The atrocities in the 1971 civil war
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@Abir...there is no point in arguing BD friends...as i always say.....it is easy to put a point and make a genuine argument with Pakistani friends rather than BD guys....So basically with this post.....what is the intent that BD guys are trying to potry???..
@BD friends....let us be clear...what are u trying to prove? Indian is a bad off guy in this sub continent????Of course man..there is no one saint in the world of World diplomacy....Do you guys thinking that Indira Gandhi was Mother Teresa that she dont have any bussiness other than helping out the blood brother BD to help get independence????? Come on....dude...India want to teach a lession to Pakistan for so it helped any one who is against Paksiatn..thts pretty simple......But problem is you BD guys are pretty confused minded people.....what is your intent of pushing ahead that India was invloved in genocide?..This is a fact that without India help BD will be struggling under Pakistan army like u r struggling at that time 1971...So what is ur opinion about it??
Of course i know..BD might be thinking that it is better to be under Pakistani ruler than o be independent....if this is the case it is not too late......
@BD friends....let us be clear...what are u trying to prove? Indian is a bad off guy in this sub continent????Of course man..there is no one saint in the world of World diplomacy....Do you guys thinking that Indira Gandhi was Mother Teresa that she dont have any bussiness other than helping out the blood brother BD to help get independence????? Come on....dude...India want to teach a lession to Pakistan for so it helped any one who is against Paksiatn..thts pretty simple......But problem is you BD guys are pretty confused minded people.....what is your intent of pushing ahead that India was invloved in genocide?..This is a fact that without India help BD will be struggling under Pakistan army like u r struggling at that time 1971...So what is ur opinion about it??
Of course i know..BD might be thinking that it is better to be under Pakistani ruler than o be independent....if this is the case it is not too late......
Vinod2070
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Wonder why this sudden interest in trying to rewrite history.
Unfortunately for such people, it happened during the media age and there are a lot of contemporary sources that recorded it in detail.
Putting a blinker and a blindfold doesn't mean those sources no longer exist.
Unfortunately for such people, it happened during the media age and there are a lot of contemporary sources that recorded it in detail.
Putting a blinker and a blindfold doesn't mean those sources no longer exist.
Night_Raven
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What the hell are you smoking ?
The ground war took place between 3rd Dec - 16 Dec : 1-3 million raped by IA in 13 days ?
Get a hold on history and dont try to distort it using your imagination ...
LaBong
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I'm not arguing with BD members about 1971 which I seldom do. My post was in reply to Pakistani members whom I find easier to reason with.
Tameem
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Dear Zakir Bhai...While i truly appreicate your ideals in this forum but here i must point out differnces to your opinion described above;
AL is not the biggest enemy of Bangladesh but "Bengali Nationalism" is, U cannot eliminate AL without eliminating it first bcz it thrives on the popular sentiments of the people at large. Can you gauranteed me that from now onwards mojority of Bengladeshis (including BNP caders) would now calling themselves Muslim first instead of Bengali. If not than you cannot eliminate Awami Leage not in a thousand years.
That Bengali Muslims mindsets first have to change in order to unite all the Muslims of the subcontinent and i don't see any possibility of it in near future. This is the first pre-requisits gesture we Pakistanis want from an average Bengali Muslims unless and untill that happened........., Thanks but no Thanks, we Pakistanis have enough in our plates at the moment.... we cannot be fool around once again so easily!!
monitor
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This is hypocrisy by the Western powers . they are playing double standard when it come to the interest of Muslim country / people . they are blind about the atrocity in Kashmir Chechnya Palestine but had help the south Sudan or east Timur independent.
monitor
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Thanks for admitting the real reason from Indian member .
We were majority in Pakistan so nothing to ruled by them rather we should be the ruler of Pakistan now . Actually we give up Pakistan due to overwhelming propaganda that we are the only oppress people of pakistan in fact most of the resources were enjoyed by a very small portion of ruling class thats what the division and created among majority east Pakistani Bengali people.
Xeric
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The illegal immigrants (10 million of them who formed the so called basis for an (armed) indian intervention in East Pakistan) were sorted out into different categories like Intelligence operators and Guerrilla fighters etc. Members of the East Pakistan para-military forces who had deserted their posts were trained separately to carryout subversion inside East Pakistan. The officers and men of the East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles formed the core of the Mukti Fauj, which later changed its name to Mukti Bahini on April 11, 1971.
The so-called freedom fighters were grouped into regular units of 500 each. They were, known as Swadhin Bengali Regiments (SBR). Two brigades, each of 3,000 persons, were raised at Tura by the indians. A womens wing of the Mukti Bahini was also created.
The Indian armed forces were given the full responsibility to turn the Mukti Bahini into some shape whereby they could assist the Indian Army during their invasion of East Pakistan. A control headquarters was established under the overall supervision of Indian Eastern Command and three sector headquarters were also formed, one each at Agartala, Cooch Behar and Balurghat. Their task was to raise Mukti Bahini companies and to plan and coordinate the activities of the guerrillas.
Brigadier Shah Beg and Brigadier Sant Singh, both of the Indian Army, were directed to organize the Mukti Bahini. The former operated from Agartala while the latter established contact with Tiger Siddiqui a Bengali rebel officer at Tura, Mymensingh. Later other senior Indian Army officers were each allotted different sectors.
These were under the command of Colonel (later Major General) MAG Osmani. Lawrence Lifshultz, a well known American journalist, describes their living style as carpeted tents, flowing whisky and surrounded by batmen. This group was based inside India and felt no qualms in accepting the Indian military intervention.
In addition to the Mukti Bahini a number of other resistance forces were formed by zealous patriots. The largest of which was the Mujib Bahini which was an elite force and according to Major General KM Safiullah, Mujib Bahini was drunk with political indoctrination. It consisted of 20,000 devoted Mujibites committed to carrying out his instructions to the hilt. The force was split into the eastern sector (Sheikh Moin and Sheikh Kamal, both sons of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman) northern sector (Rafiq) northwestern sector (Sirajul Islam) and the western sector (Tofail Ahmad). The leadership of Mujibites was trained at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. The idea of raising such a force which the Indians hoped would be pro-India in its ideological concepts was the brain child of Major General Oben a veteran guerrilla expert of the Indian Army.
S Force was created by Major Safiullah (later to become Major General Safiullah and the first Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army). It consisted of 1, 2 and 11 East Bengal Regiments, a total strength of 11,200 men. Safiullah who, by September, 1971, had promoted himself to the rank of a brigadier commanded this adhoc brigade. Both of his staff officers were from the Indian army. His brigade major was Major Gulati a gunner officer from the Indian artillery and the deputy quarter master general (DQ) was Major DR Nijrawan. It is interesting to note that the Indians were openly providing their own officers to operate within East Pakistan even before November 21.
A naval wing of the Mukti Bahini was also put in place. They were trained in underwater operations and by August 1971 three hundred rebels were sent to Cochin for under water training. Another 300 frogmen were trained at Plassey in the river Bhagirathi (West Bengal). They sank ships, destroyed coasters and oil tankers, took over barges, boats and launches. The strength of the Mukti Bahini and its sister organizations continued to rise. By the end of June the rebels were estimated to number 30,000. By November, the figure rose to 70,000 and when the all out war started it had reached around 100,000.
It is funny to note that The resistance needed planning, weapons training and leadership and only India could provide them, says Brigadier Jagdev Singh - Tragedy of Errors by Mitinuddin, page -230.
While the organization of the rebels and volunteers had commenced in April, their proper training by the Indian Army began in May. A total strength of 70,000 Bengali dissidents excluding the police, was available to the Indians. Out of this force, it did not take them long to organize eight equipped and fully trained Mukti Bahini battalions. Six training centres were established in India, each commanded by an Indian brigadier. The six sectors, as they were called, were:-
These training sectors provided all the weapons and military equipment needed for training and equipping the Mukti Bahini. Each sector had a number of training camps under it. Over 83 training camps were established (according to some, there were 150 training camps) on Indian soil all along East Pakistan, barely a few kilometers from the border. First two days were spent in documentation followed by three weeks of intense training.
An Indian major general was made in-charge of the training of Mukti Bahini. The rebels were reformed into sub-units, units and formations. Between 600-800 officers of the Mukti Bahini were trained at regular Indian Army institutions including the prestigious Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Indian Army engineers trained them in the handling of mines and explosives. They were also given training in the use of mortars, machine guns and PRC-25 wireless sets supplied to them by the Indian Army. Every six weeks 2,000 trained guerrillas were turned out for operational purposes. Over 5,000 men were trained at these camps in three months. About 600 rebels received under water training at Cochin and Plassey (West Bengal).
By October, 1971 the Mukti Bahini had carried out extensive explosions in private and public places. They attacked government offices and godowns, damaged bridges and railway lines, disrupted electric supply lines, robbed banks and killed innocent men, women and children whom they suspected of collaborating with the government. As the date for the Indian attack came near, the rebellious units of the EBR along with Indian Army personnel, tried to capture areas of strategic importance. In this they were supported not only by tanks and artillery but they received the support of the Indian Air Force as well. Belonia salient in the East was attacked on 8/ 9 November, Bhurigram in the north on night 13/ 14 November. These were preliminary operations carried out at the battalion level, even before the all out attack by the Indian armed forces on East Pakistan which began on November 21. The casualties were evacuated to Indian medical centres where they were given medical treatment and the sick and wounded were looked after.
Also, interestingly an aspect of the Mukti Bahinis fighting qualities was depicted by an Indian writer. He mentions that the rebels were mortally afraid of the Pathans. Indian army officers were often asked by some of the chicken-hearted mutineers, Pathan marya hai ye nahin (Has the Pathan been killed or is he still alive). Agar mara nahin to agay nahin jaaoon ga (If he has not been killed we will not move forward).
General Aurora while commenting on the performance of the Mukti Bahini said that the Bengalis had paranoia from the Punjabi Musalman. They would not get anywhere close enough to them. They only sent small chokras (boys) to gain information said Aurora.
The main contribution of the Mukti Bahini was in giving the latest information about Pakistan Army locations and strength, finding out gaps in the minefields and the current state of communications. It was the Mukti Bahini who informed the Indians that the Pakistani troops had retreated from one place to another. This allowed the Indians to advance into Jessore with impunity. We had the Mukti Bahini on our side. It was due to them that the Pakistan Army got disorganised and isolated, said General Aurora.
Nevertheless, during this period, Mrs Indira Gandhi, kept on insisting that her government was only providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees. She did not allow western observers to go and study the situation along the Indo-East Pakistan border for fear of their coming to know about the presence of the training camps established by the Indians to train the Mukti Bahini. Although Morarji Desai, a former prime minister of India, did admit that not only did the Indian Army trained the Mukti Bahini, the Indian soldiers disguised as Mukti Bahini had been fighting the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan from April to December 71.
In short, the indian involvement into internal affairs of Pakistan had started long before December 1971, and when your friends start collaborating with your enemies, they are no longer your friends, however, notwithstanding the fact that use of forces against your 'own people' is never acceptable nor encouraged, a military operation against the likes of Mukhti Bahini was ineveitable.
Sources:
Singh, Lachhman (Major General). Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Private Limited, 1979.
Singh, Lachhman (Major General). Victory in Bangladesh. Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 1981.
Singh, Sukhwant (Major General). Indias Wars Since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh. Volume 1. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1980.
Singh, Jaswant & Bhatia S.P (Major General). Conflict and Diplomacy: US and the Birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan Divides. New Delhi: Rupa Cooperate, 2008.
Rao, K.V. Krishna (General). Prepare or Perish. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991.
Matinuddin, Kamal (Lieutenant General). Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994.
Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh. International Institute for Strategic Studies, USA: Praeger, 1975.
Jacob, J.F.R (Lieutenant General). Surrender at Dacca: Birth of Nation. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997.
The so-called freedom fighters were grouped into regular units of 500 each. They were, known as Swadhin Bengali Regiments (SBR). Two brigades, each of 3,000 persons, were raised at Tura by the indians. A womens wing of the Mukti Bahini was also created.
The Indian armed forces were given the full responsibility to turn the Mukti Bahini into some shape whereby they could assist the Indian Army during their invasion of East Pakistan. A control headquarters was established under the overall supervision of Indian Eastern Command and three sector headquarters were also formed, one each at Agartala, Cooch Behar and Balurghat. Their task was to raise Mukti Bahini companies and to plan and coordinate the activities of the guerrillas.
Brigadier Shah Beg and Brigadier Sant Singh, both of the Indian Army, were directed to organize the Mukti Bahini. The former operated from Agartala while the latter established contact with Tiger Siddiqui a Bengali rebel officer at Tura, Mymensingh. Later other senior Indian Army officers were each allotted different sectors.
These were under the command of Colonel (later Major General) MAG Osmani. Lawrence Lifshultz, a well known American journalist, describes their living style as carpeted tents, flowing whisky and surrounded by batmen. This group was based inside India and felt no qualms in accepting the Indian military intervention.
In addition to the Mukti Bahini a number of other resistance forces were formed by zealous patriots. The largest of which was the Mujib Bahini which was an elite force and according to Major General KM Safiullah, Mujib Bahini was drunk with political indoctrination. It consisted of 20,000 devoted Mujibites committed to carrying out his instructions to the hilt. The force was split into the eastern sector (Sheikh Moin and Sheikh Kamal, both sons of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman) northern sector (Rafiq) northwestern sector (Sirajul Islam) and the western sector (Tofail Ahmad). The leadership of Mujibites was trained at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. The idea of raising such a force which the Indians hoped would be pro-India in its ideological concepts was the brain child of Major General Oben a veteran guerrilla expert of the Indian Army.
S Force was created by Major Safiullah (later to become Major General Safiullah and the first Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army). It consisted of 1, 2 and 11 East Bengal Regiments, a total strength of 11,200 men. Safiullah who, by September, 1971, had promoted himself to the rank of a brigadier commanded this adhoc brigade. Both of his staff officers were from the Indian army. His brigade major was Major Gulati a gunner officer from the Indian artillery and the deputy quarter master general (DQ) was Major DR Nijrawan. It is interesting to note that the Indians were openly providing their own officers to operate within East Pakistan even before November 21.
A naval wing of the Mukti Bahini was also put in place. They were trained in underwater operations and by August 1971 three hundred rebels were sent to Cochin for under water training. Another 300 frogmen were trained at Plassey in the river Bhagirathi (West Bengal). They sank ships, destroyed coasters and oil tankers, took over barges, boats and launches. The strength of the Mukti Bahini and its sister organizations continued to rise. By the end of June the rebels were estimated to number 30,000. By November, the figure rose to 70,000 and when the all out war started it had reached around 100,000.
It is funny to note that The resistance needed planning, weapons training and leadership and only India could provide them, says Brigadier Jagdev Singh - Tragedy of Errors by Mitinuddin, page -230.
While the organization of the rebels and volunteers had commenced in April, their proper training by the Indian Army began in May. A total strength of 70,000 Bengali dissidents excluding the police, was available to the Indians. Out of this force, it did not take them long to organize eight equipped and fully trained Mukti Bahini battalions. Six training centres were established in India, each commanded by an Indian brigadier. The six sectors, as they were called, were:-
These training sectors provided all the weapons and military equipment needed for training and equipping the Mukti Bahini. Each sector had a number of training camps under it. Over 83 training camps were established (according to some, there were 150 training camps) on Indian soil all along East Pakistan, barely a few kilometers from the border. First two days were spent in documentation followed by three weeks of intense training.
An Indian major general was made in-charge of the training of Mukti Bahini. The rebels were reformed into sub-units, units and formations. Between 600-800 officers of the Mukti Bahini were trained at regular Indian Army institutions including the prestigious Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Indian Army engineers trained them in the handling of mines and explosives. They were also given training in the use of mortars, machine guns and PRC-25 wireless sets supplied to them by the Indian Army. Every six weeks 2,000 trained guerrillas were turned out for operational purposes. Over 5,000 men were trained at these camps in three months. About 600 rebels received under water training at Cochin and Plassey (West Bengal).
By October, 1971 the Mukti Bahini had carried out extensive explosions in private and public places. They attacked government offices and godowns, damaged bridges and railway lines, disrupted electric supply lines, robbed banks and killed innocent men, women and children whom they suspected of collaborating with the government. As the date for the Indian attack came near, the rebellious units of the EBR along with Indian Army personnel, tried to capture areas of strategic importance. In this they were supported not only by tanks and artillery but they received the support of the Indian Air Force as well. Belonia salient in the East was attacked on 8/ 9 November, Bhurigram in the north on night 13/ 14 November. These were preliminary operations carried out at the battalion level, even before the all out attack by the Indian armed forces on East Pakistan which began on November 21. The casualties were evacuated to Indian medical centres where they were given medical treatment and the sick and wounded were looked after.
Also, interestingly an aspect of the Mukti Bahinis fighting qualities was depicted by an Indian writer. He mentions that the rebels were mortally afraid of the Pathans. Indian army officers were often asked by some of the chicken-hearted mutineers, Pathan marya hai ye nahin (Has the Pathan been killed or is he still alive). Agar mara nahin to agay nahin jaaoon ga (If he has not been killed we will not move forward).
General Aurora while commenting on the performance of the Mukti Bahini said that the Bengalis had paranoia from the Punjabi Musalman. They would not get anywhere close enough to them. They only sent small chokras (boys) to gain information said Aurora.
The main contribution of the Mukti Bahini was in giving the latest information about Pakistan Army locations and strength, finding out gaps in the minefields and the current state of communications. It was the Mukti Bahini who informed the Indians that the Pakistani troops had retreated from one place to another. This allowed the Indians to advance into Jessore with impunity. We had the Mukti Bahini on our side. It was due to them that the Pakistan Army got disorganised and isolated, said General Aurora.
Nevertheless, during this period, Mrs Indira Gandhi, kept on insisting that her government was only providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees. She did not allow western observers to go and study the situation along the Indo-East Pakistan border for fear of their coming to know about the presence of the training camps established by the Indians to train the Mukti Bahini. Although Morarji Desai, a former prime minister of India, did admit that not only did the Indian Army trained the Mukti Bahini, the Indian soldiers disguised as Mukti Bahini had been fighting the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan from April to December 71.
In short, the indian involvement into internal affairs of Pakistan had started long before December 1971, and when your friends start collaborating with your enemies, they are no longer your friends, however, notwithstanding the fact that use of forces against your 'own people' is never acceptable nor encouraged, a military operation against the likes of Mukhti Bahini was ineveitable.
Sources:
Singh, Lachhman (Major General). Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Private Limited, 1979.
Singh, Lachhman (Major General). Victory in Bangladesh. Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 1981.
Singh, Sukhwant (Major General). Indias Wars Since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh. Volume 1. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1980.
Singh, Jaswant & Bhatia S.P (Major General). Conflict and Diplomacy: US and the Birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan Divides. New Delhi: Rupa Cooperate, 2008.
Rao, K.V. Krishna (General). Prepare or Perish. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1991.
Matinuddin, Kamal (Lieutenant General). Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crsis 1968-1971. Lahore: Wajidalis Private Limited, 1994.
Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh. International Institute for Strategic Studies, USA: Praeger, 1975.
Jacob, J.F.R (Lieutenant General). Surrender at Dacca: Birth of Nation. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997.
toxic_pus
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And the point is what, exactly. You do realise, don't you, that Indian's involvement in 1971 is not exactly a secret.
BTW, The Bangladesh Govt-in-exile was officially formed on 17th March, 1971 with MAG Osmani as commander of Mukti Bahini. That was when the Mukti Bahinis officially came into existence. Previously, anybody who rebelled against Pakistan govt was called Mukti Joddha, Bengali for Freedom Fighter. It didn't symbolise or represent any organization in a manner the term 'Muki Bahini' came to do later on.
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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First, let me point out where the ICJ (International Commission of Jurists, not the International Court of Justice) makes the same argument as some of us have, regarding the casualty count in East Pakistan:
But the point repeatedly made by us is not that atrocities did not occur, they did, but that the numbers killed were nowhere along the lines typically claimed and that the atrocities were committed by both sides - this was a civil war after all.
This argument applies just as well against the Bengali rebels who massacred men, women and children of non-Bengali origin - and the accounts of that from various historians have also been posted on this thread.
But the point repeatedly made by us is not that atrocities did not occur, they did, but that the numbers killed were nowhere along the lines typically claimed and that the atrocities were committed by both sides - this was a civil war after all.
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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The point is, as already pointed out on several threads in the months past, that covert Indian support for the East Pakistan rebels/terrorists started in April of 1971, long before any 'ten million refugees' entered India and supposedly 'forced India to intervene in East Pakistan'.
The point is that Indian support for the East Pakistan rebels/terrorists prolonged and escalated the conflict, and therefore played a part in the subsequent violence on both sides and the refugee exodus.
Xeric
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^^ so i was able to wake you up from your lamber, eh?
The indian involvement into Pakistan's internal afairs is not a secret, indeed, but then some of your likes tends to blame Pakistan for the initiation of hostilities on 3 Dec 71, though it was india that broke the hostilities well before that by training, arming and grooming the Bengalis. Also, the point that india got involved into East Pakistan AFTER 3 Dec 71 maynot be a secret but india's state terrorism before December (since Jan 1971) remains a closely gaurded secret by some of your likes.
So, when Mr. Nur-ul-Qader, former deputy commissioner of Pabna, a small town in the north-west of East Pakistan, after March 25, went to the border village of Chuadanga, he was joined by Major Usman of the East Pakistan Rifles who brought with him a company of the EPR with their weapons. On April 8, Qader claims that he was met by Lieutenant Colonel Banerjee of the Indian Army. Also an Anglo-Indian DC, from the Indian town of Krishannagar, helped Qader to get in touch with Mr Tajuddin Ahmad who had escaped to Calcutta. Later Qader asked the commandant of the Indian Border Security Force, Lieutenant Colonel Rustamjee and the local Indian Sector commander Golak Mojumdar to request Tajuddin and other Bengali leaders including Colonel Osmani to come to Chuadanga and declare the establishment of the independent republic of Bangladesh and the formation of the Mukti Bahini. On April 10, Syed Nazr-ul-Islam, so-called acting president of Bangladesh, had broadcast the proclamation of the independence of Bangladesh from Mujibnagar, which was located at 8 Theater Road in Calcutta, formerly the offices of the deputy high commission for Pakistan.
The visit of Tajuddin to Chuadanga was arranged by the Indians and at 1030 hours on April 17, 1971 Tajuddin is reported to have come to Budhonathtola, just 4 kilometres, from the border near the western village of Mehrpur (a place where Lord Clive had taken over Bengal from the local Muslim chieftain). Colonel Osmani was also present there. A small contingent of the self styled Mukti Bahini presented a guard of honour. A ‘war council’ was formed. Chairman of the war council was Colonel MAG Osmani. Other members of the council were Major Safiullah, Zia-ur-Rahman, Khalid Musharraf, Nur-ul-Aslam and Rafiq-ul-Islam. Colonel Muhammad Ata-ul-Ghani Osmani was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the ‘Liberation Army’ (Mukti Bahini) on 17 April, 1971 at Mujibnagar, the provisional capital of the Bangladesh Government in India.
So, it is not at all surprising that when presentated with facts, some of your likes scum and accept the realities
BTW, the aim was not to present the obvious facts, but to show the other side of the story and to estalish that a friend of your enemy is your enemy!
The indian involvement into Pakistan's internal afairs is not a secret, indeed, but then some of your likes tends to blame Pakistan for the initiation of hostilities on 3 Dec 71, though it was india that broke the hostilities well before that by training, arming and grooming the Bengalis. Also, the point that india got involved into East Pakistan AFTER 3 Dec 71 maynot be a secret but india's state terrorism before December (since Jan 1971) remains a closely gaurded secret by some of your likes.
So, when Mr. Nur-ul-Qader, former deputy commissioner of Pabna, a small town in the north-west of East Pakistan, after March 25, went to the border village of Chuadanga, he was joined by Major Usman of the East Pakistan Rifles who brought with him a company of the EPR with their weapons. On April 8, Qader claims that he was met by Lieutenant Colonel Banerjee of the Indian Army. Also an Anglo-Indian DC, from the Indian town of Krishannagar, helped Qader to get in touch with Mr Tajuddin Ahmad who had escaped to Calcutta. Later Qader asked the commandant of the Indian Border Security Force, Lieutenant Colonel Rustamjee and the local Indian Sector commander Golak Mojumdar to request Tajuddin and other Bengali leaders including Colonel Osmani to come to Chuadanga and declare the establishment of the independent republic of Bangladesh and the formation of the Mukti Bahini. On April 10, Syed Nazr-ul-Islam, so-called acting president of Bangladesh, had broadcast the proclamation of the independence of Bangladesh from Mujibnagar, which was located at 8 Theater Road in Calcutta, formerly the offices of the deputy high commission for Pakistan.
The visit of Tajuddin to Chuadanga was arranged by the Indians and at 1030 hours on April 17, 1971 Tajuddin is reported to have come to Budhonathtola, just 4 kilometres, from the border near the western village of Mehrpur (a place where Lord Clive had taken over Bengal from the local Muslim chieftain). Colonel Osmani was also present there. A small contingent of the self styled Mukti Bahini presented a guard of honour. A ‘war council’ was formed. Chairman of the war council was Colonel MAG Osmani. Other members of the council were Major Safiullah, Zia-ur-Rahman, Khalid Musharraf, Nur-ul-Aslam and Rafiq-ul-Islam. Colonel Muhammad Ata-ul-Ghani Osmani was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the ‘Liberation Army’ (Mukti Bahini) on 17 April, 1971 at Mujibnagar, the provisional capital of the Bangladesh Government in India.
So, it is not at all surprising that when presentated with facts, some of your likes scum and accept the realities
BTW, the aim was not to present the obvious facts, but to show the other side of the story and to estalish that a friend of your enemy is your enemy!
Xeric
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Here's the other side of the story: (again, the killings did happen, but the scale was exeggerated by many to their advantage)
Dacca University
The Dacca University was made the first target of the military action on the night between 25/ 26 March. Dacca University had several hostels called halls: Jinnah Hall was the residence of junior lecturers and all in-house-teachers, Jagannath Hall accommodated the Hindu students; lqbal Hall was the centre piece of all political activity, Roqaya Hall was meant for all girl students. Jagannath Hall was barricaded. It was surrounded by barbed wire and within its perimeter Mukti Jogda (freedom fighters) received their training using dummy and service rifles. The university area harboured most of the armed dissidents and had become a stronghold of the rebellious students, professors and other intellectuals.
**** ****** Regiment, part of *** Infantry Brigade, was given the task to clear the university of all rebellious elements. It was a difficult task as it involved fighting in a built up area. The battalion was, therefore, given the support of tanks and artillery in the hope that the rumbling of tanks and the presence of guns near the university would compel the students to give up their weapons and surrender. But that was not to be. A full scale military operation had to be launched. Machine gun fire, mortar shells and recoilless rifles had to be used. Even tanks and artillery had to come into action. Each room of the Jagannath Hall had to be individually flushed out. Iqbal Hall and Roqaya Hall were also fired upon and later searched for incriminating evidence. By 0400 hours, a deadly silence descended on the once humming university campus. The official casualty in the military action in the university area that night was 66 Bengali rebels dead, 31 injured, 4 army jawans lost their lives defending the territorial integrity of Pakistan against its own citizens. He accepted that it was an overreaction and over kill by the troops under his command.
Tikka Khan drove around Dacca on March 26 to check the results of the military action. On the way he saw that all Bangladesh flags had disappeared and Pakistan flags had taken their place. He was visibly relieved as the open defiance against the government had at least temporarily subsided. After three days of military action in Dacca and its surrounding areas all was quiet, it did not strike him that the result achieved was through fear and that no Bengali had changed his support to the Awami League. In fact the hatred had increased.
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