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Siachen: 30 years of Indian Occupation

Now u want to compare urself with china?
Dude there is a limit to trolling.

dude don't make claims at first place like "Exactly,we don't need to divert troops from one area to another"... after which you have to eat humble pie by making lame excuses.. oh China is big that's why... :D
 
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dude don't make claims at first place like "Exactly,we don't need to divert troops from one area to another"... after which you have to eat humble pie by making lame excuses.. oh China is big that's why... :D

The news you quoted only disproves your own point. We did not have to divert troops from the west or Siachen to put them on the east. They came from our reserves and non deployed formations. Pumping troops where needed is not as issue for India. Believe me, there is no dearth of troops.

This is called clutching at straws.
 
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Both sides need to pull out troops from Siachen. Its a useless conflict over a wasteland. Just mark the positions and get the fk out. LOC needs to be normalised as well.
 
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Both sides need to pull out troops from Siachen. Its a useless conflict over a wasteland. Just mark the positions and get the fk out. LOC needs to be normalised as well.

Good thinking.

Too bad its impossible to implement
 
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Both sides need to pull out troops from Siachen. Its a useless conflict over a wasteland. Just mark the positions and get the fk out. LOC needs to be normalised as well.

We cannot take that chance after the Kargil war happened. Pakistanis took advantage of the gentlemanly agreement to withdraw during winter, and treacherously sent in infiltrators during that time. So if we leave Siachen, we cannot be sure that Pak wouldn't slyly occupy it. The trust does not exist anymore, to make such a move.
 
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We cannot take that chance after the Kargil war happened. Pakistanis took advantage of the gentlemanly agreement to withdraw during winter, and treacherously sent in infiltrators during that time. So if we leave Siachen, we cannot be sure that Pak wouldn't slyly occupy it. The trust does not exist anymore, to make such a move.
Put observers in there instead of armies. Raise alarm if there is any unusual activity.
 
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Both sides need to pull out troops from Siachen. Its a useless conflict over a wasteland. Just mark the positions and get the fk out. LOC needs to be normalised as well.

Good thinking.

Too bad its impossible to implement

How come ?

Pakistan refuses to verify AGPL(Actual Ground Position Line) because it will refute Pakistan Army's lie that Pakistan is on Siachin.
 
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Pakistan refuses to verify AGPL(Actual Ground Position Line) because it will refute Pakistan Army's lie that Pakistan is on Siachin.
Well then Pakistan Army needs to grow up I guess.
Only those win who know how to take a loss. General military wisdom.
 
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Put observers in there instead of armies. Raise alarm if there is any unusual activity.
They will be vulnerable if Pak launches a surprise raid on them, as they did a few times in the 80s (and were repulsed). We have to deploy enough troops to defend the area - no more, no less.
 
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They will be vulnerable if Pak launches a surprise raid on them, as they did a few times in the 80s (and were repulsed). We have to deploy enough troops to defend the area - no more, no less.
Any military operation requires a build up and that cant be concealed in this age of spy drones and satellites. Unusual activity will be found out by both sides.
 
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That is not spoonfeeding, because that (very weak) point could not have been divined from your post, in which this implication was not made.

And that is as weak a justification as it comes. India is not short on manpower, and having one brigade on Siachen does not make any dent in our capability to deploy sufficient numbers elsewhere. A brigade is not so large as to be called a strategic formation anyway. If an entire mountain corps had to be diverted, then maybe this argument would hold. And by the way, this non argument can be made about troops deployed anywhere - that they are not available elsewhere.

About my claims - I did not make any claims, I only asked you to substantiate yours. Heck not even that, I didn't even ask you to substantiate them, I merely asked for an explanation. I at least wanted to hear what tactical or strategic benefits Pak can have because India captured high ground. That sounds like making a virtue out of necesity, like saying the grapes are sour when you lost them. Waging a war to get Siachen, losing, making numerous attempts by commando units under mushy himself, losing, and then when you know you wont get it, pretending that it is a strategic victory for Pak that India holds Siachen. Wishful thinking at its worst.

If you want to know why it is important for India to hold Siachen glacier, plenty has been written about it:
Why India cannot afford to give up Siachen - Rediff.com India News
India will not give up tactical advantage over Pak in Siachen - The Times of India
India to continue tactical advantage over Pak in Siachen


The tactical advantage to India is obvious, because we occupy and control the "commanding heights" in the region, which is key to succesful area domination in mountainous areas. There are some strategic benefits as well, since they can observe Pakistani activity with impunity and act as a launching pad for future wars, since it is easy to come down the slopes than to climb up them. It is so important for India that the Indian army (under General VP Malik) flatly refused Prime minister IK Gujral's order to vacate Siachen - a disobedience unheard of in civil-military relations in India before or after.

Here are some stragegic benefits for India, explained by an Indian army officer, that I am copying from BR:

My quote about Pakistan's advantage was from paper published by an Institute in India. You didn't refute my statement (with Ref) by bringing forth the evidence to the contrary (with Ref). Looks like you wanted to be consulted by institute before publishing that statement. this was the substantiation i wanted.

your claims about strategic advantage are dissected below:

In his book Siachen: Conflict Without End, Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan (Retd.), a former DGMO, has written: "The (Siachen) theatre of conflict, as is now widely accepted, did not offer strategic advantages…

To justify a prolonged conflict, a piece of land must provide significant military advantage and open up options for seeking major military gains. It should either deny the adversary an avenue to launch strategic-level offensive operations to capture sensitive territory or resources, or offer the home side a launch pad for such a purpose.


Alternatively, for a land mass to be considered strategically significant, it must be politically or economically important. The neighbouring cities of Amritsar and Lahore are politically important for India and Pakistan, respectively. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were economically important to France and Germany due to the huge iron ore reserves that these provinces had and several wars were fought to gain control over them. Siachen does not qualify as an area of strategic importance on any of these grounds though it has now become a politically sensitive issue.

Many Indian analysts have made militarily unsustainable projections about the possibility of a China-Pak pincer movement over the Karakoram Range and the Saltoro Ridgeline into northern Ladakh with a view to capturing Leh. Such exaggerated apprehensions are truly amazing as these fail to take into account the lack of a road axis to mount and sustain a major offensive logistically. Thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants, and other supplies, including rations, clothing items for the extreme climatic conditions prevailing at Siachen and spares and batteries for radio sets and other telecom equipment, would need to be dumped over two to three summer seasons before a worthwhile military offensive could be launched. Since a major road cannot be built over a moving sheet of ice in what is perhaps the most treacherous mountainous terrain in the world, all logistics preparations by the adversaries would have to be undertaken by employing large transport helicopters. These slow-moving monsters would be sitting ducks for the fighter jets of the Indian Air Force.

Even if one were to grant the possibility of a joint China-Pak offensive into Ladakh, however remote the probability is in the new geo-political environment, better options are available to both the countries to plan and execute their offensives such that the Indian army is unbalanced at the operational level. China could develop its operations using the Demchok road along the Indus River as well as along the Chushul axis and Pakistan could plan to advance along the relatively less difficult Chalunka-Thoise approach from Skardu while simultaneously attacking into the Kargil sector to cut off Ladakh. If operations along this approach to Thoise, astride the Shyok River, could be successfully conducted by Pakistan, the Siachen area would be automatically cut off. Hence, it is more important to defend this axis in the Turtok sector rather than fight at Siachen itself.
Hence, I restate that India doesn't have any strategic advantage on Siachen.
 
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Any military operation requires a build up and that cant be concealed in this age of spy drones and satellites. Unusual activity will be found out by both sides.
Not a sudden commando raid by a small unit of special forces - they train for lightning strikes. Satellites can only pick up large troop movements or concentrations, unless they are specifically looking for something.

In 1987, when Brigadier Musharaff led a commando assault on key peaks in Siachen (after training extensively with US special forces), what thwarted that attempt was intercepted communications between one soldier in that unit to his wife, about something he wanted her to send him. Analysing that info and correlating it with a few others enabled Indians to anticipate the attack and fortify the positions. But we cannot rely on such luck every time.

My quote about Pakistan's advantage was from paper published by an Institute in India. You didn't refute my statement (with Ref) by bringing forth the evidence to the contrary (with Ref). Looks like you wanted to be consulted by institute before publishing that statement. this was the substantiation i wanted.

your claims about strategic advantage are dissected below:

In his book Siachen: Conflict Without End, Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan (Retd.), a former DGMO, has written: "The (Siachen) theatre of conflict, as is now widely accepted, did not offer strategic advantages…

To justify a prolonged conflict, a piece of land must provide significant military advantage and open up options for seeking major military gains. It should either deny the adversary an avenue to launch strategic-level offensive operations to capture sensitive territory or resources, or offer the home side a launch pad for such a purpose.


Alternatively, for a land mass to be considered strategically significant, it must be politically or economically important. The neighbouring cities of Amritsar and Lahore are politically important for India and Pakistan, respectively. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were economically important to France and Germany due to the huge iron ore reserves that these provinces had and several wars were fought to gain control over them. Siachen does not qualify as an area of strategic importance on any of these grounds though it has now become a politically sensitive issue.

Many Indian analysts have made militarily unsustainable projections about the possibility of a China-Pak pincer movement over the Karakoram Range and the Saltoro Ridgeline into northern Ladakh with a view to capturing Leh. Such exaggerated apprehensions are truly amazing as these fail to take into account the lack of a road axis to mount and sustain a major offensive logistically. Thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants, and other supplies, including rations, clothing items for the extreme climatic conditions prevailing at Siachen and spares and batteries for radio sets and other telecom equipment, would need to be dumped over two to three summer seasons before a worthwhile military offensive could be launched. Since a major road cannot be built over a moving sheet of ice in what is perhaps the most treacherous mountainous terrain in the world, all logistics preparations by the adversaries would have to be undertaken by employing large transport helicopters. These slow-moving monsters would be sitting ducks for the fighter jets of the Indian Air Force.

Even if one were to grant the possibility of a joint China-Pak offensive into Ladakh, however remote the probability is in the new geo-political environment, better options are available to both the countries to plan and execute their offensives such that the Indian army is unbalanced at the operational level. China could develop its operations using the Demchok road along the Indus River as well as along the Chushul axis and Pakistan could plan to advance along the relatively less difficult Chalunka-Thoise approach from Skardu while simultaneously attacking into the Kargil sector to cut off Ladakh. If operations along this approach to Thoise, astride the Shyok River, could be successfully conducted by Pakistan, the Siachen area would be automatically cut off. Hence, it is more important to defend this axis in the Turtok sector rather than fight at Siachen itself.
Hence, I restate that India doesn't have any strategic advantage on Siachen.


I know the PDF that you are copy-pasting that from, it shows up on the first page of google search results. If you google around, you will find opinions on both sides. The fact is that the Indian army has decided to side with people who say that it offers tactical and strategic benefits to us. We can keep copy-pasting articles all day supporting our own POV. But the fact that the military has picked one of those POVs as valid should lend it credibility.
 
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