About the speaker
Colonel Terrence Fornof (Colonel is equivalent to a Group Captain in the IAF) is an F-15 pilot and the Director of the Requirements and Testing office at the United States Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada. The lecture above is a private briefing in August 2008 to a group called the “Daedalians”. The Daedalians are a local group of retired military pilots.
Per the press statement handed out by Nellis AFB: “Col. Fornof did not mean to offend any U.S. allied forces, as he knows firsthand the importance of training with allied forces and the awesome firepower they bring to the fight. His comments during this briefing were his personal opinions and not those of U.S. Air Force Warfare Center or of the Air Force. “
Comments and Analysis
Despite Col. Fornof having observed Red Flag up close, his comments should not be treated as the gospel truth - there is a possibility that he is ‘playing to the gallery’. His comments carry weight since he is an operational pilot with the USAF but he certainly cannot cover the entire exercise and has no inside knowledge of the way IAF ‘fought’. Nevertheless, even though his comments appear to be negative about the IAF to the uninformed listener; overall he has actually praised the IAF and its performance.
The Su-30MKI did not use the data link in the exercise unlike the other air forces. The reason being the HAL supplied system is not compatible with NATO data links – neither is the system required to be compatible with NATO. The speaker clearly mentions that the high fratricide ratio in the kills was because of this reason. While NATO air forces are designed to inter operate with each other and carry out joint missions, the IAF is not.
Su-30MKI is equipped with its own data link which can share target information across multiple fighters. IAF is presently inducting A-50EI Phalcon AEW&C aircraft. Red Flag and other exercises before it have seen IAF working very closely with the AWACS crew of the other air force. Operational Data Link (ODL) will be provided to all fighters in the IAF over the coming years.
The IFF system used by IAF is not compatible with NATO standard, hence the need for verbal communication with the controller.
The aircraft were operating their radars on training mode since the actual signals with which the Bars radar operates are kept secret.
The high mix of highly experienced pilots in Ex Cope India, if true, cannot be consistent across all sqns that were involved in the exercise. During Cope India, the 24 Sqn operating Su-30K/MK was first Flanker unit in the IAF and only one of two Su-30 units in the entire IAF at that time. To find a concentration of senior pilots in these squadrons will not be unexpected given that these units will be forging doctrines and tactics and building up a pool of pilots. Per article on Cope India here; “Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.”. Moreover, the mix of experience needs to be examined for the USAF squadrons as well. The aggressor squadron at Nellis and the F-22 attracts the best in the USA.
MiG-21 Bison does not have an Israeli radar as noted in the lecture. The type is equipped with a Phazotron Kopyo (spear) unit. The Kopyo radar has a 57km detection range against a 5 m^2 (54ft^2) radar cross section, or fighter-sized target. It can track eight targets and shoot at two simultaneously.
Su-30MKI is equipped with Saturn AL-31FP engines, not Turmansky as mentioned in the lecture
Soviet era aircraft were designed to operate from poorly prepared airfields. For example; MiG-29 closes its intakes during taxi and take-off to avoid ingestion of FOD thrown up by the front wheels. In this state the engines are supplied air thru louvres located on upper surface of the leading edge. This design feature is at the cost of significant internal fuel capacity and hence has been eliminated in newer MiG-29 versions starting with the K/KUB variants. Flanker come with lighter anti-FOD grills in the intakes as well as wheel fenders that catch FOD. IAF has precautions built into their SOPs – which may be overlooked in case of war or any such exigency. Since the deployment was far away from home base in the USA, with no spares support and related infrastructure it was well worth to observe strict adherence to SOPs instead to being stuck with a grounded aircraft!
This is not the first time the MiG-21 Bison has been praised for successes during dissimilar air combat training (DACT) – even during previous USAF exercise and internal IAF exercises pilots are known to have scored ‘kills’ against more advanced adversaries. The small size (lower visual signature) and inherently small radar cross section coupled with modern avionics, radar, effective jammers, precision guided munitions and missiles (R-73, R-77) make Bison one of the best fighters in IAF after Su-30 and Mirage-2000. IAF’s has had good experience with small jets such as Gnat which earned the reputation of “Sabre Slayer” in the 1965 war with Pakistan. The under-development LCA Tejas promises to carry on this legacy when it replaces the Bison.
Under the glare of the world’s attention the IAF pilots, crew and their aircraft have clearly acquitted themselves well in Ex Red Flag 2008. This exercise was the most complex environment IAF worked in, even more than the Cope Thunder exercise in Alaska where Jaguar IS fighters had participated. The challenges faced were because of the operational environment, training rules and airspace restriction where the IAF is not expected to fight a war in any case. Shortcomings must have come up – but then that is exactly why IAF is training for.