Only about half of Taiwan's airforce is Link 16 capable F-16s and Mirages, their F-5s and Chingkuos may not be Link 16 capable. But communications jamming is only 1 part of EW as you know. I also never said that achieving EW dominance required that Taiwanese forces couldn't even talk.
The problem with your argument is that unlike Iraq who stood alone, Taiwan will have US support in the EM spectrum. So, not only can Taiwanese forces talk to each other and with US with impunity, odds are better than 50/50 that the Taiwanese can even present effective countermeasures against the PLA. Not only that, Taiwan defense forces have invested decades of planning at decoy radio stations designed to simulate vital units.
AESA radars, as you are well aware, are frequency agile and can form multiple beams.
Odds are good, like maybe %99 certainty, that I am the only person on this forum who seen an AESA radar in action.
Even though an AESA radar equipped fighter do have a technical advantage over a non-AESA opponent, tactical employment can make up the difference. Among the best examples of tactical employment that defeated technical superiority is Operation Bolo where US F-4s shot down half the North Vietnamese MIG-21s in one day. The main advantage of an AESA system is true multi-tasking which includes true multiple targets engagements. Taiwanese fighters do not have to engage the PLAAF fighters directly. All Taiwan has to do is create sufficient uncertainty over Taiwan and strait airspace. Without PLAAF air supremacy over the strait, no amphibious launch is possible.
And that's all assuming they'll be able to take off with cratered runways and destroyed infrastructure from a missile first strike, and won't be shot down after takeoff by PLAN destroyers being fed data from navy AWACs. If you haven't noticed, all of Taiwan is within the air defense perimeter of destroyers even sitting at dock.
After Desert Storm, US airpower analysts turned their attention on Taiwan as an intellectual exercise. I will not say when. The group contains US Air Force and Navy.
Back in DS, US airpower planners laid out two lists of target levels: important and critical.
The 'important' list contained nearly 700 targets. The 'critical' list was about 1/10th. US airpower planners decided to focus on the 'critical' list. Even with such a magnitude difference of targets, we still took about 40 days of heavy bombardment on those critical targets.
For Taiwan, if it was US who would attack Taiwan, a much smaller geographical area than Iraq, we identified nearly 1200 'important' targets and almost 1/2 qualified as 'critical' due to terrain and decades of Taiwanese planning at deception and hardening. Taiwanese runway rapid repair crews are well trained and equipped, and most fighter-bombers can take off in 2/3 of their peacetime runway length. After a missile barrage, Taiwan can deploy fake craters and simulated damages designed to delay intelligence gathering and analyses.
Here is an example of the minimum runway repaired length to return a runway to fully operational status...
That went back to the Cold War days where even C-130s can take off in that runway length. Further, most Taiwan roads can support fighter-bombers and the ROCAF routinely trained for that contingency. Not only are all air bases and airports must be targeted, since the goal is an amphibious landing, the entire western coast must be targeted because any point can be used to attack the few amphibious landing sites. Compound the problem for the PLAN is that those potential amphibious landing sites are mined and laid with various structural traps, not only as deterrence but also for destruction, making an amphibious landing difficult if not outright impossible. The mountains offers plenty of cover for artillery and missile batteries targeted specifically at those potential amphibious landing sites.
So the PLA is looking at weeks of heavy bombardment while fending off harassment from ground and air against an opponent who is supported by US.
If the "single US sub" is shooting at PLAN ships then that sub will be sunk by a PLAN sub, helicopter or patrol ship, as there's little to worry about from the antiquated ROCN. USN will not be able to slip subs in without being subject to ASW patrols. The Taiwan Strait is narrow and shallow, while almost all Taiwanese ports are on the west side of the strait. Taitung/Hualian/Yilan on the east side represents less than 1 million people combined, out of 23 million in Taiwan, and has no ports. This narrows the combat theater significantly, and not to the US's favor.
It really is amazing that you do not give US enough credit at submarine operations, especially since China have not contributed anything to the arts and crafts of submarine and submarine operations since the submarine was invented in the first place.
Do you really think that there are no US sub nor have not been in that area all these yrs? We probably know the area better than you do. I work with a few former navy guys, enlisted and officers. We have the usual 'shop talks' and the subject of Taiwan came up. The consensus is that if there is a US sub in the eastern side of the island, it will be the
ONLY sub in the area. PLAN subs will be on the bottom and flooded. The PLAN to conduct ASW? Sure. But that mean no attack from Taiwan coastal missile batteries on those ASW operations?
In summary, the advantages that the PLAAF and PLAN hold over Taiwanese armed forces is similar to the advantage that US forces held over Iraq in 1991. The difference is, since Taiwan is within 150 km of China and has the majority of its population concentrated on the side facing China, the PLAN and PLAAF can bring its full firepower on Taiwan with short notice, unlike the US which had to engage in a lengthy buildup prior to Desert Storm.
In summary, the PLA is not the US military, and Taiwan is not Iraq.