The 1947-48 Kashmir War

[Renegade]

My dear Sir,


Version of events.

What do you call “Reliable”? Main point is whether instrument of accession was signed before the Indian troops landed at Kashmir or after?

Being an Indian, I would not think that you would accept my version. I have however read many news paper reports from that time as well as had the honor of listen to the version of events from Mujahid Awwal (Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan) himself.

It is not rocket science to realize that army actions need some kind of preparation. No one with rational thinking will claim that out of the blue; the Maharaja of Kashmir writes a letter to Mountbatten on 26th and next morning Indian forces are landing at Sri Nagar. It stands to reason to assume that Nehru had ordered IA be ready for Kashmir take over as soon as insurgency led by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan started ( October 21, 1947). He was waiting for the right moment. As soon as it was known that the Maharaja had fled his capital, Indian Army was order to move. It took about 24 hours (normal for forces on standby) for IA to land at Sri Nagar. Getting the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession after the event was a piece of cake.

Both versions are available in the literature if you research, but it is your choice what to believe.

Sir,

I approach your point about the timing of the 'Instrument of Accession' with an open mind, but can you provide proof of that!!?? Till no credible proof emerges which supports your point, i find it more sensible to stick the version of events as i know them.

From the current avilable sources we can establish beyond doubt that Pakistan has been the guilty party, the burden of invasion suqrely lying on its shoulders.

As for your point, that India had been preparing to grab Kashmir i would again ask you to read the above mentioned book. In which the author clearly states that India reacted with shock & made preperations in a hurry.

1. Indian troops were airlifted from Delhi by utilizing all available aircraft. Only one batallion of the Sikh regiment could be deployed initially. Had the Indians been preparing the quantity of deployment would have been much larger & faster.


Again, please read the mentioned book. There are many more points that will prove beyond doubt that the India resopnse was a reaction to what was happening & not an action plan prepared before hand.

 

[third eye]

Sir,

I approach your point about the timing of the 'Instrument of Accession' with an open mind, but can you provide proof of that!!?? Till no credible proof emerges which supports your point, i find it more sensible to stick the version of events as i know them.

From the current avilable sources we can establish beyond doubt that Pakistan has been the guilty party, the burden of invasion suqrely lying on its shoulders.

As for your point, that India had been preparing to grab Kashmir i would again ask you to read the above mentioned book. In which the author clearly states that India reacted with shock & made preperations in a hurry.

1. Indian troops were airlifted from Delhi by utilizing all available aircraft. Only one batallion of the Sikh regiment could be deployed initially. Had the Indians been preparing the quantity of deployment would have been much larger & faster.


Again, please read the mentioned book. There are many more points that will prove beyond doubt that the India resopnse was a reaction to what was happening & not an action plan prepared before hand.

Actually, it is of no relevance when the instrument was signed and if or not Indian troops were in J&K before or after.

The state had been invaded from the Pak side so no grouse can be held on the presence of Indian troops also in the state.

 

[DeathGod]

Stuff

Well what I can gather largely from your post is just an extension of blame game that continues to grow. The 'holier than thou ' defense wont work here though. Both sides have their share of wrongs and rights and no one will be able to prove who was more right.

If India gets LOC to be converted to IB and terrorism declines then she will have the bragging rights. Frankly I (maybe because I am an Indian) dont see any other possible solution.

Wars like 47-48 , 65 etc etc will be discussed over and over again but the ground situation wont change. I dont even care to discuss about these wars, lots of people lost their lives and its time we move ahead rather than living in the past.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Well what I can gather largely from your post is just an extension of blame game that continues to grow.

The usual answer when one cannot offer a rebuttal ...

 

[DeathGod]

The usual answer when one cannot offer a rebuttal ...

You're highly mistaken. The fact is that I dont have much knowledge (by reading reference and books and stuff) about the whole issue. I know what I know from the limited reading that I have done and have no authority over the subject.

However there will be many in India and world who will give you substantial rebuttal which you wont be able to defend on all grounds to say the least.

The undeniable truth is that these allegations will always continue and wont cease until we forget about the past. Dig it and live in it and its like digging graves of our sons and daughters to come.

 

[toxic_pus]

We did respect the UNSC resolutions - they call for tripartite negotiations between India, Pakistan and a UN representative to determine the details and process of demilitarization, details over which the two sides could never come to agreement.

The UNSC resolutions did not call for an unconditional, unilateral withdrawal on the part of Pakistan.

The Truce Agreement does talk of tripartite negotiations, but not to ‘determine the details and process of demilitarization’. Part II/B(1) reads:

“When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission”​

Nehru while seeking clarifications on the resolution of 13th Aug, 1948, had sought to identify the parties to the negotiation concerning demilitarization. He wrote to Joseph Korbel, the Chairman of the Commission, on 20th Aug, 1948 (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“...the paramount need for security is recognized by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.” (para 4)​

Joseph Korbel, wrote back, on 25th Aug, 1948, confirming Nehru’s interpretation (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation...”​

Pakistan, too, had sought clarification on this very issue. Joseph Korbel, in his letter to Zafarulla Khan, dated 3rd Sept, 1948, stated (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“As regards paragraphs B 1 and 2 of Part II, the Commission, while recognizing the paramount need for security of the State of Jammu ad Kashmir, confirms that the minimum strength required for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order, would be determined by the Commission and the Government of India. The Commission considers that it is free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan on the subject.”
​

In other words, India was neither obliged to negotiate with Pakistan nor to share information about demilitarization with anyone other than UN Commission. Neither did Pakistan have any right to dictate terms and conditions for its own withdrawal or seek information from India, or perhaps even from UN, about India’s withdrawal. Pakistan’s role was relegated to that of someone who Commission may ‘hear’, and not that of a party to the negotiation. As far as India was concerned, UN was ‘free to hear views’ of Jupiterions, if UN so desired.

UNCIP’s 3rd Report, clarifies the positions of the two countries on this issue of demilitarization and the process of negotiations.

''...the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces. (para 229)

India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfillment by the Government of Pakistan of the conditions of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces. (para 230)​

The Truce Agreement is clear that Pakistan would have to evacuate the territories captured by it and the local authority will be looking after the administration of the evacuated territory under the direct supervision of the UN Commission.

“Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.” [Part II/A(3)]​

By no stretch of imagination can this be construed that ‘the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side’. This deliberately flawed position of (a) led to (b). From Pakistan’s point of view, if it could be established that the withdrawal was about bringing in a ‘military balance’, it would then naturally mean that Pakistan got to decide what, for them, was an acceptable ‘military balance’. This in turn would mean that Pakistan’s withdrawal was contingent upon its agreement with Indian plan of withdrawal. It would then be very easy for Pakistan to weasel out of its own obligation by simply citing its disagreement with Indian plan of demilitarization. (That’s exactly what they did eventually and continue to do)

The Commission had on several occasions, clarified, that Pakistan had to ‘completely’ withdraw from the occupied part. The evacuated land was then to become UN’s concern and Pakistan had absolutely no role to play in it (not even in the subsequent plebiscite). Pakistan’s argument, based on its flawed premise, was in complete contradiction with the Commission’s clarifications. For example, UNCIP’s 3rd Report states:

“...the Resolution […], as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal.” (para 242)

“That Resolution does not suggest that Pakistan should be entitled to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultations envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of withdrawal of Indian troops. What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.” (para 243) ​

To summarise, (a) negotiations regarding demilitarization was very much a bipartite affair, where Pakistan had limited role to play, if at all it had any role to play, and (b) Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’, in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization.
___________________________

End Note:

UNCIP’s 1st Report was prepared by Mr Alfredo Lonazo, representative of Columbia and is dated 22, Nov, 1948. Commission’s chairman was Mr Joseph Korbel.

UNCIP’s 3rd Report was prepared by Mr Robert van de Karchove, representative of Belgium and is dated 9 Dec, 1949. Commission’s chairman was Mr Hernando Semper.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.”

In other words not an unconditional withdrawal, and therefore no violation by Pakistan of the UNSC resolutions.

 

[Hutchroy]

Assaulting the Pakhtun culture —Farhat Taj

I am not denying the fact that the tribal fighters did indulge in human rights violations in Kashmir. They should never have gone to Kashmir for that so-called jihad in 1947-48. It is also a fact that the entire tribal population of FATA never joined them. Only a tiny fraction of the population went for ‘jihad’. How can the activities of that fraction be labelled as ‘rooted’ in the culture of the entire population? Seemingly, many more Muslim Punjabis killed, pillaged and raped non-Muslim Punjabis and vice versa during the partition in 1947. I have yet to see any Pakhtun saying on a national level public forum like the Daily Times that all that savagery is rooted in the Punjabi culture.

Secondly, the tribesmen were encouraged and facilitated by the state to go to Kashmir for ‘jihad’. It was the responsibility of the state to have disciplined them. I am not ready to believe that indiscipline too is rooted in the Pakhtun culture. If so, how come the Pakistan Army has disciplined so many Pakhtun soldiers in their rank and file, including those from the tribal areas?

Please also read the following :

Bitter Chill of Winter - Tariq Ali

Back in Rawalpindi, Anwar had returned from his honeymoon and the invasion began. The key objective was to take Srinagar, occupy the airport and secure it against the Indians. Within a week the Maharaja’s army had collapsed. Hari Singh fled to his palace in Jammu. The 11th Sikh Regiment of the Indian Army had by now reached Srinagar, but was desperately waiting for reinforcements and didn’t enter the town. The Pathan tribesman under Khurshid Anwar’s command halted after reaching Baramulla, only an hour’s bus ride from Srinagar, and refused to go any further. Here they embarked on a three-day binge, looting houses, assaulting Muslims and Hindus alike, raping men and women and stealing money from the Kashmir Treasury. The local cinema was transformed into a rape centre; a group of Pathans invaded St Joseph’s Convent, where they raped and killed four nuns, including the Mother Superior, and shot dead a European couple sheltering there. News of the atrocities spread, turning large numbers of Kashmiris against their would-be liberators. When they finally reached Srinagar, the Pathans were so intent on pillaging the shops and bazaars that they overlooked the airport, already occupied by the Sikhs.

 

[toxic_pus]

What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.”

In other words not an unconditional withdrawal, and therefore no violation by Pakistan of the UNSC resolutions.

'Assurance' was never a problem. The Commission was there precisely to see that the demilitarization wasn't being carried on in a manner that might create an 'opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities'. For instance, in the words of Mr Robert van de Karchove, the UN rapporteur (UNCIP's 3rd Interim Report):

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)​

Further,

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)​

Besides, India had given plenty of 'assurance' that there would be no unilateral reopening of hostilities on its part, unless provoked.

In spite of all that Pakistan deliberately maintained an absurd stance,

"...(a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces" (para 230)​

Regarding 'synchronization' Mr Karchove observed:

"The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans." (para 242)​

Hence,

"The Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a "synchronization" which would have been incompatible with the terms of the Resolution of 13 August." (para 243)​

Clearly Pakistan was just looking for ways to shrug off its own responsibilities in a way that would enable it to blame India for all the failures.

'Assurance' was never a problem. Pakistan had plenty of it.

 

[niaz]

This is never ending debate. People keep asking about reliable source. Hon Sirs, nearly all the secondary sources that you refer have read the same old news reports that I have only difference is that of interpretation. Like saying a glass is half full or half empty.


The two essential parts of the resolution were:


3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission.

PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Following the UN Resolution, there were many attempts to resolve this issue as noted below:

Talks between Quaid-e-Azam and Mountbatten.

In November 1947, at Lahore talks took place between Quaid-e-Azam and Mountbatten in which Quaid-e-Azam initiated certain proposals in which the Governor Generals and the Prime Ministers of both the countries were scheduled to meet to find out solution to Kashmir. The talks between said dignitaries never took place due to backing out of Sardar Patel. [2]

Liaqat Nehru Report-1950.

In 1950, Mr., Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan visited new Delhi where he signed an agreement with his counterpart, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; which has come to be know as, “Liaquat – Nehru Pact”. This pact was followed in letter and spirit by Pakistan, while India tried to overlook. This pact was the first bilateral agreement between the Pakistan and the India but its results were not long lasting.

1953- Bogra Nehru Talks.

On 25 July 1953, the Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru held negotiations on the question of Kashmir in Karachi which were followed by another round of talks in New Delhi from 16 August. A joint communiqué issue at the end of talks reaffirmed that the Kashmir dispute needed to be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir through fair and impartial plebiscite. However when it came to implementation, India balked. [3]

1962 Talks.

1962 saw Sino –Indo conflict at the end of which India faced lot of pressure from international community to have solution of Kashmir. As a sequel to it, six rounds of talks were held between the foreign ministers of the two countries from December 27, 1962 to May 16, 1963 at Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Karachi, Calcutta and again Karachi and New Delhi. Various aspects of the Kashmir dispute were discussed, however the meetings concluded without any agreement due to Indian cunning attitude.

Special Edition (Liaqat Ali Khan)

The following is a link to a magazine which is part of the Hindu Newspapers group of India.

Of the India-Pakistan summit, 1955.

The relevant portion is quoted below;

The third reason is that in 1947 Nehru was confident of winning the plebiscite. Earlier volumes in the series record Nehru's retreat from plebiscite and moves for partition. One would suspect that when it concerned Kashmir, Nehru had reservations on a plebiscite even in 1947. Thus, he wrote to Abdullah on November 21, 1947: "Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and especially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present... If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now?... It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum..." (V. 4, pp. 336-7).
Nehru pleaded with the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947): "If the average Muslim (in Kashmir) feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere... The present position is that in Kashmir proper, the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months" (V. 4; p. 351).
Another consideration weighed with Nehru. He knew that a pro-Pakistan constituency existed in Kashmir. It has to be defeated or marginalised by winning over the people - through the plebiscite offer. Hence his wise counsel to the Sheikh on November 1, 1947: "The people must be made to feel that the question of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations" (V. 4; p. 300). Mountbatten's suggestion for reference to the U.N. came later, on December 8.
With Lord Ismay's help V. P. Menon and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of Pakistan's Cabinet, arrived at a Draft Kashmir Agreement in November which Ismay discussed with Nehru and Liaquat in detail on December 28, 1947. It had no chance of success given Nehru's attitude despite Liaquat's concessions (V.4; pp. 408-9).
Once the debates in the U.N. Security Council began in January 1948, Nehru became increasingly uneasy and confused. To Krishna Menon he mentioned two alternatives: "One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether" (February 20, 1949; V. 5; p. 222).
On February 26, Mountbatten proposed that "a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite" (V. 5; p. 232).
Unquote.

I restate my position that Nehru always wanted to grab Kashmir. Even strongly pro Indian Chief Minister of Kashmir, Sh. Abdullah revolted and was sentenced to imprisonment in 1953 when Nehru went back on his word. Sheikh Abdullah remained in Prison until after Nehru’s death in 1964, when all of a sudden all charges against him were dropped and he was reinstated.
Pakistanis feel cheated and bitter about the duplicity of Nehru and Sardar Patel. However the fact remains that India is without doubt militarily, economically, in men and materials numerically superior to Pakistan. It is a universal truth that “Might is always Right”.

 

[rastor]

However the fact remains that India is without doubt militarily, economically, in men and materials is numerically superior to Pakistan. It is a universal truth that “Might is always Right”.

Very true.

Sir, from reading your posts I have cultivated much respect for you. This is the sad reality....kashmir wants to be either independent or slide to pakistan but no Indian govt would agree to that. Ultimately pakistan has to reconcile itself to keeping what it has and accept that territorial re-organization is not the only way to solve this problem.....the only probable solution is along the lines of "keep what you have"......

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)


Further,

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)

Again, that only supports Pakistan's position that the withdrawal was in essence neither unilateral nor unconditional.

I fail to see how you can argue otherwise when you just posted material endorsing the point I was arguing?

Besides, India had given plenty of 'assurance' that there would be no unilateral reopening of hostilities on its part, unless provoked.

Did India not reject the demilitarization proposals presented by both McNaughton and Owen Dixon - so how exactly was not intransigent here and how exactly was the Indian rejection of the proposed demilitarization plans in consonance with the two paragraphs quoted above and not tantamount to Indian intransigence?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

.....the only probable solution is along the lines of "keep what you have"......

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

The status quo of LoC == IB is not acceptable to Pakistan, much as a plebiscite determining the status of the entire territory of J&K is not acceptable to India - a compromise solution different from these two positions needs to therefore be worked on, and was in a way under the backchannel dialog between Pakistan under Musharraf and the GoI.

 

[toxic_pus]

Again, that only supports Pakistan's position that the withdrawal was in essence neither unilateral nor unconditional.

I fail to see how you can argue otherwise when you just posted material endorsing the point I was arguing?

I think I have already clarified it in my earlier post. Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’ in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization. Pakistan had consistently tried to ‘condition’ its own withdrawal to India’s plan for demilitarization in spite of being repeatedly clarified otherwise by the Commission. That’s where Pakistan’s intransigence lies.

The materials that I have posted, illustrate that Pakistan was not entitled to seek any ‘assurance’ in any manner that was beyond what was already contained in the Truce Agreement itself and what the very presence of UN as a mediator ensured.

The argument that Pak withdrawal was ‘conditional’ upon ‘assurance’ is an argument in vacuum and altogether a desperate attempt to clutch at straw.

Did India not reject the demilitarization proposals presented by both McNaughton and Owen Dixon - so how exactly was not intransigent here and how exactly was the Indian rejection of the proposed demilitarization plans in consonance with the two paragraphs quoted above and not tantamount to Indian intransigence?

Firstly, rejection of any proposal which had the potential to place India at a disadvantage doesn’t automatically mean ‘intransigence’. Negotiation, by its very definition meant that India had the right to reject and/or offer terms and conditions.

Secondly, neither McNaughton nor Owen Dixon made any actionable proposals. McNaughton provided a broad framework for demilitarization and nothing more, while Dixon concentrated solely on the process of plebiscite. Why their proposals were rejected is another debate and deserves a separate thread.

 

[toxic_pus]

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

It is difficult of violate one's commitment when the opportunity to execute one's commitment never presented itself. But don't let these legal trivialities spoil your accusation game.

Regarding annexation, well, Pakistan took it to the UN and UN has till date not ruled it to be 'violation' of any commitment. But again, don't let these minor facts ruin your game.