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Taiwan Simulates Chinese Invasion

The problem with your argument is that unlike Iraq who stood alone, Taiwan will have US support in the EM spectrum. So, not only can Taiwanese forces talk to each other and with US with impunity, odds are better than 50/50 that the Taiwanese can even present effective countermeasures against the PLA. Not only that, Taiwan defense forces have invested decades of planning at decoy radio stations designed to simulate vital units.


Odds are good, like maybe %99 certainty, that I am the only person on this forum who seen an AESA radar in action.

Even though an AESA radar equipped fighter do have a technical advantage over a non-AESA opponent, tactical employment can make up the difference. Among the best examples of tactical employment that defeated technical superiority is Operation Bolo where US F-4s shot down half the North Vietnamese MIG-21s in one day. The main advantage of an AESA system is true multi-tasking which includes true multiple targets engagements. Taiwanese fighters do not have to engage the PLAAF fighters directly. All Taiwan has to do is create sufficient uncertainty over Taiwan and strait airspace. Without PLAAF air supremacy over the strait, no amphibious launch is possible.


After Desert Storm, US airpower analysts turned their attention on Taiwan as an intellectual exercise. I will not say when. The group contains US Air Force and Navy.

Back in DS, US airpower planners laid out two lists of target levels: important and critical.

The 'important' list contained nearly 700 targets. The 'critical' list was about 1/10th. US airpower planners decided to focus on the 'critical' list. Even with such a magnitude difference of targets, we still took about 40 days of heavy bombardment on those critical targets.

For Taiwan, if it was US who would attack Taiwan, a much smaller geographical area than Iraq, we identified nearly 1200 'important' targets and almost 1/2 qualified as 'critical' due to terrain and decades of Taiwanese planning at deception and hardening. Taiwanese runway rapid repair crews are well trained and equipped, and most fighter-bombers can take off in 2/3 of their peacetime runway length. After a missile barrage, Taiwan can deploy fake craters and simulated damages designed to delay intelligence gathering and analyses.

Here is an example of the minimum runway repaired length to return a runway to fully operational status...

KCMzQBn.jpg


That went back to the Cold War days where even C-130s can take off in that runway length. Further, most Taiwan roads can support fighter-bombers and the ROCAF routinely trained for that contingency. Not only are all air bases and airports must be targeted, since the goal is an amphibious landing, the entire western coast must be targeted because any point can be used to attack the few amphibious landing sites. Compound the problem for the PLAN is that those potential amphibious landing sites are mined and laid with various structural traps, not only as deterrence but also for destruction, making an amphibious landing difficult if not outright impossible. The mountains offers plenty of cover for artillery and missile batteries targeted specifically at those potential amphibious landing sites.

So the PLA is looking at weeks of heavy bombardment while fending off harassment from ground and air against an opponent who is supported by US.


It really is amazing that you do not give US enough credit at submarine operations, especially since China have not contributed anything to the arts and crafts of submarine and submarine operations since the submarine was invented in the first place.

Do you really think that there are no US sub nor have not been in that area all these yrs? We probably know the area better than you do. I work with a few former navy guys, enlisted and officers. We have the usual 'shop talks' and the subject of Taiwan came up. The consensus is that if there is a US sub in the eastern side of the island, it will be the ONLY sub in the area. PLAN subs will be on the bottom and flooded. The PLAN to conduct ASW? Sure. But that mean no attack from Taiwan coastal missile batteries on those ASW operations?


In summary, the PLA is not the US military, and Taiwan is not Iraq.

Just addressing a few issues:

Taiwan is too close to the mainland. The minute they take off they can scanned and targeted by AWAC and surface Navy air defense, since all of Taiwan is within 300 km of the mainland, well within range of 055 and 052D destroyers at dock. Based on your previous posts you believe AESA equipped air defense destroyers like the AB to be extremely powerful in air defense. And yet you somehow discount the entire PLAN air defense fleet. Taiwan also has no answers to the PLAN surface fleet because they have WW2 era subs and 1970s surface combatants. There is no way for them to stop a 055 destroyer, especially one backed by land based aviation, radar stations and AWACs. How do they get around that?

If they don't engage the PLAAF then strike bombers can keep hitting their infrastructure. They won't get an opportunity to repair, within minutes to hours of missile impact the PLAAF can be flying strike packages in. How fast does a repair take? Hours minimum, it isn't instantaneous. You can't repair while missiles and bombs are coming down. This forces their remaining fighters to take off or risk being destroyed on the ground. But if they take off they'll need to engage or run. If they engage they'll lose. If they run then they might as well have been destroyed.

Subs: how are Taiwanese going to stop helicopter and fixed wing ASW patrols if they can't even take off without being scanned by AWAC radar or naval air defense radar and shot at? Most of their airbases are on the west side of the island.

And why the fixation on contested amphibious landing? PLAAF can just bomb infrastructure in Taiwan like US did in Iraq. you stated that the Taiwanese strategy should be to not engage PLAAF fighters, how are they able to stop multirole J-10 and J-16 from bombing their power plants, bridges, water treatment plants, oil refineries and other economic targets?

@gambit

BTW, this is the Han Kuang exercise. This is the annual Taiwanese military exercise, taking place since 1984, which shows how Taiwan ACTUALLY fights, not how you'd imagine them to fight. Have a good look.


they're going to line up all their tanks and artillery in nice little rows, on the beach, in the open. they're going to send their fighters out into the strait hoping to take on the PLAAF and PLAN in the middle of the Taiwan strait where they'll be up against 20+ air defense destroyers, 1000+ combat aircraft and 10+ AWACs - which is still just a fraction of the PLAAF and PLAN.

it's almost comical. they're going to get blown away within hours.
 
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And why the fixation on contested amphibious landing?
I have the same fixation about amphibious landing as the PLA leadership does.

In WW II, Germany was already in retreat from combat losses on land, Operation Overlord to invade Normandy was an option. A successful attack from a different front would put additional pressure on Germany. Even if Overlord failed, Germany would still be defeated, albeit at a later time.

In Desert Storm, the allies attacked from land with an amphibious feint. A feint implies a viable option and if an option is viable, then it is believable or can be made believable. The Allies chose not to exercised that option whereby a feint was employed to convince an opponent of that option. And the Iraqi military was convinced and eventually deceived.

For Taiwan, can China feint an attack from anywhere other than the sea? No. An amphibious invasion is the only way, making WW II Operation Overlord, aka 'D-Day', the only comparison.

D-Day was in June 4, 1944.

I have a homework assignment for you. Keywords search: "sea state", "tides", "Taiwan Strait". "D-Day", and "amphibious" .

But to sum it up...

Examples of sea state in Taiwan Strait:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs...scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=umgt20
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.00038/full
Generally, wind stress is strong during the winter in the Taiwan Strait (Jan et al., 2002), and it induces violent waves...

D-Day sea state:
https://www.ecmwf.int/en/research/projects/era-clim/d-day-analyses
Maximum heights drop below 2 m in the middle of the Channel during the early hours of 7 June, and are below one metre over the route between the Isle of Wight and Normandy by late evening, associated with the weaker, northerly winds, with shorter fetch.

Training for D-Day:
https://www.historyextra.com/period...y-the-training-was-deadlier-than-the-assault/
From the autumn of 1943, all the assault troops due to land in the first few days were given amphibious training at the Combined Training Centres in Inveraray and Castle Toward...

What this mean is that even outside the winter months, the PLA have a limited window of at best %20 for the rest of the yr for invasion. That is why I said earlier in the debate that BOTH China and Taiwan would know the exact week, if not the exact day, of an amphibious launch to invade Taiwan.

So for the PLA to invade Taiwan, using 1944's Operation Overlord, aka 'D-Day', as a guide and that the PLA have no successful amphibious operation in its history:

- It would be at least ONE YEAR of training,
- Estimate of about 600 ships,
- Ship captains and their execs, and the landing troops cannot, or should not, be reassigned.​

Fatalities during training would be inevitable, which mean there would be a reserve of replacement troops. For the invasion to be successful, all troop landing ships must arrive at multiple targets at the same time. And we know that Taiwan would know where those landing sites are.

But even before training begin, not just Taiwan but the entire world would know the signs of a buildup, just like how Desert Shield was such a buildup.

The signs would be:

- Logistics
- Propaganda
- Economics
- Financial
- Taiwan overflights
- International pressure by China on other countries​

What do you think the odds of Taiwanese sabotage at logistics, economics, and financial? You can bet your next yr's salary that Taiwanese agents and Chinese sympathizers will be readied.

A few months after the liberation of the Nazi death camps, Eisenhower toured those sites and he said: "We are told the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for. Now, at least, we know what he is fighting against."

Let us break that comment into two, shall we? Despite what China state media may say, not all Chinese are united for a military resolution regarding Taiwan. Enough mainlanders are willing to let Taiwan go even if they know militarily speaking, Taiwan could be defeated. In other words, there are plenty of Chinese who do not CARE, let alone know, what they will be fighting for. On the other hand, nearly all Taiwanese want nothing to do with China, in other words, nearly all Taiwanese know what they are fighting against.

All Taiwan, and their Chinese sympathizers, have to do is whatever they can to move China outside of that narrow 20 chance window. Taiwan may even launch preemptive military strikes at multiple buildup sites. China would respond militarily, of course, but the damages would have been done. It would take months, well into the next year, for China to plan for another invasion attempt. In order to secure safe transit, PLA must degrade Taiwan defense to below %50 capabilities. Iraq did nothing during Desert Shield. Taiwan will be proactive during PLA buildup for invasion. Can China continuously bomb Taiwan over months to protect the rebuilding of that invasion fleet? No.

There is no valid comparison for China with Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Back then, Iraq was the aggressor. Today, China WILL be perceived as the latest Iraq and Taiwan will be liken to Kuwait -- the victim of an aggressor.

As China retaliate against Taiwan for damaging the invasion fleet while the fleet was under buildup, Taiwan will be executing a 'force preservation' war doctrine. Simply speaking, Taiwan will ride it out because BOTH sides know the PLA cannot maintain that tempo. Images of war destruction from Taiwan will be available for the world to see and Taiwan will gain sympathy. Of course, China will be censored by the Party.

So already, China's plan for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan is at least 50/50 vulnerable. If Operation Overlord had that odds, it would not have been executed.
 
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I have the same fixation about amphibious landing as the PLA leadership does.

In WW II, Germany was already in retreat from combat losses on land, Operation Overlord to invade Normandy was an option. A successful attack from a different front would put additional pressure on Germany. Even if Overlord failed, Germany would still be defeated, albeit at a later time.

In Desert Storm, the allies attacked from land with an amphibious feint. A feint implies a viable option and if an option is viable, then it is believable or can be made believable. The Allies chose not to exercised that option whereby a feint was employed to convince an opponent of that option. And the Iraqi military was convinced and eventually deceived.

For Taiwan, can China feint an attack from anywhere other than the sea? No. An amphibious invasion is the only way, making WW II Operation Overlord, aka 'D-Day', the only comparison.

D-Day was in June 4, 1944.

I have a homework assignment for you. Keywords search: "sea state", "tides", "Taiwan Strait". "D-Day", and "amphibious" .

But to sum it up...

Examples of sea state in Taiwan Strait:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs...scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=umgt20
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.00038/full
Generally, wind stress is strong during the winter in the Taiwan Strait (Jan et al., 2002), and it induces violent waves...

D-Day sea state:
https://www.ecmwf.int/en/research/projects/era-clim/d-day-analyses
Maximum heights drop below 2 m in the middle of the Channel during the early hours of 7 June, and are below one metre over the route between the Isle of Wight and Normandy by late evening, associated with the weaker, northerly winds, with shorter fetch.

Training for D-Day:
https://www.historyextra.com/period...y-the-training-was-deadlier-than-the-assault/
From the autumn of 1943, all the assault troops due to land in the first few days were given amphibious training at the Combined Training Centres in Inveraray and Castle Toward...

What this mean is that even outside the winter months, the PLA have a limited window of at best %20 for the rest of the yr for invasion. That is why I said earlier in the debate that BOTH China and Taiwan would know the exact week, if not the exact day, of an amphibious launch to invade Taiwan.

So for the PLA to invade Taiwan, using 1944's Operation Overlord, aka 'D-Day', as a guide and that the PLA have no successful amphibious operation in its history:

- It would be at least ONE YEAR of training,
- Estimate of about 600 ships,
- Ship captains and their execs, and the landing troops cannot, or should not, be reassigned.​

Fatalities during training would be inevitable, which mean there would be a reserve of replacement troops. For the invasion to be successful, all troop landing ships must arrive at multiple targets at the same time. And we know that Taiwan would know where those landing sites are.

But even before training begin, not just Taiwan but the entire world would know the signs of a buildup, just like how Desert Shield was such a buildup.

The signs would be:

- Logistics
- Propaganda
- Economics
- Financial
- Taiwan overflights
- International pressure by China on other countries​

What do you think the odds of Taiwanese sabotage at logistics, economics, and financial? You can bet your next yr's salary that Taiwanese agents and Chinese sympathizers will be readied.

A few months after the liberation of the Nazi death camps, Eisenhower toured those sites and he said: "We are told the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for. Now, at least, we know what he is fighting against."

Let us break that comment into two, shall we? Despite what China state media may say, not all Chinese are united for a military resolution regarding Taiwan. Enough mainlanders are willing to let Taiwan go even if they know militarily speaking, Taiwan could be defeated. In other words, there are plenty of Chinese who do not CARE, let alone know, what they will be fighting for. On the other hand, nearly all Taiwanese want nothing to do with China, in other words, nearly all Taiwanese know what they are fighting against.

All Taiwan, and their Chinese sympathizers, have to do is whatever they can to move China outside of that narrow 20 chance window. Taiwan may even launch preemptive military strikes at multiple buildup sites. China would respond militarily, of course, but the damages would have been done. It would take months, well into the next year, for China to plan for another invasion attempt. In order to secure safe transit, PLA must degrade Taiwan defense to below %50 capabilities. Iraq did nothing during Desert Shield. Taiwan will be proactive during PLA buildup for invasion. Can China continuously bomb Taiwan over months to protect the rebuilding of that invasion fleet? No.

There is no valid comparison for China with Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Back then, Iraq was the aggressor. Today, China WILL be perceived as the latest Iraq and Taiwan will be liken to Kuwait -- the victim of an aggressor.

As China retaliate against Taiwan for damaging the invasion fleet while the fleet was under buildup, Taiwan will be executing a 'force preservation' war doctrine. Simply speaking, Taiwan will ride it out because BOTH sides know the PLA cannot maintain that tempo. Images of war destruction from Taiwan will be available for the world to see and Taiwan will gain sympathy. Of course, China will be censored by the Party.

So already, China's plan for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan is at least 50/50 vulnerable. If Operation Overlord had that odds, it would not have been executed.

So you're saying Taiwan will strike first. With what? They can't contest the air with their light 3rd/4th gen fleet, they can't contest the water with their vintage 1970's navy. You think the PLAAF and PLAN won't be on alert during heightened tensions? Almost the entire mainland's economy is far out of reach of Taiwan's missiles and they don't have the inventory to do any serious damage to its industry even if their missiles were uncontested but the PLA can turn Taiwan's economy into rubble.

Then there's Taiwanese training. Whatever makes you think that they'll execute a force preservation doctrine when every single Han Kuang exercise shows them lining up their tanks in the open and sending the ROCAF/ROCN to the middle of the strait to get shot down and sunk?

The rest is essentially fantasy.
 
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So you're saying Taiwan will strike first. With what? They can't contest the air with their light 3rd/4th gen fleet, they can't contest the water with their vintage 1970's navy. You think the PLAAF and PLAN won't be on alert during heightened tensions? Almost the entire mainland's economy is far out of reach of Taiwan's missiles and they don't have the inventory to do any serious damage to its industry even if their missiles were uncontested but the PLA can turn Taiwan's economy into rubble.

Then there's Taiwanese training. Whatever makes you think that they'll execute a force preservation doctrine when every single Han Kuang exercise shows them lining up their tanks in the open and sending the ROCAF/ROCN to the middle of the strait to get shot down and sunk?

The rest is essentially fantasy.
Taiwan's missiles and F-16s can reach critical ports and staging areas on the mainland. Taiwan do not have to destroy the amphibious fleet but the buildup. As long as China cannot launch that fleet within that narrow %20 chance window, nothing China can do to Taiwan. No, China cannot reduce Taiwan's economy to rubble. For starter, China do not have the resources to bomb Taiwan continuously to the next yr. But once Taiwan showed the world that China were resisted, sympathy will shift to Taiwan. The worst case scenario to China is if the US and allies chose to get involved and provide Taiwan with economic and military aid after China's failure to invade. In other words, an invasion is a do-or-die situation for China. The 'die' here is Taiwan independence.

And we have not even start the launch of China's amphibious fleet.
 
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Taiwan's missiles and F-16s can reach critical ports and staging areas on the mainland. Taiwan do not have to destroy the amphibious fleet but the buildup. As long as China cannot launch that fleet within that narrow %20 chance window, nothing China can do to Taiwan. No, China cannot reduce Taiwan's economy to rubble. For starter, China do not have the resources to bomb Taiwan continuously to the next yr.

And we have not even start the launch of China's amphibious fleet.

NATO inflicted $30 billion of losses onto Yugoslavia within the span of months. Yugoslavia's GDP was $30 billion at the time. 100% GDP loss is quite serious when NATO wasn't even going after Yugoslavia's economy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia#Damage_and_economic_loss

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Serbia_and_Montenegro
 
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NATO inflicted $30 billion of losses onto Yugoslavia within the span of months. Yugoslavia's GDP was $30 billion at the time. 100% GDP loss is quite serious when NATO wasn't even going after Yugoslavia's economy.
Have you ever been in a street fight? I would think not.

Check with any police officer and you will find that none of them underestimate who they encounter next. They know better and they pass down tribal knowledge from one generation of police officers to the next. Any of them, either personally or from their elders, learned that even a 10-yr old can give TWO police officers a good fight.

Why do you think the US overwhelmed the Iraqi military back in Desert Storm? Because we know better, and we know better because we learn from our mistakes. It looks like your China is not willing to learn from ours. We overwhelmed the Iraqi military because we know that even though the Iraqi military -- overall -- is technologically inferior to US, there is always a chance, either by planning or by fortune, that an Iraqi pilot or infantry commander somewhere, could do something that turn a battle against US, not necessarily to make US lose the war, but to even do US damages. That we planned, checked, and checked again, and the result was that Desert Storm made its way into military history to be among the great battles worthy of learning in military academies worldwide. Even in China.

When I read your contempt of the Taiwanese military, of how inferior they are -- 1970 vintage or no AESA radars -- I hope the entirety of the PLA leadership is populated by the likes of the PDF Chinese. In reality, the lack of AESA radars do not degrade the ROCAF in terms of being a peer to the PLAAF, but that would be beyond the scope of this debate. Your China have not contributed to the crafts, arts, and science of warfare for the past 300 yrs.

Taiwan do not need to defeat the PLA, only deny its highest priority -- the successful invasion of Taiwan. A critical component of catching an opponent off guard and keeping him unbalanced is surprise. Sure, that China want Taiwan is no state secret, but what most laymen do not know is that China never had the element of surprise, unlike Desert Storm or Operation Overlord for the US and allies, when it comes to tactical levels. Now, at least in this forum, some do know. When you have only one avenue of attack, there cannot be a surprise. Even Sun Tzu alluded to it, see if you can find somewhere in his famous treatise.
 
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