What
@Joe Shearer is trying to portray, and quite a few of us actually agree with his point of view is, that rabid nationalism is never an answer to win a counter-insurgency operation, because in Indian scenario, it is increasingly along a path of similar societal fractures, as were beginning to appear in 1920s to 30s.
India is unique wherein we have fought 4 major counter insurgencies till date and one is ongoing. Starting from Naga to ULFA to Sri Lanka to Punjab, we have evolved our CI operations.
Whereas till 1960s we used to follow the practice of mass attacks and use of artillery and air power against our own population, it has undergone a radical shift in thinking subsequently , with the aim being to protect 'our population' from 'our misguided citizens' who 'took up arms against us'.
Any CI operation is around 90% sociological, political and economical, somewhat ideological, and around 10% only military. You can win militarily (as in Vietnam) yet loose the political aspects and hence loose over all. Majority of a population in a CI territory, is the neutral civilian who wants to ensure his/her safety, security and survival. His/Her actions are totally meant to ensure the same.
You have to look at Kashmir (indeed any area afflicted by armed struggle) in these aspects. When Indians, the media and now increasingly I would also label them as so called 'nationalists' tell that the complete population is traitorous, it beats logic, alienates people caught in a hard place with no option but to play along for survival and amounts to a deliberate act to weaken the resolve of the government and the nation in such an undertaking. That, as per me, is unacceptable.
And before you start off with soldier's perspective, understand that the soldier is equally bewildered today, he is asked to protect the same people who he is asked to suppress the next day. What a conundrum!!!
Something you might want to read. Indeed, all the radical 'remove article 370' members are requested to go through this fine appreciation of the tenets of Indian Counter Insurgency Doctrine. An extract:
India’s experience with counterinsurgency began in the early 1950’s in the northeastern portion of the country. The government in New Delhi fought separatists from the ethnic Naga population. Unhappy with the borders created by the end of British rule in 1947, the Naga tribes hoped to form an autonomous state separate from the Indian Union. New Delhi refused to grant the region autonomy and a violent uprising began. The Naga rebellion created elements of counterinsurgency doctrine for the Indian army, a doctrine largely unchanged until the 1980s. The Indian Army developed their approach by studying Mao Zedong’s theory of insurgent warfare, and the British theory of counterinsurgency drawn from the experience in Malaya. The Indian Army took the primacy of isolating the insurgents and maintaining control of the population as the most valuable lesson from the British.
The Naga’s hit-and-run guerilla attacks caused the Indian Army to utilize large-unit operations. Since quick fights with insurgents did not allow support to reach a unit in contact, the Indian Army began only sending units on patrol durable enough to sustain a fight with guerillas on their own. This led to the practice of keeping most operations at company-level units or larger.This practice, however, made it harder for the larger Indian units to keep up with the small groups of Naga fighters in the jungles of northeastern India.
The Indian Army also learned lessons about the political aspects of counterinsurgency while fighting the Naga rebels. The Army revised its perception of the insurgents, no longer viewing guerillas as enemies to be found and killed, but as fellow countryman. This placed a higher value on the political aspects of counterinsurgency, and on convincing the insurgent fighters to support the government. The army’s new perception meant that military force should be used only when absolutely required. The operational effect was that the army began to minimize the use of heavy weapons, such as artillery and close air support. The Indian Army also renounced older traditions from the British colonial rule, like punitive expeditions. Even in the 1950’s the Indian Army Chief of Staff vocalized the population-centric approach with guidance to troops deploying to Naga regions:
"You must remember that all of the people in the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians. They may have different religions, may pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians and that very fact, that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of this area. You are to protect the mass of people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people and who are a danger to the lives and properties of the people. You must do therefore everything possible to win their confidence and respect and to help them feel they belong to India."
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a606326.pdf
This is the work of Maj Daniel G. Hodermarsky. He is off on quote a few accounts (most prominently claiming Indira Gandhi as PM in 1990!!!!) but am quoting him for the above text only.
I am sure, that many of our keyboard warriors would disagree with the assessment above. It does not matter, it is the collective wisdom of the Indian Army that matters, the collective wisdom (or lack thereof) of the polity which matters. All actions must and should ALWAYS be in consonance with our guiding principles as a nation and our Constitution as a law.
http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/doctrine sub conv w.pdf
The above link shall help you understand our approach to CI operations from a military point of view.
