ashok321
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Sensitive Data of Indian Navy’s Scorpene Class Submarines Leaked
- Thread starter proud_indian
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BON PLAN
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Don't worry.
If the leaks are of a small significance (seems the case), You probably will have a small compensation in form of an earlier and less costlier upgrade.
If the leaks are an avered threat for your boats, sure DCNS and Thales will offer a major upgrade (new sensor suite? new tactic battlefield management? new propeller (Barracuda style?)....) because it's the french naval industry future which is in balance.
the issue in India and Austalia and Norway and elsewhere is too important to let you down.
randomradio
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http://indianexpress.com/article/ex...ta-leak-manohar-parrikar-indian-navy-3001106/
Deep dive: Why Scorpene data leak does not compromise security of Project-75
Sushant Singh spoke to experts and submarine veterans to look at the impact of each of the 10 kinds of data breaches that The Australian newspaper reported last week.
To coordinate next year’s Golden Jubilee celebrations of the induction of the first submarine in the Navy, more than 100 retired officers of the submarine branch started a WhatsApp group last month. This group, which includes three-star officers who have spent decades with submarines, went abuzz at midnight last Tuesday after The Australian newspaper reported that 22,400 pages of documents pertaining to India’s Scorpene submarine programme, called Project-75, had been leaked.
The veterans studied the few leaked pages — with redacted data — put out by the paper, and intense discussions followed in the group for the first three days. In the end, there was near unanimity that while such data being put out publicly was not a good thing, it did not affect Project-75 in any significant way.
Under Project-75, French company DCNS provides design and technology to public sector Mazagon Docks to make six Scorpene submarines, the first of which, INS Kalvari was put out for sea trials earlier this year. The hulls of the other five submarines have been cast, and they are scheduled to be commissioned by 2020.
Captain J S Malik, a retired submariner with 32 years of experience who served as Director of Submarine Operations in Navy Headquarters, said, “Most of this data is generic and belongs to Naval Staff Qualitative Requirements (NSQR) provided by the Navy to the French company, and ‘binding data’ for the product. It does not pertain to any specific submarine, and has limited usage for the adversary.”
But Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Ministry officials have repeatedly asserted that they are “prepared for the worst-case scenario”. What could be the areas of concern for the Navy?
According to Commodore A Jai Singh, a retired submariner who was associated with Project-75 preparations at Navy Headquarters at the turn of the century, “the only thing, which if leaked out from the supplier, that can really compromise the operation of our submarines is the source code of the Fire Control System. It is a top secret thing which the DCNS doesn’t even share with the company providing the weapons. The Australian hasn’t claimed that it is in the possession of the software code, and besides that, everything else is not really going to matter.”
He added, “Just the generic technical specifications are little indication of a submarine’s operational capability. The element of stealth and superiority is how a navy operates its submarines with the equipment on board and therein lie the vital elements of secrecy essential for submarine operations.”
Three top Navy sources have confirmed to The Indian Express that the documents put out so far are not the same as the ones with the Navy. These are dated versions from a period well before the signing of the contract with DCNS in 2005. Navy officials assert that “we are no longer a buyer’s Navy but a builder’s Navy. Only six navies have successfully built ballistic missile submarines, including India. There is no need to be overly concerned as we have the capability of tweaking the design, and the weapon and sensor deployment capability to mitigate any risk from information being compromised.”
The Australian has reported being in possession of 10 types of secret information which compromises the Indian programme. The Indian Express went over each of them with experts to figure out what they mean, and how they could affect the Navy.
Stealth capabilities
Stealth capabilities pertain mainly to the acoustic signature of a submarine, and is a function of many things, including the submarine’s self-noise levels, the propeller configuration, the speed regimes underwater, the noise generated by on-board machinery, and the acoustic damping techniques used both on the hull and within the submarine. The harmonics produced by no two submarines are the same. These spot frequencies, unlike the range given in the documents, are recorded by special equipment after a submarine goes for sea-trials, and kept in the Ship Data Book, a top secret document kept with the captain of the submarine. This data is re-recorded after every major refit, as the harmonics change. In the case of a European design like the Scorpene, there would not be much to choose between contemporary designs of a relatively similar size which would operate in the same frequency ranges.
Frequencies at which submarines gain intelligence
Most modern submarine Electronic Search Measures (ESM) systems operate in a frequency range of 0.2 to 40 GHz, so to learn that Scorpenes operate in a similar frequency band is no compromise. Similarly, submarines are fitted with navigational radars with commercial applications, which operate in a particular frequency range worldwide. A modern submarine rarely, if ever, transmits at sea either from its radars or its sonars, or even its communication sets. A Naval officer who commanded a submarine for six years said that he used an active sonar only thrice in his tenure, that too only to test the equipment and validate the training of his staff.
Noise levels submarines could reach at certain speeds
Noise levels are a function of the submarine speed and the speed of rotation of a propeller, which is recorded during sea trials and noted in the Ship Data Book. The data put out is the NSQR limits given by the Navy to the designers that it should not exceed so many decibels at various speeds.
Diving depths, range and endurance
Range and endurance of all submarines are in the open domain. While specific depths may not be listed in the open specifications, most submarines the world over operate in a more or less similar depth envelope. Endurance of any submarine is dependent on its maximum patrol period, which determines the quantity of fuel carried. It varies between 50 and 60 days in the case of India’s submarines.
Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data
Every submarine is demagnetised after construction and undergoes trials at the underwater ranges at Goa. The data for even the first submarine has not been recorded so far. This data is updated even if a submarine has stayed in a dry dock for a prolonged period. Rarely has a submarine been detected by an MRASW aircraft fitted with a Magnetic Anomaly Detector. Since submarines do not transmit, they are not vulnerable to detection in the e-m spectrum.
Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and combat system
The Navy has not selected the torpedo for the six submarines after the contract for Black Shark torpedoes from the Italian company WASS was cancelled following the VVIP helicopter controversy. Based on the choice of weapons and sensors on board, and the operating philosophy, the combat system would be programmed by the Navy, so there would be very little to be gained from the basic characteristics of the system. The secrecy lies in their programming by the Navy.
Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope
Modern submarines rarely plane to periscope depth except for the minimum time required to charge their batteries. This duration is also a function of the submarine’s mission profile, as well as the tactical exploitation of the platform in the prevailing operational scenario. Knowing the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope actually discloses little or no information about what the submarine is doing or intends to do.
Propeller’s noise specifications
Each propeller generates its own harmonics of noise which is determined after extensive trials, while the data put out is the generic NSQR data. Even a minor chip of 2-3 mm completely changes propeller noise. The propeller generates different noise at different speeds at varying depths and varying hydrological conditions. The submarine is equipped with cavitation meters, to assess the noise level and accordingly vary its speed or depth to find the most suitable depth and speed profile to operate at.
Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces
A submarine is unlikely to surface in an operational deployment, and will do so if required, only in friendly waters. In an emergency, if a submarine has no choice but to surface, its visual presence will be easier to detect than its acoustic signature.
Weapons data
Weapons used in peacetime during training and during war operate on totally different frequencies. The war-shots are launched on frequency hopping mechanism, unlike peacetime firing. A veteran submariner gave the example of the only test war-shot fired by him in 2003 off the coast of Mumbai which could not be recorded by any of the half a dozen Indian ships monitoring the firing, despite knowing the exact timing and the location of the target. Moreover, the Pakistan Navy is also in possession of the same Exocet missile which these Scorpenes will use.
Deep dive: Why Scorpene data leak does not compromise security of Project-75
Sushant Singh spoke to experts and submarine veterans to look at the impact of each of the 10 kinds of data breaches that The Australian newspaper reported last week.
To coordinate next year’s Golden Jubilee celebrations of the induction of the first submarine in the Navy, more than 100 retired officers of the submarine branch started a WhatsApp group last month. This group, which includes three-star officers who have spent decades with submarines, went abuzz at midnight last Tuesday after The Australian newspaper reported that 22,400 pages of documents pertaining to India’s Scorpene submarine programme, called Project-75, had been leaked.
The veterans studied the few leaked pages — with redacted data — put out by the paper, and intense discussions followed in the group for the first three days. In the end, there was near unanimity that while such data being put out publicly was not a good thing, it did not affect Project-75 in any significant way.
Under Project-75, French company DCNS provides design and technology to public sector Mazagon Docks to make six Scorpene submarines, the first of which, INS Kalvari was put out for sea trials earlier this year. The hulls of the other five submarines have been cast, and they are scheduled to be commissioned by 2020.
Captain J S Malik, a retired submariner with 32 years of experience who served as Director of Submarine Operations in Navy Headquarters, said, “Most of this data is generic and belongs to Naval Staff Qualitative Requirements (NSQR) provided by the Navy to the French company, and ‘binding data’ for the product. It does not pertain to any specific submarine, and has limited usage for the adversary.”
But Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Ministry officials have repeatedly asserted that they are “prepared for the worst-case scenario”. What could be the areas of concern for the Navy?
According to Commodore A Jai Singh, a retired submariner who was associated with Project-75 preparations at Navy Headquarters at the turn of the century, “the only thing, which if leaked out from the supplier, that can really compromise the operation of our submarines is the source code of the Fire Control System. It is a top secret thing which the DCNS doesn’t even share with the company providing the weapons. The Australian hasn’t claimed that it is in the possession of the software code, and besides that, everything else is not really going to matter.”
He added, “Just the generic technical specifications are little indication of a submarine’s operational capability. The element of stealth and superiority is how a navy operates its submarines with the equipment on board and therein lie the vital elements of secrecy essential for submarine operations.”
Three top Navy sources have confirmed to The Indian Express that the documents put out so far are not the same as the ones with the Navy. These are dated versions from a period well before the signing of the contract with DCNS in 2005. Navy officials assert that “we are no longer a buyer’s Navy but a builder’s Navy. Only six navies have successfully built ballistic missile submarines, including India. There is no need to be overly concerned as we have the capability of tweaking the design, and the weapon and sensor deployment capability to mitigate any risk from information being compromised.”
The Australian has reported being in possession of 10 types of secret information which compromises the Indian programme. The Indian Express went over each of them with experts to figure out what they mean, and how they could affect the Navy.
Stealth capabilities
Stealth capabilities pertain mainly to the acoustic signature of a submarine, and is a function of many things, including the submarine’s self-noise levels, the propeller configuration, the speed regimes underwater, the noise generated by on-board machinery, and the acoustic damping techniques used both on the hull and within the submarine. The harmonics produced by no two submarines are the same. These spot frequencies, unlike the range given in the documents, are recorded by special equipment after a submarine goes for sea-trials, and kept in the Ship Data Book, a top secret document kept with the captain of the submarine. This data is re-recorded after every major refit, as the harmonics change. In the case of a European design like the Scorpene, there would not be much to choose between contemporary designs of a relatively similar size which would operate in the same frequency ranges.
Frequencies at which submarines gain intelligence
Most modern submarine Electronic Search Measures (ESM) systems operate in a frequency range of 0.2 to 40 GHz, so to learn that Scorpenes operate in a similar frequency band is no compromise. Similarly, submarines are fitted with navigational radars with commercial applications, which operate in a particular frequency range worldwide. A modern submarine rarely, if ever, transmits at sea either from its radars or its sonars, or even its communication sets. A Naval officer who commanded a submarine for six years said that he used an active sonar only thrice in his tenure, that too only to test the equipment and validate the training of his staff.
Noise levels submarines could reach at certain speeds
Noise levels are a function of the submarine speed and the speed of rotation of a propeller, which is recorded during sea trials and noted in the Ship Data Book. The data put out is the NSQR limits given by the Navy to the designers that it should not exceed so many decibels at various speeds.
Diving depths, range and endurance
Range and endurance of all submarines are in the open domain. While specific depths may not be listed in the open specifications, most submarines the world over operate in a more or less similar depth envelope. Endurance of any submarine is dependent on its maximum patrol period, which determines the quantity of fuel carried. It varies between 50 and 60 days in the case of India’s submarines.
Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data
Every submarine is demagnetised after construction and undergoes trials at the underwater ranges at Goa. The data for even the first submarine has not been recorded so far. This data is updated even if a submarine has stayed in a dry dock for a prolonged period. Rarely has a submarine been detected by an MRASW aircraft fitted with a Magnetic Anomaly Detector. Since submarines do not transmit, they are not vulnerable to detection in the e-m spectrum.
Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and combat system
The Navy has not selected the torpedo for the six submarines after the contract for Black Shark torpedoes from the Italian company WASS was cancelled following the VVIP helicopter controversy. Based on the choice of weapons and sensors on board, and the operating philosophy, the combat system would be programmed by the Navy, so there would be very little to be gained from the basic characteristics of the system. The secrecy lies in their programming by the Navy.
Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope
Modern submarines rarely plane to periscope depth except for the minimum time required to charge their batteries. This duration is also a function of the submarine’s mission profile, as well as the tactical exploitation of the platform in the prevailing operational scenario. Knowing the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope actually discloses little or no information about what the submarine is doing or intends to do.
Propeller’s noise specifications
Each propeller generates its own harmonics of noise which is determined after extensive trials, while the data put out is the generic NSQR data. Even a minor chip of 2-3 mm completely changes propeller noise. The propeller generates different noise at different speeds at varying depths and varying hydrological conditions. The submarine is equipped with cavitation meters, to assess the noise level and accordingly vary its speed or depth to find the most suitable depth and speed profile to operate at.
Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces
A submarine is unlikely to surface in an operational deployment, and will do so if required, only in friendly waters. In an emergency, if a submarine has no choice but to surface, its visual presence will be easier to detect than its acoustic signature.
Weapons data
Weapons used in peacetime during training and during war operate on totally different frequencies. The war-shots are launched on frequency hopping mechanism, unlike peacetime firing. A veteran submariner gave the example of the only test war-shot fired by him in 2003 off the coast of Mumbai which could not be recorded by any of the half a dozen Indian ships monitoring the firing, despite knowing the exact timing and the location of the target. Moreover, the Pakistan Navy is also in possession of the same Exocet missile which these Scorpenes will use.
BON PLAN
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China stole F22 and F35 datas. It's official. Just see the J31 front part.... a kind of F35, isn't it?
![[Bregs]](/data/avatars/m/148/148509.jpg?1491816884){kind=avatar}
[Bregs]
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The only reassuring highlight of the future of the scorpene deal so far has been the mature and calculated response by France and India. It looks like the relations are so close,mature and comfortable that the two countries will be able to wither this storm created by this criminal leaks
Last edited:
Stephen Cohen
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We Indians really got lucky
Today if we look ; in view of these leaks
All those delays have been a HUGE blessing in disguise
We will have to make only a few changes and modifications to deal with the situation
randomradio
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After everything is said and done, this leak will only have served to make Indian-French ties stronger and better.
PARIKRAMA
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I think like @[Bregs] said ... the maturity by the two nations in light of this issue is truly commendable.That is a different matter that neither could do anything about it.
Having said that, the brassracks .... like @BON PLAN said, depending on extent of damage, upgrades and modifications will be carried out.
Now time for baniyagiri to start
@BON PLAN baniyagiri will be acting like a merchant with associated haggling
Cant tag you. Why such a name???
Having said that, the brassracks .... like @BON PLAN said, depending on extent of damage, upgrades and modifications will be carried out.
Now time for baniyagiri to start
@BON PLAN baniyagiri will be acting like a merchant with associated haggling
Cant tag you. Why such a name???
[Bregs]
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I think like @[Bregs] said ... the maturity by the two nations in light of this issue is truly commendable.That is a different matter that neither could do anything about it.
Having said that, the brassracks .... like @BON PLAN said, depending on extent of damage, upgrades and modifications will be carried out.
Now time for baniyagiri to start
@BON PLAN baniyagiri will be acting like a merchant with associated haggling
Cant tag you. Why such a name???
so far so good, who leaked for what motives, to damage which country most is still not clear but the explosives situation it wanted to create might not happen
Hmm i will change my user name soon
,
dadeechi
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Indians do value France as a strategic defense partner. I am pretty sure India and France would identify and implement the changes to mitigate the known risks. My concern was about the unknowns.
Unless India & France could get detailed understanding of the full scope of the leaks there would always be a concern...
PARIKRAMA
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No cause for worry
By Vice Admiral R N Ganesh (rtd)
SCORPENE security breach
The recent expose in an Australian newspaper of restricted data about the French company DCNS, designer and builder of the Scorpene class submarine under construction at Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai, caused consternation in India. Undoubtedly, it was a major breach in information security. Whether or not the nature of classified data revealed adversely impacts the operational effectiveness of the Scorpene as the mainstay of the Indian Navy’s (IN) submarine force, is the issue.
Typically, the overwhelming majority of all documentation which pertains to a submarine is technical and comprises operational, maintenance and repair instructions, which may be relevant to rival commercial entities – but minimal use for an adversary at sea. The frequent reference to the number of pages that have been “leaked” should be seen in this background.
The state of the art in various aspects of submarine technology such as sensors, weapons, control systems, propulsion and power generation is known to those in the game, whether naval or shipbuilding industry. Defence industry publications especially, Jane’s Fighting Ships, Aircraft, Weapon Systems or similar ones are all exemplars of this and publish surprisingly authentic data. Generic data and performance capabilities are known or can be assessed in broad terms. The assumption that more specific details will totally tilt the balance in the adversary’s favour is, thus, highly debatable.
In all likelihood, a former DCNS employee with commercial motives shared the documentation to embarrass the company. Given that the data was written even before the submarine was built, this content must be considered largely indicative and would be subject to valid-ation by extensive tests and trials at sea.
The leaked information could be useful to two kinds of entities. Firstly, rival submarine manufacturers who offer a competitive product might desire such leaked information. Secondly, it could also interest other states for which our military capabilities are a subject of surveillance and analysis.
A major factor that differentiates submarines from other war-fighting platforms is that the submarine relies entirely on passive means of detection and identification and makes no electronic or sonic transmissions throughout its operational time at sea, except with great deliberation and under tightly controlled conditions. This method of operation drastically minimises the impact of any interceptions that may be made of submarine emissions, and neutralises any advantage the adversary may gain by knowledge of its sensor operating characteristics.
Today, even conventional diesel-electric submarines that fighting navies operate, remain submerged throughout their sea patrols, and their infrequent radio communication is made from under water through buoyant radio antennae, which obviates the need for the vessel to come near the surface.
There appears to be an impression that if parameters such as the sonar frequencies of the submarine are divulged its stealth and surveillance capabilities are neutralised. This is far from the reality – submarine sonars passively monitor the entire spectrum of underwater noise generated by other ships, which the ships can do little to prevent.
Even if they did have prior knowledge of the frequencies being monitored by the submarine, they can in no way reduce their noise signatures, nor can they affect the submarine’s effectiveness as an intelligence gatherer. This applies equally to all forms of surveillance – whether acoustic or electromagnetic – that the submarine carries out.
The most vital operational data about a submarine are the fields of energy of various types that it unavoidably generates in operation. These energy fields can be mapped to form the submarine’s signatures. Thus, the submarine has a noise (acoustic) signature, a heat or infra-red signature, an electromagnetic signature and a magnetic signature.
Combination of these signatures
Obviously, such data cannot exist in the manufacturer’s documents as it is compiled by a navy through extensive tests and trials at sea after the submarine becomes operational. It is the combination of these “signatures” that finally determines the ability to detect and identify the submarine. Thereafter, this closely guarded information is accessible to only a few officers – even within a navy.
Knowledge of frequencies of the submarine’s radiated noise as reported in the present case will not simply lay it open to detection and attack, as appears to be the conclusion in some writings. It is of little benefit to an enemy warship which has first to detect the submarine’s radiated noise.
Therein lies the basic challenge; the warship’s detection equipment can detect and analyse radiations within a broad spectrum, but the submarine will detect the warship much earlier, at several times the distance, because of its innate quietness (lower acoustic signature) compared to the warship.
The adversary requires actionable information related to a submarine’s manoeuvres and any indication to launch weapons. As far as a submarine’s weapon control and other systems are concerned, these are internal operations of the vessel to manage its fire control system, machinery, manoeuvre systems, and so on. They do not enter the adversary’s information system or impact his engagement, and are of little relevance or interest to him.
Whatever the latest technology advances may be, one fact should never be lost sight of: it is not technology alone but knowledge, professionalism, dedication and discipline that will spell success in any battle. Fortunately, the IN’s submarine arm is endowed with all these qualities and, therefore, the nation need not have to worry on this count.
(The writer is former Director-General, Nuclear Submarines project and Director, Asia Centre, Bengaluru)
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/567438/no-cause-worry.html
+++
Got here the former Vice Admiral here.. His credentials are
+++
tagging all
https://defence.pk/members/bregs.148509/
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By Vice Admiral R N Ganesh (rtd)
SCORPENE security breach
The recent expose in an Australian newspaper of restricted data about the French company DCNS, designer and builder of the Scorpene class submarine under construction at Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai, caused consternation in India. Undoubtedly, it was a major breach in information security. Whether or not the nature of classified data revealed adversely impacts the operational effectiveness of the Scorpene as the mainstay of the Indian Navy’s (IN) submarine force, is the issue.
Typically, the overwhelming majority of all documentation which pertains to a submarine is technical and comprises operational, maintenance and repair instructions, which may be relevant to rival commercial entities – but minimal use for an adversary at sea. The frequent reference to the number of pages that have been “leaked” should be seen in this background.
The state of the art in various aspects of submarine technology such as sensors, weapons, control systems, propulsion and power generation is known to those in the game, whether naval or shipbuilding industry. Defence industry publications especially, Jane’s Fighting Ships, Aircraft, Weapon Systems or similar ones are all exemplars of this and publish surprisingly authentic data. Generic data and performance capabilities are known or can be assessed in broad terms. The assumption that more specific details will totally tilt the balance in the adversary’s favour is, thus, highly debatable.
In all likelihood, a former DCNS employee with commercial motives shared the documentation to embarrass the company. Given that the data was written even before the submarine was built, this content must be considered largely indicative and would be subject to valid-ation by extensive tests and trials at sea.
The leaked information could be useful to two kinds of entities. Firstly, rival submarine manufacturers who offer a competitive product might desire such leaked information. Secondly, it could also interest other states for which our military capabilities are a subject of surveillance and analysis.
A major factor that differentiates submarines from other war-fighting platforms is that the submarine relies entirely on passive means of detection and identification and makes no electronic or sonic transmissions throughout its operational time at sea, except with great deliberation and under tightly controlled conditions. This method of operation drastically minimises the impact of any interceptions that may be made of submarine emissions, and neutralises any advantage the adversary may gain by knowledge of its sensor operating characteristics.
Today, even conventional diesel-electric submarines that fighting navies operate, remain submerged throughout their sea patrols, and their infrequent radio communication is made from under water through buoyant radio antennae, which obviates the need for the vessel to come near the surface.
There appears to be an impression that if parameters such as the sonar frequencies of the submarine are divulged its stealth and surveillance capabilities are neutralised. This is far from the reality – submarine sonars passively monitor the entire spectrum of underwater noise generated by other ships, which the ships can do little to prevent.
Even if they did have prior knowledge of the frequencies being monitored by the submarine, they can in no way reduce their noise signatures, nor can they affect the submarine’s effectiveness as an intelligence gatherer. This applies equally to all forms of surveillance – whether acoustic or electromagnetic – that the submarine carries out.
The most vital operational data about a submarine are the fields of energy of various types that it unavoidably generates in operation. These energy fields can be mapped to form the submarine’s signatures. Thus, the submarine has a noise (acoustic) signature, a heat or infra-red signature, an electromagnetic signature and a magnetic signature.
Combination of these signatures
Obviously, such data cannot exist in the manufacturer’s documents as it is compiled by a navy through extensive tests and trials at sea after the submarine becomes operational. It is the combination of these “signatures” that finally determines the ability to detect and identify the submarine. Thereafter, this closely guarded information is accessible to only a few officers – even within a navy.
Knowledge of frequencies of the submarine’s radiated noise as reported in the present case will not simply lay it open to detection and attack, as appears to be the conclusion in some writings. It is of little benefit to an enemy warship which has first to detect the submarine’s radiated noise.
Therein lies the basic challenge; the warship’s detection equipment can detect and analyse radiations within a broad spectrum, but the submarine will detect the warship much earlier, at several times the distance, because of its innate quietness (lower acoustic signature) compared to the warship.
The adversary requires actionable information related to a submarine’s manoeuvres and any indication to launch weapons. As far as a submarine’s weapon control and other systems are concerned, these are internal operations of the vessel to manage its fire control system, machinery, manoeuvre systems, and so on. They do not enter the adversary’s information system or impact his engagement, and are of little relevance or interest to him.
Whatever the latest technology advances may be, one fact should never be lost sight of: it is not technology alone but knowledge, professionalism, dedication and discipline that will spell success in any battle. Fortunately, the IN’s submarine arm is endowed with all these qualities and, therefore, the nation need not have to worry on this count.
(The writer is former Director-General, Nuclear Submarines project and Director, Asia Centre, Bengaluru)
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/567438/no-cause-worry.html
+++
Got here the former Vice Admiral here.. His credentials are
+++
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The Eagle
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@PARIKRAMA why does it give a feeling like some played the french hard for compensation in lieu of other benefits for this and other platform as well. I don't have a solid ground here to prove the point but instinct says, it is like hey lets give them a worry then share the observation then ask for something in return, as them agrees, play the best out of it. I know for the moment, it feels like a conspiracy theory, but things indicates that what on earth would make someone that interesting and credible to share the data which is already, back then, was ordered to be removed/erased and is of no significance but sort of raw material that wouldn't affect the operator strategy and secrets.
As it has been noticed, lightly expressed by French, for the compensation type words and things, I feel like that the leak itself may prove to be a blessing for India for Sub-Upgrades without any additional charges as well as the Rafale discounts however, still my opinion and nothing officials but just a thought.
The Australian obviously cannot do much about more leaks as DCNS has approached right platform and Court is now involved and to the some extent it blinks like, indeed there is something more important that DCNS don't want it to be publicized or shared being sensitive and pushing hard otherwise, would have to bear way more than what earned till now by on-going project in India and possibly loss of Australian contract.
As I said before, it could be a fight between competitors as well that being jealous, made an attempt to damage the reputation of DCNS and regain the market influence though a dirty business and nothing is impossible. Only the up-coming days and any upgrade with respect to current tech in these Sub may prove the worth of leaked data and who knows that data hasn't traveled the world yet as other than countries, there are parties/people that earn money only by such ways/helping the governments. Lets wait and see.
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