Taliban Military Chief Mullah Baradar captured by Pakistan
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Of course it does. They won't be able to pay their fighters or have anywhere near as many weapons without indian help.
Bill Longley
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Pakistan always helped USA in War against Extremists. It was Americans who liked to bark on Indian instigations
remember we captured or killed Dadullah in 2007, and Obiedullah and few other top leaders in Past
its time US should stop barking (it has) and help Pakistan in fight against terror instead of doing TC of Indians
remember we captured or killed Dadullah in 2007, and Obiedullah and few other top leaders in Past
its time US should stop barking (it has) and help Pakistan in fight against terror instead of doing TC of Indians
S-2
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A lot to consider. A.M. highlighted Pakistani concerns, affronts and abridgements as seen by Carlotta Gall's contacts. He didn't highlight U.S. thoughts that Ms. Gall had also conveyed.
My thoughts- The arrest was important, without question. Baradar wasn't in Karachi on R&R, IMV. He works very hard, is sufficiently young, and has immense responsibilities. He is the financial conduit that sustains Taliban military operations. As such he receives money from a variety of sources and, in turn, dispenses that money. Thus his awareness of those networks is profound.
Dispensing funds goes hand-in-hand with operational requirements. He not only has bankrolled military operations but designs or shapes their strategic objectives before funding them. Thus Baradar has intimate awareness of the taliban's operational networks and key players down to a fairly deep level. He likely knows the names of low-level commanders whom he hasn't personally met so his reach is immense on both of the aforementioned fronts.
I don't know the status or objectives of negotiations from any perspective other than that available in open sources. As of four-six months ago, there was much speculation that the taliban were achieving an overwhelming military victory. Afghan elections had been a farce partially because of the inability to meaningfully penetrate into the southern Pashtun regions and draw large numbers of Pashtuns into the political process. Military operations were seen as stultified by the inability to raise forth adequate troops and police from the Afghan side.
Omar had repeatedly held that he wouldn't negotiate until ISAF forces had withdrawn from the region-at least from what little I'd read. I am only aware of efforts made in the KSA to see what possibilities existed to peel away Hekmatyar from that position. I understand that there is a member of Karzai's cabinet that is from the political wing of Hezb-i-islami, Hekmatyar's political party but I don't know the success of those talks. Jalaluddin Haqqani seems enfeebled from my readings and has largely turned over effective control of their network to his son Sirajuddin.
America has indicated that we see little gain to be made by attempting negotiations that lack good faith by the senior taliban leadership. The difference between RECONCILIATION and REINTEGRATION. Are people talking? Of course. How deeply and meaningfully is the key and it seems from all of those whom are willing to allude to such that many have their hands in the stew without improving, necessarily, the recipe. Like so much else, there are self-serving motives at play from simply feeding egos to posturing political end-goals and all that's in-between from the comments made by various officials.
To sum up negotiations, does anybody really know who is talking to whom and at what level of authority? I'm certain that nobody here does.
Baradar's capture puts paid the allegations long made. Whether under the thumb of the ISI or not, the Afghan insurgency is almost certainly directed from within Pakistan. That's more important for the future of this war than the past and must be viewed as water under the bridge. Where matters proceed from here is more important.
Baradar is charismatic. Whether he was thrown under the bus by hard-line elements of the afghan insurgency or even the ISI is speculative. His capture isn't the same as Dadullah's killing in 2007. The insurgency has evolved dramatically since then and his role has been paramount. Burning Baradar by whomever will considerably weaken the insurgency unless he was already well on his way out if for no other reason than he purportedly holds the keys to the bank vault. Without that having been transferred to others, those networks will have to be re-established and that takes time. Burning Baradar would also alienate a goodly portion of military commanders in the field whom owe Baradar their fealty.
We don't know enough. The permutations here are near endless. So too the future possibilities. Let's discuss those-
For true peace to occur, there must be a grand strategic reconciliation. I believe that any trust deficit existing between America and Pakistan, however pronounced and written upon, is superceded by the trust deficit existing between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.
The optimal objective is regionally earthshaking- a stabilized and INDEPENDANT Afghanistan with equally friendly relations existing with both India and Pakistan as well as CAR and Iran. A resolution of both the Durand line parallel with Kashmir that affords secure boundaries for all three nations seems critical to such. Achieving such requires the effective integration of Pashtun political aspirations while raising the standards of governance and diminishing corruption inside Afghanistan along with productive bi-lateral discussions on Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
There are strong non-governmental and unreconcilable forces opposed to such who will make every effort to derail either process. I have no road-map nor time-line to achieving either as we're so early in either game. Baradar may hold the key and this arrest certainly says SOMETHING about how Pakistan views matters-at least with respect to Afghanistan. It couldn't have happened without Pakistan's assistance and cooperation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They unquestionably had the lead on the tactical end and, quite possibly, all three levels.
I speculated last night that Kiyani holds the key here. There have been too many high level meetings with key American, NATO, and P.A. corps commanders of late to ignore that SOMETHING profound was in the works. Equally, America has been busy on other fronts as well-most notably India. I don't know the specifics of discussions between our officials and Singh but there are evidently new talks occurring regarding Kashmir.
I don't know much about Abdul Ghani Baradar except for the NEWSWEEK backgrounder but it indicates a thoughtful, careful, approachable man of some considerable intellect. He is old-school but seemingly with a very approachable and personal touch in his command relationships. Part of me wants to think he engineered his own bust but I'm disinclined to go THAT FAR...yet. He has perishable operational and tactical intelligence among a host of valuable insights but his value goes so far beyond those defined limits as to boggle my mind.
This is going to be really, really interesting in the weeks ahead. Sorry for the length but it's a deep and far-reaching bag of kittens to corral.
Thanks.
My thoughts- The arrest was important, without question. Baradar wasn't in Karachi on R&R, IMV. He works very hard, is sufficiently young, and has immense responsibilities. He is the financial conduit that sustains Taliban military operations. As such he receives money from a variety of sources and, in turn, dispenses that money. Thus his awareness of those networks is profound.
Dispensing funds goes hand-in-hand with operational requirements. He not only has bankrolled military operations but designs or shapes their strategic objectives before funding them. Thus Baradar has intimate awareness of the taliban's operational networks and key players down to a fairly deep level. He likely knows the names of low-level commanders whom he hasn't personally met so his reach is immense on both of the aforementioned fronts.
I don't know the status or objectives of negotiations from any perspective other than that available in open sources. As of four-six months ago, there was much speculation that the taliban were achieving an overwhelming military victory. Afghan elections had been a farce partially because of the inability to meaningfully penetrate into the southern Pashtun regions and draw large numbers of Pashtuns into the political process. Military operations were seen as stultified by the inability to raise forth adequate troops and police from the Afghan side.
Omar had repeatedly held that he wouldn't negotiate until ISAF forces had withdrawn from the region-at least from what little I'd read. I am only aware of efforts made in the KSA to see what possibilities existed to peel away Hekmatyar from that position. I understand that there is a member of Karzai's cabinet that is from the political wing of Hezb-i-islami, Hekmatyar's political party but I don't know the success of those talks. Jalaluddin Haqqani seems enfeebled from my readings and has largely turned over effective control of their network to his son Sirajuddin.
America has indicated that we see little gain to be made by attempting negotiations that lack good faith by the senior taliban leadership. The difference between RECONCILIATION and REINTEGRATION. Are people talking? Of course. How deeply and meaningfully is the key and it seems from all of those whom are willing to allude to such that many have their hands in the stew without improving, necessarily, the recipe. Like so much else, there are self-serving motives at play from simply feeding egos to posturing political end-goals and all that's in-between from the comments made by various officials.
To sum up negotiations, does anybody really know who is talking to whom and at what level of authority? I'm certain that nobody here does.
Baradar's capture puts paid the allegations long made. Whether under the thumb of the ISI or not, the Afghan insurgency is almost certainly directed from within Pakistan. That's more important for the future of this war than the past and must be viewed as water under the bridge. Where matters proceed from here is more important.
Baradar is charismatic. Whether he was thrown under the bus by hard-line elements of the afghan insurgency or even the ISI is speculative. His capture isn't the same as Dadullah's killing in 2007. The insurgency has evolved dramatically since then and his role has been paramount. Burning Baradar by whomever will considerably weaken the insurgency unless he was already well on his way out if for no other reason than he purportedly holds the keys to the bank vault. Without that having been transferred to others, those networks will have to be re-established and that takes time. Burning Baradar would also alienate a goodly portion of military commanders in the field whom owe Baradar their fealty.
We don't know enough. The permutations here are near endless. So too the future possibilities. Let's discuss those-
For true peace to occur, there must be a grand strategic reconciliation. I believe that any trust deficit existing between America and Pakistan, however pronounced and written upon, is superceded by the trust deficit existing between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.
The optimal objective is regionally earthshaking- a stabilized and INDEPENDANT Afghanistan with equally friendly relations existing with both India and Pakistan as well as CAR and Iran. A resolution of both the Durand line parallel with Kashmir that affords secure boundaries for all three nations seems critical to such. Achieving such requires the effective integration of Pashtun political aspirations while raising the standards of governance and diminishing corruption inside Afghanistan along with productive bi-lateral discussions on Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
There are strong non-governmental and unreconcilable forces opposed to such who will make every effort to derail either process. I have no road-map nor time-line to achieving either as we're so early in either game. Baradar may hold the key and this arrest certainly says SOMETHING about how Pakistan views matters-at least with respect to Afghanistan. It couldn't have happened without Pakistan's assistance and cooperation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They unquestionably had the lead on the tactical end and, quite possibly, all three levels.
I speculated last night that Kiyani holds the key here. There have been too many high level meetings with key American, NATO, and P.A. corps commanders of late to ignore that SOMETHING profound was in the works. Equally, America has been busy on other fronts as well-most notably India. I don't know the specifics of discussions between our officials and Singh but there are evidently new talks occurring regarding Kashmir.
I don't know much about Abdul Ghani Baradar except for the NEWSWEEK backgrounder but it indicates a thoughtful, careful, approachable man of some considerable intellect. He is old-school but seemingly with a very approachable and personal touch in his command relationships. Part of me wants to think he engineered his own bust but I'm disinclined to go THAT FAR...yet. He has perishable operational and tactical intelligence among a host of valuable insights but his value goes so far beyond those defined limits as to boggle my mind.
This is going to be really, really interesting in the weeks ahead. Sorry for the length but it's a deep and far-reaching bag of kittens to corral.
Thanks.
fatman17
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"For true peace to occur, there must be a grand strategic reconciliation. I believe that any trust deficit existing between America and Pakistan, however pronounced and written upon, is superceded by the trust deficit existing between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan."
why bring India in this IMO Pak/Afghan reconciliation - I dont agree with the oft-bandied notion that peace in afghanistan runs through Kashmir.
Kashmir is a 'bi-lateral' issue between India/Pakistan-period! no Afghanistan there- so why then this 3rd party in this IMO a Pak/Afghan 'bi-lateral' issue. here the US can play its 'good offices' to greater use and get both parties to move forward towards a overall 'reintegration' or 'reconciliation' whichever works.
lets keep it simple folks!
why bring India in this IMO Pak/Afghan reconciliation - I dont agree with the oft-bandied notion that peace in afghanistan runs through Kashmir.
Kashmir is a 'bi-lateral' issue between India/Pakistan-period! no Afghanistan there- so why then this 3rd party in this IMO a Pak/Afghan 'bi-lateral' issue. here the US can play its 'good offices' to greater use and get both parties to move forward towards a overall 'reintegration' or 'reconciliation' whichever works.
lets keep it simple folks!
S-2
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"Kashmir is a 'bi-lateral' issue between India/Pakistan-period!"
I must have written too much for your tired eyes, sir-
"...along with productive bi-lateral discussions on Kashmir between India and Pakistan."
"lets keep it simple folks!"
Let's read carefully folks!
Thanks.
I must have written too much for your tired eyes, sir-
"...along with productive bi-lateral discussions on Kashmir between India and Pakistan."
"lets keep it simple folks!"
Let's read carefully folks!
Thanks.
Valiant_Soul
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The Pakistani media's response to the arrest of top Afghan Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has been surprisingly muted.
Mullah Baradar was arrested near Karachi in a joint raid by the CIA and the Pakistani military's intelligence service on 8 February.
The arrest made international headlines throughout the day on Tuesday.
But Pakistani newspapers and television channels barely covered the news, with some completely ignoring it.
Analysts say the blackout was because Pakistan's government and the army are wary of being seen as an American poodle.
'Ignored'
Most newspapers on Wednesday morning relegated the story either to the lower half of their front page, or to the back page.
And all confined themselves to excerpts from the New York Times report - which broke the story on Tuesday - and the curt reactions of US and Pakistani officials.
The only exception was the Dawn newspaper which carried a detailed follow-up of the story, explaining when and where Mullah Baradar was captured - information that the New York Times report did not include.
The electronic media, which has greater outreach in a country like Pakistan with its low literacy rate, totally ignored the news except in their early morning bulletins which broadcast the news quoting the New York Times report.
There was a complete blackout of the story in all the top-of-the-hour bulletins after midday on Tuesday.
This has surprised many in Pakistan, given that a vibrant private-sector electronic media has lately shown itself to be aggressively competitive in digging up important news and follow-up stories.
Because Tuesday was otherwise a slow day for news, journalists cannot argue that they did not have enough time to examine the implications of the arrest.
Many believe that their muted response is indicative of the extent to which the Pakistani security establishment can influence the media.
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which helped the CIA arrest Mullah Baradar, is widely understood to be well outside the control of the government and is more directly linked with the military.
Analysts say the story was downplayed because it would have raised uncomfortable questions over the military's collaboration with the US, especially at a time when the army had not yet confirmed the arrest and had not formulated its public response.
Any collaboration with the US in its "war on terror" in Afghanistan has become increasingly unpopular since an elected government took power in 2008.
Some of the criticism has emanated from the military itself.
Observers feel that there would have a been an uproar in the media had the arrest taken place with the approval of the political establishment.
'Muted' Pakistan media response to Taliban arrest
Mullah Baradar was arrested near Karachi in a joint raid by the CIA and the Pakistani military's intelligence service on 8 February.
The arrest made international headlines throughout the day on Tuesday.
But Pakistani newspapers and television channels barely covered the news, with some completely ignoring it.
Analysts say the blackout was because Pakistan's government and the army are wary of being seen as an American poodle.
'Ignored'
Most newspapers on Wednesday morning relegated the story either to the lower half of their front page, or to the back page.
And all confined themselves to excerpts from the New York Times report - which broke the story on Tuesday - and the curt reactions of US and Pakistani officials.
The only exception was the Dawn newspaper which carried a detailed follow-up of the story, explaining when and where Mullah Baradar was captured - information that the New York Times report did not include.
The electronic media, which has greater outreach in a country like Pakistan with its low literacy rate, totally ignored the news except in their early morning bulletins which broadcast the news quoting the New York Times report.
There was a complete blackout of the story in all the top-of-the-hour bulletins after midday on Tuesday.
This has surprised many in Pakistan, given that a vibrant private-sector electronic media has lately shown itself to be aggressively competitive in digging up important news and follow-up stories.
Because Tuesday was otherwise a slow day for news, journalists cannot argue that they did not have enough time to examine the implications of the arrest.
Many believe that their muted response is indicative of the extent to which the Pakistani security establishment can influence the media.
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which helped the CIA arrest Mullah Baradar, is widely understood to be well outside the control of the government and is more directly linked with the military.
Analysts say the story was downplayed because it would have raised uncomfortable questions over the military's collaboration with the US, especially at a time when the army had not yet confirmed the arrest and had not formulated its public response.
Any collaboration with the US in its "war on terror" in Afghanistan has become increasingly unpopular since an elected government took power in 2008.
Some of the criticism has emanated from the military itself.
Observers feel that there would have a been an uproar in the media had the arrest taken place with the approval of the political establishment.
'Muted' Pakistan media response to Taliban arrest
seekers
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"Kashmir is a 'bi-lateral' issue between India/Pakistan-period!"
I must have written too much for your tired eyes, sir-
"...along with productive bi-lateral discussions on Kashmir between India and Pakistan."
"lets keep it simple folks!"
Let's read carefully folks!
Thanks.
Why not talk over Pakistan-US Bilateral relations??
Pakistan is Key partner in US War on terror but .........
US. is keep suffocating the dying Textile industry of Pakistan.
Bangladesh,Sri-lanka ,Jordan are enjoying Free trade with doing nothing in war on terror.
Textile industry has 60% share in Pakistan Export and US. is major buyer of Pakistan textile.
With Free-trade agreement Pakistan could revive Its economy and could be get rid of more debts.
fawwaxs
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White House declines to discuss Baradar’s arrest
WASHINGTON: The White House on Tuesday refused to discuss publicly the arrest of the Taliban’s military chief in Karachi about seven days ago but did not reject the suggestion that he had been captured.
Earlier, while speaking to various news outlets, US officials confirmed that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was arrested in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and US intelligence forces.
“This is a major player in the Afghan Taliban, someone with a lot of blood on his hands,” a senior US official told Fox News. “If he’s off the streets, it would be a serious setback for the Taliban in the near term and deal a severe personal blow to Mullah Omar, who has relied on him for years as a trusted associate.”
Mullah Baradar’s arrest was also confirmed by the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry who told CBS News that his capture was proof of a “stronger cooperative effort” between the United States and Pakistan.
Speaking form Islamabad, where he was briefed about Mullah Baradar’s arrest, the senator described the catch as a signal that “Pakistan will pursue militants who engage in violent extremist acts against its people.” The Pakistani government, he said, knew that “this fight is their fight”.
At the White House, Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said he was not going to get into details “about this individual or others”, when asked what Mullah Baradar’s arrest meant for the US-led war against terror.
Asked why it was important not to talk about it, Mr Gibbs said: “Obviously this involves very sensitive intelligence matters, this involves the collection of intelligence, and it is best to do that and not to necessarily talk about it.”
Commenting on the suggestion that the arrest indicated greater cooperation between Pakistani and United States intelligence agencies, Mr Gibbs said: “I think we have, over the course of many months, seen an increase in that cooperation.”
Since last spring, he added, the United States had “seen increase in the Pakistani push back on extremists in their own country, which is beneficial not simply for us”, but for Pakistan as well.
The Pakistanis, he said, had realised that the extremist operating within their border threatened their country as well.
The White House press secretary agreed with the suggestion that the successful military operation in Swat encouraged Pakistan to increase its cooperation with the US.
“We have had, through engagement, an increased amount of cooperation with them.
“We’re working constructively with them, meeting with them regularly. We have a better intelligence-sharing capability,” said Mr Gibbs.
“I don’t think it’s an either/or. I think, in this case, as I said in my first answer, I think their realization of what was happening within their own country and the threat that it posed also played a big part in changing their actions.”
Asked if Mullah Baradar’s capture vindicated the Obama administration’s anti-terrorism policies, the White House Press Secretary said: “We’re not looking for a vindication.
“The president has taken strong steps to make sure that we’re doing everything we can to keep our country safe.”
If talking about Mullah Baradar’s arrest was going to endanger the United States mission in the Pak-Afghan region, why the news of the arrest became public, asked a journalist.
“Well, I will say this -- well, I’m — I’m not going to do this. I said I wasn’t and I’m not going to get dragged into -- look, anytime classified information becomes public, it’s never helpful,” said Mr Gibbs.
WASHINGTON: The White House on Tuesday refused to discuss publicly the arrest of the Taliban’s military chief in Karachi about seven days ago but did not reject the suggestion that he had been captured.
Earlier, while speaking to various news outlets, US officials confirmed that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was arrested in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and US intelligence forces.
“This is a major player in the Afghan Taliban, someone with a lot of blood on his hands,” a senior US official told Fox News. “If he’s off the streets, it would be a serious setback for the Taliban in the near term and deal a severe personal blow to Mullah Omar, who has relied on him for years as a trusted associate.”
Mullah Baradar’s arrest was also confirmed by the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry who told CBS News that his capture was proof of a “stronger cooperative effort” between the United States and Pakistan.
Speaking form Islamabad, where he was briefed about Mullah Baradar’s arrest, the senator described the catch as a signal that “Pakistan will pursue militants who engage in violent extremist acts against its people.” The Pakistani government, he said, knew that “this fight is their fight”.
At the White House, Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said he was not going to get into details “about this individual or others”, when asked what Mullah Baradar’s arrest meant for the US-led war against terror.
Asked why it was important not to talk about it, Mr Gibbs said: “Obviously this involves very sensitive intelligence matters, this involves the collection of intelligence, and it is best to do that and not to necessarily talk about it.”
Commenting on the suggestion that the arrest indicated greater cooperation between Pakistani and United States intelligence agencies, Mr Gibbs said: “I think we have, over the course of many months, seen an increase in that cooperation.”
Since last spring, he added, the United States had “seen increase in the Pakistani push back on extremists in their own country, which is beneficial not simply for us”, but for Pakistan as well.
The Pakistanis, he said, had realised that the extremist operating within their border threatened their country as well.
The White House press secretary agreed with the suggestion that the successful military operation in Swat encouraged Pakistan to increase its cooperation with the US.
“We have had, through engagement, an increased amount of cooperation with them.
“We’re working constructively with them, meeting with them regularly. We have a better intelligence-sharing capability,” said Mr Gibbs.
“I don’t think it’s an either/or. I think, in this case, as I said in my first answer, I think their realization of what was happening within their own country and the threat that it posed also played a big part in changing their actions.”
Asked if Mullah Baradar’s capture vindicated the Obama administration’s anti-terrorism policies, the White House Press Secretary said: “We’re not looking for a vindication.
“The president has taken strong steps to make sure that we’re doing everything we can to keep our country safe.”
If talking about Mullah Baradar’s arrest was going to endanger the United States mission in the Pak-Afghan region, why the news of the arrest became public, asked a journalist.
“Well, I will say this -- well, I’m — I’m not going to do this. I said I wasn’t and I’m not going to get dragged into -- look, anytime classified information becomes public, it’s never helpful,” said Mr Gibbs.
fawwaxs
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