Taiwan Armed Forces

[jhungary]

@Nihonjin1051 Finally someone brought on the nuclear bomb lol

wanna be nuked again.
Most posters' mindsets are staying before ten years.

 

[XiaoYaoZi]

@Nihonjin1051 Finally someone brought on the nuclear bomb lol

Just kidding.
Most posters' mindsets like you are staying before ten years.

 

[Aepsilons]

Just kidding.
Most posters' mindsets like you are staying before ten years.

Just kidding are we? lol.

See, you proved my friend @jhungary correct.

 

[sicsheep]

Just kidding are we? lol.

See, you proved my friend @jhungary correct.

why don't you show some source before talking out of your a$$ lol

Yes, it was actually a military exercise the Taiwanese Armed Forces conducted during the 70th anniversary of the end of the Sino Japanese War. In fact, some high level officers of the JSDF were in attendance of the event. It was a solidarity event.

 

[Aepsilons]

Japanese military representative attends display




TAIPEI, Taiwan -- A military representative at Japan's de facto embassy in Taiwan yesterday attended an R.O.C. Armed Forces military display as a special guest to mark the 70th anniversary of the R.O.C.'s victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Macoto Ogata, a retired Japanese general who served as an official at the Japan Interchange Association (JIA), yesterday joined the commemorative event held at a military parade ground in Hsinchu County, on behalf of the JIA.

Ogata's participation in the military display ended a week of speculation on whether Japan would send personnel to participate the commemorative event.

The JIA represents Japan's interests in Taiwan in the absence of official diplomatic ties.

Japan's top envoy to Taiwan, Mikio Numata, however, did not join the event. Numata told local media Thursday that he had other plans yesterday, hinting that he would not join the display.

Yesterday's large-scale military display that featured the R.O.C. Armed Forces' backbone weapon systems was part of a series of commemorative events to mark the 70th anniversary of the R.O.C.'s victory over Japan during the war that lasted from 1937 to 1945.

The series of celebrations, however, have reportedly angered Japanese officials at the JIA.

The Japanese-language Sankei Shimbun last Sunday quoted unidentified JIA officials as expressing dissatisfaction with the Ma Ying-jeou administration over the events.

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) previously said that it had sent an official invitation letter to Ogata last Friday to invite both Ogata and Numata.

The MND said this was part of the long-time practice of inviting foreign diplomats and military attaches to attend military events or drills as special guests.

Asked to comment on the invitation, Numata said Thursday that he had not received an invitation, adding that he was unlikely to attend the event.

According to ruling Kuomintang (KMT) lawmaker Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), Ogata did receive the invitation letter with his name on it during his meeting with an MND official last Friday. However, Ogata refused to accept a separate invitation letter that was meant to reach Numata from the MND official.

That was why Numata insisted that he did not receive the invitation.

Meanwhile, according to the MND, a total of 22 ambassadors/representatives or deputy representatives from Kiribati, Palau, South Korea, Germany, Australia, Russia, France, and military attaches stationed in Taiwan participated yesterday's military display as special guests.


Japanese military representative attends display - The China Post

 

[XiaoYaoZi]

Just kidding are we? lol.

See, you proved my friend @jhungary correct.

Most of you lacked of knowledge of this issue, many premises are nonexistent, so most discusses are useless.

 

[Aepsilons]

It is awareness of military issues in general.

Mr. Sheep's debate so far is typical of the Chinese members' here. One will make a general declaration, then as those who have actual military experience, which often includes facts to back up counter-arguments, points out detailed deficits in that general declaration, established principles and experience are conveniently discarded.

It seems so. Btw, on to topic, what's your view on the possibility of a Taiwan-Japan-US Security Pact?

 

[sicsheep]

Wow!!! You really are an expert when it comes to the disposition of chinese forces man.

China has 400.000 troops on the Indian border and 350.000 on the Russian border.

lol another guy talking out of his a$$ with no back up whats so ever

How do you substantiate your claim?

And if Chinese soldier is not bunch into boat, how do you suppose you can transport them over the channel?

what i tried to say was there is no question if air superiority will be gained before the landing, if no air superiority, I dont see PLA sending troops to Taiwan.

The series of celebrations, however, have reportedly angered Japanese officials at the JIA.

The Japanese-language Sankei Shimbun last Sunday quoted unidentified JIA officials as expressing dissatisfaction with the Ma Ying-jeou administration over the events.

You call this a solidarity event?

 

[Carlosa]

Air power will make or break any war plan for an invasion of Taiwan.

I can remember back in D-Shield, Air Force planners were already dealing with the headaches of 'target assault traffic deconfliction', in their lingo. Some targets that can be hit by B-52s were easy to manage air traffic. But most required close coordination between EW support, air superiority, and the strike fighters themselves. We actually worried about our guys literally flying into each other. Then came D-Storm and many times we came very close to our fighters having 'mid-air' in trying to hit their assigned targets. We assigned altitude layers but even so, there were close calls and even instances of falling bombs nearly hitting friendly jets.

I see the same problems for the PLAAF in trying to hit mobile and/or fortified Taiwanese air defense targets. The PLAAF do not have the 'carpet bombing' capability like the USAF does. Not enough fighters and the target will survive and/or escape. But the mountainous terrain will limit how many fighters per target and ingress routes to those targets, making the PLAAF fighters vulnerable.

If it is estimated to be too costly for air power alone for any proposed invasion of Taiwan, then there will be no invasion of Taiwan.

To further emphasize your point:

Taiwan, Asia’s Secret Air Power

When current and former world leaders, including Bill Clinton, visit Taiwan, they often stay at the Grand Hotel Taipei, an opulent Chinese architectural landmark perched atop Yuan Mountain. With spectacular views of the downtown riverfront and a palm-lined swimming pool surrounded by lush green jungle, guests at the Grand Hotel could be forgiven for thinking they had arrived at one of the most peaceful spots in East Asia.

In fact, just under their feet lies a vast underground command center from which Taiwan’s top leadership would direct their nation’s armed forces in the event of a war with China. This facility, like many around the high-tech island, shows that when it comes to the defense of Taiwan, there is much more than meets the eye.

Known officially as the Tri-Service Hengshan Military Command Center, the sprawling tunnel facility stretches through the mountain in a line that starts near the Grand Hotel and goes down to the giant Ferris wheel in Dazhi. Built to defend against China’s growing fleet of ballistic missiles, this hardened nerve center is designed to allow Taiwan’s government (and thousands of military personnel) to live and work for months, riding out air raids above while organizing the defense of Taiwan from below.

Linked to a large network of subterranean command posts and military bases around Taiwan and its outer islands – as well as the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii – the Hengshan Military Command

Center is the ultimate redoubt for Taiwan’s president. It is so important, in fact, that China’s strategic rocket force, the Second Artillery, has actually simulated missile attacks on the bridges that connect it to the Presidential Office.

On the other side of the city, buried inside a wet rocky outcropping near the campus of National Taiwan University, lies another tunnel complex, the Air Operations Center. Known affectionately as “Toad Mountain” by Taiwanese air force officers, this facility oversees one of the most robust air and missile defense networks on the planet. Fed vast quantities of information by airborne early-warning aircraft, long-range radars, listening posts, unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites, Toad Mountain stands constant watch over all of Taiwan’s airspace, ready to scramble fighters or assign surface-to-air missiles to intercept intruders. And, like every other Taiwanese military facility, it has multiple back-ups. Just in case.

One of those back-ups is located on Taiwan’s east coast inside Chiashan or “Optimal Mountain,” not far from the mouth of a gorge cut through pure white marble. Unlike the gorge, however, no tourists are allowed inside this billion dollar bunker complex. According to first-person accounts, the base is an entire military city built inside a hollowed-out mountain. Not only does it have space inside for parking, arming, and repairing over two hundred fighter aircraft, it also has its own hospital and multiple gas stations serving jet fuel. With ten blast doors that exit out to multiple runways via a long taxiway that can itself be used as an emergency runway, it may be toughest airbase ever built.

Ninety miles down the coastline, Taiwan’s air force is further bolstered by the Shihzishan or “Stone Mountain” complex at Chihhang Air Base. Though somewhat smaller than Chiashan, its labyrinthine tunnels can still shelter some eighty aircraft. Both of these facilities benefit from their strategic locations on the far side of the highest mountain range in East Asia. Missiles fired from the Chinese mainland can’t reach them – they would smash into the side of mountains before they got there.

For this reason Taiwan regularly practices dispersing its fighter jets from vulnerable west coast bases to airfields on the east coast. Units are also moved between bases to make it difficult to predict where they might be at any given time, and dummy aircraft are parked on tarmacs and inside shelters to confuse enemy intelligence.

To further mitigate the threat of a knock-out Chinese missile strike on its airfields, Taiwan’s air force maintains five emergency highway strips where it can land, refuel, rearm, and launch fighters in the event that nearby runways are cratered. In addition, each Taiwanese airbase has large engineering units attached to it with ample stocks of equipment for rapidly repairing runways. Clocking in at four hours, Israel’s Self Defense Force used to have the world speed record in the runway repair game. No longer. Earlier this year a team of Taiwanese sappers beat that record by an hour.

Facing an existential threat from China and its much larger military, these are just a few of many examples of how Taiwan’s military is using quality to offset its quantitative shortcomings. Whether or not

Taiwan can pull it off could hardly be more important for the United States and the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

Indeed, if the contest of the century is to be waged between the U.S. and China for primacy in the Pacific, Taiwan will be the center of the action. Look at any map and it should quickly become apparent why. Taiwan sits at the crossroads between the East and South China Seas, within torpedo range of the world’s most heavily trafficked sea lanes. Not only critical for bottling the Chinese navy up inside the first island chain–and thereby protecting Japan and the Philippines from the threat of naval blockade–Taiwan also plays a leading role in the air.

With China fielding ballistic missiles for targeting U.S. aircraft carrier groups in the Western Pacific and Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, Taiwan’s defenses matter more now than ever. Chinese missiles would have to go through Taiwan’s airspace on the way to their targets. With the right combination of high-powered ballistic missile defense radars and interceptors, Taiwan can serve as a shield to protect deployed American forces during a contingency.

This potential was inadvertently revealed in late 2012 when North Korea launched a long-range rocket into the Philippine Sea. At the time, Taiwan’s new ultra high frequency (UHF) radar system was able to track the missile and provide the U.S. and Japanese warships with 120 seconds of extra warning time, an eternity in the short life of a hypersonic missile flight.

For this reason and many others, China’s Communist Party

leadership in Beijing continues to see Taiwan as its most worrisome external political and diplomatic problem. Viewed by Beijing as the Chinese world’s first liberal democracy, Taiwan’s remarkable political success story casts China’s oppressive system in an unfavorable comparative light.

To combat what it thinks is a grave political threat, Beijing’s strategy has been to employ a combination of coercive and cooperative measures to isolate (and eventually subjugate) Taiwan. The most prominent aspect of China’s strategy is its missile build-up, which aims to intimidate the voters in Taiwan and policymakers in the United States.

Yet without the ability to dominate the air domain, any Chinese attempt to blockade or invade Taiwan would be disastrous. This may explain why China’s amphibious fleet has not grown by a single ship since 2007. It makes little sense for any navy to spend limited resources on ships that could be sunk at the outset of war.

However, the air and missile threat to Taiwan, and by extension the United States, is very real and growing fast. China’s Second Artillery Force has developed and tested a ballistic missile warhead for targeting airfield runways with penetrating cluster munitions. At the same time, China has been able to convince two successive U.S. administrations (and three French Presidents) to freeze the sale of new fighter jets to Taiwan, leading to a widening “fighter gap” in the Taiwan Strait.

Without new F-16 or Mirage-2000 fighters, Taiwan knows that it

may soon find itself overwhelmed in the air even though its pilots are far better trained than their mainland adversaries. In an air war quality may be the most important factor, but quantity matters a lot too. Fortunately, Taiwan’s government appears to be making serious progress on developing its own indigenous means of undercutting China’s growing missile and air forces. While Taiwan will be hard pressed to ensure that it always has cross-strait air superiority, it can easily deny the same to China. By developing and fielding a number of world-class capabilities to survive missile strikes and keep enemy aircraft from freely operating in its airspace, Taiwan may have broken the code on deterring Chinese aggression.

Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute in Arlington, VA. He was also a recent visiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo. Previously, he was a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses.

lol another guy talking out of his a$$ with no back up whats so ever?

The Indian military has better numbers than your map and anyway, the majority of the forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions are dedicated to the Indian theater of operations and together with the air force units, second artillery corps and other forces that are independent of the regional commands, they total about 400.000 roughly. Similar situation on the Russian border. Your statement that China has no forces in the Indian and Russian borders are completely laughable.

 

[sicsheep]

The Indian military has better numbers than your map.

You with the Indian Amry now?

 

[Aepsilons]

More on Taiwan Special Forces


Nihonjin1051's comment: awesome armor.

 

[Carlosa]

Taiwan’s Using Drones to Spy on China

Taiwan develops ‘smart’ munitions against China invasion

Source: SCMP

Taiwan’s air force will be armed with “smart” munitions be- fore the year’s end that could be used against any Chinese invasion by striking airfields and harbours on the mainland, media reported Saturday.

The new weaponry, developed under a project codenamed “Wan Chien” (Ten Thousands Swords), is scheduled to be carried by dozens of Taiwan’s fighter jets.

The island nation began developing its own smart weapons after the United States – Taiwan’s main arms supplier – re- fused to sell them guided bombs.

Taiwan’s air force plans to upgrade 60 fighters before the year’s end, with the last six being refitted and scheduled to be completed in December, the Taipei-based China Times re- ported.

The defence ministry declined to comment on the report.
The new weaponry will enable Taiwanese fighter jets to hit Chinese targets from a distance and reduce the risk of having to fly over mainland territory, analysts say.

The weapons, an equivalent of the US-developed joint direct attack munition (JDAM) that converts unguided bombs into all-weather “smart” munitions, is designed to target har- bours, missile and radar bases, as well as troop build-ups prior to any invasion of the island, they say.

Each kit carries more than 100 warheads capable of blowing dozens of small craters in airport runways, making them im- possible to use, they say.

The China Times said the refusal to sell JDAMs to Taiwan by United States had prompted the island to develop the offen- sive weapon on its own.

Ties between Taiwan and its giant neighbour have improved significantly since the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang govern- ment took power in Taipei in 2008. Ma was re-elected in Jan- uary last year.

But China still considers the island part of its territory await- ing reunification, by force if necessary, prompting Taipei to seek more advanced defence weaponry mainly from the United States.

Taiwanese experts estimate the People’s Liberation Army currently has more than 1,600 missiles aimed at the island.

More on Taiwan Special Forces

Intelligence: Taiwan Tops China In The Worst Possible Way

December 12, 2013: When pressed, Taiwan will admit that their new early warning radar atop Leshan Mountain in central Taiwan is probably the most powerful such phased array radar in the world. American experts hint that while the Leshan radar may not be the most powerful, it is among the most powerful.

Taiwan put the Leshan radar into service in January 2013, and have been quite pleased with its performance. Not only can the radar spot missile launches up to 5,000 kilometers away, it can give Taiwan about six minutes warning of a Chinese missile attack. That’s enough to alert the missile defenses and Taiwanese defense installations. China has over 1,400 ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan, and any invasion attempt is expected to start with the launching of many, if not most, of these missiles.

Early warning of a Chinese missile attack is not what the Leshan radar is used for most of the time. No, much to the distress of China the Leshan radar can also keep track of most aerial activity over China. That 5,000 kilometers range of the Leshan radar pretty much covers most of China, not to mention North Korea and, well, you get the picture. The radar covers areas closer (than 2,000 kilometers) in even more detail, and this provides excellent coverage of most key Chinese military bases and weapons production facilities.

The Leshan radar has been under construction for a decade and costs $1.4 billion. The radar operates on a mountain over 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) high. Much of the equipment and building materials had to be flown in, and the climate up there is a lot colder than most Taiwanese are accustomed to. Putting the radar at such a high altitude gave it a clear view of eastern China. Despite Chinese objections, the United States provided much of the needed radar design data and some of the equipment.

The Leshan radar is based on the U.S. Air Force Pave Paws early warning radar. The U.S. has five of these radars in service as part of the American BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning system), a half century old system using radars and satellites to monitor the planet for ballistic missile launches (specifically ICBMs, but any large missile launch is detected). Early on, BMEWS consisted of long range radars (like Pave Paws) that could spot warheads coming over the North Pole (from Russia). When SSBNs (ballistic missile carrying nuclear subs) entered the Russian arsenal in the 1970s, BMEWS was augmented by DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites equipped with heat sensors that could detect the enormous amount of heat generated by a ballistic missile launch (or any large explosion, like an above- ground nuclear weapons test). The BMEWS satellites covered the entire planet, while the radars only covered most of the northern hemisphere.

Taiwan was allowed to get the Pave Paws technology as an alternative to the four Aegis destroyers the Taiwanese wanted to buy. The U.S. agreed to sell Pave Paws in part because the U.S. Air Force found that the existing Taiwan air defense network can be modified to integrate the new Pave Paws technology.

Pave Paws is an ultra-high-frequency system with a phased array radar capable of covering a vertical arc from 3 degrees to 85 degrees out to over 5,000 kilometers. It was designed to track ballistic missiles and has a limited capability to track satellites. Apparently having a Pave Paws type radar so close to China gives the user the ability to constantly monitor Chinese air space. In return for access to all this data, the U.S. will keep the Leshan radar up to date and provide Taiwan with additional intel on China the U.S. has collected using other means. Thus, most of the time the Leshan radar is an intelligence asset with a secondary job of providing early warning.

------------------------------------------------------

Taiwan and Japan’s Collective Self-Defense

Ankit and I were joined on the podcast this week by Clint, our Tokyo- based editor and residential Japan expert, who runs the new Tokyo Report blog. Not surprisingly, the topic of discussion or the podcast was Japan’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of its constitution to allow for collective self-defense.

As is probably clear from listening to the podcast, there were slight disagreements on a couple of issues between Ankit and Clint on the one hand, and myself on the other. First, I felt that the purpose of the reinterpretation was to finally provide Japan with the inherent right to collective self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Clint assured me that the reinterpretation was aimed at being much more limited.

Having the chance to read up more on the subject, I am unsurprised to learn that Clint was correct (after all, he is our resident Japan expert). First, unlike Article 51 which provides nations with the inherent right to come to the aid of allies even if the states themselves are not directly threatened, the reinterpretation of Article 9 only allows Tokyo to come to the defense of allies if it can be tied directly to its own defense. As the vice president of New Komeito, LDP’s coalition partner, Kazuo Kitagawa explained: “Collective self- defense under international law means defending other countries without considering if that would infringe on one’s own security, but we see this as part of the self-defense of Japan.”

Second, because of pressure from New Komeito, the revision doesn’t explicitly give Japan the right to collective self-defense, but rather says that some actions that are permitted could be construed as collective self-defense.

The other point of disagreement was over where Japan would apply it. We all agreed that it would be applied to its alliance with the U.S., and possibly in certain actions related to the Korean Peninsula, such as shooting down North Korean ballistic missiles headed for the United States (South Korea once again reiterated after this revision that it opposes Japan intervening on the Korean Peninsula without its explicit approval).

I argued, however, that one of the unsaid aims of the revision was to give Japan the ability to intervene on behalf of Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China ever sought to seize the island by force. Clint and Ankit were highly skeptical that this was the case.

After reading up more on the new revision, I still believe that this is the case. For example, the Japan Times explains that under the reinterpretation, three conditions must be met to allow Japan to come to the aid of a partner nation:

“The attack on that country poses a clear danger to Japan’s survival or could fundamentally overturn Japanese citizens’ constitutional rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

“There is no other way of repelling the attack and protecting Japan and its citizens.

“The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary.”

Previously it reported that the final draft of the Cabinet document said Japan could intervene militarily “when an attack on a country that ‘has close relations’ with Japan ‘poses a clear danger of threatening our country’s existence and fundamentally overthrowing our people’s lives, freedom and right to pursue happiness.’”

This seems to apply to Taiwan. As The Diplomat has noted, no country in Northeast Asia has as close and friendly of relations with Japan as Taipei. Secondly, China conquering and occupying Taiwan would present about as clear a danger to Japan’s survival as any event short of an attack on Japan itself. The Senkaku Islands are roughly half the distance from Taiwan as they are from mainland China, which would allow Beijing to bring far more force to bear in an attack on them. It would also allow Beijing to approach the islands from roughly two different directions. Furthermore, Taiwan’s strategic location would greatly enhance China’s ability to interdict maritime shipping to and from Japan.

Thus, China’s occupation would be a threat to both Japan’s territorial integrity as well as the “lives, freedom and right to pursue happiness” of the Japanese people. If the PLA was in the midst of an invasion of Taiwan, it’s hard to imagine any other way of repelling the attack then through intervening in support of Taiwan. In any case, one of the examples openly being espoused as an example of when Japan would exercise collective self-defense is when a U.S. ship came under attack on the high seas. This would almost certainly happen if America intervened in support of Taiwan, which would allow Japan to join the fight.

Thus, I think at the very least Japan’s right of collective self-defense is meant to apply to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, even if this is left unsaid for obvious diplomatic reasons.

 

[Aepsilons]

Taiwan develops ‘smart’ munitions against China invasion

Source: SCMP

Taiwan’s air force will be armed with “smart” munitions be- fore the year’s end that could be used against any Chinese invasion by striking airfields and harbours on the mainland, media reported Saturday.

The new weaponry, developed under a project codenamed “Wan Chien” (Ten Thousands Swords), is scheduled to be carried by dozens of Taiwan’s fighter jets.

The island nation began developing its own smart weapons after the United States – Taiwan’s main arms supplier – re- fused to sell them guided bombs.

Taiwan’s air force plans to upgrade 60 fighters before the year’s end, with the last six being refitted and scheduled to be completed in December, the Taipei-based China Times re- ported.

The defence ministry declined to comment on the report.
The new weaponry will enable Taiwanese fighter jets to hit Chinese targets from a distance and reduce the risk of having to fly over mainland territory, analysts say.

The weapons, an equivalent of the US-developed joint direct attack munition (JDAM) that converts unguided bombs into all-weather “smart” munitions, is designed to target har- bours, missile and radar bases, as well as troop build-ups prior to any invasion of the island, they say.

Each kit carries more than 100 warheads capable of blowing dozens of small craters in airport runways, making them im- possible to use, they say.

The China Times said the refusal to sell JDAMs to Taiwan by United States had prompted the island to develop the offen- sive weapon on its own.

Ties between Taiwan and its giant neighbour have improved significantly since the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang govern- ment took power in Taipei in 2008. Ma was re-elected in Jan- uary last year.

But China still considers the island part of its territory await- ing reunification, by force if necessary, prompting Taipei to seek more advanced defence weaponry mainly from the United States.

Taiwanese experts estimate the People’s Liberation Army currently has more than 1,600 missiles aimed at the island.



Intelligence: Taiwan Tops China In The Worst Possible Way

December 12, 2013: When pressed, Taiwan will admit that their new early warning radar atop Leshan Mountain in central Taiwan is probably the most powerful such phased array radar in the world. American experts hint that while the Leshan radar may not be the most powerful, it is among the most powerful.

Taiwan put the Leshan radar into service in January 2013, and have been quite pleased with its performance. Not only can the radar spot missile launches up to 5,000 kilometers away, it can give Taiwan about six minutes warning of a Chinese missile attack. That’s enough to alert the missile defenses and Taiwanese defense installations. China has over 1,400 ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan, and any invasion attempt is expected to start with the launching of many, if not most, of these missiles.

Early warning of a Chinese missile attack is not what the Leshan radar is used for most of the time. No, much to the distress of China the Leshan radar can also keep track of most aerial activity over China. That 5,000 kilometers range of the Leshan radar pretty much covers most of China, not to mention North Korea and, well, you get the picture. The radar covers areas closer (than 2,000 kilometers) in even more detail, and this provides excellent coverage of most key Chinese military bases and weapons production facilities.

The Leshan radar has been under construction for a decade and costs $1.4 billion. The radar operates on a mountain over 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) high. Much of the equipment and building materials had to be flown in, and the climate up there is a lot colder than most Taiwanese are accustomed to. Putting the radar at such a high altitude gave it a clear view of eastern China. Despite Chinese objections, the United States provided much of the needed radar design data and some of the equipment.

The Leshan radar is based on the U.S. Air Force Pave Paws early warning radar. The U.S. has five of these radars in service as part of the American BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning system), a half century old system using radars and satellites to monitor the planet for ballistic missile launches (specifically ICBMs, but any large missile launch is detected). Early on, BMEWS consisted of long range radars (like Pave Paws) that could spot warheads coming over the North Pole (from Russia). When SSBNs (ballistic missile carrying nuclear subs) entered the Russian arsenal in the 1970s, BMEWS was augmented by DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites equipped with heat sensors that could detect the enormous amount of heat generated by a ballistic missile launch (or any large explosion, like an above- ground nuclear weapons test). The BMEWS satellites covered the entire planet, while the radars only covered most of the northern hemisphere.

Taiwan was allowed to get the Pave Paws technology as an alternative to the four Aegis destroyers the Taiwanese wanted to buy. The U.S. agreed to sell Pave Paws in part because the U.S. Air Force found that the existing Taiwan air defense network can be modified to integrate the new Pave Paws technology.

Pave Paws is an ultra-high-frequency system with a phased array radar capable of covering a vertical arc from 3 degrees to 85 degrees out to over 5,000 kilometers. It was designed to track ballistic missiles and has a limited capability to track satellites. Apparently having a Pave Paws type radar so close to China gives the user the ability to constantly monitor Chinese air space. In return for access to all this data, the U.S. will keep the Leshan radar up to date and provide Taiwan with additional intel on China the U.S. has collected using other means. Thus, most of the time the Leshan radar is an intelligence asset with a secondary job of providing early warning.

@Carlosa ,

I had the pleasure of touring Taiwan's military bases near Taipei many years ago , and let me tell you that the country is heavily defended with multilayered air defense, naval defense that can literally take out any air fleet foolish enough to try to come too close. Unless the PLAAF can mobilize their entire Air Fleet (which won't happen due to the shear pin point synchronized accuracy of the ROCAF, and due to PLAAF not foolishly keeping their military regions undefended --- have to worry about the threat of Vietnam, India, Russia, Kazhakstan, Mongolia, North Korea , and Japan [lol]).

@jhungary also mentioned one thing that is vital to discussion. An invasion of Taiwan is literally near impossible due to Taiwan's vast stores of anti ship missiles including the Hsiung Feng I, II, III batteries that protect the island's coast line and can literally sink transport ships (which would be carrying up to a thousand troops), even destroyers, frigates, and even theoretically carriers. The Hsiung Feng III can cruise at mach 2.0, with near pin point accuracy so , the PLAN would not be too close. Else suffer losses too epic to quantify.

The combined ROCAF anti air, anti missile defense, coupled with the ROCN anti ship capabilities, and then synergized with the ROCA's anti air and anti ground abilities, an invasion of Taiwan is truly, truly, next to impossible.

I mean, come on, lol, even the United State Army bypassed Japanese-administered Taiwan in the 2nd World War II. It was just too well defended. And that was 70 years ago. Imagine now.



For your pleasure, please watch:

 

[Spectre]

@Carlosa ,

I had the pleasure of touring Taiwan's military bases near Taipei many years ago , and let me tell you that the country is heavily defended with multilayered air defense, naval defense that can literally take out any air fleet foolish enough to try to come too close. Unless the PLAAF can mobilize their entire Air Fleet (which won't happen due to the shear pin point synchronized accuracy of the ROCAF, and due to PLAAF not foolishly keeping their military regions undefended --- have to worry about the threat of Vietnam, India, Russia, Kazhakstan, Mongolia, North Korea , and Japan [lol]).

@jhungary also mentioned one thing that is vital to discussion. An invasion of Taiwan is literally near impossible due to Taiwan's vast stores of anti ship missiles including the Hsiung Feng I, II, III batteries that protect the island's coast line and can literally sink transport ships (which would be carrying up to a thousand troops), even destroyers, frigates, and even theoretically carriers. The Hsiung Feng III can cruise at mach 2.0, with near pin point accuracy so , the PLAN would not be too close. Else suffer losses too epic to quantify.

The combined ROCAF anti air, anti missile defense, coupled with the ROCN anti ship capabilities, and then synergized with the ROCA's anti air and anti ground abilities, an invasion of Taiwan is truly, truly, next to impossible.

I mean, come on, lol, even the United State Army bypassed Japanese-administered Taiwan in the 2nd World War II. It was just too well defended. And that was 70 years ago. Imagine now.

Nice post, but let's the play the devil's advocate and think what would be required for Invasion of Taiwan to be successful and does it match with long terms plans of China.

Just a thought for you

Regards

 

[Aepsilons]

Nice post, but let's the play the devil's advocate and think what would be required for Invasion of Taiwan to be successful and does it match with long terms plans of China.

Just a thought for you

Regards

Naval Contingent

• Mobilization of the East Sea Fleet
• Mobilization of the South Sea Fleet

• Important to note: The mobilization of the East and South Sea Fleet to engage the Republic of China Navy (Taiwan) would leave the Chinese Coastline severely undermanned and would leave the entire Chinese naval defense placed solely on the PLAN North Sea Fleet --- to defend against the Japanese Navy (Japanese Maritine Self Defense Force) , which is in itself composed of the 4 fleets : 1st Escort Fleet -JMSDF, 2nd Escort Fleet - JMSDF, 3rd Escort Fleet- JMSDF, 4th Escort Fleet- JMSDF.
  • If Japan would remove its strategic ambiguity and come to the aid of Taiwan in her (Taiwan) hour of existential need, surely the JMSDF 1st Escort Fleet, supported by the JMSDF 2nd Escort Fleet would engage , draw out the PLAN North Sea Fleet and exterminate the enemy fleet.
  • The 1st and 2nd Escort Fleets would then meet with the JMSDF's 3rd, and 4th Escort Fleet to aid ROCN's Combined Fleet and (most likely) receive the naval mobilization of the US 7th Fleet, supported by the US Pacific Command.
    • The enemy naval force would be neutralized, i estimate.

Ground Contingent

• PLA would have to mobilize at least, conservative estimate 100 divisions --- or 1 million for the invasion of Taiwan. And occupation.
• Note that this invasion can only happen if the PLAN can neutralize enemy naval units; which won't be possible. As I have mentioned what will happen if the JMSDF and the US Navy intervene.
• So, an invasion won't happen, it literally cannot happen.

Air Contingent

• Taiwanese Air Defense --- Multilayered Qualitative --- will wipe out an entire Air Fleet.
• Again, without naval dominance, there is no ground invasion, and thus air dominance is near impossible.

Nice post, but let's the play the devil's advocate and think what would be required for Invasion of Taiwan to be successful and does it match with long terms plans of China.

Just a thought for you

Regards

The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation and the 1997 Defense Guidelines indirectly tie Tokyo’s security to Taipei through obligations to help Washington maintain regional stability and support U.S military forces in East Asia. This has become more so with the recent changes in Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution and Japan’s Posture towards Proactive Contribution to Peace and Security.

These conditions mean that Japan will be involved in any Taiwan Strait conflict should Taiwan be attacked and the security alliance be called into action to keep the region stabilized. Thus the defense guidelines reinforce the link between Japanese security and Taiwan via the US-Japanese alliance to ensure a Japanese response to instability caused by conflict or refugee flows.

When Kajiyama Seiroku was chief cabinet secretary , he claimed that the geographical scope of the New U.S-Japan defense guidelines would cover a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, Tokyo has kept a strategic ambiguity about the guidelines by claiming that it is a situational rather than a geographical concept.

The indirect Tokyo-Taipei security relationship will be strengthened when Washington approves proposed Taiwanese participation in the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system together with Japan and the United States. This proposal cannot be disregarded. Even if Taiwan does not become a joint developer of the TMD, it still will enjoy an informal, quasisecurity relationship with Japan if the umbrella of the TMD is extended to Taiwan. This scenario is unpalatable to Beijing, which fears a TMD extension to Taiwan would create a “defacto alliance between Taipei and Tokyo and Washington” that could destroy any chance of a China-Taiwan Reunification.

Japan’s need to ensure its economic viability further cements the close ties between Taipei and Tokyo. As a major trading and energy importing nation, freedom of navigation is critical to Japan’s economic survival. It is a highly dependent nation on trade routes that pass through waters surrounding Taiwan for access to resources as well as to export markets in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the Americas. Hence, a cross-Strait conflict might disrupt Japan’s oil lifeline. Indeed, the stakes for Japan in the continued peace and stability in and around the Taiwan area are high. Apart from a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the domination of Taiwan and its surrounding waters by an unfriendly power would be interpreted by Tokyo as a threat to Japanese security and prosperity. The present divided jurisdiction of the Taiwan Strait between Beijing and Taipei is preferable to Tokyo than a vicinity exclusively dominated by the PRC.

Furthermore , if the PRC were to succeed in capturing Taiwan , it could use the island as a launching pad , along with Hainan Province and the Pracel Islands for its naval power to dominate Japan’s sea lanes in the South China Sa. Thus the continued existence of Taiwan as a political entity and military power distinct from the PRC holds great importance for Japan’s economic and geopolitical interests. If Japan were to increasingly fear a Chinese threat to its security, it commitantly will value its ties with Taiwan.

The ruling DPP had , on different occasions , urged Japan to adopt a Taiwan relations act similar to the one adopted by the United States. Taiwan implicitly is and has been asking Japan to underwrite its security vis-à-vis China. Despite these overtures from Taiwan and its concern about a potential Chinese threat, Japan has seemed to take a strategic ambiguous position. With recent forays into the region, however, it seems that Japan may be prepared to consider the Taiwanese forays to Japan, despite the Diaoyuitai / Senkaku Differences. A Japanese-Taiwanese Special Relations Act and perhaps a future Tokyo-Taipei TMD / Security Act would potentially negate any minor differences between the two countries and integrate a free, independent Taiwan with Japan, long term.


Regards,