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Taiwan Armed Forces

This is why you and your kind deserves to be mocked. What I gave was just ONE example of that principle. Ninety days of deployment takes a toll on a soldier, mentally and physically, even if he is not under combat stress all the time. There is a definite science to this but considering how you Chinese discarded the laws of physics in the past, I see no reasons why you cannot discard other common sense as well.

your question was "Does the PLA have enough munitions to sustain at least 90 days of worth of 24/7 assault ?"
there was no answer I could give you that i'll be able to back up with fact since PLA does not publish a list of their munition inventory. same for you to proof otherwise. so there is no point arguing about this.
 
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your question was "Does the PLA have enough munitions to sustain at least 90 days of worth of 24/7 assault ?"
there was no answer I could give you that i'll be able to back up with fact since PLA does not publish a list of their munition inventory. same for you to proof otherwise. so there is no point arguing about this.
Still not very smart. And I thought you are supposed to have that 'high Chinese IQ'. :lol:

If you cannot ascertain that the PLA cannot supply at least 90 days of war fighting capability, then you cannot declare that the PLAAF will take control of Taiwanese airspace.

Here is another example for your feeble mind...

History Lab
Mr. Kissinger: Can we talk about war reserve stocks. I was reassured by the proposition that the Germans have 37.5 days of 105 mm ammunition which, at US consumption rates, amounts to 80 days. But whereas the Germans report having 37.5 days of 155 mm ammunition, by US standards they have only 31 days. This 37.5 days transferred into 80 days can be consoling if it is consumed at US rates. But suppose it is consumed at German rates. Either the Germans must change their standard operating procedure to conform to ours or they will run out of ammunition. Or their rate of consumption is more realistic than ours.

Adm. Moorer: It is a question of the planning factor. NATO has a standard day of supply, and we have multiplied that figure and matched it to the US planning factor. NATO includes an intensity factor—they assume a higher expenditure the first month, a leveling off in the second month, and the third month the same. We straight-line it. The NATO intensity factor means that their estimate is different after 30 days than it is at 90 days.
When I said '24/7' assault, it does not literally mean every second of that 90 days. It means: Can the PLAAF commit such a sustained assault on Taiwanese defense forces on a day to day persistence that it will not allow any respite for the Taiwanese to regroup and make a counter-assault?

If the PLA does not have that much resources, accounting for potential losses, then common sense dictate that China does not go to war. Currently, no military other than the US can make that kind of combat commitment.

But hey...Nationalistic passions trumps science and common sense, right ?
 
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Still not very smart. And I thought you are supposed to have that 'high Chinese IQ'. :lol:

If you cannot ascertain that the PLA cannot supply at least 90 days of war fighting capability, then you cannot declare that the PLAAF will take control of Taiwanese airspace.

Here is another example for your feeble mind...

History Lab

When I said '24/7' assault, it does not literally mean every second of that 90 days. It means: Can the PLAAF commit such a sustained assault on Taiwanese defense forces on a day to day persistence that it will not allow any respite for the Taiwanese to regroup and make a counter-assault?

If the PLA does not have that much resources, accounting for potential losses, then common sense dictate that China does not go to war. Currently, no military other than the US can make that kind of combat commitment.

But hey...Nationalistic passions trumps science and common sense, right ?

Common sense tells you PLA is not invading Taiwan due to lack of munitions? :woot:
 
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@gambit , thought you would like to entertain more quantitative as well as qualitative information regarding Taiwan's defense developments --- and they're looking quite impressive, if i say so myself. :)





Key Forecasts on the Republic of China Armed Forces:



· There is forecast that defense expenditure will increase by 6.7% in 2015 and beyond.

· Taiwanese real GDP will grow by 4.1% in 2015

· Taiwan is currently set to upgrade its F-16 jet fleet in late 2016

· Taipei and Beijing have held government to government talks , yet with Taipei insisting Beijing to yield to Taipei’s jurisdictional areas in islands under control of the Republic of China Government. Beijing contest and thus security risks and security issues persists despite governmental bilateralism



SWOT Analysis of Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

· Stable democratic political environment

· Ma’s second term has continued to stabilize cross-Straits relations, with official high level talks for the first time in 2014

· Strong alliances with the West, particularly the US, have created a high tech armed force

· Taiwan Relations Act obliges the US to maintain an interest in the island’s dfense

· The US continues to sell large arms packages to Taiwan

· China now has settled policy of showing no interest in attacking Taiwan barring any major destabilizing moves from Taipei

· New capabilities such as fast attack craft, supersonic anti-ship missiles and Apache attack helicopters will improve the Taiwanese military’s ability to repel an invasion form the mainland

· Recent defense developments with the Japanese Self Defense Force illustrates a growing culture of interoperability between Tokyo and Taipei and may improve over the years; Japan has considered Taipei’s yearning for a Security Pact between Tokyo and Taipei.

· A Strong industrial technological base supports the military industrial complex

· US Support and access to high tech weaponry has enabled the development of enhanced research capabilities

· State sponsorship of the industry virtually guarnatees its survival in some form, as well as helping to drive development

· A constantly modernizing military creates sustained demand for defense articles

· An unmanned aerial vehicle with the range to reach China, while unlikely to be deployed, demonstrates Taiwan’s superior technological advancement



Reference:

TAIWAN DEFENCE & SECURITY REPORT. (2015). Taiwan Defence & Security Report, (1), 1.

If you cannot ascertain that the PLA cannot supply at least 90 days of war fighting capability, then you cannot declare that the PLAAF will take control of Taiwanese airspace.

You have made excellent input, my friend. And the military strategy lesson you instill for readers is truly invaluable, reminds me of the days when I was in the Armed Forces and reading on battlefield tactics. While I submit to your expertise in ground tactics, permit me, Sir, to also contribute an additional information regarding Taiwan's Defense Capabilities as it plays in context to undermining an assault by Beijing, please entertain my post:


In 2015, the defense budget in Taiwan will rise to $12.8 Billion USD , an increase of 6.7% relative to the national GDP. As military expenditure approaches 2.3 % of GDP, this has shown a streamlined modification of the Armed Forces capabilities as the ROCAF continues with its modernization program that aims attain target goals that the JSDF has attained in the latter’s massive modernization buildup.

I want to also add that the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which is a US think tank, reported that in late 2012 while China’s defense budget increased between 2000 to 2011, Taiwan’s rose by 21% in real terms. China’s only increased by 11% in 2014. While China may have theoretical numerical advantage, the Taiwanese Militray definitely has impeccable qualitative advantage. Let us also not forget that Taiwan has an all-volunteer force, streamlined, and trained in the same order as that of Japan’s own Self Defense Forces, as well as with Singapore’s and South Korea’s Armed Forces.
 
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Your assumptions are not really factually correct. I respect your posts in general but numbers matter in war time. Yes Islands are easy to defend if you have a superior navy and can prevent the attackers from landing.

But any attack would first take care of the infrastructure which would cripple the ability of the Taiwan Island's resistance. The rest would be swift dominance and massive numbers crushing any resistance.

Number is important, you just pick the wrong number to focus on.

Problem is that, you, along with many other, oversimplified battlefield by simply looking at number on both side.
The problem with number associated with combat support services, mainly logistic. It never matter the number of your fighter, ships, soldiers, tank or whatever equipment you had, but HOW MANY YOU CAN SUPPORT IN THEATRE.

For argument sake, let's say that China have 1000 fighters and 2 millions troop, and 60 destroyers. Now, what you are saying is basically putting 2 assumption into equation.

1.) You assume China can destroy 100% of Taiwanese Defence Infrastructure
2.) You assume all Chinese Asset can operate in their AO with respect to Taiwan at any given time.

Now, for assumption 1. we all knew no country can destroy 100% of their infrastructure of an enemy in their pre-assault bombardment. In fact, most military analyst actually were against destroying enemy infrastructure to begin with, because by destroying enemy infrastructure, you not only hinder your enemy movement of reinforcement and supply, you also hinder your own breakout from the Initial AO.

Now, both effect must be equal, if you destroy enough infrastructure to hinder your enemy by 50%, you also destroy enough enemy infrastructure to hinder your own troop forward progress by 50%. Simply because Train station, port, airport will not rebuild overnight and for anything you destroyed, you will not have access to later.

For assumption 2. Just because China have 1000 fighter planes, that does not mean they can launch 1000 planes at the same time and service their AO at the same time.

As China in this case would be the aggressor, they would have to put pressure to Taiwanese defence and in this case, Taiwanese defence can be use as an reactionary role. Pretty much the same thing happen in Battle of Britain.

For China, it is no good to launch 1000 planes at the same time, because that would mean in any given day, you would have air support for the first 3 hours, then the fighter have to go back and refuel and rearm and come back and resume CAP. That mean you have 3 hours CAP, then nothing for 3 hours and then 3 hours CAP...

Problem is, for PLAAF to achieve air superiority, they would have to put up fighter and contest the sky with Taiwanese 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, which mean that they will have to divide their air asset in different shift. While shift 1 on station, you prepare to launch shift 2, and when shift 1 are low of gas and ammo, you put shift 2 on station and you pull shift 1 out. Now, that would halve the effective fighting power for China. And then you also need to consider stress put into the airframe, pilot, supporting personnel and eventually you are looking at a third or quarter of the 1000 fighter are used at any given time to contest the air superiority with the Taiwanese, which make up with not only fighters, but also ground base defence. And then you also have to know not all Chinese fighter are able to reach Taiwan, only those who are facing Taiwan can reach Taiwan, other fighter station in other airbases (like in Beijing or Tibet) simply cannot make the range and become irreverent.

The same deal goes with ships. Having any given number of ship does not mean they are and can use in all the AO. The Taiwanese does not need to engage a ship to ship combat, a pound to pound with Taiwanese Destroyer versus Chinese destroyer, all they need to target is transport ship. And this is something Chinese simply cannot hide them, as long as the Chinese need to land the troop in Taiwan to fight, they have to march the transport ship to Taiwanese coast.

Another problem is that it does not matter if China have 2 millions troop, how many they can support is all that matter. A typical best ratio is 50:50 (1 attack troop to 1 support troop) and then you have to also consider the lifting ability and supporting ability. It's nothing like some Chinese member here suggest that they can simply march 500,000 fishing boat to overwhelm the Taiwanese defence.......

Actually, there is no question that air superiority will be achieved before landing, you assumption of Chinese just send soldiers on boats is wrong.

How do you substantiate your claim?

And if Chinese soldier is not bunch into boat, how do you suppose you can transport them over the channel?
first wave of attack will be a mix of cruise missile, rockets, SRBMs, targeting infrastructure, command and control, runways, docks, SAM batteries.

Cruiser missile, Rocket and SRBM are point to point weapons, do you know how many road junction are there in Taiwan??

You cannot expect a total count with Missile, Rocket and SRBM. You can expect this to come thru, but you will be disappointed

PLAAF will then take care of whatever is already in the air. PLAN will have full control of the straight and conduct firepower preparations around the landing zones.

the only hope for Taiwan is to dig in inland, and preserve their forces.

Again, How?? Did Chinese fighter have some kind of magic missile that can shoot down any and every Taiwanese fighter that were airborne?

I mean Nationalism is good thing but it have to be match with Reality. All your "point" is what you believe or what you want to believe, just because you are saying it does not mean you can do it. And you have said nothing that can elaborate how you can achieve what you said here?

We are done here. A Chinese who have never served in the military and lives in the US pretty much declared logistics are irrelevant to the PLA.

He actually did better then I originally thought, I expected him to say something along the line with nuclear weapon actually...
 
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@jhungary

I think its also important to note that tho the Chinese Military have the numbers, which they've always had, they've not engaged an enemy military since their 1979 War with Vietnam, which was not technologically superior to them. The Taiwanese Military is not only has a technological edge, but they also have the qualitative edge, given their vast interoperability with the United State Military, NATO contingents and even with the JSDF in previous engagements and training operations.

He actually did better then I originally thought, I expected him to say something along the line with nuclear weapon actually...

I agree, at least he didn't go that route. Tho his understanding of Taiwan's Defense Structure is severely, severely limited. The post and lack of appreciation on the Taiwanese capabilities is testament to that.
 
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@jhungary

I think its also important to note that tho the Chinese Military have the numbers, which they've always had, they've not engaged an enemy military since their 1979 War with Vietnam, which was not technologically superior to them. The Taiwanese Military is not only has a technological edge, but they also have the qualitative edge, given their vast interoperability with the United State Military, NATO contingents and even with the JSDF in previous engagements and training operations.

Well, the Taiwanese Military have no choice but to go qualitative edge as they are too depend on second world share of armament. As I said some post ago, they are too rely on the second hand-Hand me down from Western Army like Keelung Class destroyer, Knox Class, OHP Class, F-16 A/B block 15, Mirage 2000, M60/M48 Patton and so on. All were simply hand-me down dumping ground from Western military. They have to develop a quality edge over anyone in order to survive.

Problem is, if China were to invade Taiwan, and US does not intervene, there are no way the Taiwanese can held out, the only thing they can do is to make Chinese hurt and have them ask themselves this question "Is it worth it?"

The whole Taiwanese defence strategy is designed to prolong the war as long as possible by focusing on Early Warning, and targeted response. The more the number the Chinese put in, they will only generate more casualty.

Experience wise, more than likely they are the same, but bear in mind, Chinese is changing their doctrine from they had use before and the Taiwanese were simply going on about as usual. The Taiwanese would have a wee bit advantage than the Chinese, as the Taiwanese are used to and train with High Technology warfare, while Chinese is just started modernizing, which although they had the technology, most of them weren't actually drilled on it

I agree, at least he didn't go that route. Tho his understanding of Taiwan's Defense Structure is severely, severely limited. The post and lack of appreciation on the Taiwanese capabilities is testament to that.

His post reflect most normal people (or civvies) talking about war. They list a list of thing they want and then expected to fill the list. War never did go to the plan, and no plan ever survive first contact with the enemy. What they say here is what they want, and in their mind, since they want them, then they would be able to achieve it while totally disregard what the enemy is going to do and expect the enemy simply fall into line.

We have a term for it, called "Video Game Expectation", most people know about war in Video Game, which you can literally manipulate your opponent into following your move as everything have a script for it.

Real war don't have script, and usually things don't go to mind when you most expected.
 
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We have almost no military garrison near Russian boarder, and minimum garrison near Tibet Indian boarder. We are not worried either country is gonna invade us.

Wow!!! You really are an expert when it comes to the disposition of chinese forces man.

China has 400.000 troops on the Indian border and 350.000 on the Russian border.
 
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Wow!!! You really are an expert when it comes to the disposition of chinese forces man.

China has 400.000 troops on the Indian border and 350.000 on the Russian border.

Sadly, its just not even worth our time to respond to posters like that who try to engage in discussion without even having an actual awareness of the ground situation. Its just, not fair for us to engage.
 
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Sadly, its just not even worth our time to respond to posters like that who try to engage in discussion without even having an actual awareness of the ground situation. Its just, not fair for us to engage.

I agree man, that's why you are not seeing much of me around here lately, its not worth our time.
 
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I agree man, that's why you are not seeing much of me around here lately, its not worth our time.

Well I hope you stay active or at least stay in lurker mode , buddy, we will lose a good member if you stop coming here.
 
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Taiwan’s Using Drones to Spy on China


Taiwan is using unmanned surveillance drones to monitor possible missile launches in the Taiwanese strait has aimed across the Taiwan Strait, according to local news accounts.

According to an article published in the Taipei Times, Taiwan’s military has begun expanding the deployment zone of its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from airspace over eastern and southern Taiwan to airspace over the Taiwan Strait. Consequentially, the report said that the UAVs can detect military movements along China’s coastal region.

The Taipei Times cited an anonymous military official as the source for the report.

A report in the Liberty Times, the Chinese-language sister site of the Taipei Times, quoted the military official as saying that the drones allow Taiwan’s military to “monitor China’s military movements in the southeastern coastal area,” according to the South China Morning Post.

Taiwan has developed 32 indigenous surveillance drones for military use. The drones were produced by the National Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology under the direction of Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense. The National Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology is also believed to be developing a stealthy armed UAV variant. News reports have said that the armed UAV will boast “short wings, stealth features and a weapons cabin that can carry missiles and bombs.” It would also have radar absorbing paint.

Currently, Taiwan’s military bases its drone fleet at a site in Taimali, Taitung County in southeastern Taiwan. All training exercises are carried out at this site, the Taipei Times report said. It added that the Taiwanese military is considering using a section of the Hengchun airport in Pingtung as a second UAV drone site. Pingtung is located in southwestern Taiwan, which would greatly enhance the UAVs ability to gather intelligence on the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) missile sites along the southeastern coast of China.

Despite the improvement in cross-Strait relations in recent years, China is believed to have around 2,000 missiles permanently aimed at Taiwan to deter it from declaring formal independence from the mainland.

The Taipei Times report went on to say that the U.S. has expressed concern to Taiwan over how its drones are being deployed. Washington has asked Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense to send specialists to Washington to brief their counterparts at the U.S. Department of Defense, according to the report.

Still, Taiwan’s proximity to China could make the intelligence its UAVs gather on China’s military a huge asset to the United States. Before developing its own surveillance drones domestically, reports had suggested that Taiwan was interested in acquiring RQ-4 Global Hawk drones from the United States.


Taiwan’s Using Drones to Spy on China | The Diplomat

Taiwan-Sharp-Kite-UAV.png



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Sadly, its just not even worth our time to respond to posters like that who try to engage in discussion without even having an actual awareness of the ground situation. Its just, not fair for us to engage.
It is awareness of military issues in general.

Mr. Sheep's debate so far is typical of the Chinese members' here. One will make a general declaration, then as those who have actual military experience, which often includes facts to back up counter-arguments, points out detailed deficits in that general declaration, established principles and experience are conveniently discarded.

I didn't say PLA have or doesn't have 90 day worth of munition, but if you think it matters then I hope USAF is full of college rejects like you
How can you debate rationally with someone who effectively discarded thousands of yrs worth of military science ? Am not saying that thousands of yrs ago, spears and arrows were allotted for exactly 90 days of expenditure. In the old days, even though invading armies can live off the land, they still have supply trains. Fast forward to today, the land cannot be milked to created sophisticated weaponry like guided missiles or artillery, making logistics even more crucial. When you cannot precisely account for how many missiles you WILL lose through factors beyond your control, such as weather or defects or counter-measures, how many missiles or bullets or shells or tanks can you bring to the war to sustain your assault WILL decide whether you can afford to go to war or not. Since when does it need an Einstein-like IQ to understand this ?

...the only thing they can do is to make Chinese hurt and have them ask themselves this question "Is it worth it?"
Air power will make or break any war plan for an invasion of Taiwan.

I can remember back in D-Shield, Air Force planners were already dealing with the headaches of 'target assault traffic deconfliction', in their lingo. Some targets that can be hit by B-52s were easy to manage air traffic. But most required close coordination between EW support, air superiority, and the strike fighters themselves. We actually worried about our guys literally flying into each other. Then came D-Storm and many times we came very close to our fighters having 'mid-air' in trying to hit their assigned targets. We assigned altitude layers but even so, there were close calls and even instances of falling bombs nearly hitting friendly jets.

I see the same problems for the PLAAF in trying to hit mobile and/or fortified Taiwanese air defense targets. The PLAAF do not have the 'carpet bombing' capability like the USAF does. Not enough fighters and the target will survive and/or escape. But the mountainous terrain will limit how many fighters per target and ingress routes to those targets, making the PLAAF fighters vulnerable.

If it is estimated to be too costly for air power alone for any proposed invasion of Taiwan, then there will be no invasion of Taiwan.
 
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