I have to voice my agreement-in-principle with Maverick2009's last post; though it is certain that Indian deployment to the Western border would be negatively affected by Chinese posturing (the consequences of a Chinese RRU moving to a border 'WZ front,' as they call it, would be correspondingly higher); simply assuming that this would be the case is at best only a display of naïve-optimism. China's actual demeanor towards a Pakistan-India military confrontation would be best estimated from its outright refusal to lend diplomatic support in the Kargil conflict to the wait-and-see attitude adopted during the mobilizations in the Punjab in 2002.
Additionally, the attitude of several posters in this thread (including the OP, no offense to anyone) seems to indicate a general disregard for the IAF's technology and training; while it is okay to be generally patriotic, arrogance arising out of excessive nationalism should be avoided insomuch as a serious discussion is desired.
A note on the Flanker: the low-intensity airspace conflict in the Sudan has highlighted the potential effectiveness of this aircraft in the Air Superiority role. Its capacity for PGM's makes it a potent strike fighter for the IAF. the The Flanker threat should not be taken lightly, bravado notwithstanding.
Assuming the possibility of a limited conventional conflict between Pakistan and India that involves the air forces (and this is quite an assumption if the Kargil War was anything to go by), the IAF should be able to rotate its most effective formations to the area of conflict. The alleged disparity in combat value would then drop off. I am reminded of an incident during the Kargil War that most choose to ignore (will attempt to provide citation and retract if none available): PAF F-16's aborted a CAP near the LoC after some Indian jets (possibly Flogger M's, given their BVR advantage to PAF's early model F-16s) achieved lock-on with long range AAM guidance radar.
Whereas the PAF might enjoy a qualitative edge over the IAF and might be closing the quantity gap, the rather low possibility of a general conflict will prevent the PAF from fully exploiting such superiority as might exist. It is more likely that the air forces of both sides will be limited to local air superiority missions and close air support, contrary to active theater-interdiction and preemptive installation strikes where the PAF's strengths could truly shine (one might argue that cruise missiles have already - at least partially - divested the air force of these roles). Additionally, Pakistan's own preference for a limited war might undermine the effectiveness of its military machine, as it passes theater initiative over to the Indians and forces us to adopt a defensive posture in other areas of the theater, necessitating force commitments against a potentially inferior, but far more numerous enemy.
The most recent large-scale CAS exercises I can think of were conducted in 1988 under Operation High Mark '89 in Operation Zarb-y-Momen highlighted several operational shortcomings:
Out of 412 sorties planned for close support, 324 sorties were achieved. Post-exercise analysis revealed certain problems related to poor radio contact with the FACs, non-availability of updated maps, navigation problems related to the improper selection of Contact Point (CP), and lastly, delays in mission tasking, leaving insufficient time for mission planning.
Source: Pakistan Military Consortium
While it would be great that the level of co-ordination between the services has grown since the late '80s, the fact that the PAF was not even in dispersal at the outbreak of the Kargil War seems to indicate otherwise. Additionally, It should be noted that 1988 was a good year for the PAF, the climax of a period of tremendous modernization and combat experience as a result of Pakistani involvement in the First Afghan War (although, to be fair, CAS was not a mission profile much employed in that conflict). Similarly, the role of the PAF in the ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the Frontier has not been publicized much, and it remains to be seen how effective it would be in that role, considering the general failure of the NATO air forces in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia in the recent past.
On the flip side, the allegedly direct involvement of PAF advisors in Sri Lankan offensive operations over the last two to three years, and the evident success of the same, could mean that the PAF has adequate doctrinal emphasis on CAS missions.
@ the OP: No disrespect, but the tit-for-tat 'counters' you have suggested for Indian strategy, regardless of how effective, serve to indicate that the PAF's own strategy is non-existent and follows t least one step behind India's. At a time when most advanced nations are switching over from counter-strategy to asymmetric strategic positioning, this view is somewhat simplistic and, possibly, mistaken.
Thus ends my first post here at PakDef. Hello, everyone!
