Strategies/Tactics of Pakistani Military

[MilSpec]

Tactical planning of Pakistani military has always baffled me, sometimes they have come up with brilliant acts of planning, valor and perseverance, and in other instances all three of mentioned attributes seemed lack luster.

1965 conflict (operation Gibraltar): Pakistani military completely misread the consequences of mass infiltration in Kashmir. The ground forces seems were not expecting a full fledged ground attack. In the end instead of taking the battle to into India, Pakistani military ended up defending its own borders. Logic says after such gross mis-planning of events, political position of Pak military would be weakened, but instead military rule still continued.

1971 Eastern front: Security of East Pakistan lies in west Pakistan, has to be the most dumbest line to be ever uttered in any military circles. It’s almost sending firefighters naked in a burning building with a helmet on and expecting utmost safety. What has always baffled me, disparity between the personnel of east and west Pakistan. The following is data mostly from TV interviews seen previously and some information in free domain, gives an Idea of sheer stupidity of 90% troop concentration in one part and leaving east Pakistan almost unprotected.

Few members here have aggressively defended the logistic difficulties and heavily outnumbered troops as primary cause of the unilateral surrender, but I haven’t come across any one on the forum who can precisely explain the this uncanny disparity to begin with when both parts of the nation got freedom at the same time. Such numbers are mind boggling, after such tactical blunder in planning, it almost seemed that the military’s redundant political policies have sealed it’s fate, but…..

The Surrender: Pakistani military is renowned around the world for a highly disciplined army and is known for exceptional courage. There were some exceptional displays of resilience and fortitude from pak army, but still doesn’t explain how close to 54000 military personal would unilaterally surrender. With an exodus of 93000 pow’s with majority of them being military personnel, this is the biggest surrender in the history of post-world war II era. And just like 65’s conflict, there were no actions taken based official investigation for the tactical and policy failures.

West Pakistan; Longewalla: No air support, poor coordination, lack of planning, venturesome armored brigade chief, none of them can really explain 120 indian soldiers and a recoil-less jeep holding off 2000 pakistani soldiers, and an entire armored brigade till dawn and then getting decimated by IAF. (Although a great victory It was still a magnanimous intel failure on the indian side).

1999 kargil; Although a brilliant plan in the onset of the conflict, Kargil turned out to be a disaster when Indian air force got involved. It is almost unbelievable that Pakistan did not foresee the IAF involvement and sent it’s brave troops to be annihilated by IAF bombing raids, while the rest of Pakistan stood witness in silence. A relatively better plan than 65 as Pakistan was successful in ensuring India did not open up other fronts (a tactical blunder on indian side nevertheless), still had loose ends on political and tactical end, causing grave harm to lives and reputation of strong soldiers. And again against all logic, no punitive actions against chief designers of the plan, instead most of them became the most important political leaders in key positions.

Afghan war; “strategic depth” was never really taken seriously even in any military circles apart from one particular “jarnail” hence is not worth discussing, but Pakistani authorities, maybe not the the military directly led to arming “mujhideens” and subsequently the taliban, Arming hordes and hordes of uneducated militia with ak’s and rpgs, and expecting that their activities will never affect Pakistan almost paid off until the fall of Taliban. Did the policy makers ever have any “Plan B” for a scenario when the beast would attack the master, from the current situation, it seems not!

War on terror: after realignment with ISAF on WoT, Pakistan has paid a big prize with lives of civilians and security staff, sovereignty etc. (also won pretty big prizes in terms of military aid, 7 billion bush, 5 billion obama), Pakistani establishment was extremely successful in using religion to successfully fuel the afghan war, I have often wondered is there a dual purpose use of religion, is there a possibility of demilitarization of militia’s and domestic terrorist. If not, aren’t the actions of paksitani establishment solely responsible for the Kalashnikov culture?

 

[Icewolf]

Thread reported...

And by your claim in the last sentence it can also be said that India caused Parliament attacks & 26/11 on itself as well.

 

[SQ8]

Tactical planning of Pakistani military has always baffled me, sometimes they have come up with brilliant acts of planning, valor and perseverance, and in other instances all three of mentioned attributes seemed lack luster.

1965 conflict (operation Gibraltar): Pakistani military completely misread the consequences of mass infiltration in Kashmir. The ground forces seems were not expecting a full fledged ground attack. In the end instead of taking the battle to into India, Pakistani military ended up defending its own borders. Logic says after such gross mis-planning of events, political position of Pak military would be weakened, but instead military rule still continued.

1971 Eastern front: Security of East Pakistan lies in west Pakistan, has to be the most dumbest line to be ever uttered in any military circles. It’s almost sending firefighters naked in a burning building with a helmet on and expecting utmost safety. What has always baffled me, disparity between the personnel of east and west Pakistan. The following is data mostly from TV interviews seen preciously and some information in free domain, gives an Idea of sheer stupidity of 90% troop concentration in one part and leaving east Pakistan almost unprotected.

Few members here have aggressively defended the logistic difficulties and heavily outnumbered troops as primary cause of the unilateral surrender, but I haven’t come across any one on the forum who can precisely explain the this uncanny disparity to begin with when both parts of the nation got freedom at the same time. Such numbers are mind boggling, after such tactical blunder in planning, it almost seemed that the military’s redundant political policies have sealed it’s fate, but…..

The Surrender: Pakistani military is renowned around the world for a highly disciplined army and is known for exceptional courage. There were some exceptional displays of resilience and fortitude from pak army, but still doesn’t explain how close to 54000 military personal would unilaterally surrender. With an exodus of 93000 pow’s with majority of them being military personnel, this is the biggest surrender in the history of post-world war II era. And just like 65’s conflict, there were no actions taken based official investigation for the tactical and policy failures.

West Pakistan; Longewalla: No air support, poor coordination, lack of planning, venturesome armored brigade chief, none of them can really explain 120 indian soldiers and a recoil-less jeep holding off 2000 pakistani soldiers, and an entire armored brigade till dawn and then getting decimated by IAF. (Although a great victory It was still a magnanimous intel failure on the indian side).

1999 kargil; Although a brilliant plan in the onset of the conflict, Kargil turned out to be a disaster when Indian air force got involved. It is almost unbelievable that Pakistan did not foresee the IAF involvement and sent it’s brave troops to be annihilated by IAF bombing raids, while the rest of Pakistan stood witness in silence. A relatively better plan than 65 as Pakistan was successful in ensuring India did not open up other fronts (a tactical blunder on indian side nevertheless), still had loose ends on political and tactical end, causing grave harm to lives and reputation of strong soldiers. And again against all logic, no punitive actions against chief designers of the plan, instead most of them became the most important political leaders in key positions.

Afghan war; “strategic depth” was never really taken seriously even in any military circles apart from one particular “jarnail” hence is not worth discussing, but Pakistani authorities, maybe not the the military directly led to arming “mujhideens” and subsequently the taliban, Arming hordes and hordes of uneducated militia with ak’s and rpgs, and expecting that their activities will never affect Pakistan almost paid off until the fall of Taliban. Did the policy makers ever have any “Plan B” for a scenario when the beast would attack the master, from the current situation, it seems not!

War on terror: after realignment with ISAF on WoT, Pakistan has paid a big prize with lives of civilians and security staff, sovereignty etc. (also won pretty big prizes in terms of military aid, 7 billion bush, 5 billion obama), Pakistani establishment was extremely successful in using religion to successfully fuel the afghan war, I have often wondered is there a dual purpose use of religion, is there a possibility of demilitarization of militia’s and domestic terrorist. If not, aren’t the actions of paksitani establishment solely responsible for the Kalashnikov culture?

Operation Gibraltar was not the only peg, Op grand slam that followed would still have gotten success had the leadership not been changed at the last minute by a dithering Ayub.

71: the defense of the east lies in the west may have been a failure in itself... but the usage of some 90000 troops(a sizable number) in a line defense tactic where they could have instead kept fighting long after any attack in a fortress defense posture is total idiocy.. But then again.. The man who led them was known better for orgies instead of organization.

Longewalla: Brilliant plan.. except it was made clear to the Planners by the PAF they there was NO way they could provide any effective support at that distance and that too at short notice. Yet the planners refused to co-ordinate with the PAF thinking that they would be able to hold off air attacks with their AAA mounts on the tanks. Idiocy again.

Afghan war: Try to stave off a soviet invasion by inviting Afghan Gun and Opium culture into Pakistan and ruining its society forever. Eventual efforts for endgame bore no fruit and third force under Taliban came in who turned out to be worst(in case people forget.. the Taliban tried blackmailing Pakistan more than anyone else).
The idea that Afghanistan, a land ravaged by war and practically a cultural disaster was to provide strategic depth for our forces(HOW??) is ..idiocy.

Kargil: Brilliant tactical plan, Bad strategic idea.. ZERO co-ordination or consultation with any of the ther branches or even the government of the hapless Nawaz Sharif. A Generals dream of personal glory that cost Many soldiers their lives.
Initial effect.. Foot on the throat of Indian forces in Kashmir.. When the retreat is ordered.. Mass Slaughter at the hands of the Indians.

WoT: One man's decision to completely bargain off the dignity and sovereignty of the country out of plain fear of losing his seat and his own personal gain. Then, a narrow minded establishment not taking advantage of diplomatic and strategic potential offered by the opportunity to the fullest and still trying to keep some of its home grown snakes alive in the fear that it would not have any other way to harass India in Kashmir.
Result: Pakistan's cancer that is now heading close to terminal stage.

 

[MilSpec]

Thread reported...

And by your claim in the last sentence it can also be said that India caused Parliament attacks & 26/11 on itself as well.

Cause and effect, mujhahideens were armed in the region by Pakistani administration, whereas Kashmir insurgents were not armed by govt of India, hence you logic doesn't make sense when you draw any similarities from the last sentence. Discussion welcome.

 

[SQ8]

Thread reported...

And by your claim in the last sentence it can also be said that India caused Parliament attacks & 26/11 on itself as well.

As long as civil and meaningful discussions(which means zero room for jingoism) can be kept, its fine.. lets give the OP a chance to show that.

Cause and effect, mujhahideens were armed in the region by Pakistani administration, whereas Kashmir insurgents were not armed by govt of India, hence you logic doesn't make sense when you draw any similarities from the last sentence. Discussion welcome.

Yet the impetus for the Muj movements is based on the Kashmir struggle..
after all, its near impossible to create a movement out of thin air.. as you have already pointed out for Op Gibraltar in the 65 war.

 

[MilSpec]

@Oscar, Why the startling disparity between east and west, what was the philosophy behind that, i can understand Post british era stuff, but sabre's came much later, why not train bengali pilots, and commision bengali divisions,

 

[SQ8]

@Oscar, Why the startling disparity between east and west, what was the philosophy behind that, i can understand Post british era stuff, but sabre's came much later, why not train bengali pilots, and commision bengali divisions,

A bit of mis-conception.. there were Bengali pilots.. quite a few of them.. and even Bengali divisions.
What you see is the ORBAT after the desertions that began in the wake of the uprising.

The equipment distribution however, is where the actual problem lay.
Forces in East Pakistan were deliberately underequipped ... Part due to the fact that the Industrial sectors were mostly in the west.. and part due to a shortage of resources.. and part due to the mentality of the "Aryan" Sahibs of W.Pakistan.

 

[Icewolf]

Cause and effect, mujhahideens were armed in the region by Pakistani administration, whereas Kashmir insurgents were not armed by govt of India, hence you logic doesn't make sense when you draw any similarities from the last sentence. Discussion welcome.

Cause = Indian Army massacring Kashmiris in IOK ----> Effect = 26/11 and Parliament attacks.

Is this what you mean? Am I saying a lie?

 

[MilSpec]

As long as civil and meaningful discussions(which means zero room for jingoism) can be kept, its fine.. lets give the OP a chance to show that.



Yet the impetus for the Muj movements is based on the Kashmir struggle..
after all, its near impossible to create a movement out of thin air.. as you have already pointed out for Op Gibraltar in the 65 war.

true, I have never contended that India hasn't had it's fallacies, any insurgency cannot survive without "external support ans internal will", history taught us that. My reply was to the logic where the member drew out similarity from two diametrically opposite actions of the two governments in question.

 

[MilSpec]

A bit of mis-conception.. there were Bengali pilots.. quite a few of them.. and even Bengali divisions.
What you see is the ORBAT after the desertions that began in the wake of the uprising.

The equipment distribution however, is where the actual problem lay.
Forces in East Pakistan were deliberately underequipped ... Part due to the fact that the Industrial sectors were mostly in the west.. and part due to a shortage of resources.. and part due to the mentality of the "Aryan" Sahibs of W.Pakistan.

My bad, let me rephrase, could the infrastructure, troop deployment, and training have been equally distributed in military.

Could there have been a equal share of civil servants from east depicting the actual demographic share of the bengalis.

Was Ayub and his cabinet responsible for what seems like the disparity or there is some other element to the picture

 

[SQ8]

My bad, let me rephrase, could the infrastructure, troop deployment, and training have been equally distributed in military.

Could there have been a equal share of civil servants from east depicting the actual demographic share of the bengalis.

Was Ayub and his cabinet responsible for what seems like the disparity or there is some other element to the picture

The equipment may not have been needed..and the landscape of E.Pakistan was fairly well suited for defense if used intelligently.
Properly positioned Artillery,Anti-Tank positions,AAA and four squadrons of aircraft was quite capable of defending the landscape in lieu of a moderately equipped but well trained infantry force. The Bengali's would have risen to the occasion without a hitch..
it seems oblivious to most Pakistanis that No one cheered more for the sacrifices and reported victories in the 65 war than those in E.Pakistan.. Prayers at every mosque.. and a large section of the population was supportive.

Yet, the "Sahibs" of W.Pakistan saw it better to treat the Bengalis as servants rather than equals.. not understanding their PoV and trying to impose theirs. CSP officers posted in E.Pakistan were sourced mostly if not all from the western wing to keep watch over the Bengalis whom they did not trust.
Racism had a lot to do with the downfall of Pakistan in Dhaka(and may do the same soon now.. but that is for another topic).
Ayub was just a representation of the attitude that stemmed from the northern feudal's wish for control of Pakistan.
He just provided impetus to this biased behavior.
Behavior that was not always seen within the ranks of the military, and many officers within the Armed forces of Pakistan still felt betrayed by their Bengali counterparts since they were not aware nor sensitive to the extent of the problem and placed a lot of trust in whom they considered their colleagues.
This attitude varied from the AF to the Army.. with the latter being comprised more of lackey's and "turnable" attitude officers.


However, even with the scarce resources.. there was a movement of an F-6 sq to Dhaka scheduled before the outbreak of the war. But the forces that landed to stop the insurgency weren't well equipped either.. most with tennis shoes or sandals and lee-enfields.. the fact that they were still able to contain a large scale insurgency before facing the invasion.. is testament to their determination.

 

[MilSpec]

The equipment may not have been needed..and the landscape of E.Pakistan was fairly well suited for defense if used intelligently.
Properly positioned Artillery,Anti-Tank positions,AAA and four squadrons of aircraft was quite capable of defending the landscape in lieu of a moderately equipped but well trained infantry force. The Bengali's would have risen to the occasion without a hitch..
it seems oblivious to most Pakistanis that No one cheered more for the sacrifices and reported victories in the 65 war than those in E.Pakistan.. Prayers at every mosque.. and a large section of the population was supportive.

Yet, the "Sahibs" of W.Pakistan saw it better to treat the Bengalis as servants rather than equals.. not understanding their PoV and trying to impose theirs. CSP officers posted in E.Pakistan were sourced mostly if not all from the western wing to keep watch over the Bengalis whom they did not trust.
Racism had a lot to do with the downfall of Pakistan in Dhaka(and may do the same soon now.. but that is for another topic).
Ayub was just a representation of the attitude that stemmed from the northern feudal's wish for control of Pakistan.
He just provided impetus to this biased behavior.
Behavior that was not always seen within the ranks of the military, and many officers within the Armed forces of Pakistan still felt betrayed by their Bengali counterparts since they were not aware nor sensitive to the extent of the problem and placed a lot of trust in whom they considered their colleagues.
This attitude varied from the AF to the Army.. with the latter being comprised more of lackey's and "turnable" attitude officers.


However, even with the scarce resources.. there was a movement of an F-6 sq to Dhaka scheduled before the outbreak of the war. But the forces that landed to stop the insurgency weren't well equipped either.. most with tennis shoes or sandals and lee-enfields.. the fact that they were still able to contain a large scale insurgency before facing the invasion.. is testament to their determination.

In your expert opinion, has the establishment learned from such mistakes, most members here curse bangladeshis for betrayal, when it seems west pak had quite a substantial role in the tragedy for your nation.

After east pakistan, has there been any impetus to ensure such disparity is abolished in pakistan, and all provinces have equal or near equal representation in policy making and power projection bodies such as civil service, military service, education and technology.

Are there any fears that, policies which led to events of 71 have certain resemblance to what might be happening in balochistan?

 

[Icewolf]

Are there any fears that, policies which led to events of 71 have certain resemblance to what might be happening in balochistan?

Balochistan and Bangladesh are totally different issues. First, Balochistan is not surrounded by enemie(s) (not ones that we cannot take care of anyways )

Bangladesh had a population far greater than West Pakistan. Balochistan has a population of 5 million Balochis, while the rest are Pashtuns which are known to be highly nationalistic.

 

[OrionHunter]

An undeniable fact is that some of Pakistan's Generals are brilliant in tactics but near zero in strategy. They lack foresight and planning especially the consequences of their actions in geopolitical terms.

They believe in that old adage, "Wham bam, thank you ma'am." Never mind the consequences of a military or political riposte that could ultimately lead to defeat.

This has been amply exhibited in all wars, especially the Kargil conflict. A brilliant tactical plan by Mush in the opening gambit, but strategically a disaster of galactic proportions as the war progressed. Well, one doesn't expect Army generals to be brilliant statesmen and diplomats too!

Mush and his ilk at the helm got so much egg on their faces, enough for a huge king sized omelet!

Cheers!

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Operation Gibraltar was not the only peg, Op grand slam that followed would still have gotten success had the leadership not been changed at the last minute by a dithering Ayub.

71: the defense of the east lies in the west may have been a failure in itself... but the usage of some 90000 troops(a sizable number) in a line defense tactic where they could have instead kept fighting long after any attack in a fortress defense posture is total idiocy.. But then again.. The man who led them was known better for orgies instead of organization.

Longewalla: Brilliant plan.. except it was made clear to the Planners by the PAF they there was NO way they could provide any effective support at that distance and that too at short notice. Yet the planners refused to co-ordinate with the PAF thinking that they would be able to hold off air attacks with their AAA mounts on the tanks. Idiocy again.

Afghan war: Try to stave off a soviet invasion by inviting Afghan Gun and Opium culture into Pakistan and ruining its society forever. Eventual efforts for endgame bore no fruit and third force under Taliban came in who turned out to be worst(in case people forget.. the Taliban tried blackmailing Pakistan more than anyone else).
The idea that Afghanistan, a land ravaged by war and practically a cultural disaster was to provide strategic depth for our forces(HOW??) is ..idiocy.

Kargil: Brilliant tactical plan, Bad strategic idea.. ZERO co-ordination or consultation with any of the ther branches or even the government of the hapless Nawaz Sharif. A Generals dream of personal glory that cost Many soldiers their lives.
Initial effect.. Foot on the throat of Indian forces in Kashmir.. When the retreat is ordered.. Mass Slaughter at the hands of the Indians.

WoT: One man's decision to completely bargain off the dignity and sovereignty of the country out of plain fear of losing his seat and his own personal gain. Then, a narrow minded establishment not taking advantage of diplomatic and strategic potential offered by the opportunity to the fullest and still trying to keep some of its home grown snakes alive in the fear that it would not have any other way to harass India in Kashmir.
Result: Pakistan's cancer that is now heading close to terminal stage.

@Oscar
What you have mentioned in the underlined part is a repeated malaise of operational planning in the PA. This step-brotherly attitude of PA towards PAF has cost Pakistan heavily in every conflict. But the irony of it all was; that the PAF was able to pull PA's chestnuts out of the fire after 'Op Grand Slam' ground to a halt. PAF never even had the chance to do it again after PA's disaster in Kargil. And later the PAF was looked askance at (by some quarters) for not having rushed in to the aid of the PA's soldiers on the heights when they were being pulverised alternately by IAF's air attacks and Artillery barrages. The final indignity inflicted on the PAF was when the 'Cowboy Commando' Parvez Musharaff effectively derailed PAF's succession plan post the Kargil mess that he had created.

On a similar note, the PN has never counted for anything in the Strategic Plans drawn up by GHQ. Which is kind of amazing, considering that Pakistan is hugely vulnerable on that border considering that nearly all POL and strategic materials come in to Pakistan via that route. In any conflict that will be a major factor.