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The S-400 Missile deal will make Pakistan's Nuclear Ballistic Missiles obsolete

India, Russia fail to finalize S-400 air-defense deal
By: Vivek Raghuvanshi   11 hours ago
after China to acquire S-400 systems from Russia.

NEW DELHI ― India’s ongoing negotiations with Russia for the $5 billion-plus purchase of five S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile systems are in deadlock yet again.

Indian Ministry of Defence officials, top brass with Russian arms export agency Rosoboronexport, and Almaz-Antey, the original equipment manufacturer and designer, have failed to reach a settlement on the price, training, service support and transfer of technology of the missiles, a top MoD official said.

“Russia is demanding $5.5 billion for the five [S-400] units, very high training fee and refusing to give technology transfer of three types of guided missiles,” the official said, adding that no plan has yet been offered for service and a spares-support package.

Another MoD official said the final contract is not going to be signed anytime soon, and India will not pay more than $4.5 billion for the systems. He noted that the deal would incorporate a Make in India economic policy in regard to the manufacturing of spares, the guided missiles and a life-time service support package.

Rosoboronexport executives were unavailable for comment.

India and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on the sale of the S-400 systems during a bilateral summit in October 2016 in Goa, India, in the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The MoD’s apex procurement body, the Defence Acquisition Council, approved in December 2015 the purchase of five S-400s at a cost of about $4.5 billion.

“The service has already carried out two separate rounds of trails in Russia last year, but our air defense personnel have to undergo robust training to successfully operate S-400 Triumf systems before they are inducted,” a senior Indian Air Force official said.

The Russian-built S-400 systems are capable of intercepting and destroying airborne targets at a distance of up to 400 kilometers (250 miles) and can simultaneously engage up to six targets. Each S-400 comprises tracking and search radar systems, eight launchers, 112 guided missiles, and command and support vehicles.

Another Air Force official said the S-400s will help the service counter ballistic missiles and target stealth aircraft. He added that the system would have three types of guided missiles. He also asserted that an India-owned S-400 would easily overpower Pakistan’s air defense capabilities and prove a match against China’s strategic assets.

India will be the second customer after China to acquire S-400 systems from Russia.



Turkey makes deal to buy Russian-made S-400 air defense system
Turkey is a NATO member, and its negotiations for the purchase of the Russian system have raised concerns with allies who say the country should invest in technology that is compatible with theirs.

By: Burak Ege Bekdil

India is currently developing and testing is ballistic missile defense grid that is essentially an anti-missile system. The grids includes indigenously developed Prithvi Air Defence for high-altitude interception (above 75 kilometers) and Advanced Air Defence for low-altitude interception (below 15 kilometers).

In addition, India is developing medium-range surface-to-air missile systems reportedly capable of taking out an incoming missile with its range of more than 70 kilometers.

The state-owned Defence Research and Development Organization is also in talks with Israeli defense companies to develop an anti-cruise missile system, but there are currently no details available.

India is also seeking to develop and acquire systems that can counter ballistic missiles and cover a 2,000- to 5,000-kilometer range.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/...ssia-fail-to-finalize-s-400-air-defense-deal/
 
The ICBM-class target that was intercepted in a live test in 2017 was actually MiRV'ed and the purpose of the test was to verify execution of "midcourse discrimination" protocols.

Writing is on the wall:

"This is the first full-fledged intercept test of the system since the successful intercept in June 2014 (FTG-06b). Dubbed “FTG-15,” today’s event involved an ICBM-range target launched from the Kwajalein Atoll. Multiple sensor systems, including space-based infrared satellites and likely an Aegis SPY-1 radar, detected the missile and tracked its location. The Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX) also surveilled the missile, providing high resolution imagery which allowed the GMD system to discriminate the missile’s warhead from its accompanying debris.

Using this data, a GBI was launched from Vandenberg AFB. Once in space, the GBI released its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which identified the warhead with its onboard electro-optical and infrared sensors, diverted into the warhead’s path, and collided with it."


Source: https://missilethreat.csis.org/gmd-intercept-mean/

Accompanying debris - interesting choice of words. These were the decoys (i.e. threat cloud phenomenon). The ICBM-class target was designed to simulate modern-era ICBM capability.

intercept.gif


In the video that they released for public consumption, they omitted lot of detail. Watch the aforementioned animation - it show you the complete picture.
The missile's last stage, post-boost vehicle and other stuff that's jettisoned acts as debris. They have never tested against MIRVs. The second object hit by the EKV was a basic inflatable balloon decoy, which in principle shouldn't have been hit if it was identified successfully.
Even if the warhead was maneuverable, it could not fool the EKV and/or outmaneuver it.

Please keep in mind that a maneuverable warhead does not behave like a thug trying to dodge cops in a Ford Mustang by changing lanes at every opportunity [mid-flight]. A warhead's maneuverability is to re-adjust its trajectory to a limited extent so that it can reach its target with better precision.

Current and upcoming Russian and Chinese ICBMs use independent propulsion inside RVs for just that purpose. Its true that the thruster fuel is usually limited and only enough for trajectory correction, but the new developments are making the Yankees nervous.
ICBMs will be obsolete at some point. Nuclear MAD will come to an end.
You are massively overestimating capabilities of a BMD network, and underestimating the tricks that can be pulled at every phase of the flight to counter it. For example, for midcourse phase the Americans themselves developed inflatable RVs which were thermally regulated to mimic the thermal signature of a real RV (in addition to the radar signature). Similarly, for terminal phase the Russians and Chinese are developing HGVs. Then there's the simple tactic of outnumbering the BMDs or taking out the sensor network. By their own admission, US BMD can withstand only a limited/rogue strike, such as one by North Korea.

This is just like the armor/anti-armor dynamics. However the race has just begun, and BMDs have a LOT of catching up to do.
 
The missile's last stage, post-boost vehicle and other stuff that's jettisoned acts as debris. They have never tested against MIRVs. The second object hit by the EKV was a basic inflatable balloon decoy, which in principle shouldn't have been hit if it was identified successfully.
Thanks for your input.

"Outside the Earth’s atmosphere, the missile engines burn out and it reaches its peak velocity. At this point, the missile’s payload, a warhead, usually separates from the rest of the body. The warhead is also accompanied by the flying junk pile of debris created by launching a missile as well as by decoys or other countermeasures designed to complicate the missile defense job. All of these objects move together through space as part of a threat cloud. So for a missile defense system to successfully destroy the warhead, its various sensors must first discriminate it from among the various other parts of the cloud." - CSIS

Well, I overlooked jettisoned stuff but my point is valid regardless.

The ICBM [in question] was carrying one real warhead and some decoys (one dummy warhead including), per insider sources. I stumbled upon an insider source once but no luck afterwards.

This article is the closest in providing dirty details: https://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/missile-defense-test-realistic-syring-insists/

"It actually replicated — without getting into classified details — an operational scenario that we're concerned about." - James Syring

The top cone is definitely MiRV capable: http://alert5.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/3433730.jpg

Primary objective of this test was to pull-off "midcourse discrimination." So mission accomplished.

They definitely have the capability to take care of an MiRV'ed ICBM now.

Current and upcoming Russian and Chinese ICBMs use independent propulsion inside RVs for just that purpose. Its true that the thruster fuel is usually limited and only enough for trajectory correction, but the new developments are making the Yankees nervous.
That is not news; American nuclear warheads have same capability.

In-fact, you might want to learn about "superfuse capability" of American SLBMs in service:

https://thebulletin.org/how-us-nucl...tability-burst-height-compensating-super10578
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-americas-new-nuke-upgrades-would-be-an-endgame-for-1793260891
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/03/super-fuze/

The "superfuse capability" has transformed the entire American SLBM fleet into a force that is suitable for decapitating strikes. In contrast, Russian and Chinese nuclear forces are optimized for taking out cities and some military bases only. It is really funny when some American sources declare American nuclear capability as "aging." :lol: ;)

Nonetheless, point is that how would a warhead outmaneuver a GMD EKV; this EKV is highly maneuverable by virtue of its design, very fast and equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors to get a lock on the incoming warhead and ram into it. Even if the maneuverability of a warhead is enhanced to an extent, still no guarantee of escaping a GMD EKV.

You are massively overestimating capabilities of a BMD network, and underestimating the tricks that can be pulled at every phase of the flight to counter it. For example, for midcourse phase the Americans themselves developed inflatable RVs which were thermally regulated to mimic the thermal signature of a real RV (in addition to the radar signature). Similarly, for terminal phase the Russians and Chinese are developing HGVs. Then there's the simple tactic of outnumbering the BMDs. By their own admission, US BMD can withstand only a limited/rogue strike, such as one by North Korea.
I am neither underestimating and nor overestimating anything. I am not saying that ICBMs are obsolete at this stage. Of-course, numbers are a problem. And fear factor is unlikely to diminish. Even a handgun scares people.

As for the tricks, good luck in fooling a multi-layered network of sensors that has global reach and incorporate DSP assets, SBIRS assets, airborne assets, powerful radar systems [mobile and stationary] and naval assets. People here have no idea how massive this surveillance network has become in recent years, and improvements are a given.

Americans have developed and fielded a massive fleet of high quality ICBMs [as tools of deterrence] themselves, and they are in a good position to assess limitations of this war-fighting strategy and discover ways to exploit it.

GMD network represents a [new] deterrence capability which has ample potential to upset strategic balance vis-a-vis US in the years to come, and improvements are a given. This network has become sophisticated enough to neutralize a barrage of ICBMs [of certain scale] at present. More importantly, this capability is making tremendous difference in the strategic calculus of US; it provides US sufficient room to [defeat] a nuclear power in an all-out war with minimal losses. US will carry out decapitating strikes beforehand and even if some ICBMs slip through and head its way, GMD network will take care of the barrage. American nuclear doctrine is being revisited accordingly. Coincidence? This is the big game behind-the-scenes.

44 GMD interceptors [as of 2018] represents an alarming growth in ICBM-intercept capability in a span of few years. First GMD interceptor became functional in 2003. US is also developing MOKV which will be able to take out several nuclear warheads in a single launch. This capability will make GMD network cost-effective and extremely capable at neutralizing a large barrage of ICBMs in the future.

Do you think North Korea fits the bill here? Testing an ICBM is one thing; mass-producing it is really expensive. North Korea cannot afford an arms-race with the US, and need to address issues of re-entry. The RV of Hwasong-15 missile broke apart upon re-entry.

Iran does not threaten US in any way or form.

North Korea and Iran are just a propaganda smokescreen.

This is just like the armor/anti-armor dynamics. The race will always be on.
I do not believe that ballistic missiles have much room for improvement, specially at the stage of what US, Russia and China have fielded. Conversely, sky is the limit in finding methods to neutralize this kind of threat.

A sword has its uses even today but it is utterly obsolete as a weapon of war at the same time. This would be the fate of ballistic missiles one day, if mankind last long enough.

Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important to discover new methods of ensuring strategic balance. Only China has the resources for these experiments.
 
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in the recent news US has stopped funding for their missiles program and instead issued a PO to buy S-400
 
Thanks for your input.

"Outside the Earth’s atmosphere, the missile engines burn out and it reaches its peak velocity. At this point, the missile’s payload, a warhead, usually separates from the rest of the body. The warhead is also accompanied by the flying junk pile of debris created by launching a missile as well as by decoys or other countermeasures designed to complicate the missile defense job. All of these objects move together through space as part of a threat cloud. So for a missile defense system to successfully destroy the warhead, its various sensors must first discriminate it from among the various other parts of the cloud." - CSIS

Well, I overlooked jettisoned stuff but my point is valid regardless.

The ICBM [in question] was carrying one real warhead and some decoys (one dummy warhead including), per insider sources. I stumbled upon an insider source once but no luck afterwards.

This article is the closest in providing dirty details: https://breakingdefense.com/2017/05/missile-defense-test-realistic-syring-insists/

"It actually replicated — without getting into classified details — an operational scenario that we're concerned about." - James Syring
I'm not refuting that the radars cannot differentiate between the debris, decoys and warhead. They absolutely can, provided the decoys are basic ones. Sure, this was the first time they actually demonstrated it against an ICBM-class target, but still the entire system is nowhere near capable of handling a massive strike from a formidable enemy.

The top cone is definitely MiRV capable: http://alert5.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/3433730.jpg

They definitely have the capability to take care of an MiRV'ed ICBM now.
Um no, its not. Its not wide enough, besides just look at the fuel lines going in. This target missile (Orbital ATK's OBV) seems to have a unitary warhead, accompanied with decoys.

Of course, MIRVs only increase the number of required interceptions, they don't complicate the job that much. My point was that they haven't conducted this sort of test, and they probably don't need to. You can always selectively hit some of the decoys to prove that, just like they did in the test you mentioned.

That is not news; American nuclear warheads have same capability.

In-fact, you might want to learn about "superfuse capability" of American SLBMs in service:

https://thebulletin.org/how-us-nucl...tability-burst-height-compensating-super10578
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-americas-new-nuke-upgrades-would-be-an-endgame-for-1793260891
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/03/super-fuze/

The "superfuse capability" has transformed the entire American SLBM fleet into a force that is suitable for decapitating strikes. In contrast, Russian and Chinese nuclear forces are optimized for taking out cities and some military bases only. It is really funny when some American sources declare American nuclear capability as "aging." :lol: ;)
I'm afraid you've misunderstood the job of the superfuse. Its just an improved radar fuse for the RV, so that instead of detonating at a fixed altitude (or on impact), the altitude required for detonation is varied so that maximum damage can be inflicted on the target. See the following images from the article you quoted:
Figure-2-Postol-final-correction-done_1.jpg

Figure-3-Postol-new_1.jpg


It has nothing to do with the maneuvering of the RV. Present US RVs are not capable of maneuvering inside the atmosphere, they spin all the way through in a relatively straight trajectory. The US nuclear arsenal is indeed aging when compared to contemporary Russian & Chinese systems.

Nonetheless, point is that how would a warhead outmaneuver a GMD EKV; this EKV is highly maneuverable by virtue of its design, very fast and equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors to get a lock on the incoming warhead and ram into it. Even if the maneuverability of a warhead is enhanced to an extent, still no guarantee of escaping a GMD EKV.
Sure it is pretty precise, but EKV's own maneuverability doesn't gives it much advantage in this case. Consider a RV and a EKV in space. Both objects are closing in at a relative velocity of several km/s (nearly 10km/s in the worst case). There's no degree of maneuverability or sensor aboard the EKV which can help predict the maneuver the RV will execute during the last microseconds. Being a hard-kill vehicle makes the job even tougher. It can't 'chase' the RV, like a SAM.

I am neither underestimating and nor overestimating anything. I am not saying that ICBMs are obsolete at this stage. Of-course, numbers are a problem. And fear factor is unlikely to diminish. Even a handgun scares people.

As for the tricks, good luck in fooling a multi-layered network of sensors that has global reach and incorporate DSP assets, SBIRS assets, airborne assets, powerful radar systems [mobile and stationary] and naval assets. People here have no idea how massive this surveillance network has become in recent years, and improvements are a given.
Haha what is this obsession with sensors? That's what I often tell the Indians. You can detect the entire bird species over a country for all they care, but the point is, can you do anything about it? Detection/tracking is only a part of the job.

The tricks I'm referring to are evasion tactics. More sophisticated decoys, more maneuverable RVs and most importantly, Hypersonic Glide Vehicles. The US has been building up this network since the 60s, but the only advantage it has given them is more time for retaliatory decision making.

Americans have developed and fielded a massive fleet of high quality ICBMs [as tools of deterrence] themselves, and they are in a good position to assess limitations of this war-fighting strategy and discover ways to exploit it.
So have the Russians, so that doesn't gives the Americans any advantage.

GMD network represents a [new] deterrence capability which has ample potential to upset strategic balance vis-a-vis US in the years to come, and improvements are a given. This network has become sophisticated enough to neutralize a barrage of ICBMs [of certain scale] at present. More importantly, this capability is making tremendous difference in the strategic calculus of US; it provides US sufficient room to [defeat] a nuclear power in an all-out war with minimal losses. US will carry out decapitating strikes beforehand and even if some ICBMs slip through and head its way, GMD network will take care of the barrage. American nuclear doctrine is being revisited accordingly. Coincidence? This is the big game behind-the-scenes.

44 GMD interceptors [as of 2018] represents an alarming growth in ICBM-intercept capability in a span of few years. First GMD interceptor became functional in 2003. US is also developing MOKV which will be able to take out several nuclear warheads in a single launch. This capability will make GMD network cost-effective and extremely capable at neutralizing a large barrage of ICBMs in the future.
Again, sure the GMD has introduced a new dimension, and of course the Americans have planned decapitation strike strategies for a long time (even without the GMD)...but there is no 'big' game being played here as far as major powers such as Russia or China are concerned. The bottom-line is, that MAD is inevitable in such a scenario for the forseeable future. Countermeasures will continue to evolve at much cheaper costs.

Just take a look at present Russian capabilites:
The TOPOL-M missile was designed to penetrate an American anti-ballistic missile shield by leveraging high-speed, a relatively small infrared signature during its boost phase, advanced decoys (as many as ten carried on a single missile), maneuvering mid-course capability, and maneuvering independently targeted reentry vehicles, of which it can carry up to six, although they are said to carry just one operationally.
The rocket motors were designed for a short, very powerful boost stage so that American space-based infrared detection satellites (SBIRS, DSP) have less time to detect and track it. Its decoys make it hard for radar to adequately track the correct target, and its countermeasures are said to have been upgraded to fool infrared tracking systems, which are use for mid-course interception. The missile and reentry vehicles' ability to dynamically maneuver outside of their ballistic track makes producing an effective kill solution, or even predicting the TOPOL-M's target, problematic. All these features come together to make a missile that is probably outside of America's missile defense capabilities today, and the sheer number of them that exists makes the idea of defending against anything but a limited barrage totally invalid.
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russias-fast-and-illusive-topol-m-ballistic-missile-is-1618672889

Do you think North Korea fits the bill here? Testing an ICBM is one thing; mass-producing it is really expensive. North Korea cannot afford an arms-race with the US, and need to address issues of re-entry. The RV of Hwasong-15 missile broke apart upon re-entry.

North Korea and Iran are just a propaganda smokescreen.

Of course it does. Take a look here:
So the administration plans to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the two other approaches, both of which are still in the experimental stage. The first involves stepped-up cyberattacks and other sabotage that would interfere with missile launches before they occur — what the Pentagon calls “left of launch.” The second is a new approach to blowing up the missiles in the “boost phase,” when they are slow-moving, highly visible targets.

President Trump has praised the existing missile defense system, insisting last month that it “can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time,” a claim that arms control experts call patently false. In trial runs, conducted under ideal conditions, the interceptors in Alaska and California have failed half of the time. And the Pentagon has warned administration officials that the North will soon have enough long-range missiles to launch volleys of them, including decoys, making the problem far more complex.

That helps explain the rush for new protections.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/north-korea-missile-defense-cyber-drones.html
If the US was so confident about the GMD's capability, why bother with developing North-Korea specific solutions? The problem is that rocket man doesn't seems to give a $hit about MAD, unlike the Russians or the Chinese. The Americans need to make sure that they find another way to deter North Korea. This unpredictability is worrying for the entire world.

All major US-based analysts rightly refuted Trump when he claimed a 97% success-rate of the GMD.
Eighteen Hwasong-14s would leave GMD in the realm of a coin-toss (an overall effectiveness of 50 percent). That means there’s a 50/50 chance that a North Korean thermonuclear payload would reach a U.S. city and kill millions. And this all assumes that North Korea does not employ penetration aids like decoy re-entry vehicles to effectively confuse they system into committing a large chunk of GBIs against dummies. This would leave fewer interceptors for an actual warhead, increasing the chance of a nuclear weapon penetrating the system.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/d...gainst-north-korea-and-that-should-scare-you/

I do not believe that ballistic missiles have much room for improvement, specially at the stage of what US, Russia and China have fielded. Conversely, sky is the limit in finding methods to neutralize this kind of threat.

A sword has its uses even today but it is utterly obsolete as a weapon of war at the same time. This would be the fate of ballistic missiles one day, if mankind last long enough.

Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important to discover new methods of ensuring strategic balance. Only China has the resources for these experiments.
Well that's your opinion, and you have the right to be entitled to it. However I would recommend reading up on the other side of the story, specifically China's upcoming HGV projects and Russia's Yars ICBM. I wish the Russians or Chinese would also release some information about the work they're doing with their extremely identical inflatable decoys.
 
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Which one? The one rejected by Turkey?

The one India begged Russia not to sell to China but Russia gave India middle finger because India can cozy with US why Russia need to do any favor to India? In contrary Russia indirectly want to punish India via China.
 
Shaheen-3 warhead has a surface area of 2.88 meter square.
That's the maximum radar cross section you get .
How such a small target will be detected and tracked?
 
There should be an IQ test done before anyone is allowed to become an "expert" and write articles for "www.defensenews.in" or any other defense news media outlet.

S400 is indeed an impressive system...but the author's claim that it would make NASR obsolete is just plain retarded.

According to the article India is acquiring 5 S400 systems...that's right just 5 for the entire landmass of India(which is quite large). This means that India wouldn't have them deployed in every corner of the country reaching all the way to its borders with China/Pak. These systems will most likely be deployed to protect certain high value areas, which are far more likely to be more inland than near the border regions.

Secondly NASR is a counter to India's Cold Start Doctrine. This means that if India makes quick thrusts(before Pak can mobilize) into Pak with its integrated battle groups, NASR would be used to kill off entire advancing columns. The purpose of NASR is to stop the enemy from gaining their Cold Start objectives(which is to quickly get a hold of Pak territory before Pak can use any nuclear options). This means that NASR would most likely be used in the border regions/near border regions. So unless India is planning to mobilize S400 with their IBG(integrated battle groups), S400 and NASR have practically zero chance of coming into each other's range.

If the author thought that all 5 S400 would be deployed near the Pakistan border to destroy any incoming missiles from Pakistan's side in order to justify the NASR being neutralized argument...then again the author is an idiot. Mainly bcuz no country does that...all countries try to protect high value targets with SAM systems first. But for a moment let's entertain this idiotic scenario as well and let's assume that for some reason India deployed all 5 or some of S400 near the Pakistan border to destroy incoming NASR missiles during Cold Start advancement of Indian forces. In that case India would lose those S400 systems. Being that close to Pak's border would put them within reach for a Wild Weasel type of aircraft to take them out...or by launching a few Babur's...or through stand off weapons...or by sheer oversaturation by launching a lot of low cost(in comparison to S400) low range missiles at it.

The most likely scenario is S400 will be deployed considerably far inland around high value targets. This ensures the survivability of the S400, which is crucial if u need it to protect those high value potential targets from ur enemy. This would make it much harder for Pak to take it out. On the flip side it would also mean that S400 wouldn't be engaging NASR at all. What the author should've discussed is how it(S400) might pose a challenge for Pakistan's other missiles like Ghauri/Shaheen/Babur. These are the Pakistani missiles that the S400 can end up shooting down in a potential conflict. Then there are all the potential counters from the Pakistan's side that can still defeat/nullify S400...like Babur's stealth/terrain hugging flight and Shaheen's MIRV(Ababeel). But asking for a fair analysis is asking too much. So far anything regarding this topic written by Indians that I've come across is purely driven by idiotic nationalism where like a bollywood hero Indian BMD/SAM system always defeats the villains(Pakistani missiles) and Indians live happily ever after.

@The Deterrent @LeGenD @Kiss_of_the_Dragon
This is a pointless thread started by posting a baseless article. In my opinion it should be closed. By posting here we r only entertaining this BS.
 
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The one India begged Russia not to sell to China but Russia gave India middle finger because India can cozy with US why Russia need to do any favor to India? In contrary Russia indirectly want to punish India via China.

We know your capability. You say that your system is better than that of Russia and then beg s400, SU 30, Su 35, Submarine etc. Yours is a chinese mall and you the quality very well.
 
Even if S400 is effective, Pakistan will use 300-500 fake missiles first in order to finish off the inventory of S-400 missiles in the first few days..
 
I'm not refuting that the radars cannot differentiate between the debris, decoys and warhead. They absolutely can, provided the decoys are basic ones. Sure, this was the first time they actually demonstrated it against an ICBM-class target, but still the entire system is nowhere near capable of handling a massive strike from a formidable enemy.
Bro, how can you assert with certainty that the sensors [in question] can distinguish [only] basic decoys from the actual warhead? Please keep in mind that a great deal of secrecy is involved in these matters [understandably] and technicalities are not completely understood in public domain. Not wise to jump to conclusions therefore.

A single THAAD system spooked China when it was deployed in South Korea in 2017. China has openly expressed that the radar system of THAAD is counterproductive to Chinese interests and should be removed. China has even exerted pressure on South Korea to refuse deployment of THAAD system in its territory or face economic sanctions.

"The U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other countries in the region." - Chinese Premier Xi Jinping

If THAAD system is advanced, GMD network is a nightmare (for an adversary). ;)

Similarly, deployment of relevant sensors in Poland and Romania has infuriated Russia, to the point that Russia commenced its S-500 missile defense project and continues to harass Baltic states with aggressive posturing from time-to-time. Russia has conveyed to US in clear terms that these sensors be removed from Poland and Romania to normalize relations.

Reactions of China and Russia strongly imply that the sensors [in question] represent a credible threat to their deterrence strategies because they have expanded the footprint of GMD network at the surface. US has repeatedly insisted that North Korea and Iran have necessitated these deployments. However, China and Russia are not stupid - they understand what US is up to.

Another factor is external source of facilitation in "midcourse discrimination" process. GMD EKV is equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors for this objective, but it is also capable of receiving and processing information from external assets to augment its chances of colliding with the right target. This boils down to its computing power which will be undoubtedly incredible.

"Multiple sensor systems, including space-based infrared satellites and likely an Aegis SPY-1 radar, detected the missile and tracked its location. The Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX) also surveilled the missile, providing high resolution imagery which allowed the GMD system to discriminate the missile’s warhead from its accompanying debris.

Using this data, a GBI was launched from Vandenberg AFB. Once in space, the GBI released its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which identified the warhead with its onboard electro-optical and infrared sensors, diverted into the warhead’s path, and collided with it."
- CSIS

SBX-1 is the most powerful AESA radar system in existence and its primary tracker is known to operate in the X-band frequency range. According to its operators, its results enable stunningly rich assessment of any matter of interest, and it can facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." In-fact, SBIRS network in space can also facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." Therefore, probability of defeating countermeasures increases accordingly. Primary advantage of network-centric approach is to address limitations of an asset with strengths of another.

"However, the system is able, today, to operate without the X-band radar. We use it in the test construct to gather the data that we need to gather, and to aid in the discrimination effort. But I don't want you to walk away to think that it was not a realistic test scenario." - James Syring

Source: https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...ess-briefing-by-vice-admiral-james-syring-on/

To give you an idea how effective those external facilitation techniques can be, SBX-1 platform enabled an Arleigh Burke class destroyer to eliminate a defunct spy satellite orbiting Earth at the speed of 17000 mph and at an altitude of 180 miles with an interceptor that was not optimized for ASAT missions, and precision was such that the interceptor struck its target at a spot where it was actually intended to. This was a clear-cut demonstration of precision that was greater than the typical "hitting a bullet with bullet" scenario. This mission took place in 2008.

---

Prior to the live intercept of an ICBM-class target in 2017, many were quick to point out that GMD network is not up to the task. Many were skeptical about the possibility of a GMD EKV to take out an ICBM-class target, let alone perform "midcourse discrimination." In sharp contrast to perceptions of some, GMD network was up the task by 2014 but public was not informed. Some were actually lobbying for termination of GMD program at the time, declaring it a waste of resources. However, North Korea motivated Trump administration to order MDA to conduct a live test to pacify growing concerns, and the network delivered.

Story does not end here. SOP of MDA is to deploy a minimum of two GMD EKVs to intercept a single warhead, therefore probability of escape is non-existent.

Now, of-course, it is not possible to satiate concerns of everybody. Criticism is a status-quo.

I did not assert that GMD network is capable of thwarting a [massive] strike from a formidably enemy at this stage but it will get there at some point. You need to look at GMD network from the standpoint of strategic calculus of the US, not in isolation.

GMD network, in its current stage, make it possible for the US to defeat a [near-peer] nuclear power, provided that the US take such initiative. Plan is to severely degrade war-fighting capability of the opponent with an overwhelming barrage of decapitating strikes [involving both conventional and nuclear weapons]. Under these circumstances, if the opponent is somehow able to launch a limited barrage of ICBMs towards US mainland, GMD network will come into play and neutralize this barrage. Therefore, US will win the war with [acceptable] costs. Very crude and barbaric, if you ask me, but this is how it is.

Conversely, GMD network grants sufficient leverage to US to threaten and destroy a [regional] nuclear power with minimum losses. China is also vulnerable because its strike options are really limited at present; efforts are underway to address this shortcoming though. However, arms-race is continuous.

Um no, its not. Its not wide enough, besides just look at the fuel lines going in. This target missile (Orbital ATK's OBV) seems to have a unitary warhead, accompanied with decoys.
Miniaturization is the name of the game, my friend. Looks can be deceiving.

mm3-DFST9803326_JPG.jpg


gmddummy.jpg


Similar dimensions and size.

Top cone of the bottom ICBM is large enough to house a minimum of 3 warheads, IMO.

I am not asserting that the ICBM in question was actually armed with 3 warheads but I get the impression that it was armed with a real warhead and a dummy warhead for a realistic simulation of "midcourse discrimination." Not sure how many decoys it actually carried. MDA has withheld this kind of information from the public. But confidence of MDA chief is very telling.

"I was confident before the test that we have the capability to defeat any threat that they would throw at us. And I'm more confident today -- even more confident today after seeing the intercept test yesterday that we continue to be on that course." - James Syring

Of course, MIRVs only increase the number of required interceptions, they don't complicate the job that much. My point was that they haven't conducted this sort of test, and they probably don't need to. You can always selectively hit some of the decoys to prove that, just like they did in the test you mentioned.
Indeed! Glad you understood. :tup:

I'm afraid you've misunderstood the job of the superfuse. Its just an improved radar fuse for the RV, so that instead of detonating at a fixed altitude (or on impact), the altitude required for detonation is varied so that maximum damage can be inflicted on the target. See the following images from the article you quoted:
Figure-2-Postol-final-correction-done_1.jpg

Figure-3-Postol-new_1.jpg


It has nothing to do with the maneuvering of the RV. Present US RVs are not capable of maneuvering inside the atmosphere, they spin all the way through in a relatively straight trajectory. The US nuclear arsenal is indeed aging when compared to contemporary Russian & Chinese systems.
Bro,

You misunderstood my point here. I shared that information with you to make you aware of the fact that US has optimized its SLBM fleet for carrying out "decapitating strikes." This advancement is in line with the plan of severely degrading the war-fighting capability of a [near-peer] nuclear power with an overwhelming number of decapitating strikes [first strike initiative].

Sure it is pretty precise, but EKV's own maneuverability doesn't gives it much advantage in this case. Consider a RV and a EKV in space. Both objects are closing in at a relative velocity of several km/s (nearly 10km/s in the worst case). There's no degree of maneuverability or sensor aboard the EKV which can help predict the maneuver the RV will execute during the last microseconds. Being a hard-kill vehicle makes the job even tougher. It can't 'chase' the RV, like a SAM.
I am not sure how you reached that conclusion.

Is an MaRV equipped with relevant sensors to detect an incoming EKV? I don't think so. So how would it outmaneuver an EKV at the last instant? Also, we are talking about an EKV which is actually equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors to get a lock on the warhead from considerable distance and would be actively homing in for the kill. And watch this animation to understand how an EKV maneuvers:


"The EKV continuously adjusts its flight path until it collides with the target." - CSIS

An MaRV is known to perform preplanned flight maneuvers during the re-entry phase of its flight in order to reach its target with a higher degree of precision. The only known practical method of safeguarding an MaRV from an attempt to intercept it during the midcourse phase of its flight is through use of decoys (i.e. threat cloud formation). However, this strategy is unlikely to work against GMD Network.

Haha what is this obsession with sensors? That's what I often tell the Indians. You can detect the entire bird species over a country for all they care, but the point is, can you do anything about it? Detection/tracking is only a part of the job.

The tricks I'm referring to are evasion tactics. More sophisticated decoys, more maneuverable RVs and most importantly, Hypersonic Glide Vehicles. The US has been building up this network since the 60s, but the only advantage it has given them is more time for retaliatory decision making.
Bro,

Sensors are the name of the game. You need to delve into this matter, to understand why.

FYI: https://www.quora.com/Why-do-anti-ballistic-missiles-use-IR-sensors-and-not-radars

AND;

nuclear-weapons-m-how-missile-defense-works.jpg


So have the Russians, so that doesn't gives the Americans any advantage.
Bro,

Of-course, Russian nuclear force represents a potent threat to the US due to its sheer size and capability. However, you are overlooking a number of other factors that may come into play in a conflict, should it ever break out. US has employed vast surveillance capabilities to study and mark Russian strategic assets [and initiatives] over the course of years because there is no substitute for "meaningful intelligence" and not much window for aggressive posturing. Should an all-out war ever break out [God forbid], US will not take its chances and unleash a massive barrage of decapitating strikes on Russian inventories with the intent to severely degrade Russian war-fighting capability. In this manner, Russian retaliatory options will be reduced to a manageable threat. Now, assuming that a few Russian strategic assets escaped the initial barrage and retaliate, GMD network will take care of it.

Please keep in mind that Russian war-fighting capability has significantly eroded since the days of Cold War and shortcomings are glaring. Russian state-of-the-art assets are short in numbers. Understandable because Russian defense budget is really low in comparison to that of the US and even China. To give you an idea, study this comparison: https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russia-s-involvement-in-syria-proves-that-its-far-behin-1794966734

This is why Russia doesn't have much to demonstrate in regards to its missile defense related programs because resources are limited. Russia has fielded some nuclear-tipped interceptors to counter a barrage of ICBMs from the US but American experts insist that ICBMs are designed to move at extreme speeds; therefore, probability of intercept is not good enough with an explosive warhead [even if it is nuclear]. American warheads are also hardened enough to withstand kinetic forces generated by a nuclear blast [to a certain extent]. Therefore, hit-to-kill mechanism is relatively much superior approach to intercept and also a safe bet. Unfortunately for Russia, US has the resources to experiment with hit-to-kill platforms and hone them.

Conversely, China falls in the category of "manageable threat" at present. Chinese nuclear force is vast on paper but a chunk of its force is suitable for regional engagements. Relatively few assets threaten US mainland. China is attempting to address its shortcomings in this regard but arms-race is a given.

I shall also point out that US has commenced full-spectrum ASW program since 2014. They cannot take the threat of SLBMs lightly anymore. FYI: https://news.usni.org/2014/08/27/opinion-new-era-anti-submarine-warfare

US currently operate largest fleet of so-called FAS [optimized for both offensive and surveillance missions] and is also employing a number of other techniques to hunt SLBMs across the seas. These include:

1. SURTASS*
2. SBIRS
3. P-8 Poseidon aircraft
4. Drones [WIP]
5. UUV [WIP]
6. Nanotechnologies [WIP]

*Superb method of tracking extremely quiet submarines across the breath of seas. However, activation in high-alert situations mostly because its emissions are harmful to marine mammals.

Again, sure the GMD has introduced a new dimension, and of course the Americans have planned decapitation strike strategies for a long time (even without the GMD)...but there is no 'big' game being played here as far as major powers such as Russia or China are concerned. The bottom-line is, that MAD is inevitable in such a scenario for the forseeable future. Countermeasures will continue to evolve at much cheaper costs.
Yes, but nobody was aware of superfuse related modifications in SLBMs to make them suitable for decapitating strikes until recently. Leak was intentional to send a message to relevant sources.

GMD network is expanding and improvements are non-stop. To give you an idea, MDA has received ample funds to replace GMD EKVs with more capable and cost-effective GMD RKVs, develop GMD MOKVs and expand the number of interceptors to 100 in the 2020s.

GMD network is also meaningful in the context that it may reduce prospects of a preemptive nuclear strike on US mainland from an adversary.

And why Russia and China are investing in missile defense platforms? Doesn't make sense if technologies are not up to the mark and/or threat of MAD will not diminish eventually.

That ICBM is certainly a decent feat of engineering but that article is also a propaganda piece to scare the gullible and maintain status-quo. FEAR FACTOR is crucial to ensure flow of funds. ;)

Look at this video:


Sufficient thermal signature to get a lock from SBIRS, and this happens in an instant.

"This dual sensor design gives SBIRS the ability to scan a wide area of the earth’s surface and stare at, or quickly flip between others areas in great detail, at the same time. This way, one sensor can view the globe persistently for launch detection, while the other can be tasked to more closely watch certain regions or even possibly to track missiles not just during launch, but after their rocket motors burn out and they are coasting in space or the extremes of the upper atmosphere. In doing so, the system can help differentiate the reentry vehicles/warheads from decoys or debris."

+

"Because SBIRS high-fidelity sensors, which are said to be at least three times as sensitive as older systems, it is rumored that these satellites can detect and possibly track many other things than just ballistic missile launches. These speculations include surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, artillery fire, and even aircraft in flight."

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/these-are-the-doomsday-satellites-that-detected-the-exp-1737434876
http://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/sbirs/
http://www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/unlocking-the-sbirs-data-revolution/

"SBIRS persistent surveillance capabilities enable detection and reporting of missile launches around the globe, support the nation's ballistic missile defense system, expand technical intelligence, and gather and bolster situational awareness for warfighters on the battlefield."

http://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Articl...2-launches-improves-space-based-capabilities/

No ballistic or cruise missile can evade SBIRS, my friend. Both DSP and SBIRS networks in-conjunction, provide a crucial capability to the US to track and monitor ballistic missile launches from any country so the US can respond to a threat in time, if necessary.

Of course it does. Take a look here:

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/north-korea-missile-defense-cyber-drones.html
If the US was so confident about the GMD's capability, why bother with developing North-Korea specific solutions? The problem is that rocket man doesn't seems to give a $hit about MAD, unlike the Russians or the Chinese. The Americans need to make sure that they find another way to deter North Korea. This unpredictability is worrying for the entire world.

All major US-based analysts rightly refuted Trump when he claimed a 97% success-rate of the GMD.

https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/d...gainst-north-korea-and-that-should-scare-you/
It is important to distinguish PSYOPS and propaganda from ground realities at individual capacity in the age of information (and disinformation).

Trump administration's assessment is in regards to [present-day] operational capacity of the GMD network and it is accurate - why would an American administration lie about matters of national security? Critics are missing the point by touting statistics of entire history of relevant tests. GMD network achieved operational maturity in 2014; earlier statistics are of little consequence today.

Boeing left a hint for observers in 2014: http://www.boeing.com/features/2014/08/bds-gmd-test-08-19-14.page

Now, do you think that North Korea has the resources to develop and field a potent [first] strike capability of that scale and capability? From where North Korea would acquire such resources while being subjected to heavy sanctions? At most, North Korea will be able to field a small inventory of ICBMs with an RV suitable for exploding a nuke above a city. GMD network, in its existing capacity, can tackle this kind of threat on its own [easily].

Well that's your opinion, and you have the right to be entitled to it. However I would recommend reading up on the other side of the story, specifically China's upcoming HGV projects and Russia's Yars ICBM. I wish the Russians or Chinese would also release some information about the work they're doing with their extremely identical inflatable decoys.
Whatever countermeasures US and Russia are able to cook up, US is capable of replicating and experiment with.

I am not asserting that GMD network is the end-game for an arms-race; no system is. However, it is the end-game of COLD-WAR era nuclear MAD scenarios.

I believe that nuclear MAD with Russia will end in the 2030s give or take, depending upon the priorities of the US.

Therefore, solution is to explore new methods of warfare. Few nations have this luxury unfortunately.

Shaheen-3 warhead has a surface area of 2.88 meter square.
That's the maximum radar cross section you get .
How such a small target will be detected and tracked?
GMD network is capable of distinguishing and tracking movements of much smaller objects (less than 10 cm in width and/or length) in real-time.
 
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Bro, how can you assert with certainty that the sensors [in question] can distinguish [only] basic decoys from the actual warhead? Please keep in mind that a great deal of secrecy is involved in these matters [understandably] and technicalities are not completely understood in public domain. Not wise to jump to conclusions therefore.
Because I'm a bit familiar with what the US did back in 1973. Inflatable decoys mimicking the optical, thermal and radar signature of a real RV are relatively easy to develop.
The IEO Mark 2 version was developed for the RVTO-3A program with the objective of obtaining optical and radar signatures of the IEO during midcourse and early reentry, determining if the IEO and Mark 12 surface temperatures match to within 10K, determining the reentry altitudes at which the optical signatures, radar signatures, and ballistic coefficients of the IEO and the Mk-12 clearly diverge, and determining the physical survival altitude of the IEO.

ieo.jpg
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/decoys.htm

Kindly go through this information first:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penetration_aid


A single THAAD system spooked China when it was deployed in South Korea in 2017. China has openly expressed that the radar system of THAAD is counterproductive to Chinese interests and should be removed. China has even exerted pressure on South Korea to refuse deployment of THAAD system in its territory or face economic sanctions.

"The U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other countries in the region." - Chinese Premier Xi Jinping

If THAAD system is advanced, GMD network is a nightmare (for an adversary). ;)

Similarly, deployment of relevant sensors in Poland and Romania has infuriated Russia, to the point that Russia commenced its S-500 missile defense project and continues to harass Baltic states with aggressive posturing from time-to-time. Russia has conveyed to US in clear terms that these sensors be removed from Poland and Romania to normalize relations.

Reactions of China and Russia strongly imply that the sensors [in question] represent a credible threat to their deterrence strategies because they have expanded the footprint of GMD network at the surface. US has repeatedly insisted that North Korea and Iran have necessitated these deployments. However, China and Russia are not stupid - they understand what US is up to.

Again, your assumption here is unrelated to whether the capability is credible or not. THAAD isn't even capable of countering ICBM-class targets, of course the Chinese & Russians wouldn't want to miss ANY of their MRBM targets when the time comes. But to equate this to diminishing MAD is absurd. If you had followed up the US BMD deployments in Eastern Europe, you would have come across what Russia deployed in response, and how easily it can overcome THAAD.

Complaining about these deployments is necessary, even if they don't pose a significant threat, as they allow the adversary to keep scaling up things without notice otherwise. Its like Pakistan complaining about Indian Agni-V and blaming India for initiating an arms race.

Another factor is external source of facilitation in "midcourse discrimination" process. GMD EKV is equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors for this objective, but it is also capable of receiving and processing information from external assets to augment its chances of colliding with the right target. This boils down to its computing power which will be undoubtedly incredible.

"Multiple sensor systems, including space-based infrared satellites and likely an Aegis SPY-1 radar, detected the missile and tracked its location. The Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX) also surveilled the missile, providing high resolution imagery which allowed the GMD system to discriminate the missile’s warhead from its accompanying debris.

Using this data, a GBI was launched from Vandenberg AFB. Once in space, the GBI released its Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which identified the warhead with its onboard electro-optical and infrared sensors, diverted into the warhead’s path, and collided with it."
- CSIS

SBX-1 is the most powerful AESA radar system in existence and its primary tracker is known to operate in the X-band frequency range. According to its operators, its results enable stunningly rich assessment of any matter of interest, and it can facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." In-fact, SBIRS network in space can also facilitate a GMD EKV in "midcourse discrimination." Therefore, probability of defeating countermeasures increases accordingly. Primary advantage of network-centric approach is to address limitations of an asset with strengths of another.

"However, the system is able, today, to operate without the X-band radar. We use it in the test construct to gather the data that we need to gather, and to aid in the discrimination effort. But I don't want you to walk away to think that it was not a realistic test scenario." - James Syring

Source: https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...ess-briefing-by-vice-admiral-james-syring-on/

To give you an idea how effective those external facilitation techniques can be, SBX-1 platform enabled an Arleigh Burke class destroyer to eliminate a defunct spy satellite orbiting Earth at the speed of 17000 mph and at an altitude of 180 miles with an interceptor that was not optimized for ASAT missions, and precision was such that the interceptor struck its target at a spot where it was actually intended to. This was a clear-cut demonstration of precision that was greater than the typical "hitting a bullet with bullet" scenario. This mission took place in 2008.
Oh God, not the radar stuff again. Instead of singing endless praises of the SBX-1 (which is an incredible system nevertheless), please read up on penetration aids. As I've mentioned before, the radar/satellite/sensor network may be able to detect and track a thousand threats at a time...but the problem is discrimination of the right threats and the successful interception of those threats.

Prior to the live intercept of an ICBM-class target in 2017, many were quick to point out that GMD network is not up to the task. Many were skeptical about the possibility of a GMD EKV to take out an ICBM-class target, let alone perform "midcourse discrimination." In sharp contrast to perceptions of some, GMD network was up the task by 2014 but public was not informed. Some were actually lobbying for termination of GMD program at the time, declaring it a waste of resources. However, North Korea motivated Trump administration to order MDA to conduct a live test to pacify growing concerns, and the network delivered.

Story does not end here. SOP of MDA is to deploy a minimum of two GMD EKVs to intercept a single warhead, therefore probability of escape is non-existent.

Now, of-course, it is not possible to satiate concerns of everybody. Criticism is a status-quo.

I did not assert that GMD network is capable of thwarting a [massive] strike from a formidably enemy at this stage but it will get there at some point. You need to look at GMD network from the standpoint of strategic calculus of the US, not in isolation.

GMD network, in its current stage, make it possible for the US to defeat a [near-peer] nuclear power, provided that the US take such initiative. Plan is to severely degrade war-fighting capability of the opponent with an overwhelming barrage of decapitating strikes [involving both conventional and nuclear weapons]. Under these circumstances, if the opponent is somehow able to launch a limited barrage of ICBMs towards US mainland, GMD network will come into play and neutralize this barrage. Therefore, US will win the war with [acceptable] costs. Very crude and barbaric, if you ask me, but this is how it is.

Conversely, GMD network grants sufficient leverage to US to threaten and destroy a [regional] nuclear power with minimum losses. China is also vulnerable because its strike options are really limited at present; efforts are underway to address this shortcoming though. However, arms-race is continuous.

May I add here that just TWO units of R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6), each with 10x MIRVs, without ANY penetration aids...are enough to exhaust the entire supply of 44 GBIs in the BEST case scenario?

I honestly have no idea why you're trying to support your arguments without any real-world parameters. Probability of escape of a real-world midcourse phase MaRV with only 2 GBIs is "non-existent"? I've got nothing more to say.

Miniaturization is the name of the game, my friend. Looks can be deceiving.

mm3-DFST9803326_JPG.jpg


gmddummy.jpg


Similar dimensions and size.

Top cone of the bottom ICBM is large enough to house a minimum of 3 warheads, IMO.

I am not asserting that the ICBM in question was actually armed with 3 warheads but I get the impression that it was armed with a real warhead and a dummy warhead for a realistic simulation of "midcourse discrimination." Not sure how many decoys it actually carried. MDA has withheld this kind of information from the public. But confidence of MDA chief is very telling.

"I was confident before the test that we have the capability to defeat any threat that they would throw at us. And I'm more confident today -- even more confident today after seeing the intercept test yesterday that we continue to be on that course." - James Syring
Again, unnecessarily trying to support your argument with your own personal assumptions. "Looks can be deceiving"? Seriously?
The test target is based on Minuteman's booster itself, but not entirely. Only the first stage is of the same diameter. The second stage upwards is way narrower, nearly half the diameter. So its not capable of housing any MIRVs (or multiple non-inflatable warheads). The dummy warhead was an inflatable spherical decoy.

Please try to argue for things that matter, and not for the sake of a mere argument and trying to prove yourself right.

Bro,

You misunderstood my point here. I shared that information with you to make you aware of the fact that US has optimized its SLBM fleet for carrying out "decapitating strikes." This advancement is in line with the plan of severely degrading the war-fighting capability of a [near-peer] nuclear power with an overwhelming number of decapitating strikes [first strike initiative].
Um you said "That is not news; American nuclear warheads have same capability.", in response to the mention of MaRVs, which is simply not true.
I became 'aware' of this fact when the first article came out about it. However I'm not aware of its relevance here in the US BMD & MaRV discussion.

I am not sure how you reached that conclusion.

Is an MaRV equipped with relevant sensors to detect an incoming EKV? I don't think so. So how would it outmaneuver an EKV at the last instant? Also, we are talking about an EKV which is actually equipped with advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors to get a lock on the warhead from considerable distance and would be actively homing in for the kill. And watch this animation to understand how an EKV maneuvers:


"The EKV continuously adjusts its flight path until it collides with the target." - CSIS

An MaRV is known to perform preplanned flight maneuvers during the re-entry phase of its flight in order to reach its target with a higher degree of precision. The only known practical method of safeguarding an MaRV from an attempt to intercept it during the midcourse phase of its flight is through use of decoys (i.e. threat cloud formation). However, this strategy is unlikely to work against GMD Network.
Of course the RV can't detect an incoming ABM/EKV. The point is, a RV with a small PBV (usually having a similar set of thrusters as in the video) can execute a pre-planned set of maneuvers (unknown to the adversary) throughout the midcourse phase. Such a sequence of maneuvers is extremely difficult to be predicted and handled with.

The scenario is analogous to a SAM interception. The only thing a pilot needs to evade is agility similar to a SAM, which can execute maneuvers of much higher Gs. However in the RV vs EKV case, both have similar maneuvering capability. When your enthusiasm cools down, read up again on the RS-12's & RS-24's MIRVs and their unconventional capabilities.

Bro,

Sensors are the name of the game. You need to delve into this matter, to understand why.

FYI: https://www.quora.com/Why-do-anti-ballistic-missiles-use-IR-sensors-and-not-radars

AND;

nuclear-weapons-m-how-missile-defense-works.jpg
:disagree:
No, they are a PART of the game. The threat cloud SBX can discriminate successfully is that of a potential North Korean launch. Its nowhere near the chaff + identical decoys armed cloud of the Russian or Chinese systems. Then there is the simple maneuvering.

In the real world, sun doesn't illuminates the RVs for EKVs to identify easily.
In the real world, Russia bombs the crap out of the radar network.
In the real world, pre-emptive high altitude detonations of 10 MT weapons disrupt communications by EMP.

Bro,

Of-course, Russian nuclear force represents a potent threat to the US due to its sheer size and capability. However, you are overlooking a number of other factors that may come into play in a conflict, should it ever break out. US has employed vast surveillance capabilities to study and mark Russian strategic assets [and initiatives] over the course of years because there is no substitute for "meaningful intelligence" and not much window for aggressive posturing. Should an all-out war ever break out [God forbid], US will not take its chances and unleash a massive barrage of decapitating strikes on Russian inventories with the intent to severely degrade Russian war-fighting capability. In this manner, Russian retaliatory options will be reduced to a manageable threat. Now, assuming that a few Russian strategic assets escaped the initial barrage and retaliate, GMD network will take care of it.

Please keep in mind that Russian war-fighting capability has significantly eroded since the days of Cold War and shortcomings are glaring. Russian state-of-the-art assets are short in numbers. Understandable because Russian defense budget is really low in comparison to that of the US and even China. To give you an idea, study this comparison: https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russia-s-involvement-in-syria-proves-that-its-far-behin-1794966734

This is why Russia doesn't have much to demonstrate in regards to its missile defense related programs because resources are limited. Russia has fielded some nuclear-tipped interceptors to counter a barrage of ICBMs from the US but American experts insist that ICBMs are designed to move at extreme speeds; therefore, probability of intercept is not good enough with an explosive warhead [even if it is nuclear]. American warheads are also hardened enough to withstand kinetic forces generated by a nuclear blast [to a certain extent]. Therefore, hit-to-kill mechanism is relatively much superior approach to intercept and also a safe bet. Unfortunately for Russia, US has the resources to experiment with hit-to-kill platforms and hone them.

Conversely, China falls in the category of "manageable threat" at present. Chinese nuclear force is vast on paper but a chunk of its force is suitable for regional engagements. Relatively few assets threaten US mainland. China is attempting to address its shortcomings in this regard but arms-race is a given.

I shall also point out that US has commenced full-spectrum ASW program since 2014. They cannot take the threat of SLBMs lightly anymore. FYI: https://news.usni.org/2014/08/27/opinion-new-era-anti-submarine-warfare

US currently operate largest fleet of so-called FAS [optimized for both offensive and surveillance missions] and is also employing a number of other techniques to hunt SLBMs across the seas. These include:

1. SURTASS*
2. SBIRS
3. P-8 Poseidon aircraft
4. Drones [WIP]
5. UUV [WIP]
6. Nanotechnologies [WIP]

*Superb method of tracking extremely quiet submarines across the breath of seas. However, activation in high-alert situations mostly because its emissions are harmful to marine mammals.
Again, too many assumptions and idher udher ki batain.

As I said earlier, US had planned decapitation strikes since the 60s, when there was no MD. Read up on the SIOPs issued till 2003, or OPLANs issued thereafter. The problem is, that even with GMD, the probability of success of a "Skyfall" is minimal. But obviously its the best call for when the time comes, as it will be the least deadly (funny in relative terms) option.

Nobody cares about the Russian conventional strength. All they have to do is pop open the hatches of their silo-ed Satans, mobile Topols and hidden Bulavas. Run the numbers, its a fun exercise.

Lastly, again you always try to talk about what the US is doing in terms of detection (of SSBNs here), but nothing about what evasion tactics the adversaries are coming up with.

Yes, but nobody was aware of superfuse related modifications in SLBMs to make them suitable for decapitating strikes until recently. Leak was intentional to send a message to relevant sources.

GMD network is expanding and improvements are non-stop. To give you an idea, MDA has received ample funds to replace GMD EKVs with more capable and cost-effective GMD RKVs, develop GMD MOKVs and expand the number of interceptors to 100 in the 2020s.

GMD network is also meaningful in the context that it may reduce prospects of a preemptive nuclear strike on US mainland from an adversary.

And why Russia and China are investing in missile defense platforms? Doesn't make sense if technologies are not up to the mark and/or threat of MAD will not diminish eventually.
Superfuse does increases chance of a successful decapitation strike, but not by a huge amount. Also it is very convenient to admire it as some amazing breakthrough (whereas its a jugaad) which the Russians or the Chinese can't implement with their own vehicles. :rolleyes:

Even a 1000 single-EKV GBIs are not enough to stop all the 40 R-36M2 systems. What about the Topols and the Bulavas? Run the numbers in a best case scenario for your own satisfaction. And last I heard, the MOKVs which already had a projected completion time of 2030 for beginning production.

Investment in small scale BMD is necessary because of three factors:
1. Rogue nations not deter-able by MAD
2. Rogue launches by a small faction of the adversary
3. Increasing survivability of the Command Centers to make sure a retaliatory strike is initiated successfully.

That ICBM is certainly a decent feat of engineering but that article is also a propaganda piece to scare the gullible and maintain status-quo. FEAR FACTOR is crucial to ensure flow of funds. ;)

Look at this video:


Sufficient thermal signature to get a lock from SBIRS, and this happens in an instant.

"This dual sensor design gives SBIRS the ability to scan a wide area of the earth’s surface and stare at, or quickly flip between others areas in great detail, at the same time. This way, one sensor can view the globe persistently for launch detection, while the other can be tasked to more closely watch certain regions or even possibly to track missiles not just during launch, but after their rocket motors burn out and they are coasting in space or the extremes of the upper atmosphere. In doing so, the system can help differentiate the reentry vehicles/warheads from decoys or debris."

+

"Because SBIRS high-fidelity sensors, which are said to be at least three times as sensitive as older systems, it is rumored that these satellites can detect and possibly track many other things than just ballistic missile launches. These speculations include surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, artillery fire, and even aircraft in flight."

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/these-are-the-doomsday-satellites-that-detected-the-exp-1737434876
http://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/sbirs/

No ballistic or cruise missile can evade SBIRS, my friend. Both DSP and SBIRS networks in-conjunction, provide a crucial capability to the US to track and monitor ballistic missile launches from any country so the US can respond to a threat in time, if necessary.
Again you conveniently ignored all the other stuff an operational Topol-M does, and focused on the detection part. Did you know that the primary purpose of the SBIRS network was to give more decision time to the President for retaliation options, rather than missile defense?
SBIRS can surely detect and track anything with a flame, but once again, the problem is successful discrimination and interception.

You should learn to differentiate between PSYOPS, propaganda and ground realities.

Trump administration's assessment is in regards to [present-day] operational capability of the GMD network and it is accurate - why would an administration lie about matters of national security? Critics are really stupid in pointing out statistics of the entire history of relevant tests. GMD network achieved operational maturity in 2014; earlier statistics do not matter anymore.

Now, do you think that North Korea has the resources to develop and field a potent [first] strike capability of that scale and capability? From where North Korea would acquire such resources while being subjected to heavy sanctions? At most, North Korea will be able to field a small inventory of ICBMs with an RV suitable for exploding a nuke above a city. GMD network, in its existing capacity, can tackle this kind of threat on its own [easily].
Right, because you of course have insider knowledge of US BMD programs. :rolleyes:
Have you not read Trump's tweets? He's been begging Kim for a reason to go to war. Of course the MDA officials will cite the best possible theoretical success ratio against a North Korean strike. But is it the same as against the Russians or the Chinese?

The North Koreans can easily amass a strike force of 20+ ICBMs (HS-14s & HS-15s) in the immediate future, which is nearly enough to exhaust all the present GBIs (if all launch successfully and all are intercepted with a 97% probability). I agree however that the analysts were too harsh on the intercept probability estimates, but even Trump's best case scenario doesn't fits the bill for the foreseeable future against Russians/Chinese.

Whatever countermeasures US and Russia are able to cook up, US is capable of replicating and experiment with.

I am not asserting that GMD network is the end-game for an arms-race; no system is. However, it is the end-game of COLD-WAR era nuclear MAD scenarios.

I believe that nuclear MAD with Russia will end in the 2030s.
I was hoping that you would take a moment and read up about the things I mentioned previously, but it seems like you're sold already. The level of your confidence in US's BMD capability seems to be more than the OEM themselves, and your admiration of the sensor/radar/satellite network is beyond my understanding because its only a part of the whole process.

This whitepaper came out yesterday, and it is my sincere hope that you go through it thoroughly and try to understand every bit of it.
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-docume...issile-defense-test-white-paper-1-24-18v4.pdf
If Hans M. Kristensen, David Wright, Jeffery Lewis, Vipin Narang etc. can't make you take a step back and reevaluate your assumptive conclusions, I have nothing more to add any further.
 
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We know your capability. You say that your system is better than that of Russia and then beg s400, SU 30, Su 35, Submarine etc. Yours is a chinese mall and you the quality very well.

Sure you Indians know our quality that why you guys keep imported our product and let us have a trade surplus and we should thank you for that :P but I had never claimed that Chinese system is better than Russia, some few exceptional arrogant Chinese made such claim is not my problem, they entitled to have their opinion :lol: but the majority of us are wise & humble.

Now back to the thread, with S-400 acquisition we just earn a strategical leverage vis-a-vis India, we can checkmate your capital city which the core of Indian decision maker are located unless you tell your leaders not to take the airplane, India can dispatch as much as mountain division you like, Brahmos, Apache....what ever you like at our border but when your capital is within our SAM unit India will become irrelevant as adversary for China.
 

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