The Quetta Experience: Attitudes and Values within Pakistan's Army By David O. Smith

[Zulfiqar]

This is a study by an american officer who attended command and staff college and also interviewed many american officers that attended till 2016.

Interesting thing abouts "chappa" among other things.

 

[django]

@Inception-06 @Signalian @Path-Finder Hazrat @Zarvan @war&peace @Moonlight @Arsalan @Zibago @Hell hound @Burhan Wani @Maarkhoor

 

[gangsta_rap]

I really cant tolerate reading on after it starts right of the bat with the usual Army controls all BS.

If the army really does control all why tf did musharraf do the NRO? why did the all power full dictator and all powerful COAS have to cut such a bad deal with civilians?

 

[Lincoln]

I really cant tolerate reading on after it starts right of the bat with the usual Army controls all BS.

If the army really does control all why tf did musharraf do the NRO? why did the all power full dictator and all powerful COAS have to cut such a bad deal with civilians?

The first part of the preface is merely opinion which is as in all books, because it's a book. If you can get past that, rest of the book is pretty objective. Tells you it's methodology (for collecting information from the students at the Staff College), people interviewed, citations and so on. Its content is based on what the interviewee's which were Pakistani Army students or Foreign students answered to questions, also tells about the curriculum which is apparently based on a World War II doctrine and a bit outdated for modern warfare.

 

[Zulfiqar]

The first part of the preface is merely opinion which is as in all books, because it's a book. If you can get past that, rest of the book is pretty objective. Tells you it's methodology (for collecting information from the students at the Staff College), people interviewed, citations and so on. Its content is based on what the interviewee's which were Pakistani Army students or Foreign students answered to questions, also tells about the curriculum which is apparently based on a World War II doctrine and a bit outdated for modern warfare.

The interviews were mostly with foreign students.

There were some things that I don't agree with such as nuclear security, the opinion on our COIN strategy ( considering that all fata has now been pacified along with Karachi and only balochistan is remaining) among some other things.Will discuss them later.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Great read. Thanks guys ...

One thing I found interesting. I have read in many books - Pakistani and foreign that PA is exceptionally proficent in tactical training but lacks in strategic vision and initiative. A study of Pakistan's wars exposes this problem, again and again. PA needs to address this. It needs to upgrade education and do partneships with Turkish and German military academies both of which excel in strategic and initiative culture.

 

[313ghazi]

Great read. Thanks guys ...

One thing I found interesting. I have read in many books - Pakistani and foreign that PA is exceptionally proficent in tactical training but lacks in strategic vision and initiative. A study of Pakistan's wars exposes this problem, again and again. PA needs to address this. It needs to upgrade education and do partneships with Turkish and German military academies both of which excel in strategic and initiative culture.

I've heard the same from other sources before. I used to be friends with a captain in the army and he talked about the stiff structure and lack of "out of the box" thinking. Seems to be reflective of many Pakistani families. "Elders know best", "30 year old is only a bacha if i am 50" that kind of BS.

 

[VCheng]

STUDY FINDINGS

Line of Inquiry 1: The Staff College Experience: Demographic Changes and Social Issues

Fears of “Islamization” within the Pakistan Army officer corps and its susceptibility to radical religious influence are exaggerated.

The background of the top performing students at the Staff College has not changed despite ethnicity and social class composition changes in the officer corps.

The Staff College succeeds in identifying the next cadre of senior military officers, but fails in its mission to provide a quality professional military education to the bulk of its students.

The Staff College curriculum is weak in joint operations, land-centric in its approach to modern warfare, imparts an outmoded ground forces doctrine, and pays insufficient attention to logistics.

The U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program promotes progressive military thinking in the Pakistan Army

Line of Inquiry 2: Perception of External Threats and Friendships

There is a growing “generational divide” between senior/mid-level officers and Staff College students about the priority of external and internal threats to Pakistan.

The United States is perceived as a direct military threat to Pakistan.

Neither Afghanistan-focused militant groups nor the Afghan National Army (ANA) are perceived as significant military threats to Pakistan.

Line of Inquiry 3: Perception of Internal Threats and Friendships

Pakistan-focused militant groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are Pakistan’s most significant internal security threat.

Despite increasing the amount of Staff College curriculum devoted to SubConventional Warfare (SCW), the doctrine emphasizes kinetic operations instead of counterinsurgency techniques.

Kashmir-focused militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are not perceived as a threat to the state.

Sub-Conventional Warfare doctrine in Staff College exercises reveals that only lip service is paid to civilian collateral damage and the laws of land warfare.

Line of Inquiry 4: Attitudes toward the State and its Institutions

Staff College students support democracy and civilian governance in theory, but are harshly critical of civilian political institutions in practice.

Staff College students were strongly supportive of the two military rulers, Zia and Musharraf, while they were in office, but viewed them (and all former military rulers) negatively after they left office.

Line of Inquiry 5: Attitudes toward Nuclear Issues

A negligible amount of Staff College curriculum is devoted to nuclear issues, deployment of nuclear systems, and nuclear warfighting doctrine.

There is little appreciation of the potential strategic impact of the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

Despite Pakistan’s deteriorating internal security environment, the nuclear arsenal is considered to be safely and securely stored.

========================================================

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Army will continue to be led by relatively moderate officers who see value in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Future generations of senior leaders may be more amenable to resolving contentious issues with India to concentrate on dealing with internal security problems, but the current generation will continue to see value in India-focused militant groups.

The Pakistan Army will continue to use Afghanistan-focused militant groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network to shape a government in Afghanistan more to its liking.

The Army lacks sufficient capacity and an adequate counterinsurgency doctrine to contain the multiple militancies in the country

The Army’s desire to maintain its traditional influence over key foreign policy and national security decisions will continue to create friction in civil-military relations.

Because of the Army’s visceral distaste for politicians and the media, an eventual return to military rule cannot be ruled out.

The safety and security of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials remain at risk because of the size and scope of the program and Pakistan’s steadily deteriorating internal security environment.

The Army’s eroding conventional military balance and institutional weaknesses in the military establishment will likely compel Pakistan to escalate quickly to the nuclear level to avoid defeat in any future war with India.

 

[313ghazi]

“Most [of the DS] were good, but some were abhorrent; some were superb, and most were capable and competent tactically… My experience was that instructors who studied in the West were much more open and more prone to critical thought.”

could be biased because of the source, but I think it's true of wider society.

The 2002 Student related an anecdote about an allied officer’s DS who offered the advice that when he beat his wife he should do so gently because women were more fragile than men. Another DS confided to the Lebanese student that the Muslims in Lebanon should “get rid of the 50 percent of the Lebanese population that were Christians,” not realizing (or perhaps not caring) that the Lebanese student was a Christian.

what buffoons.

Reading the bit about cheating on pages 43 and 44. That doesn't bode well.

The 2008-2009 Student thought the tension between creative thinking and the use of past solutions was rooted in Pakistani cultural and educational practices that he thought explained how many things actually worked not only in Pakistani society, but at the Staff College. In Pakistan, he explained, everyone’s place in the social hierarchy is precisely defined and well understood. One was obligated to do certain things for the family and larger kinship group. One manifestation of this cultural norm at the Staff College was that every Pakistani student knew the precise graduation order of everyone in his Pakistan Military Academy “batch” [graduating class], and those in senior or junior “batches.” They invariably referred to more senior “batchmates” as “Sir.” Even greater deference was shown to the DS and senior officers. Because of their greater seniority in the Army, he thought their opinions on anything simply could not be openly questioned by more junior Pakistani officers. Thus, creative thinking was subtly discouraged in practice even as it was acknowledged as being desirable by the more cosmopolitan senior officers and DS.

This insight was the key to understanding why chappa was so prized. To disagree with a Staff College-approved solution was like disagreeing with the opinions of a DS or a senior officer. It was more than just a social gaffe; it actually skirted the boundaries of disloyalty to the Army. Anyone who did so made others visibly nervous and uncomfortable. The Student described most learning at the Staff College as “autodidactic” and considered his classmates as poorly educated compared to the Western military officers. Their only higher education was the two-year PMA course that amounted to little more than a junior college education.
Their experiences at PMA prepared them well for the Army, but not very well for higher learning and creative thinking.

Very telling, this is exactly what that young army captain used to complain about.

The Students attending the Staff College during the first 25 years of the study period also would have agreed with this assessment made by the 1980 Student: “Tactics are basically World War 2 foot infantry tactics and are in sharp contrast to current U.S. and NATO doctrine. Attack is usually for shallow objectives at ratios of 2 to 1. Defense is usually linear and based on the assumption that the enemy will attack at approximately 2 to 1 strength. Artillery is highly centralized and inflexible. The effects of electronic warfare, improved night vision devices, anti-tank GMs, helicopter-lifted infantry and gunship, and various changes in technology are known but have not been allowed to affect tactical doctrine.” Virtually identical comments were made two and three decades later respectively by the 2002 and 2011-2012 Students. The latter joked that he “got a degree in World War II tactics” at the Staff College.

This is just dangerous. Our safety depends on them next door being equally as incompetent.

The 1989 Student thought there was an even greater problem in the Pakistan Army than simply poor unit execution of doctrine. He considered that a high percentage of the doctrine taught at the Staff College was “recycled U.S. Army doctrine.” However, unlike in the U.S. Army, which generally views doctrine as a set of guidelines that have to be adapted to every specific case, the Staff College seemed unwilling to tolerate the slightest deviation. This “blind adherence,” he thought, led to rigidity and parochial thinking. Ironically, because this officer had been very open and blunt in his denunciation of cheating, during a major exercise in which he was the intelligence officer of the opposing force, Foxland, he was accused by a DS of usingchappa. On his recommendation, the Foxland forces made a chemical weapon attack on the friendly Blueland unit and “wiped it out.” The sponsor DS thought
chappa must have been used to identify the location of the friendly unit. The Student vigorously denied this and explained that the tactical doctrine of the Pakistan Army was so rigid and predictable that one could easily template a defensive layout by analyzing only a few data points.

This might go someway to explain what we heard in Kargil and also about initial lack of PAF involvement in COIN operations.

The assessment of nearly all Students can be summarized in the comment of the 2012-2013 Student B who considered Tri-Brachial an example of “disjointed operations,” noting that although all three service college classes had been brought together to plan a joint military operation, the focus of the exercise was on individual service orientation lectures with only “lip service” paid to actual joint planning techniques. This officer also noted there were only eight total PAF and PN officers in a class of 382 Pakistani officers, making it theoretically possible for an Army officer at the Staff College never to come in contact in his syndicate room with an officer from any other service until the end of year when the Tri-Brachial exercise was held.

A year later, the 2010-2011 Student A’s Pakistani student sponsor admitted there was too much emphasis on India as the main threat. Even more recently, a Pakistani student admitted to the 2012-2013 Student B, “I don’t know why we hate them so much. We like their music, their movies, and our two languages are nearly the same.” He said others in the class also thought it was time to let go of this irrational enmity and for Pakistan to “move on.”

The impact of kanjarification of our society.

A portion of the internal security curriculum that year was also devoted to martial law and the provision of military assistance to civil authorities.
Two years later, the 1997 Student was intrigued by the lack of recognition of the importance of military intelligence in counterinsurgency operations. The typical view expressed by his classmates was that ISI performed that function at the strategic level and the Army’s Military Intelligence Directorate did it at the tactical level. Both intelligence organizations, however, were considered by the Pakistani students as “a place where you’d stick people who couldn’t serve competently elsewhere.

This might explain why we had no idea about the militant threat we faced in the early days.

Although the Staff College placed marginally more emphasis on internal security operations in the 2007-2008 course, the real turning point came in 2009 when the internal security curriculum expanded to nearly five weeks and almost daily discussion of the subject occurred in the syndicate rooms. This change coincided with the breakdown of a controversial peace agreement struck between the federal government and a militant group known asTehrik-i-Namaz-i- Sharia Muhammadi
, or TNSM, in the Swat Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province

at least they learnt.

On backing Kashmiri freedom fighters...

The most candid comment about the positive use of militants to gain Pakistani objectives was made during the 2010-2011 course by the Commandant, an ethnic Kashmiri. While summing up the major lessons of a major SCW exercise that year, he made this comment: “We have our own insurgents, and, if need be, we can use them.” The Student initially thought he must have misspoken, but after consulting with other Western students who were similarly surprised to hear such a candid admission, realized he had heard him quite correctly.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Look guys it does not need foreign military students at Staff College, Quetta to tell us the training and education our officers is outdated and fails to produce leaders who can react to the fast dynamic of a battle and understand the strategy. The best example I can give is 1965 war. If the same Pakistan Army was led by German or Turkish officer corps you can almost be certain that Pakistan would have liberated Kashmir and won the war.

In hindsight it does not require a Austerlitz to see that if Pakistan threatened the chicken neck that was the Jammu sector India would be face having entire Kashmir being cut off leading to the surrender of the Indian Army there. As this disaster would unfold India would get desperate. If somebody is strangling you and has his hands around your neck what do you do? Yeh kick him where he is most exposed - straight into his testicles which have the neccessary effect of the guy letting you go as he bends over in agony.

So what was Pakistan's exposed testicles? Well Lahore of course. Barely 10 miles from Indian border and flat country inbetween. As we know this is exactly what happened. And what defensive plan did Pakistan have for this - given that it was 99% certain India would retaliate? Non at all.

 

[AMG_12]

Halfway through, so far a good read. The problems highlighted are existent and the lack of critical thinking and chappa culture are prevalent in almost all military schools of Pakistan. His emphasis on out-of-date military doctrines is also a key issue, in the past we have witnessed lack of coordination among the tri-services and even today its limited and can be further exploited as done by most modern militaries around the world. We have developed tactics keeping India and its technological reach and advancement in mind which IMO require refinement, we need to think one step ahead.

Look guys it does not need foreign military students at Staff College, Quetta to tell us the training and education our officers is outdated and fails to produce leaders who can react to the fast dynamic of a battle and understand the strategy. The best example I can give is 1965 war. If the same Pakistan Army was led by German or Turkish officer corps you can almost be certain that Pakistan would have liberated Kashmir and won the war.

In hindsight it does not require a Austerlitz to see that if Pakistan threatened the chicken neck that was the Jammu sector India would be face having entire Kashmir being cut off leading to the surrender of the Indian Army there. As this disaster would unfold India would get desperate. If somebody is strangling you and has his hands around your neck what do you do? Yeh kick him where he is most exposed - straight into his testicles which have the neccessary effect of the guy letting you go as he bends over in agony.

So what was Pakistan's exposed testicles? Well Lahore of course. Barely 10 miles from Indian border and flat country inbetween. As we know this is exactly what happened. And what defensive plan did Pakistan have for this - given that it was 99% certain India would retaliate? Non at all.

Even the war in FATA has been disastrous if you look at it from tactical perspective. Yes, we were inexperienced in the western theatre with little at our disposal but that doesn't justify the lack of out of box thinking by battlefield commanders. Hundreds of lives were lost due to inefficiency, lack of coordination and wrong decisions. School of infantry and Tactics saw some change in curriculum as precious lives were lost mainly because of no prior knowledge of battlefield at all as all the focus was on Eastern Frontier. Happens when you downplay a situation.

 

[TMA]

Great read. Thanks guys ...

One thing I found interesting. I have read in many books - Pakistani and foreign that PA is exceptionally proficent in tactical training but lacks in strategic vision and initiative. A study of Pakistan's wars exposes this problem, again and again. PA needs to address this. It needs to upgrade education and do partneships with Turkish and German military academies both of which excel in strategic and initiative culture.

Yes. This is a Pakistani trait...great at tactics but bad at strategy...
hence you will hear many Pakistanis saying we defeated the terrorism in FATA and Karachi...but really it was just a few battles... the (hybrid) war against Pakistan is carrying on....

I've heard the same from other sources before. I used to be friends with a captain in the army and he talked about the stiff structure and lack of "out of the box" thinking. Seems to be reflective of many Pakistani families. "Elders know best", "30 year old is only a bacha if i am 50" that kind of BS.

You can see this sort of attitude on PDF.

But the elders are wiser (usually), but the younger ones are "braver".

 

[Indus Pakistan]

But in all the long report it does mention that there is something remarkable and exceptional about Pakistan Army that while we can find faults we must also take pride in PA. As a institution it has remained highly disciplined, integrated and cohesive. In addition it does a marvelous job of bring men [women] from all walks of like, all ethnic groups, religious schisms and creates one unifying entity. That as the report makes clear is remarkable and quite unlike other countries like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan etc

In that sense it is the primary nation building institution in Pakistan and underpins the state.

 

[Inception-06]

Halfway through, so far a good read. The problems highlighted are existent and the lack of critical thinking and chappa culture are prevalent in almost all military schools of Pakistan. His emphasis on out-of-date military doctrines is also a key issue, in the past we have witnessed lack of coordination among the tri-services and even today its limited and can be further exploited as done by most modern militaries around the world. We have developed tactics keeping India and its technological reach and advancement in mind which IMO require refinement, we need to think one step ahead.


Even the war in FATA has been disastrous if you look at it from tactical perspective. Yes, we were inexperienced in the western theatre with little at our disposal but that doesn't justify the lack of out of box thinking by battlefield commanders. Hundreds of lives were lost due to inefficiency, lack of coordination and wrong decisions. School of infantry and Tactics saw some change in curriculum as precious lives were lost mainly because of no prior knowledge of battlefield at all as all the focus was on Eastern Frontier. Happens when you downplay a situation.

what means chappa culture ?

In that sense it is the primary nation building institution in Pakistan and underpins the state.

and thats what we need in every school and mosque!

 

[Sinnerman108]

One must understand that military officers are a part of the very society that they will eventually defend.

Truth of the matter is that curriculum from grade 1 to 12 is obsolete,
There is absolutely no emphasis on critical thinking, or challenging the norm
everyone knows which questions will come, from which chapters, and everyone knows what answer to write.

As for social .. well we all know what religion and social pressures have done to society in general.

I agree with what the book says, however I also think that in spite of these "problems"
Army as an institution performs very well.