The 1947-48 Kashmir War

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I think I have already clarified it in my earlier post. Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’ in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization. Pakistan had consistently tried to ‘condition’ its own withdrawal to India’s plan for demilitarization in spite of being repeatedly clarified otherwise by the Commission. That’s where Pakistan’s intransigence lies.

The materials that I have posted, illustrate that Pakistan was not entitled to seek any ‘assurance’ in any manner that was beyond what was already contained in the Truce Agreement itself and what the very presence of UN as a mediator ensured.

The argument that Pak withdrawal was ‘conditional’ upon ‘assurance’ is an argument in vacuum and altogether a desperate attempt to clutch at straw.

Please re-read the text you yourself posted - the UN commission implicitly tied any Pakistani withdrawal to Indian actions on demilitarization - there is no clutching at straws here except by you to somehow cast Pakistan as being obligated to perform an 'unconditional and unilateral withdrawal' to erroneously establish a violation of the UNSC resolutions.

""It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)
​

Firstly, rejection of any proposal which had the potential to place India at a disadvantage doesn’t automatically mean ‘intransigence’. Negotiation, by its very definition meant that India had the right to reject and/or offer terms and conditions.

The rejection of several proposals on demilitarization by India, on the pretext of 'disadvantage', when the goal was to in fact stall implementation of the UNSC resolutions and declare LoC == IB, does qualify as intransigence, but obviously not to the party guilty of it.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

It is difficult of violate one's commitment when the opportunity to execute one's commitment never presented itself. But don't let these legal trivialities spoil your accusation game.

The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite to resolve the dispute of J&K as outlined in the UNSC resolutions - statements and actions tantamount to withdrawal from the resolutions was a violation of that commitment.

Regarding annexation, well, Pakistan took it to the UN and UN has till date not ruled it to be 'violation' of any commitment. But again, don't let these minor facts ruin your game.

Not aware of that process and what rationale the UN used to make/not make a decision - perhaps you can provide further details or links to them ...

 

[rastor]

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

The status quo of LoC == IB is not acceptable to Pakistan, much as a plebiscite determining the status of the entire territory of J&K is not acceptable to India - a compromise solution different from these two positions needs to therefore be worked on, and was in a way under the backchannel dialog between Pakistan under Musharraf and the GoI.

AM,

Those UNSC resolutions are nothing more than junk paper if either India or Pak decide it is so. If you mean something along the lines of "give us the valley - keep the rest" - it ain't gonna happen under threat of proxies and judging from Niaz's posting not by offer of peace too.....that which has taken blood/sweat to achieve is unlikely to be given away....

The basis of all this is not justice or the 'righteous' but power. The more powerful entity will prevail.....take the fact pakistan hasn't gotten anywhere with it's proxies or wars.....I for one would definitely be OK with India ceding kashmir for independence or change in territorial status quo but reality is different. Time for Pakistan to re-calibrate and define what is in it's best interest.

 

[toxic_pus]

Please re-read the text you yourself posted - the UN commission implicitly tied any Pakistani withdrawal to Indian actions on demilitarization - there is no clutching at straws here except by you to somehow cast Pakistan as being obligated to perform an 'unconditional and unilateral withdrawal' to erroneously establish a violation of the UNSC resolutions.

""It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)
​

‘Indian actions on demilitarization’ was to be preceded by Pakistan’s ‘actions on demilitarization’ making it logically impossible to tie Pakistan’s withdrawal to Indian ‘actions’. That is in fact an absurd proposition. What it could have been contingent upon was the Indian _plan_ of demilitarization. But then, the Commission had explicitly detached Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Indian plan of demilitarization, it being a matter to be settled entirely between GoI and the Commission.

What makes Pakistan’s withdrawal unconditional and unilateral, is that it is irrelevant if Pakistan agreed (or disagreed) to the timing, manner and quantum of Indian withdrawal, so long as UN played the role of mediator. Pakistan had absolutely no say in any of this. It was all UN’s headache. Pakistan had to withdraw _in advance_, consequent on which India had to begin withdrawing in accordance to a plan, agreed upon by GoI and UN and published in public. UN was to _supervise_ the withdrawal to ensure that no country was at a disadvantage. Period.

Nothing, that I have posted, says anything otherwise – explicitly or implicitly.

The rejection of several proposals on demilitarization by India, on the pretext of 'disadvantage', when the goal was to in fact stall implementation of the UNSC resolutions and declare LoC == IB, does qualify as intransigence, but obviously not to the party guilty of it.

If you peel all the layers, you would find that India had rejected only ONE proposal regarding demilitarization. It was about the quantum of troops to be left on either side, immediately after demilitarization. The reason was Pakistan's deliberately twisted interpretation of 'local authority' in evacuated territory (in spite of repeated clarification by the Commission) and the perfidy in connection with disbanding and disarming the 'Azad forces'. The idea of converting LoC into IB was the most practical solution given Pakistan's insistence on not meeting its obligation on one pretext or the other and thereby holding up demilitarization and everything that was to follow from it.


It is easy to point fingers when ignorance is wisdom.

The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite to resolve the dispute of J&K as outlined in the UNSC resolutions - statements and actions tantamount to withdrawal from the resolutions was a violation of that commitment.

Wrong. The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite once certain very specific conditions were fulfilled. Non fulfillment of those conditions gave India every right to withdraw from the resolutions.

That statements do not tantamount to violation of any commitment, is another matter

Not aware of that process and what rationale the UN used to make/not make a decision - perhaps you can provide further details or links to them ...

Don't have any links. I will try to post some details later on.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

‘Indian actions on demilitarization’ was to be preceded by Pakistan’s ‘actions on demilitarization’ making it logically impossible to tie Pakistan’s withdrawal to Indian ‘actions’. That is in fact an absurd proposition. What it could have been contingent upon was the Indian _plan_ of demilitarization. But then, the Commission had explicitly detached Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Indian plan of demilitarization, it being a matter to be settled entirely between GoI and the Commission.

What makes Pakistan’s withdrawal unconditional and unilateral, is that it is irrelevant if Pakistan agreed (or disagreed) to the timing, manner and quantum of Indian withdrawal, so long as UN played the role of mediator. Pakistan had absolutely no say in any of this. It was all UN’s headache. Pakistan had to withdraw _in advance_, consequent on which India had to begin withdrawing in accordance to a plan, agreed upon by GoI and UN and published in public. UN was to _supervise_ the withdrawal to ensure that no country was at a disadvantage. Period.

Nothing, that I have posted, says anything otherwise – explicitly or implicitly.

Wrong - what you have posted cleary does condition Pakistani withdrawal to actions, or a plan of action that satisfied certain criteria the commission laid out - once again, read the text you yourself posted:

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)​

The underlying clearly makes a Pakistani withdrawal neither unilateral nor unconditional - any one with a rudimentary understanding of English can see that.

If you peel all the layers, you would find that India had rejected only ONE proposal regarding demilitarization. It was about the quantum of troops to be left on either side, immediately after demilitarization. The reason was Pakistan's deliberately twisted interpretation of 'local authority' in evacuated territory (in spite of repeated clarification by the Commission) and the perfidy in connection with disbanding and disarming the 'Azad forces'. The idea of converting LoC into IB was the most practical solution given Pakistan's insistence on not meeting its obligation on one pretext or the other and thereby holding up demilitarization and everything that was to follow from it.

Peeling the layers? You mean more excuses to explain away Indian intransigence - since the Indian goal was to stall in order to withdraw from its commitment.

It is easy to point fingers when ignorance is wisdom.

It is easy to point fingers when the party being accused is in fact guilty.

Wrong. The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite once certain very specific conditions were fulfilled. Non fulfillment of those conditions gave India every right to withdraw from the resolutions.

And where was the timeline for implementation of conditions, failing to meet which a party could determine that the commitment was null and void?

Barring an explicit timeline within the resolutions, your argument would theoretically allow for 'withdrawal from the commitment on the basis of non-implementation' after two days - and is therfore an invalid excuse for India's violation of her commitment to the UNSC resolutions.

That statements do not tantamount to violation of any commitment, is another matter

Statements followed up by actions in the form of the forcible annexation and integration of the disputed territory under Indian control - an explicit violation of the commitment to the UNSC resolutions that declare the territory disputed and the means of dispute resolution a plebiscite.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

AM,

Those UNSC resolutions are nothing more than junk paper if either India or Pak decide it is so.

Any agreement or treaty is 'junk paper' if no effective enforcement mechanism exists - by that yardstick the IWT is junk, Simla is junk etc. etc. Why should India be trusted with any agreement in the future?

If you mean something along the lines of "give us the valley - keep the rest" - it ain't gonna happen under threat of proxies and judging from Niaz's posting not by offer of peace too.....that which has taken blood/sweat to achieve is unlikely to be given away....

The basis of all this is not justice or the 'righteous' but power. The more powerful entity will prevail.....take the fact pakistan hasn't gotten anywhere with it's proxies or wars.....I for one would definitely be OK with India ceding kashmir for independence or change in territorial status quo but reality is different. Time for Pakistan to re-calibrate and define what is in it's best interest.

You have essentially dropped all pretense of having any legal or moral claim to J&K, nor any valid excuse to justify Indian occupation and subjugation of J&K, by resorting to the excuse of last resort for scoundrels and thugs - 'might is right'.

Since that is where you rest your case, do you then accept then that in return for India's forcible occupation and subjugation of Kashmir and the Kashmiri people, and the numerous atrocities inflicted upon those people by India in the effort to strengthen her occupation, Pakistan is well within its bounds to use covert and overt violent means, as it sees fit, to make Indian occupation and subjugation as costly for India as possible?

 

[toxic_pus]

We are just going in circles.

Wrong - what you have posted cleary does condition Pakistani withdrawal to actions, or a plan of action that satisfied certain criteria the commission laid out...

To the satisfaction of UN, yes. Not Pakistan.

That was the whole point of UN being there as a mediator. That was the whole point of negotiation between GoI and UN. That was the whole point of keeping Pakistan out from the negotiation. Because Pakistan’s obligation to withdraw was _absolute_, where withdrawal meant _complete_ evacuation of Pak nationals, Army and other fighting forces, while India’s obligation arose as and when Pakistan withdrew. Hence, timing, manner and quantum of Indian troop withdrawal needed to be determined to the satisfaction of UN. Not of Pakistan.

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

Again, it was UN to decide if plan of Indian withdrawal fulfilled the criteria. Not Pakistan. Pakistan was not even entitled to know about the terms and conditions, until the time of agreement. You also forgot to highlight the part that says _the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission_ which makes abundantly clear that it was not something that concerned Pakistan.

Besides, para 242 was the Commission’s response to Pakistan’s demand that withdrawal be ‘synchronized’ and that the only way to ensure such ‘synchronization’ was by sharing of information.

The Commission's reply regarding synchronization cannot be interpreted out of the context of the Resolution which, as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal. […] The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans. It was feasible, in the Commission's judgment and the Commission's military adviser had had this in mind, that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage.(para 242)​

The connotation of that quote becomes clear when read in the right context. And that is, the 'synchronization' was UN's responsibility. (Hence Indian plan needed to be to the satisfaction of UN.)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)[/I]

Give it a rest. The highlighted part is a reference to Part II/C of the Truce agreement. It states:

“Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communiqué containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.”​

That you have to fall back on questioning my understanding of rudimentary English, illustrates how desperately you want to see what you want to see. In spite of knowing that it is logically impossible for an action to be dependent on something that succeeds it and is in essence dependent on it, or in spite of UN clarifying in no uncertain terms that Pakistan’s withdrawal was not conditional to Indian plan of demilitarization you keep insisting that it was so. Your intransigence is now reaching new heights of absurdity.

Peeling the layers? You mean more excuses to explain away Indian intransigence - since the Indian goal was to stall in order to withdraw from its commitment.


It is easy to point fingers when the party being accused is in fact guilty.

Ignorance is indeed bliss.

And where was the timeline for implementation of conditions, failing to meet which a party could determine that the commitment was null and void?

Barring an explicit timeline within the resolutions, your argument would theoretically allow for 'withdrawal from the commitment on the basis of non-implementation' after two days - and is therfore an invalid excuse for India's violation of her commitment to the UNSC resolutions.

An agreement becomes null and void when, among other reasons, the other party to the agreement takes a position which makes it apparent, its intention to not perform. Pakistan’s declared stance on several issues (e.g. deliberate misinterpretation of ‘local authority’, refusing to disband and disarm ‘Azad’ force, insisting on simultaneous troop withdrawal to bring in ‘military balance’, refusal to accept its role, or the lack of it, in the process of negotiation, but more importantly, refusing to implement Part I/B & E of Cease Fire agreement etc.) made it clear that Pakistan didn’t want to withdraw. India was not under any compulsion to wait till infinity when it became apparent that no withdrawal was possible in the face of Pakistan's hardened stand.

One more time, incorporating Kashmir within the folds of Indian Constitution wasn’t illegal. There is nothing in any resolution that prevents India from administering Kashmir in a way that it deemed fit.

...the UNSC resolutions that declare the territory disputed and the means of dispute resolution a plebiscite.

No resolution at the UN was passed declaring the territory ‘disputed’. On the contrary, the Commission had explicitly assured India that the sovereignty of J & K would never be questioned. By virtue of Instrument of Accession, a substantial part of that sovereignty rested with India.

You can give this canard a rest too.

 

[rastor]

Since that is where you rest your case, do you then accept then that in return for India's forcible occupation and subjugation of Kashmir and the Kashmiri people, and the numerous atrocities inflicted upon those people by India in the effort to strengthen her occupation, Pakistan is well within its bounds to use covert and overt violent means, as it sees fit, to make Indian occupation and subjugation as costly for India as possible?

It's called sovereign entities. Pakistan is well within its bounds to do anything it pleases. And so does India. There is no inherent bounds or laws of morality that govern sovereign entities other than the fear of consequences. Calculate the cost & benefit of actions and arrive at a stratergy..........I feel that equation has changed for pakistan in the last decade w.r.t proxies.

 

[Hutchroy]

Tribal warriors —Ishtiaq Ahmed

For me, ‘tribal’ is not synonymous with Pukhtun. All Pukhtuns are not tribals, even when most tribals are Pukhtuns. Within tribals, the awareness about badal or retaliation upon which Pukhtunwali is based keeps them under control in such situations, but not in other situations

It happens, though seldom, that the central argument in an op-ed gets sidelined by a stray sentence. If someone were to ask me to tell what really was the bottom line in my op-ed ‘The 1947-48 Kashmir War’ (Daily Times, March 16, 2010), I would not hesitate a minute — it was to establish that the Kashmir War of 1947-48 was an irresponsible adventure.

However, what has captured the fancy of some people is the following formulation: “The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping.”

Some Pukhtuns found such wording objectionable. Within a matter of a few hours, I was branded a Punjabi chauvinist, an agent of the Pakistan military and much worse. I wrote another op-ed ‘Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Islam and non-violence’ (Daily Times, January 26, 2010), which the Pukhtuns liked very much but some Punjabis did not. The latest Pukhtun tirade is therefore quite ironical.

Let me admit that the formulation above is not one of my most precious ones, but I do not think it is entirely off the mark in relation to my understanding of culture. By culture I mean socially transmitted recurring behaviour patterns. They include beliefs, practices, customs, institutions, and ways of thinking and behaving. But cultures are anything but coherent systems. They are full of contradictions and tensions.

Cultures do not change, but change all the time; cultures are supposed to be consensus-based, but never are; those who speak on behalf of cultures actually speak for themselves. Cultures are full of confusion and tension and conflict. Within cultures there are many subcultures just as within nations there are many sub-nations and regional configurations. Therefore, when one finds something objectionable in a culture, it does not necessarily mean an indictment of that culture as a whole. I love Spanish music and its artistic achievements, but detest bullfighting because that spectacle is bloody and grotesque. The beast is struck by long daggers one after the other while thousands of spectators derive sadistic pleasure. Bullfighting is intrinsic to Spanish culture, but it is not the only measure of Spanish culture.

Those who believe in the purity or flawlessness of cultures or nations are the upholders of hollow myths. Pukhtunwali in the tribal areas is the most complete system of shutting out women from public life, while it simultaneously enables men to access the maliks and chiefs and take part in discussions on an egalitarian basis. Can one not condemn one aspect but praise another aspect of Pukhtunwali? I am most comfortable in Punjabi culture, but not all forms of it. Just go to any village a 100 kilometres away from Lahore and you will find the age-old caste divisions still a social fact. The landowners sit on chairs while the artisans and poor are always sitting on the ground. What is so great about such Punjabi culture?

When referring to the tribesmen who took part in the 1947-48 Kashmir War, I was not even in a remote sense thinking of all Pukhtuns. For me, ‘tribal’ is not synonymous with Pukhtun. All Pukhtuns are not tribals, even when most tribals are Pukhtuns. Within tribals, the awareness about badal or retaliation upon which Pukhtunwali is based keeps them under control in such situations, but not in other situations. European mercenaries who fight bloody wars in Africa tend to be ‘normal’ Frenchmen or Englishmen at home.

We have people claiming Pukhtun ancestry in Punjab, Bengal, Hyderabad Deccan and even in Tamil Nadu. The Khans of Bollywood are the heartthrob of millions, Zaheer Khan, Irfan Pathan and his brother Yusuf Pathan play great cricket. The Thespian, Dilip Kumar or Yusuf Khan, is a fine gem of Pukhtun ancestry. The late Madhubala is considered as the most perfect beauty that graced the silver screen. She was a Durrani Pukhtun by origin. So, for me Pukhtuns are not genetically prone to violence.

Yet, all this does not nullify a recurrent historical fact. From at least the time of Mahmud of Ghazni (around 1000 AD), invading armies have recruited warriors from the tribal area when they descended into the plains of the subcontinent. Such warriors looted, pillaged and raped wherever they went. The last of the bloodiest invasions were launched by Nadir Shah (1698-1747) and then Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722-1773) who raided India nine times, each time spilling innocent blood and causing destruction. A Punjabi saying from that time portrayed it in the following words: ‘Khada peeta laahey daa, te rehnda Ahmad Shahey daa’ (what we eat and drink is our property; the rest Ahmad Shah will take). Maharaja Ranjit Singh and afterwards the British put a stop to such raids on Punjab from the northwest.

Tribal lashkars were again in currency at the time of the partition of India. I have personally collected evidence of such hordes attacking Hindus and Sikhs in Jhelum, Gujrat and Lahore in July-August 1947. Again in 1965, when we were at war with India the qabailis (tribals) came down to Lahore for jihad. When they realised that it would entail getting strafed from the air by Indian fighter jets, they refused to move towards Wagah. Instead they turned on the shopkeepers of Lahore, taking away their things, eating without paying and generally creating a serious law and order situation. Altaf Gauhar has vividly described such scenes in his book on Ayub Khan. I am myself witness to that episode because I was in Lahore at that time.

Now, the central question is: why were the tribals and not any other group from somewhere else in Pakistan chosen to go into Kashmir in 1947? The answer must be that they alone had the reputation of being ruthless fighters, fully armed and not averse to killing. Then another question needs to be posed: what could be the motive of such warriors to join that war? The answer is that since they joined voluntarily an expedition that put their life at risk, they were at the minimum prepared to kill. That they looted, pillaged and raped as well shows that those were even stronger motives. It is not surprising they easily became cannon fodder during the Afghan jihad and now the Taliban prey on them. Pukhtuns from the settled areas, those who have received education and enjoy a better standard of living, are very different from them.

Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) and the South Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore. He is also Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stockholm University. He has published extensively on South Asian politics. At ISAS, he is currently working on a book, Is Pakistan a Garrison State? He can be reached at isasia@nus.edu.sg

 

[bat2k]

Any agreement or treaty is 'junk paper' if no effective enforcement mechanism exists - by that yardstick the IWT is junk, Simla is junk etc. etc. Why should India be trusted with any agreement in the future?

You have essentially dropped all pretence of having any legal or moral claim to J&K, nor any valid excuse to justify Indian occupation and subjugation of J&K, by resorting to the excuse of last resort for scoundrels and thugs - 'might is right'.

Since that is where you rest your case, do you then accept then that in return for India's forcible occupation and subjugation of Kashmir and the Kashmiri people, and the numerous atrocities inflicted upon those people by India in the effort to strengthen her occupation, Pakistan is well within its bounds to use covert and overt violent means, as it sees fit, to make Indian occupation and subjugation as costly for India as possible?

Dear AM,
Assuming that you are discussing with an open mind, I would suggest that:
1. You show this discussion to some Goras (basically someone who is logical and neutral beyond doubt in both our eyes) and take their opinion.
2. Remember this saying from another member's signature (posted earlier in this discussion) : A man may fail several times, but he isn't a failure till he starts to blame someone else. Its true for any entity including a country. If the focus of your existence remains India rather than your own development, no one can help you.

And about all your comments about Nehru being dubious etc. towards Pakistan, I do not understand what do you expect? Every human being has his hopes/fears/agendas and so does every nation. It was Nehru's job to ensure India's self interest (and his own as well!) of getting J&K to be part of India was preserved, just like it was Jinnah's job to ensure J&K goes to Pakistan; in both cases assuming that the local population was not opposed to them. The last point would be an endless debate because the state, despite being Muslim majority had a) Large non-Muslim areas completely opposed to Pakistan, and b) A large Muslim majority but still not in favour of Pakistan (they wanted independence; their leader definitely preferred India over Pakistan); so lets leave it at that.
Anyway, coming back to the point:
Why is Nehru hiding his fears or his backup options from public / Pakistan, dubious. Dubious would have been Nehru making false promises with the intention of breaking them. I do not know about any attempt on his part to mislead the people of Kashmir in any way. The conversations you have recited clearly convey that
1. He was concerned about the public opinion
2. He wanted to manage it, like any politician, and not by "managing" the votes, but by managing people's expectations (the job of every leader) and keeping them happy within India in the event of a plebiscite. His concerns are not unfounded because undoubtedly there were elements within Kashmir who wanted J&K to be part of Pakistan.

I would recommend you read more about Nehru before making up your mind - he had lots of flaws as a person and as a leader, but he was never dubious.
Please remember, he was the leader of India facing off with the leader of Pakistan. He would have been dubious if he had been not been promoting India's self interest. Nehru/Congress and Muslim League never had any trust in each other - so Nehru never let them down. So where is the question of Nehru ever cheating with ML/Pakistan?

If anything, Govt of Pakistan assuring Hari Singh of continued supply of resources and peace on the borders, and then going back on both, was dubious, to Hari singh. Will I blame them for it? No, because the Govt of Pakistan was trying to do its job. This sort of dubiousness should be expected in international diplomacy. Stop crying foul over this. The PA/govt had a brilliant plan that failed. High time the people are made to understand this and move on, rather than blaming one or two leaders for the repeated failure of definitely a brave army against a larger and more powerful neighbour. I would say that the Pakistani leadership that promotes myths like "1 Muslim = 1000 Kafirs" or "we have been let down by our leadership in wars despite having advantageous positions" is being dubious with its own people. And people like yourself who fool themselves are being dubious to their own self and to the nation. Pl wake up, for all of our sakes, but most so for your own.

 

[Saleem]

And BLA, SD and Northern alliance were boy scouts from india?

indian terror operations are no secret now.

it is trying to slaughter in kashmir for 20+ years. everyone agrees that insurgencies cannot exist without local support i.e. there must oppression which drives people to fight for an insurgency to start let alone thrive. it follows that indian terror in kashmir is responsibe for the peoples' attempt to defend themselves.

 

[jeebus]

There are hardly any credible neutral report on any of them linking to Indian agency while what relationship Taliban and Let share with ISI is very well know and vetted by credible organisations.

it is trying to slaughter in kashmir for 20+ years.

You have proven my point.. how come the Indian state "slaughter" only for the past 20+ years out of the 60+ years ... isn't it because that in 1989 is when pakistan started infiltrating kashmir with "terrorists" and the army had to fight an insurgency..... and your president himself acknowledged this by calling the kashmiri fighters "terrorists"....

I agree there is no smoke without fire, there have been some instances of injustices which have been/needs to be punished but all this situation is a problem started by a short sighted ISI who never thought the Frankenstein(taliban, LeT) it is creating will one day will bite its creator.

 

[asad71]

KASHMIR STORY-FIRST PERSON BY FM Sam MANEKSHAW

This eye witness account by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw MC, of the accession of Kashmir and the subsequent half way cease fire, before the objective was acheived, ( The root cause of the Kashmir problem,ever since ) will interest you a great deal.

------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -
'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir,
or do you want to give it away?'
Sam Manekshaw, the first field marshal in the Indian army, was at the ringside of events when Independent India was being formed. Then a colonel, he was chosen to accompany V P Menon on his historic mission to Kashmir. This is his version of that journey and its aftermath, as recorded in an interview with Prem Shankar Jha.
At about 2.30 in the afternoon, General Sir Roy Bucher walked into my room and said, 'Eh, you, go and pick up your toothbrush. You are going to Srinagar with V P Menon. The flight will take off at about 4 o'clock'. I said, 'why me, sir?'
'Because we are worried about the military situation..
V P Menon is going there to get the accession from the Maharaja and Mahajan.' I flew in with V P Menon in a Dakota. Wing Commander Dewan, who was then squadron leader Dewan, was also there. But his job did not have anything to with assessing the military situation. He was sent by the Air Force because it was the Air Force which was flying us in.'
Since I was in the Directorate of Military Operations, and was responsible for current operations all over India, West Frontier, the Punjab, and elsewhere, I knew what the situation in Kashmir was. I knew that the tribesmen had come in - initially only the tribesmen - supported by the Pakistanis.
Fortunately for us, and for Kashmir, they were busy raiding, raping all along. In Baramulla they killed Colonel D O T Dykes.. Dykes and I were of the same seniority. We did our first year's attachment with the Royal Scots in Lahore, way back in 1934-5. Tom went to the Sikh regiment. I went to the Frontier Force regiment. We'd lost contact with each other. He'd become a lieutenant colonel. I'd become a full colonel.
Tom and his wife were holidaying in Baramulla when the tribesmen killed them.
The Maharaja's forces were 50 per cent Muslim and 50 per cent Dogra.
The Muslim elements had revolted and joined the Pakistani forces. This was the broad military situation. The tribesmen were believed to be about 7 to 9 kilometers from Srinagar. I was sent into get the precise military situation. The army knew that if we had to send soldiers, we would have to fly them in. Therefore, a few days before, we had made arrangements for aircraft and for soldiers to be ready.
But we couldn't fly them in until the state of Kashmir had acceded to India. From the political side, Sardar Patel and V P Menon had been dealing with Mahajan and the Maharaja, and the idea was that V.P Menon would get the Accession, I would bring back the military appreciation and report to the government. The troops were already at the airport, ready to be flown in. Air Chief Marshall Elmhurst was the air chief and he had made arrangements for the aircraft from civil and military sources.
Anyway, we were flown in. We went to Srinagar. We went to the palace. I have never seen such disorganisation in my life. The Maharaja was running about from one room to the other. I have never seen so much jewellery in my life --- pearl necklaces, ruby things, lying in one room; packing here, there, everywhere. There was a convoy of vehicles.

The Maharaja was coming out of one room, and going into another saying, 'Alright, if India doesn't help, I will go and join my troops and fight (it) out'.
I couldn't restrain myself, and said, 'That will raise their morale sir'. Eventually, I also got the military situation from everybody around us, asking what the hell was happening, and discovered that the tribesmen were about seven or nine kilometres from what was then that horrible little airfield.
V P Menon was in the meantime discussing with Mahajan and the Maharaja. Eventually the Maharaja signed the accession papers and we flew back in the Dakota late at night. There were no night facilities, and the people who were helping us to fly back, to light the airfield, were Sheikh Abdullah, Kasimsahib, Sadiqsahib, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D P Dhar with pine torches, and we flew back to Delhi. I can't remember the exact time. It must have been 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock in the morning.
(On arriving at Delhi) the first thing I did was to go and report to Sir Roy Bucher. He said, 'Eh, you, go and shave and clean up. There is a cabinet meeting at 9 o'clock. I will pick you up and take you there.' So I went home, shaved, dressed, etc. and Roy Bucher picked me up, and we went to the cabinet meeting.
The cabinet meeting was presided by Mountbatten. There was Jawaharlal Nehru, there was Sardar Patel, there was Sardar Baldev Singh. There were other ministers whom I did not know and did not want to know, because I had nothing to do with them. Sardar Baldev Singh I knew because he was the minister for defence, and I knew Sardar Patel, because Patel would insist that V P Menon take me with him to the various states.
Almost every morning the Sardar would sent for V P, H M Patel and myself. While Maniben (Patel's daughter and de facto secretary) would sit cross-legged with a Parker fountain pen taking notes, Patel would say, 'V P, I want Baroda. Take him with you.' I was the bogeyman. So I got to know the Sardar very well.
At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ' come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?' I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in.
Everything was ready at the airport.
As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, 'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away'. He (Nehru) said,' Of course, I want Kashmir (emphasis in original). Then he (Patel) said 'Please give your orders'. And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, 'You have got your orders'.
I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o'clock or 12 o'clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took place. I became a brigadier, and became director of military operations and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the cease-fire on 1 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in the Military Operations Directorate.

Excerpted from Kashmir 1947, Rival Versions of History, by Prem Shankar Jha, Oxford University Press, 1996, Rs 275