The Battle Of Chawinda

[VisionHawk]

VisionHawk,
The figures given by me are from 8th Sept till 22nd Sept. Various sources give different figures that vary slightly.

On 8th Sept Pakistani 25 Cav played a crucial role in confusing and stopping the Indian 1 Armd Div. Thereafter the whole Pakistani 6th Armd Div joined the battle, which turned into a slogging match.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/mar/chawinda.htm

Can u please specify the lines where the figures mentioned by u are perhaps i missed them i cannot find them pls can u help me by telling where it is written in the article thanks

and u said that the figures by u are from 8 september to 22 september
in which ur also including battle of pilohra (spellings) if im not wrong the battle of chawinda took place from 14 septmeber when Indians launched an attack on Pakistani positions with centurions and amx

 

[sparten]

The Battle between 25th Cav (only 2 sqd) and the Indian Army was on September 8th. The main battle was from 8th to 21 when the Indians were forced (except for a small pocket) across the border.

Causes of Failuer of IA

1)Intelligence did not know of the existance of 6th Armoured division.
2) It also badly estimated the damge to 1st Armoured at Asal Utter, when 1 Armoured fought the battle more or less at full strength.
3) Although intelligence was correct in the fact that 25th Cav was the only, regt in line, the resistance shown by the "Men of Steel", was so ferocious that the Indians were convinced that they were facing a brigade, and hesistated allowing reinforcements to arrive and save the day.
4) Maj General Abrar Hussein's almost unhuman calmness on day one when the IA came nearest a victory. Latter Tikka Khan arrived and then the situation stabalized.

 

[sword9]

Originally posted by VisionHawk@Mar 24 2006, 06:50 PM
Can u please specify the lines where the figures mentioned by u are perhaps i missed them i cannot find them pls can u help me by telling where it is written in the article thanks

The defencejounal link was to indicate that the entire tank battles of 1st Indian Armd Div and 6th Pak Armd Div took place in that sector from 8th - 22nd. On the 6th of Sept the battle was purely of Pak 25th Cavalry against 1st Armd Brigade (of 1st Indian Armd Div). By the time Indian armour could asses the strength armd against them it was too late PA's 6th Armd Div had reinforced that sector- your 25 Cavalry had done an excellent job without doubt.

and u said that the figures by u are from 8 september to 22 september
in which ur also including battle of pilohra (spellings) if im not wrong the battle of chawinda took place from 14 septmeber when Indians launched an attack on Pakistani positions with centurions and amx

Yes I had included Phillora as well since I could not get separate data specific for Chawinda. The data available with me was for Phillora-Chawinda sector in which our 1 Corps was operating.

For example, 17 (Poona) Horse was in both Chawinda and Phillora, so getting exact figures of tank losses will entail some serious reading and research.

However, will not taking away credit from 25 Cavalry for its action in Chawinda, most of you negate the role played by the PA Arty Regt in that battle. Most casulties sufferred by I Armd Bde was by PA arty shelling.

 

[sword9]

Originally posted by sparten@Mar 25 2006, 06:11 PM
The Battle between 25th Cav (only 2 sqd) and the Indian Army was on September 8th. The main battle was from 8th to 21 when the Indians were forced (except for a small pocket) across the border.

The strength of 25 Cav was 3 Sqns and got reduced to 2 sqn after the first battle.

Causes of Failuer of IA

Failure due to poor leadership and tactics by the commander of 1st Armd Brigade.

However, the main aim to remove Pak armour for Chamb was achived as 6th Armd Div was relocated to Sialkot sector.

You have your Chawinda while we have our Assal Uttar and Longewal.

 

[A1Kaid]

Battle of Chawinda 1965

The Grave Yard of Indian Tanks

Song sung by Inayat Hussain Bhatti

Great War song and the lyrics are very meaningful!




Defence Journal

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN examines this crucial battle objectively.

Introduction

The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa and Chawinda from 8th to 21 September 1965 were the most decisive battles of the 1965 War . Initially the Indians were very close to victory while in the last stages the Pakistan Army was in a relatively better position to launch a counterstroke which could have forced the Indians to abandon all gains made inside the Shakargarh Bulge from 7th September.

The Chawinda Battles also gave birth to many myths as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. Many conflicting claims were made about ‘Military Effectiveness’ ‘Martial Fervour’ etc citing the ‘Battles of Chawinda’ as an example. The Indian commanders were also criticised for phenomenal incompetence, but somehow they rationalised their failures as a case of normal failure in face of technically superior tanks.


Pakistani Dispositions

Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-Chenab Corridor where the battle of Chawinda was fought were as following:-- (ONE) 8 Division consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104 and 115 Brigades) four armoured regiments (20 Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31 & 33 TDU 1) defending Sialkot-Pasrur Sector and Jassar. The total frontage that this division had to defend was approximately 180,000 yards. 2 But this was only a theoretically awesome figure, because till 1965, keeping in view the force to space ratio in terms of divisions available, the Indians were not in a position to be effective as a threat all along this frontage. (TWO) 6 Armoured Division in Chenab Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area from any Indian incursion. The 6 Armoured Division was not a full strength division and consisted of a divisional headquarter, three armoured regiments (one of which was in Chamb for Grand Slam) two artillery regiments, two motorised infantry regiments and had no brigade headquarter. Initially it was placed at Gujranwala but later placed at Pasrur4. This Division according to Musa was placed at Pasrur with the express intention of dealing with enemy’s main attack which was expected on the Jassar-Sialkot approach.5

Indian War Plan

The Main Indian Attack was aimed at decisively disrupting the Pakistani defensive layout and resultantly forcing Pakistan to commit its main armoured reserves for defence was to be launched by the newly formed Indian 1 Corps comprising the 1st Armoured Division and three infantry divisions (6 Mountain Division 14 Division and 26 Division) in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor from Samba area on the general axis Samba-Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link and eventually secure line Daska-Dhallewali-Mandhali6. In other words the Indian aim as stated by another Indian military writer was to ‘cut off Sialkot from Lahore’.7 As per the wording of the decisions taken at the planning conference of the Indian Chief of Army Staff held on 9th August the object of the 1 Corps attack aimed at Daska was ‘with a view to relieving Jammu’.8 This meant that the Indian Army Chief viewed a Pakistani attack on Jammu with a view to severe the Indian line of communication as most likely. This attack was rightly termed as ‘Riposte’ by some Indian authors.Riposte has been defined as ‘Striking a vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon his attack’.


(Moving forward)....

CONCLUSION

The real heroes of Chawinda were Colonel Nisar and his unit ∏ whatever their perception or misperception,not knowing what was in front of them , and thankfully so,for this may have reduced their resolution to make a resolute stand, saved Pakistan on 8th September by their most heroic resistance in Gadgor area. General Ibrar who entered the scene albeit after the really decisive engagement of Gadgor had been fought played a decisive role in keeping the Pakistani position intact after fiascos like Phillora [A1Kaid:A Previous Battle] and by prodding Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik not to panic on the fateful 16th of September. The Indians made the Pakistani task easier by pure and unadulterated military incompetence at unit and brigade level ! There is no doubt that nothing could have stopped them from reaching the MRL on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September, had they possessed, an armoured brigade or divisional commander of even a medium calibre! The Indian failure commenced from division and brigade and not from troop and squadron level. At tank, tank troop and tank squadron level, both sides fought equally level ! It was at brigade and divisiona level that the Indians failed on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September , and thank God there was no brigade headquarter (Abdul Ali Malik having nothing to do with Gadgor) controlling 25 Cavalry on the Pakistani side.I say this with conviction with what I saw of the Pakistan Army and this is true till 1993 when I left service ! From what I have assessed the Indians are equally illustrious to date at brigade and higher levels ! This mutual incompetence has saved both the countries in all three wars ! Abrar later played a decisive role in saving Pakistan by his most resolute leadership during the highly critical period from 11th to 19th September when the Indians came close to victory on at least three different occasions. During one of the most critical moments of the Battle of Chawinda , on 16th September , Abrar as we discussed earlier dismissed the request of 24 Brigade Commander to abandon Chawinda. This if done would have seriously jeopardised the Pakistani position ! And yet after the war Abrar was superseded and 24 Brigade Commander promoted to general rank finally retiring as a three star general! The third factor in the Pakistani success was 4 Corps Artillery Brigade under the indomitable as well as extremely able leadership of Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry. All three were sidelined. Abrar never went beyond Major General’s rank since Yahya Khan did not like his face, and Abrar was not from Ayub’s unit !Chaudhry also suffered on the same count and retired as a brigadier while the much more mediocre gunner Tikka rose to the highest rank!Nisar did become a brigadier but was sidelined even before the 1971 war broke out, since he was not from the infantry, and did not have the right push and pull or patrons in higher positions after 1971! It was an irony of Pakistani history that Abrar since he was on the wrong side of the army chief was placed on a much lower rung in the heroes of 1965 war than men like Tikka Khan (in whose area of responsibility no major fighting took place) etc.On the other hand many like Niazi (14 Para Brigade Commander) etc rose to the rank of Lieutenant General by virtue of push and pull based on parochial and personal relations with Ayub being from his unit, while the real heroes were sidelined.


Source: Battle of Chawinda

 

[chindit]

It wasnt really a grave yard of indian tanks. by the end of the war - both sides lost about 60 tanks each in this sector. maybe even less. give me a day and I can post the numbers and sources.

 

[PakistanMyPride]

It wasnt really a grave yard of indian tanks. by the end of the war - both sides lost about 60 tanks each in this sector. maybe even less. give me a day and I can post the numbers and sources.

lol, it wasnt really a grave yard but a great grave yard of indian tanks This is a historical fact and People of Chawinda are witnessed to it

 

[Rajkumar]

^^you need to see few facts here then we ll discuss it.
1.main aim of IA was to relive pressure on chamb sector which was achieved by IA. capturing of Lahore was secondary goal. Yes IA should have given hard blow but they didn't may be because first goal was achieved.

2.loss of IA was around 20 tanks so it cannot be grave yard instead battle of asal uttar should be called as gravy yard for tanks where around 90 tanks were lost by PA and 35 by IA.

3. since "Operation Gibraltar" launched by PA was well planned. they exercised their option with in war rooms with all their advantages and lacks which gave them enough benefit. They could not gain from element of surprise while attacking on unprepared IA. PA knew UN will intervene with in short period they should given really hard thrust but they didn't perhaps they underestimated IA and were in hope of repeated performance of IA of 1962.


i would say there were lousy decisions from both sides but it does not matter because every inch of Indian land is intact now including Kashmir and operation Gibraltar failed.

 

[Gabbar]

Notes

1 Gul Hassan the then Pakistani Director Military Operations (DMO) from 1961 to
1965 stated in his memoirs that all Pakistani planning was based on the fact
that “both sides would refrain from undertaking a crossing over a major water
obstacle at the outset of operations”.

The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis
December 30, 2001

Major A.H. Amin, 11 PAVO Cavalry


The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general
has remained the subject of too much propaganda and too little analysis. On
Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a superhuman effort while on
the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian Army at unit,
brigade, divisional and corps level.

On the other hand the total failure of the main Pakistani attack in Khem Karan
was ignored or forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by official
propagandists who successfully shifted the entire public attention on laurels of
Aziz Bhatti etc. Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank
regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad
was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armored Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.
Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit employment.

TO READ MORE FOLLOW CLICK ON THE LINK..........

The Battle

 

[ejaz007]

^^you need to see few facts here then we ll discuss it.
1.main aim of IA was to relive pressure on chamb sector which was achieved by IA. capturing of Lahore was secondary goal. Yes IA should have given hard blow but they didn't may be because first goal was achieved.

2.loss of IA was around 20 tanks so it cannot be grave yard instead battle of asal uttar should be called as gravy yard for tanks where around 90 tanks were lost by PA and 35 by IA.

3. since "Operation Gibraltar" launched by PA was well planned. they exercised their option with in war rooms with all their advantages and lacks which gave them enough benefit. They could not gain from element of surprise while attacking on unprepared IA. PA knew UN will intervene with in short period they should given really hard thrust but they didn't perhaps they underestimated IA and were in hope of repeated performance of IA of 1962.


i would say there were lousy decisions from both sides but it does not matter because every inch of Indian land is intact now including Kashmir and operation Gibraltar failed.

You need to correct your facts:

1. The aim of IA was to capture Lahore. Why were your commanders planning on having champaign in Lahore Gymkhana. IA failed to achieve the objective and were blocked at BRB canal.

2. Ia lost 35-39 tanks on the first day alone. How can they loose 20 tanks in all.

3. Operations Gibraltar would have achieved a lot more if the commanding officer would not have been replaced. A dumb move by Mr. Ayub.

 

[Gabbar]

You need to correct your facts:

1. The aim of IA was to capture Lahore. Why were your commanders planning on having champaign in Lahore Gymkhana. IA failed to achieve the objective and were blocked at BRB canal.

2. Ia lost 35-39 tanks on the first day alone. How can they loose 20 tanks in all.

3. Operations Gibraltar would have achieved a lot more if the commanding officer would not have been replaced. A dumb move by Mr. Ayub.

Instead of arguing who destryed what and how many. Please read the post above. It's very good read. I will try to post one from neutral indian prostective as well.

 

[niaz]

Battle of Chawinda 1965

The Grave Yard of Indian Tanks




I8P4Yny3KII[/media] - WORLD'S GREATEST TANK ATTACK ON PAKISTAN

Song sung by Inayat Hussain Bhatti

Great War song and the lyrics are very meaningful!




Defence Journal

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN examines this crucial battle objectively.

Introduction

The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa and Chawinda from 8th to 21 September 1965 were the most decisive battles of the 1965 War . Initially the Indians were very close to victory while in the last stages the Pakistan Army was in a relatively better position to launch a counterstroke which could have forced the Indians to abandon all gains made inside the Shakargarh Bulge from 7th September.

The Chawinda Battles also gave birth to many myths as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. Many conflicting claims were made about ‘Military Effectiveness’ ‘Martial Fervour’ etc citing the ‘Battles of Chawinda’ as an example. The Indian commanders were also criticised for phenomenal incompetence, but somehow they rationalised their failures as a case of normal failure in face of technically superior tanks.


Pakistani Dispositions

Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-Chenab Corridor where the battle of Chawinda was fought were as following:-- (ONE) 8 Division consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104 and 115 Brigades) four armoured regiments (20 Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31 & 33 TDU 1) defending Sialkot-Pasrur Sector and Jassar. The total frontage that this division had to defend was approximately 180,000 yards. 2 But this was only a theoretically awesome figure, because till 1965, keeping in view the force to space ratio in terms of divisions available, the Indians were not in a position to be effective as a threat all along this frontage. (TWO) 6 Armoured Division in Chenab Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area from any Indian incursion. The 6 Armoured Division was not a full strength division and consisted of a divisional headquarter, three armoured regiments (one of which was in Chamb for Grand Slam) two artillery regiments, two motorised infantry regiments and had no brigade headquarter. Initially it was placed at Gujranwala but later placed at Pasrur4. This Division according to Musa was placed at Pasrur with the express intention of dealing with enemy’s main attack which was expected on the Jassar-Sialkot approach.5

Indian War Plan

The Main Indian Attack was aimed at decisively disrupting the Pakistani defensive layout and resultantly forcing Pakistan to commit its main armoured reserves for defence was to be launched by the newly formed Indian 1 Corps comprising the 1st Armoured Division and three infantry divisions (6 Mountain Division 14 Division and 26 Division) in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor from Samba area on the general axis Samba-Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link and eventually secure line Daska-Dhallewali-Mandhali6. In other words the Indian aim as stated by another Indian military writer was to ‘cut off Sialkot from Lahore’.7 As per the wording of the decisions taken at the planning conference of the Indian Chief of Army Staff held on 9th August the object of the 1 Corps attack aimed at Daska was ‘with a view to relieving Jammu’.8 This meant that the Indian Army Chief viewed a Pakistani attack on Jammu with a view to severe the Indian line of communication as most likely. This attack was rightly termed as ‘Riposte’ by some Indian authors.Riposte has been defined as ‘Striking a vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon his attack’.


(Moving forward)....

CONCLUSION

The real heroes of Chawinda were Colonel Nisar and his unit ∏ whatever their perception or misperception,not knowing what was in front of them , and thankfully so,for this may have reduced their resolution to make a resolute stand, saved Pakistan on 8th September by their most heroic resistance in Gadgor area. General Ibrar who entered the scene albeit after the really decisive engagement of Gadgor had been fought played a decisive role in keeping the Pakistani position intact after fiascos like Phillora [A1Kaid:A Previous Battle] and by prodding Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik not to panic on the fateful 16th of September. The Indians made the Pakistani task easier by pure and unadulterated military incompetence at unit and brigade level ! There is no doubt that nothing could have stopped them from reaching the MRL on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September, had they possessed, an armoured brigade or divisional commander of even a medium calibre! The Indian failure commenced from division and brigade and not from troop and squadron level. At tank, tank troop and tank squadron level, both sides fought equally level ! It was at brigade and divisiona level that the Indians failed on 8th 9th 10th and 11th September , and thank God there was no brigade headquarter (Abdul Ali Malik having nothing to do with Gadgor) controlling 25 Cavalry on the Pakistani side.I say this with conviction with what I saw of the Pakistan Army and this is true till 1993 when I left service ! From what I have assessed the Indians are equally illustrious to date at brigade and higher levels ! This mutual incompetence has saved both the countries in all three wars ! Abrar later played a decisive role in saving Pakistan by his most resolute leadership during the highly critical period from 11th to 19th September when the Indians came close to victory on at least three different occasions. During one of the most critical moments of the Battle of Chawinda , on 16th September , Abrar as we discussed earlier dismissed the request of 24 Brigade Commander to abandon Chawinda. This if done would have seriously jeopardised the Pakistani position ! And yet after the war Abrar was superseded and 24 Brigade Commander promoted to general rank finally retiring as a three star general! The third factor in the Pakistani success was 4 Corps Artillery Brigade under the indomitable as well as extremely able leadership of Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry. All three were sidelined. Abrar never went beyond Major General’s rank since Yahya Khan did not like his face, and Abrar was not from Ayub’s unit !Chaudhry also suffered on the same count and retired as a brigadier while the much more mediocre gunner Tikka rose to the highest rank!Nisar did become a brigadier but was sidelined even before the 1971 war broke out, since he was not from the infantry, and did not have the right push and pull or patrons in higher positions after 1971! It was an irony of Pakistani history that Abrar since he was on the wrong side of the army chief was placed on a much lower rung in the heroes of 1965 war than men like Tikka Khan (in whose area of responsibility no major fighting took place) etc.On the other hand many like Niazi (14 Para Brigade Commander) etc rose to the rank of Lieutenant General by virtue of push and pull based on parochial and personal relations with Ayub being from his unit, while the real heroes were sidelined.


Source: Battle of Chawinda

In the book “The Way it was” by Brig Z Alam the problem of ignoring merit in the PA
promotions is highlighted. You have rightly pointed out that real heros of the Chowinda battle were Col Nasir (at Marala) and Maj Gen Abrar, whereas in the news media Gen Tikka Khan was made a hero with Abrar Hussein unknown to the public at large. You can’t blame Yahya Khan for this as the CINC was Gen Musa and all promotions had to be approved by FM Ayub Khan. Yahya Khan only became a 3 star general in 1966.

IMO 6th Armoured Div has the distinction of having two of the most capable generals of Pakistan Army as GOC’s. Maj Gen Abrar Hussain and Maj Gen Iftikhar Jajua.

Incidentally I was under the impression that Abrar retired as Lt General. Would any one from the PA confirm this?

 

[chindit]

this is really ridiculous. so many pages on this forum link to photographs of bharat rakshak. yet if i link to a page, it gets deleted. why not just say that you really dont like the truth.

btw the page i linked actually gave a pakistani army source on it if you had cared to read it

 

[Zob]

Chindit BR is not accepted for anything so please find a neutral source.... and as for the battle of Chawinda ur first and foremost the aim was to capture LAHORE.... and GABBAR this All content © 2003 Ravi Rikhye. Reproduction in any form prohibited without exbrss permission.

give ur post no credibilty...!!!!!!

 

[chindit]

Chindit BR is not accepted for anything so please find a neutral source.... and as for the battle of Chawinda ur first and foremost the aim was to capture LAHORE.... and GABBAR this All content © 2003 Ravi Rikhye. Reproduction in any form prohibited without exbrss permission.

give ur post no credibilty...!!!!!!

man, if it makes you happy - then yes pakistan destroyed 600 tanks at chawinda. (which by the way - is double of what a typical indian army armoured division would have)

its like that joke about a jumbo jet plane crashing in a cemetary and the authorities recovering 2000 bodies of the passengers.