Swedish Defense Agency's Damning Report on S-400's Capabilities
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Pakhtoon yum
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Over hyped and kinda annoying now.
Nilgiri
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Some say around 400km for legacy birds, some up to 600 km. Lower RCS and stealth would of course reduce this...and of course low altitude strike.
I would assume exact number/scenario all depends on integration with other sensor feed architecture too.
Signalian
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lets say JF-17 has RCS of 3m2, what will be the distance from S-400 radar to get detected?
Nilgiri
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Regular altitude flight the claim of Russia is around 400km away I think (for basic volume search mode)...since you have to drop RCS significantly for exponential return on detection range reduction to kick in. Effective solution targetting would be some fraction of this depending on the scenario, doctrines at play etc.
If its low altitude radar-evasion flight, much lower than that....it would depend on the network integration designed to pick this up.
Pure stand alone wise to get some idea, would need the radar specifics and that is classified I think given that would be a freebie windfall for SEAD planners of opponent side.
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Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI in its recent report states that the range of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system and its capability to counter counter-measures is overrated.
According to the report, “Bursting the Bubble? Russia´s A2AD-Capabilities in the Baltic Sea Region”, published on Monday, FOI states that the actual range of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, which is promoted as having a range of 400 kilometres, is actually 150-200 kilometres, the report stated.
A2/AD is a military buzzword for the ability to deter, at a distance, an enemy’s deployment in a geographic area.
“The S-400 air defence system is often claimed to have a 400-km range, but FOI’s technical experts estimate that the effective range against maneuvering targets at low altitude is much less, even down to 20 km for smaller targets hugging the terrain,” according to the report.
“In our report we establish that Russia’s A2/AD capability is less effective than what is claimed by either the Russian military or the Western press. For one thing, it’s more difficult than many people think to detect and strike a target that’s tens of kilometres away,” says Robert Dalsjö, Deputy Research Director at FOI, who wrote the report with Michael Jonsson.
The S-400 uses four missiles of different range capabilities: the very-long-range 40N6 (400 km), the long-range 48N6 (250 km), the medium-range 9M96E2 (120 km) and the short-range 9M96E (40 km).
According to the report, the missile with a purported 400-km range, the 40N6, is not yet operational and has been plagued by problems in development and testing. In its current configuration, the S-400 system should mainly be considered a threat to large high-value aircraft such as AWACS or transport aircraft at medium to high altitudes, out to a range of 200-250 km. In contrast, the effective range against agile fighter jets and cruise missiles operating at low altitudes can be as little 20- 35 km.
The report also analysed several possible countermeasures for Russian A2/AD-capabilities. Russian capabilities are mainly based on three systems: the S-400 anti-aircraft system, the Bastion anti-ship system, and the Iskander ballistic missile system for use against land targets.
There are several measures for countering A2/AD systems. Some are passive, such as flying around the coverage area of sensors, or stationing troops at a location in good time. Others are active countermeasures, both “soft,” in the form of electronic jamming or chaff dispersed from aircraft, and “hard,” where portions of overall capability are physically knocked out, the report stated.
“One can neutralise an entire system by knocking out just one link in a functional chain, for example a data link or fire-control radar. And since seeing over the horizon requires airborne radar, it may then be enough to shoot down the radar aircraft,” says Robert Dalsjö.
However, making Russia’s A2/AD capability into a manageable problem requires commitments, according to the report.
“Western armed forces have long been fighting against poorly equipped adversaries, such as for example the Taliban. Thus, capacity-building and investments are now required in areas such as electronic warfare, countermeasures and guided weapons,” concludes Dalsjö.
Aside from all sorts of political considerations, Chinese and Indian strategic planners will have to assess carefully the strict military dimension of the missile strike that the United States launched against a government-controlled airbase in Syria early on Friday.
China and India are both clients of Russia’s arms industry, and have bought a number of S-400 long-range air defense missile systems. The Kremlin is a historical ally of Damascus and deployed batteries of this advanced missile platform at the Khmeimim airbase near Latakia in western Syria after its intervention in support of President Bashar al-Assad.
On paper, the S-400 system is designed to destroy aircraft, drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles up to 400 kilometers away; it is also equipped with a radar able to detect targets at a range of 600km. Since its installation in Syrian territory, the action of Western and Turkish warplanes in support of rebel forces has been limited.
0
The presence of S-400 platforms in the Syrian theater possibly influenced the US strategy of attack against the Assad regime. The USS Porter and USS Ross, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean, bombarded the Shayrat airbase in central Syria, which the Syrian Air Force used to launch suspected chemical attacks that left dozens of civilians dead in rebel-held Khan Shaykhun.
Though the Pentagon informed the Russian military beforehand of the impending operation, the US military command decided to attack from a safe distance. Tomahawk missiles have a range of 1,600km and their use in place of strike aircraft was probably intended to minimize potential losses caused by the very fast and precise S-400 surface-to-air missiles.
This could mean that the Pentagon acknowledges the effectiveness of the S-400 against warplanes and the electronic jamming capabilities of the US EA-18G Growler jets, which can weaken the operability of the Russian air shield in Syria but not neutralize it completely.
Thus the S-400’s deterrent function against aircraft sorties appears to be confirmed by the military option chosen by the United States to punish Assad. Chinese and Indian generals will be delighted with this outcome, which proves they have been right to bet on the S-400 system for their respective air defenses.
In particular, Delhi can reasonably be confident it will manage to undercut Beijing’s airborne capacities so as to gain aerial strategic parity in the Himalayan region, where the two countries have long-standing border disputes.
S-400’s vulnerability to swarm missile attacks
On the other hand, the barrage of Tomahawks demonstrated the Pentagon’s capacity to perforate the Russian defenses in Syria, possibly showing the vulnerability of the S-400 to low-flying missiles with small radar cross-sections.
The S-400 radar probably detected the Tomahawk swarm but the firing system apparently did not attempt to hit any missiles. It is now an open question whether Moscow’s military command in Syria deliberately opted not to engage the US missiles once informed of the imminent attack or, in contrast, was unable to react.
The Russian camp obviously leans toward the first scenario. In Moscow’s view, the interception of US Tomahawks by the S-400 system would have provoked a dangerous escalation. The fact that, after the US strike, Moscow announced its intention to strengthen the Syrian air defenses, however, is a sign that the Russian defense shield in war-torn Syria needs some improvements.
That said, all types of air defense systems, including the S-400, are still in large part untested as to whether they can resist multiple missile attacks. India and China should take that into account while focusing on the reinforcement of their own air and missile defenses. In this sense, the S-400’s mixed performance in Syria against the US Tomahawks should at least raise some doubt in Delhi and Beijing over the capabilities of this Russian arms system.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/t...efense-system-super-weapon-or-overhyped-20111
According to the report, “Bursting the Bubble? Russia´s A2AD-Capabilities in the Baltic Sea Region”, published on Monday, FOI states that the actual range of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, which is promoted as having a range of 400 kilometres, is actually 150-200 kilometres, the report stated.
A2/AD is a military buzzword for the ability to deter, at a distance, an enemy’s deployment in a geographic area.
“The S-400 air defence system is often claimed to have a 400-km range, but FOI’s technical experts estimate that the effective range against maneuvering targets at low altitude is much less, even down to 20 km for smaller targets hugging the terrain,” according to the report.
“In our report we establish that Russia’s A2/AD capability is less effective than what is claimed by either the Russian military or the Western press. For one thing, it’s more difficult than many people think to detect and strike a target that’s tens of kilometres away,” says Robert Dalsjö, Deputy Research Director at FOI, who wrote the report with Michael Jonsson.
The S-400 uses four missiles of different range capabilities: the very-long-range 40N6 (400 km), the long-range 48N6 (250 km), the medium-range 9M96E2 (120 km) and the short-range 9M96E (40 km).
According to the report, the missile with a purported 400-km range, the 40N6, is not yet operational and has been plagued by problems in development and testing. In its current configuration, the S-400 system should mainly be considered a threat to large high-value aircraft such as AWACS or transport aircraft at medium to high altitudes, out to a range of 200-250 km. In contrast, the effective range against agile fighter jets and cruise missiles operating at low altitudes can be as little 20- 35 km.
The report also analysed several possible countermeasures for Russian A2/AD-capabilities. Russian capabilities are mainly based on three systems: the S-400 anti-aircraft system, the Bastion anti-ship system, and the Iskander ballistic missile system for use against land targets.
There are several measures for countering A2/AD systems. Some are passive, such as flying around the coverage area of sensors, or stationing troops at a location in good time. Others are active countermeasures, both “soft,” in the form of electronic jamming or chaff dispersed from aircraft, and “hard,” where portions of overall capability are physically knocked out, the report stated.
“One can neutralise an entire system by knocking out just one link in a functional chain, for example a data link or fire-control radar. And since seeing over the horizon requires airborne radar, it may then be enough to shoot down the radar aircraft,” says Robert Dalsjö.
However, making Russia’s A2/AD capability into a manageable problem requires commitments, according to the report.
“Western armed forces have long been fighting against poorly equipped adversaries, such as for example the Taliban. Thus, capacity-building and investments are now required in areas such as electronic warfare, countermeasures and guided weapons,” concludes Dalsjö.
Aside from all sorts of political considerations, Chinese and Indian strategic planners will have to assess carefully the strict military dimension of the missile strike that the United States launched against a government-controlled airbase in Syria early on Friday.
China and India are both clients of Russia’s arms industry, and have bought a number of S-400 long-range air defense missile systems. The Kremlin is a historical ally of Damascus and deployed batteries of this advanced missile platform at the Khmeimim airbase near Latakia in western Syria after its intervention in support of President Bashar al-Assad.
On paper, the S-400 system is designed to destroy aircraft, drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles up to 400 kilometers away; it is also equipped with a radar able to detect targets at a range of 600km. Since its installation in Syrian territory, the action of Western and Turkish warplanes in support of rebel forces has been limited.
0
The presence of S-400 platforms in the Syrian theater possibly influenced the US strategy of attack against the Assad regime. The USS Porter and USS Ross, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean, bombarded the Shayrat airbase in central Syria, which the Syrian Air Force used to launch suspected chemical attacks that left dozens of civilians dead in rebel-held Khan Shaykhun.
Though the Pentagon informed the Russian military beforehand of the impending operation, the US military command decided to attack from a safe distance. Tomahawk missiles have a range of 1,600km and their use in place of strike aircraft was probably intended to minimize potential losses caused by the very fast and precise S-400 surface-to-air missiles.
This could mean that the Pentagon acknowledges the effectiveness of the S-400 against warplanes and the electronic jamming capabilities of the US EA-18G Growler jets, which can weaken the operability of the Russian air shield in Syria but not neutralize it completely.
Thus the S-400’s deterrent function against aircraft sorties appears to be confirmed by the military option chosen by the United States to punish Assad. Chinese and Indian generals will be delighted with this outcome, which proves they have been right to bet on the S-400 system for their respective air defenses.
In particular, Delhi can reasonably be confident it will manage to undercut Beijing’s airborne capacities so as to gain aerial strategic parity in the Himalayan region, where the two countries have long-standing border disputes.
S-400’s vulnerability to swarm missile attacks
On the other hand, the barrage of Tomahawks demonstrated the Pentagon’s capacity to perforate the Russian defenses in Syria, possibly showing the vulnerability of the S-400 to low-flying missiles with small radar cross-sections.
The S-400 radar probably detected the Tomahawk swarm but the firing system apparently did not attempt to hit any missiles. It is now an open question whether Moscow’s military command in Syria deliberately opted not to engage the US missiles once informed of the imminent attack or, in contrast, was unable to react.
The Russian camp obviously leans toward the first scenario. In Moscow’s view, the interception of US Tomahawks by the S-400 system would have provoked a dangerous escalation. The fact that, after the US strike, Moscow announced its intention to strengthen the Syrian air defenses, however, is a sign that the Russian defense shield in war-torn Syria needs some improvements.
That said, all types of air defense systems, including the S-400, are still in large part untested as to whether they can resist multiple missile attacks. India and China should take that into account while focusing on the reinforcement of their own air and missile defenses. In this sense, the S-400’s mixed performance in Syria against the US Tomahawks should at least raise some doubt in Delhi and Beijing over the capabilities of this Russian arms system.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/t...efense-system-super-weapon-or-overhyped-20111
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