, that is! In my opinion, you have put up good points, and should wait to see how others receive it before moving on.
  2. Personally, again, I would give this much more value if you linked it to what was happening in Kerala from the time of the Portuguese advent (1498) onwards. It was an involved interplay of forces, not just between the Portuguese and the Kerala princes, singly, rarely acting in concert, but also with the occasional alliance of the Gulf rulers, the ruler of Egypt, for instance, the rulers of the Bahmani successor Sultanates, for another. This might be brought up.
  3. About the social and religious impact, I am rather doubtful. It sounds as if you are unaware that Islam found converts among those in Kerala who had trade and commercial links with the Middle East for nearly a millennium, possibly more, before Islam. The first mosques in India were built, not in Sindh, as some of our ignorant friends think, but in Kerala and further north, on the Konkan coast. So would Tipu have made that much of a difference? Your guess is as good as mine.
  4. There are other points, but we should encourage other opinions, so I am stopping at this point.
 
I am so sorry, I got overtaken by events, and completely forgot to respond to the points made by you. Amends made herewith.

Sir, thank you for taking the time to reply to my thread.

GodlessBastard said:
Joe Shearer said:
Except for Kalinga, Talikota, Plassey and Diu, there is a strong north-west orientation, which has been the traditional orientation of Indian history. In my opinion, that is wrong.

Indeed, I too have noticed the North-West bias while compiling this list. Making such a list in the first place is a difficult task, considering how large and diverse the subcontinent is. But wouldn't you agree that the Northwest has, traditionally, been the gateway through which new ideas and people arrived in India? The Greeks, the Sakas, the Hunas, the Arabs, the Turks - they all came from the northwest, and they all changed the India of their times.

I'll be honest, and admit that I don't know much about the history of Northeast India. If I had, I might have included some important battles from this region.

Just to clear up an issue, and as an afterthought:

After writing that post, to which 22 is a reply, it gradually dawned on me that in fact, this drawing people's attention to the north-east was almost exactly as wrong as the drawing people's attention to the north-west. What we should have addressed, as a couple of subsequent posts did, was the significant frontier battles, irrespective of the frontier involved; and we should have done so against the backdrop of other, interior significant battles - battles fought, not at the frontiers, but in the interior.

So the series of posts on the activities on the Kerala front, and about the Dutch defeat at the hands of Travancore, are all important. They represent a struggle for survival of our independent mercantile tradition, and its final capture by Europeans, who then fought over the mangled remains. These battles, and the wars, at our sea frontiers and their accompanying interior battles were magnified by British historians, and as a result, we have tended to scratch around for alternatives, perhaps in an effort to break away from the perceived domination by British historians.

Perhaps, to redress the balance, we need to look afresh at those sea battles, and assess their significance.

GodlessBastard said:
Joe Shearer said:
The Battle of Saraighat in 1671 between Ahoms (victorious) and the Mughals set the limits of Mughal power in the east. By leaving Assam alone under its independent Ahom kings, this battle had a seminal effect on the future of India-that-is-Bharat that succeeded British India in 47. It allowed the Assam kings to maintain their loose and relaxed hold on their hills subjects, and their attitude of friendly indifference to Tibet. It was this relaxed attitude that the British sought to correct on their conquest of Assam, and it was this that finally led to the McMahon Line, which is such a bone of contention with China today.
Thank for mentioning this. I have heard of the Mughal-Ahom Wars but they slipped my mind when I made the list. I think Saraighat is definitely a strong candidate for the list, considering its strong impact even today (w.r.t Sino-Indian relations).

Which battle do you think I should replace in my list with Saraighat? I'm thinking Pratapgarh.
With some others (was it Austerlitz?), I was actually of the opinion that your list didn't need fine-tuning. I am not sure Pratapgarh should have been there in the first place, btw.

GodlessBastard said:
Joe Shearer said:
The Battle of Buxar in 1764, between the British under Sir Hector Munro (victors) against the coalition of Shah Alam II, Shuja-ud-daulah and Mir Qasim, was the real battle for establishment of British power in the east, and not the highly-publicised, perhaps over-publicised, Battle of Panipat. At Buxar, the British showed their true military strength over the rapidly-weakening war-fighting skills of the north Indian princes. This battle was the first solid step in the expansion of the British in the Gangetic valley.

Do you mean the Battle of Plassey? Battle of Panipat did not directly involve the British.

I had always assumed that Plassey was the decisive battle that gave the Brits their permament footing in the subcontinent.

Do you think Buxar should replace Plassey in my list?

You are right, Panipat was a slip of the pen.

And you are also right: in an idiosyncratic way, I do think Buxar should replace Plassey.

GodlessBastard said:
Joe Shearer said:
The Battle of Chushul, 1742, between the Dogra-Ladakhi garrison of Leh (victors) and the Tibetan troops, was the keystone for border negotiations between the Jammu-based Dogra king, Gulab Singh, and the joint representation of the Chinese Court and the Dalai Lama. This border was not set very accurately, giving space for an ambitious British officer to draw a boundary line along the Kuen-Lun Mountains. The PRC took no notice of this whatsoever, nor of the far more conservative intentions of the Treaty of Chushul, but that is another war and another story.

Another important battle for sure, but I'm not sure if it is significant enough to be on the list. I say this because it affected a very small and isolated portion of the subcontinent.

Chushul was included to illustrate the neglect of our other frontiers. I am not sure that it was one of the top ten significant ones. On the other hand, it affects the entire country, insofar as China's inveterate hostility affects the whole country today, and forces us to prepare to defend ourselves at an enormous cost.

GodlessBastard said:
Also, which battle would you say is the most decisive in the history of the subcontinent? I am asking you because you have extensive knowledge on history, and your opinion is highly valued

That's a lallapalooza! I'd like some more time on this one.
 
Pratapgad was absolutely pivotal; without that victory for Indic forces India would have probably ended up getting Islamized.

A surprising conclusion.
  1. The battle was Marathas vs. Adil Shahis. Are we identifying the Marathas with 'Indic' forces, whatever these were in the 17th and 18th centuries? It is an historical cliche that not only the Marathas, but every other contingent of soldiers in India at that time was constituted of a mixture of Hindus and Muslims.
  2. Is the reverse implied? Are Adil Shahis non-Indic forces? Why?
  3. How would India have got further Islamicised (or Islamised, if that neologism is preferred) if this victory had not come about? Did Islamicisation suddenly stop because of this battle and its outcome? Why would that have happened? Also, is it being implied that there was a trend towards Islamicisation before the battle? What is that implication based on?
 
The Battle of Talikota
One of the most fateful events in indian history was the battle of Talikota that occurred during the time of Ramaraya who was the de facto ruler of Vijayanagar. The shas gathered together their armies on the plains of Bijapur at the end of 1564 and built up an enormous Islamic horde of around 700,000 troops. This vast army started marching southwards with considerable speed. Ramaraya faced the situation calmly and on Vijayadashmi day 15th September 1564 asked his generals to prepare for an all out war with the Shahs. By December the Shahs reached Talikota, a fortified town near the Krishna river and declared holy war on the infidels. Ramaraya took all the right steps. He sent his brother Tirumala with a large force to prevent the Shahs from crossing the Krishna. He sent his other brother Venkatadri to defend the south bank of the Krishna and he himself came in next with the rest of the army to form the rear. The total armies appear to have been between 500,000 core troops, plus the mercenaries. The main chinks in the armies were the two divisions of a total of about 140,000 troops which belonged to Shah commanders who had been hired foolishly by Ramaraya after their eviction from Bijapur by the Sultan. These divisions were along with Ramaraya&#8217;s main divisions.

By December 29th 1564 the first battles broke out. Qutb Shah and Nizam Shah, who were great friends, decided to go on their own first and led their divisions to clash with Tirumala&#8217;s division. The army inflicted a huge defeat on the Shahs and the Sultans fled in disarray losing thousands of men in the encounter. The Sultans were shaken by this encounter and asked Adil Shah to forget previous arguments and stand by them for the intended counter-attack. The Sultans met secretly and decided that the only way to succeed was to resort to stratagem. Nizam Shah and Qutb Shah decided to parley with the mighty Raya who was now planning a massive counter-thrust into the Shah flanks. At the same time Adil Shah sent a false message to the commander that he wished to remain neutral. While this was going on messengers from the Sultans went to the Shah commanders in the Vijayanagaran army and appealed to their religious duty of Jihad and secured their alliance to launch a subversive attack. As a result of these parleys Ramaraya delayed his counter-thrust giving a small but critical time window for the Shahs to regroup. Sultan Imad Shah of Berar made the first thrust by attacking Tirumala&#8217;s division guarding the Krishna ford. Tirumala fell upon him with his full force and in short but intense encounter destroyed the Sultan&#8217;s army and sent him flying for life. However, the euphoria of this victory proved short-lived as the sultans Nizam Shah, Qutb Shah, Barid Shah on one side and Adil Shah on the other used this distraction to cross the Krishna and attack the main divisions. This crossing was very similar to what alexander did. The one side of the bank was covered by elephants so the enemy basically played same trick as alexander did.They walked along the river for 3 days and then suddenly crossed when the rayas were resting.


Ramaraya, though thoroughly surprised, rapidly responded. Despite his advanced age (in the 70s) he decided to personally lead the armies and took to the field in the center. He was faced by Nizam Shah&#8217;s division. Ramaraya&#8217;s first brother Tirumala hurriedly returned to form the left wing of the army that was countered by Adil Shah and traitorous s under the Maharatta chief Raja Ghorpade. His second brother Venkatadri formed the right wing that was opposed by Qutb Shah and Barid Shah, strengthened by Nizam Shah&#8217;s auxiliaries as the battle progressed. On 23rd Jan 1565 the enormous armies clashed on the plains near the villages of Rakshasi and Tangadi. Several reports claimed that over a million men were involved in this historic clash. Venkatadri struck early and within the first two hours the right wing&#8217;s heavy guns fired constantly on the ranks of Barid Shah. As the ranks were softened the infantry under Venkatadri plowed through the divisions of Barid Shah annihilating them. The assault was so vigorous that it looked like a victory was imminent. Qutb Shah too was in retreat, when Nizam Shah sent his forces to shore up the ranks of the Sultans. Nizam Shah himself was then pressed hard by the heavy cannonade from Ramaraya&#8217;s division and was facing a infantry thrust with Ramaraya at the helm. At this point the Sultans signaled to the Shah officers in the Vijayanagaran army to launch a subversive attack. Suddenly Ramaraya found his rear surprised by the two Shah divisions in his ranks turning against him. About 140,000 Shah troops had opened a vigorous rear attack and captured several artillery positions. The Shah divisions even discharged bags of copper coins to cause confusion. Several cannon shells landed near Ramaraya&#8217;s elephant and he fell from it as his mount was struck by a cannon shard. Ramaraya tried to recover but Nizam Shah made a dash to seize him.

He was dragged to the Shah camp and the Sultan asked him to acknowledge Allah as the only god. Ramaraya instead cried &#8220;Narayana Krishna Bhagavanta&#8221;, and Nizam Shah slit the king&#8217;s throat and declared himself a Ghazi in Jihad. Ramaraya&#8217;s severed head was then fixed to a pole and waved before the troops. The s panicked at the death of their commander and chaos broke out in their midst. Venkatadri was also killed as the Qutb, Nizam and Barid put all their forces together and launched a concerted punch. Tirumala tried to stiffen the center but at that point the whole division of Adil Shah that was waiting all the while made the final assault on the rear of Tirumala&#8217;s division. The Vijayanagar artillery had by then been exhausted and was blasted by the Adil Shah&#8217;s artillery and the s faced a rout. Several 100,000s of troops were slain.

Tirumala seeing the total rout fled to Vijayanagara and taking up the treasury on 1500 elephants fled south towards Penukonda. Those who could flee the city survived, the rest became victims of the Islamic Jihad. The Shahs swooped down upon the city and beheaded several tens of thousands of the male inhabitants as they could find (&#8220;every one became a ghazi by killing a Kaffr&#8221;). The young women were captured for the harems and the rest were herded into groups and burnt alive. Miscellaneous dacoits, Maharatta brigands under Raja Ghorpade Bahadur, and the Maharashtrian Brahmin thief, Murari Rao, who got wind of the news also arrived with their henchmen and looted the grand city. The looting is supposed to have gone on for six months, after which the sultans fired the city. The heat from the burning of the city is supposed to have been so intense that it left cracks in the granite hills on its periphery. Ramaraya&#8217;s skull was taken by Nizam Shah to Ahmednagar and was fitted to the spout of a drain that opened out of the fort. This grotesque gargoyle bearing the fallen king&#8217;s skull was seen for several years after the event
 
A surprising conclusion.
  1. The battle was Marathas vs. Adil Shahis. Are we identifying the Marathas with 'Indic' forces, whatever these were in the 17th and 18th centuries? It is an historical cliche that not only the Marathas, but every other contingent of soldiers in India at that time was constituted of a mixture of Hindus and Muslims.
  2. Is the reverse implied? Are Adil Shahis non-Indic forces? Why?
  3. How would India have got further Islamicised (or Islamised, if that neologism is preferred) if this victory had not come about? Did Islamicisation suddenly stop because of this battle and its outcome? Why would that have happened? Also, is it being implied that there was a trend towards Islamicisation before the battle? What is that implication based on?

A force that revels in demolishing temples is certainly non-Indic. Afzal Khan, by his actions at Tulzapur and Pandharpur, before he met his demise at Pratapgad, certainly qualifies as non-Indic.

There may have been some Muslims who did serve Shivaji, but it did not change the Indic character of the Maratha power. The vast majority of his troops were recruited from the Maval region of the Sahyadris. And I am not saying Muslim = non-Indic. There were non-Indics in the Vijaynagar armies, the consequences of that are described the post 43:

The Sultans met secretly and decided that the only way to succeed was to resort to stratagem ... While this was going on messengers from the Sultans went to the Shah commanders in the Vijayanagaran army and appealed to their religious duty of Jihad and secured their alliance to launch a subversive attack ... At this point the Sultans signaled to the Shah officers in the Vijayanagaran army to launch a subversive attack. Suddenly Ramaraya found his rear surprised by the two Shah divisions in his ranks turning against him. About 140,000 Shah troops had opened a vigorous rear attack and captured several artillery positions. The Shah divisions even discharged bags of copper coins to cause confusion. Several cannon shells landed near Ramaraya&#8217;s elephant and he fell from it as his mount was struck by a cannon shard. Ramaraya tried to recover but Nizam Shah made a dash to seize him.

He was dragged to the Shah camp and the Sultan asked him to acknowledge Allah as the only god. Ramaraya instead cried &#8220;Narayana Krishna Bhagavanta&#8221;, and Nizam Shah slit the king&#8217;s throat and declared himself a Ghazi in Jihad. Ramaraya&#8217;s severed head was then fixed to a pole and waved before the troops. The s panicked at the death of their commander and chaos broke out in their midst.

I would say that the reconquest of most of South Asia by the Indic Marathas, with the later involvement of the Sikhs, did stem the tide of Islamicization. And Pratapgad was a pivotal moment in the survival of the Marathas. What would have happened if the whole of South Asia had remained under the domination on Islamic rulers? The answer necessarily has to be speculative but perhaps one can make inferences from the behavior of Tipu Sultan. Even though there were other non-Muslim power centers in India, he did not feel any compunction in indulging in utterly savage and barbaric behavior against non-Muslims, particularly in the Malabar.
 
A force that revels in demolishing temples is certainly non-Indic. Afzal Khan, by his actions at Tulzapur and Pandharpur, before he met his demise at Pratapgad, certainly qualifies as non-Indic.

Obviously your answers are motivated by some spirit other than an interest in military history or contemporary military analysis.

Please think carefully before answering - are all forces that demolish temples non-Indic? Are forces that destroy other places of worship, churches, for instance, or mosques, also non-Indic?

Regarding your own unfortunately-phrased response, you say that

Afzal Khan, by his actions at Tulzapur and Pandharpur, before he met his demise at Pratapgad, certainly qualifies as non-Indic.

Haven't you changed subjects abruptly? You were talking about forces, and in order to illustrate their depravity, you now talk about the individual Afzal Khan. Are the two the same, or is it a philosophical tenet to extend flexibly from the particular to the general without warning?

I would say that the reconquest of most of South Asia by the Indic Marathas, with the later involvement of the Sikhs, did stem the tide of Islamicization. And Pratapgad was a pivotal moment in the survival of the Marathas. What would have happened if the whole of South Asia had remained under the domination on Islamic rulers? The answer necessarily has to be speculative but perhaps one can make inferences from the behavior of Tipu Sultan. Even though there were other non-Muslim power centers in India, he did not feel any compunction in indulging in utterly savage and barbaric behavior against non-Muslims, particularly in the Malabar.

My questions at point 3 were five in number, but your response seems to address only the first of those. It would be interesting to have your answers of the remaining questions, as it will clear up what you think Islamisation, or Islamicisation was, other than random conversions. If you feel your answers already given suffice, please say so.
 

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