Alphacharlie
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Meri Jann - Lets Not Get Personal.
Security of Pakistani Nuclear Assets - Interview of Director, SPD Pakistani NCA
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Meri Jann - Lets Not Get Personal.
Zarvan
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Pakistan needs to increase Nuclear Warheads and also Missiles specially ICBM because we can't trust west
Pakistani_Soldier_1
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IAEA terms Pakistan’s nuclear program safe and secure ISLAMABAD, Apr 25 (APP): International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Monday declared the nuclear program of Pakistan as safe and secure and appreciated the obvious dedication to the safety and security of the regulators as well of operators.Talking exclusively to APP on the sidelines of “International seminar on nuclear safety and security”, held here from 21-23 April, Deputy Director General IAEA Denis Flory said the IAEA emphasizes the importance of national responsibility for security, which Pakistan takes seriously.In fact, Pakistan has had an Action Plan in place to strengthen nuclear security since 2006, he added.
Giving details he said this plan covers such items as Management of Radioactive Sources; Nuclear Security Emergency Co-ordination Center (NuSECC);Locating and Securing Orphan Radioactive Sources.
Pakistan has worked with the Agency both to implement that Plan and to provide resources for its implementation, he maintained.
For example, he said,Pakistan is the 10th largest contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund, contributing $1.16 million. This is an example of their strong leadership and commitment as well as their serious approach to nuclear security in the course of implementing its action plan.
Donatello
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ISLAMABAD, Apr 25 (APP): International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Monday declared the nuclear program of Pakistan as safe and secure and appreciated the obvious dedication to the safety and security of the regulators as well of operators.Talking exclusively to APP on the sidelines of “International seminar on nuclear safety and security”, held here from 21-23 April, Deputy Director General IAEA Denis Flory said the IAEA emphasizes the importance of national responsibility for security, which Pakistan takes seriously.In fact, Pakistan has had an Action Plan in place to strengthen nuclear security since 2006, he added.
Giving details he said this plan covers such items as Management of Radioactive Sources; Nuclear Security Emergency Co-ordination Center (NuSECC);Locating and Securing Orphan Radioactive Sources.
Pakistan has worked with the Agency both to implement that Plan and to provide resources for its implementation, he maintained.
For example, he said,Pakistan is the 10th largest contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund, contributing $1.16 million. This is an example of their strong leadership and commitment as well as their serious approach to nuclear security in the course of implementing its action plan.
Sir we don't need any assurance from any outside body. We have been operating civilian and military reactors for decades.
Pakistani_Soldier_1
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YES ! I KNOW THAT. .
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One thing a real mystery is the number of Nukes pakistan has. i recall a recent article claiming its 150 to 190
on one hand you are calling him meri jaan and other hand you are asking him not to get personal
Bratva
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Some snippets from
Annals of National Security NOVEMBER 16, 2009 ISSUE
Defending the Arsenal
In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe?
BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Musharraf also confirmed that Pakistan had constructed a huge tunnel system for the transport and storage of nuclear weaponry. “The tunnels are so deep that a nuclear attack will not touch them,” Musharraf told me, with obvious pride. The tunnels would make it impossible for the American intelligence community—“Big Uncle,” as a Pakistani nuclear-weapons expert called it—to monitor the movements of nuclear components by satellite.
A senior Pakistani official who has close ties to Zardari exploded with anger during an interview when the subject turned to the American demands for more information about the arsenal. After the September 11th attacks, he said, there had been an understanding between the Bush Administration and then President Pervez Musharraf “over what Pakistan had and did not have.” Today, he said, “you’d like control of our day-to-day deployment. But why should we give it to you? Even if there was a military coup d’état in Pakistan, no one is going to give up total control of our nuclear weapons. Never. Why are you not afraid of India’s nuclear weapons?” the official asked. “Because India is your friend, and the longtime policies of America and India converge. Between you and the Indians, you will **** us in every way. The truth is that our weapons are less of a problem for the Obama Administration than finding a respectable way out of Afghanistan.”
The ongoing consultation on nuclear security between Washington and Islamabad intensified after the announcement in March of President Obama’s so-called Af-Pak policy, which called upon the Pakistan Army to take more aggressive action against Taliban enclaves inside Pakistan. I was told that the understandings on nuclear coöperation benefitted from the increasingly close relationship between Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Kayani, his counterpart, although the C.I.A. and the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have also been involved. (All three departments declined to comment for this article. The national-security council and the C.I.A. denied that there were any agreements in place.)
In interviews in Pakistan, I obtained confirmation that there were continuing conversations with the United States on nuclear-security plans—as well as evidence that the Pakistani leadership put much less weight on them than the Americans did. In some cases, Pakistani officials spoke of the talks principally as a means of placating anxious American politicians. “You needed it,” a senior Pakistani official, who said that he had been briefed on the nuclear issue, told me. His tone was caustic. “We have twenty thousand people working in the nuclear-weapons industry in Pakistan, and here is this American view that Pakistan is bound to fail.” The official added, “The Americans are saying, ‘We want to help protect your weapons.’ We say, ‘Fine. Tell us what you can do for us.’ It’s part of a quid pro quo. You say, also, ‘Come clean on the nuclear program and we’ll insure that India doesn’t put pressure on it.’ So we say, ‘O.K.’ ”
But, the Pakistani official said, “both sides are lying to each other.” The information that the Pakistanis handed over was not as complete as the Americans believed. “We haven’t told you anything that you don’t know,” he said. The Americans didn’t realize that Pakistan would never cede control of its arsenal: “If you try to take the weapons away, you will fail.”
The triggers are a key element in American contingency plans. An American former senior intelligence official said that a team that has trained for years to remove or dismantle parts of the Pakistani arsenal has now been augmented by a unit of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the élite counterterrorism group. He added that the unit, which had earlier focussed on the warheads’ cores, has begun to concentrate on evacuating the triggers, which have no radioactive material and are thus much easier to handle.
“The Pakistanis gave us a virtual look at the number of warheads, some of their locations, and their command-and-control system,” the former senior intelligence official told me. “We saw their target list and their mobilization plans. We got their security plans, so we could augment them in case of a breach of security,” he said. “We’re there to help the Pakistanis, but we’re also there to extend our own axis of security to their nuclear stockpile.” The detailed American planning even includes an estimate of how many nuclear triggers could be placed inside a C-17 cargo plane, the former official said, and where the triggers could be sequestered. Admiral Mullen, asked about increased American insight into the arsenal, said, through his spokesman, “I am not aware of our receipt of any such information.” (A senior military officer added that the information, if it had been conveyed, would most likely “have gone to another government agency.”)
Early this summer, a consultant to the Department of Defense said, a highly classified military and civil-emergency response team was put on alert after receiving an urgent report from American intelligence officials indicating that a Pakistani nuclear component had gone astray. The team, which operates clandestinely and includes terrorism and nonproliferation experts from the intelligence community, the Pentagon, the F.B.I., and the D.O.E., is under standing orders to deploy from Andrews Air Force Base, in Maryland, within four hours of an alert. When the report turned out to be a false alarm, the mission was aborted, the consultant said. By the time the team got the message, it was already in Dubai.
In an actual crisis, would the Pakistanis give an American team direct access to their arsenal? An adviser to the Pentagon on counterinsurgency said that some analysts suspected that the Pakistani military had taken steps to move elements of the nuclear arsenal “out of the count”—to shift them to a storage facility known only to a very few—as a hedge against mutiny or an American or Indian effort to seize them. “If you thought your American ally was telling your enemy where the weapons were, you’d do the same thing,” the adviser said.
The recollections of Bush Administration officials who dealt with Pakistan in the first round of nuclear consultations after September 11th do not inspire confidence. The Americans’ main contact was Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, the agency that is responsible for nuclear strategy and operations and for the physical security of the weapons complex. At first, a former high-level Bush Administration official told me, Kidwai was reassuring; his professionalism increased their faith in the soundness of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and its fail-safe procedures. The Army was controlled by Punjabis who, the Americans thought, “did not put up with Pashtuns,” as the former Bush Administration official put it. (The Taliban are mostly Pashtun.) But by the time the official left, at the beginning of George W. Bush’s second term, he had a much darker assessment: “They don’t trust us and they will not tell you the truth.”
No American, for example, was permitted access to A. Q. Khan, the metallurgist and so-called father of the Pakistani atomic bomb, who traded crucial nuclear-weapons components on the international black market. Musharraf placed him under house arrest in early 2004, claiming to have been shocked to learn of Khan’s dealings. At the time, it was widely understood that those activities had been sanctioned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.). Khan was freed in February, although there are restrictions on his travel. (In an interview last year, Kidwai told David Sanger, for his book “The Inheritance,” that “our security systems are foolproof,” thanks to technical controls; Sanger noted that Bush Administration officials were “not as confident in private as they sound in public.”)
A former State Department official who worked on nuclear issues with Pakistan after September 11th said that he’d come to understand that the Pakistanis “believe that any information we get from them would be shared with others—perhaps even the Indians. To know the command-and-control processes of their nuclear weapons is one thing. To know where the weapons actually are is another thing.”
The former State Department official cited the large Pakistan Air Force base outside Sargodha, west of Lahore, where many of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable F-16s are thought to be stationed. “Is there a nuke ready to go at Sargodha?” the former official asked. “If there is, and Sargodha is the size of Andrews Air Force Base, would we know where to go? Are the warheads stored in Bunker X?” Ignorance could be dangerous. “If our people don’t know where to go and we suddenly show up at a base, there will be a lot of people shooting at them,” he said. “And even if the Pakistanis may have told us that the triggers will be at Bunker X, is it true?
I flew to New Delhi after my stay in Pakistan and met with two senior officials from the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s national intelligence agency. (Of course, as in Pakistan, no allegation about the other side should be taken at face value.) “Our worries are about the nuclear weapons in Pakistan,” one of the officials said. “Not because we are worried about the mullahs taking over the country; we’re worried about those senior officers in the Pakistan Army who are Caliphates”—believers in a fundamentalist pan-Islamic state. “We know some of them and we have names,” he said. “We’ve been watching colonels who are now brigadiers. These are the guys who could blackmail the whole world”—that is, by seizing a nuclear weapon.
The Indian intelligence official went on, “Do we know if the Americans have that intelligence? This is not in the scheme of the way you Americans look at things—‘Kayani is a great guy! Let’s have a drink and smoke a cigar with him and his buddies.’ Some of the men we are watching have notions of leading an Islamic army.”
In an interview the next afternoon, an Indian official who has dealt diplomatically with Pakistan for years said, “Pakistan is in trouble, and it’s worrisome to us because an unstable Pakistan is the worst thing we can have.” But he wasn’t sure what America could do. “They like us better in Pakistan than you Americans,” he said. “I can tell you that in a public-opinion poll we, India, will beat you.”
During my stay in Pakistan—my first in five years—there were undeniable signs that militancy and the influence of fundamentalist Islam had grown. In the past, military officers, politicians, and journalists routinely served Johnnie Walker Black during our talks, and drank it themselves. This time, even the most senior retired Army generals offered only juice or tea, even in their own homes. Officials and journalists said that soldiers and middle-level officers were increasingly attracted to the preaching of Zaid Hamid, who joined the mujahideen and fought for nine years in Afghanistan. On CDs and on television, Hamid exhorts soldiers to think of themselves as Muslims first and Pakistanis second. He claims that terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year were staged by India and Western Zionists, aided by the Mossad. Another proselytizer, Dr. Israr Ahmed, writes a column in the Urdu press in which he depicts the Holocaust as “divine punishment,” and advocates the extermination of the Jews. He, too, is said to be popular with the officer corps.
Defending the Arsenal - The New Yorker
Annals of National Security NOVEMBER 16, 2009 ISSUE
Defending the Arsenal
In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe?
BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Musharraf also confirmed that Pakistan had constructed a huge tunnel system for the transport and storage of nuclear weaponry. “The tunnels are so deep that a nuclear attack will not touch them,” Musharraf told me, with obvious pride. The tunnels would make it impossible for the American intelligence community—“Big Uncle,” as a Pakistani nuclear-weapons expert called it—to monitor the movements of nuclear components by satellite.
A senior Pakistani official who has close ties to Zardari exploded with anger during an interview when the subject turned to the American demands for more information about the arsenal. After the September 11th attacks, he said, there had been an understanding between the Bush Administration and then President Pervez Musharraf “over what Pakistan had and did not have.” Today, he said, “you’d like control of our day-to-day deployment. But why should we give it to you? Even if there was a military coup d’état in Pakistan, no one is going to give up total control of our nuclear weapons. Never. Why are you not afraid of India’s nuclear weapons?” the official asked. “Because India is your friend, and the longtime policies of America and India converge. Between you and the Indians, you will **** us in every way. The truth is that our weapons are less of a problem for the Obama Administration than finding a respectable way out of Afghanistan.”
The ongoing consultation on nuclear security between Washington and Islamabad intensified after the announcement in March of President Obama’s so-called Af-Pak policy, which called upon the Pakistan Army to take more aggressive action against Taliban enclaves inside Pakistan. I was told that the understandings on nuclear coöperation benefitted from the increasingly close relationship between Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Kayani, his counterpart, although the C.I.A. and the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have also been involved. (All three departments declined to comment for this article. The national-security council and the C.I.A. denied that there were any agreements in place.)
In interviews in Pakistan, I obtained confirmation that there were continuing conversations with the United States on nuclear-security plans—as well as evidence that the Pakistani leadership put much less weight on them than the Americans did. In some cases, Pakistani officials spoke of the talks principally as a means of placating anxious American politicians. “You needed it,” a senior Pakistani official, who said that he had been briefed on the nuclear issue, told me. His tone was caustic. “We have twenty thousand people working in the nuclear-weapons industry in Pakistan, and here is this American view that Pakistan is bound to fail.” The official added, “The Americans are saying, ‘We want to help protect your weapons.’ We say, ‘Fine. Tell us what you can do for us.’ It’s part of a quid pro quo. You say, also, ‘Come clean on the nuclear program and we’ll insure that India doesn’t put pressure on it.’ So we say, ‘O.K.’ ”
But, the Pakistani official said, “both sides are lying to each other.” The information that the Pakistanis handed over was not as complete as the Americans believed. “We haven’t told you anything that you don’t know,” he said. The Americans didn’t realize that Pakistan would never cede control of its arsenal: “If you try to take the weapons away, you will fail.”
The triggers are a key element in American contingency plans. An American former senior intelligence official said that a team that has trained for years to remove or dismantle parts of the Pakistani arsenal has now been augmented by a unit of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the élite counterterrorism group. He added that the unit, which had earlier focussed on the warheads’ cores, has begun to concentrate on evacuating the triggers, which have no radioactive material and are thus much easier to handle.
“The Pakistanis gave us a virtual look at the number of warheads, some of their locations, and their command-and-control system,” the former senior intelligence official told me. “We saw their target list and their mobilization plans. We got their security plans, so we could augment them in case of a breach of security,” he said. “We’re there to help the Pakistanis, but we’re also there to extend our own axis of security to their nuclear stockpile.” The detailed American planning even includes an estimate of how many nuclear triggers could be placed inside a C-17 cargo plane, the former official said, and where the triggers could be sequestered. Admiral Mullen, asked about increased American insight into the arsenal, said, through his spokesman, “I am not aware of our receipt of any such information.” (A senior military officer added that the information, if it had been conveyed, would most likely “have gone to another government agency.”)
Early this summer, a consultant to the Department of Defense said, a highly classified military and civil-emergency response team was put on alert after receiving an urgent report from American intelligence officials indicating that a Pakistani nuclear component had gone astray. The team, which operates clandestinely and includes terrorism and nonproliferation experts from the intelligence community, the Pentagon, the F.B.I., and the D.O.E., is under standing orders to deploy from Andrews Air Force Base, in Maryland, within four hours of an alert. When the report turned out to be a false alarm, the mission was aborted, the consultant said. By the time the team got the message, it was already in Dubai.
In an actual crisis, would the Pakistanis give an American team direct access to their arsenal? An adviser to the Pentagon on counterinsurgency said that some analysts suspected that the Pakistani military had taken steps to move elements of the nuclear arsenal “out of the count”—to shift them to a storage facility known only to a very few—as a hedge against mutiny or an American or Indian effort to seize them. “If you thought your American ally was telling your enemy where the weapons were, you’d do the same thing,” the adviser said.
The recollections of Bush Administration officials who dealt with Pakistan in the first round of nuclear consultations after September 11th do not inspire confidence. The Americans’ main contact was Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, the agency that is responsible for nuclear strategy and operations and for the physical security of the weapons complex. At first, a former high-level Bush Administration official told me, Kidwai was reassuring; his professionalism increased their faith in the soundness of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and its fail-safe procedures. The Army was controlled by Punjabis who, the Americans thought, “did not put up with Pashtuns,” as the former Bush Administration official put it. (The Taliban are mostly Pashtun.) But by the time the official left, at the beginning of George W. Bush’s second term, he had a much darker assessment: “They don’t trust us and they will not tell you the truth.”
No American, for example, was permitted access to A. Q. Khan, the metallurgist and so-called father of the Pakistani atomic bomb, who traded crucial nuclear-weapons components on the international black market. Musharraf placed him under house arrest in early 2004, claiming to have been shocked to learn of Khan’s dealings. At the time, it was widely understood that those activities had been sanctioned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.). Khan was freed in February, although there are restrictions on his travel. (In an interview last year, Kidwai told David Sanger, for his book “The Inheritance,” that “our security systems are foolproof,” thanks to technical controls; Sanger noted that Bush Administration officials were “not as confident in private as they sound in public.”)
A former State Department official who worked on nuclear issues with Pakistan after September 11th said that he’d come to understand that the Pakistanis “believe that any information we get from them would be shared with others—perhaps even the Indians. To know the command-and-control processes of their nuclear weapons is one thing. To know where the weapons actually are is another thing.”
The former State Department official cited the large Pakistan Air Force base outside Sargodha, west of Lahore, where many of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable F-16s are thought to be stationed. “Is there a nuke ready to go at Sargodha?” the former official asked. “If there is, and Sargodha is the size of Andrews Air Force Base, would we know where to go? Are the warheads stored in Bunker X?” Ignorance could be dangerous. “If our people don’t know where to go and we suddenly show up at a base, there will be a lot of people shooting at them,” he said. “And even if the Pakistanis may have told us that the triggers will be at Bunker X, is it true?
I flew to New Delhi after my stay in Pakistan and met with two senior officials from the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s national intelligence agency. (Of course, as in Pakistan, no allegation about the other side should be taken at face value.) “Our worries are about the nuclear weapons in Pakistan,” one of the officials said. “Not because we are worried about the mullahs taking over the country; we’re worried about those senior officers in the Pakistan Army who are Caliphates”—believers in a fundamentalist pan-Islamic state. “We know some of them and we have names,” he said. “We’ve been watching colonels who are now brigadiers. These are the guys who could blackmail the whole world”—that is, by seizing a nuclear weapon.
The Indian intelligence official went on, “Do we know if the Americans have that intelligence? This is not in the scheme of the way you Americans look at things—‘Kayani is a great guy! Let’s have a drink and smoke a cigar with him and his buddies.’ Some of the men we are watching have notions of leading an Islamic army.”
In an interview the next afternoon, an Indian official who has dealt diplomatically with Pakistan for years said, “Pakistan is in trouble, and it’s worrisome to us because an unstable Pakistan is the worst thing we can have.” But he wasn’t sure what America could do. “They like us better in Pakistan than you Americans,” he said. “I can tell you that in a public-opinion poll we, India, will beat you.”
During my stay in Pakistan—my first in five years—there were undeniable signs that militancy and the influence of fundamentalist Islam had grown. In the past, military officers, politicians, and journalists routinely served Johnnie Walker Black during our talks, and drank it themselves. This time, even the most senior retired Army generals offered only juice or tea, even in their own homes. Officials and journalists said that soldiers and middle-level officers were increasingly attracted to the preaching of Zaid Hamid, who joined the mujahideen and fought for nine years in Afghanistan. On CDs and on television, Hamid exhorts soldiers to think of themselves as Muslims first and Pakistanis second. He claims that terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year were staged by India and Western Zionists, aided by the Mossad. Another proselytizer, Dr. Israr Ahmed, writes a column in the Urdu press in which he depicts the Holocaust as “divine punishment,” and advocates the extermination of the Jews. He, too, is said to be popular with the officer corps.
Defending the Arsenal - The New Yorker
Woody Nerd
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@WebMaster @AgNoStiC MuSliM @fatman17 my dears, you go on and on about nuclear security, while i appreciate your confidence in our capabilities, i would like to get some of my concerns allayed too. For one, are we capable of defending against cyber espionage..not of the usual wannabe-hacker kind rather that of NSA level data collection, that can result in sensitive info being in the hands of persons that are looking to sell. I dont consider that US or UK will ever allow such a leak of info, since its in their interest to keep South Asia stable, but the same cannot be said about some other influential parties. Like Israel for instance, who always feels threatened by anything Islamic, and our leadership has been relatively quite islamic since creation. And let us not forget about natanz and stuxnet. Or for that matter, lets not forget the likes of nls_933w.dll(to use your computer in ways unimaginable without you knowing), CAPTIVATEDAUDIENCE(that turns your computer into a bug), GUMFISH(that can actually use your mobile camera to take snapshots without you ever realising) and there are dozens of others outside public eye veiw. Trust me it all seems like stuff from a sci-fi movie, but rest assured i have had enough experience in really dark places of the deep web, to say for sure that this is more than possible. What happens when your patriotic security guard flashes his new cell infront of his friends at a sensitive location, while someone on the other end of the world(or in a neighboring state) is taking snapshots of your "secure areas" through his phone. And weeks later the area gets attacked by mercenaries/terrorists who seem to know exactly where the valuable stuff is. Forgive my raw sarcasm, but i wish to impress upon you the level of my concern here. No need to go as back as ojri camp, we have had such attacks in the recent past too, and increasingly.
Look, all i am saying is that technological superiority means you own privacy. Can we consider ourselves technologically superior to India with its silicon valley developing faster than its economy? Or from Israel who is the major developer of 60% of the common tech from your flash drive to mainstream software? The least we can do is to develop a ruthless team of cyber security force superior than the ones already in place, ready to obliterate any prying eyes from the highest high to the lowest low in the realm of internet and technology, to protect our national secrets, and if possible our data. If we have learnt anything from the past, it is to never underestimate our enemies. It seems the only thing preventing any major disaster of such a kind is the US stakes involved in case of a nuclear crisis in South Asia. Pride and arrongance have more than once come around to bite us in the a**, and still we strut around.
"Once you rule out the impossible, whatever else remains, however improbable, must be the truth" and hence possible.
Look, all i am saying is that technological superiority means you own privacy. Can we consider ourselves technologically superior to India with its silicon valley developing faster than its economy? Or from Israel who is the major developer of 60% of the common tech from your flash drive to mainstream software? The least we can do is to develop a ruthless team of cyber security force superior than the ones already in place, ready to obliterate any prying eyes from the highest high to the lowest low in the realm of internet and technology, to protect our national secrets, and if possible our data. If we have learnt anything from the past, it is to never underestimate our enemies. It seems the only thing preventing any major disaster of such a kind is the US stakes involved in case of a nuclear crisis in South Asia. Pride and arrongance have more than once come around to bite us in the a**, and still we strut around.
"Once you rule out the impossible, whatever else remains, however improbable, must be the truth" and hence possible.
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MastanKhan
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Gosh no but they can get a pretty good price for the info, from "interested parties", no?
Everything is on sale in black markets, you name it. You just have to know where to look....
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OmnISec
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But we do. IAEA can be considered as an external auditor and it is essential that every nuclear reactor all over the world is monitored albiet the public ones obviously. You don't want Fukushima or Chernoybl to take place every decade or so, do you?
fatman17
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Pakistan is very Developed in usage of Nuclear Technology to develop a variety of Plants, I found it Amazing and Impressive: Director General International Atomic Energy Agency Yukiya Amano @iaeaorg @BetterPakistan @pid_gov @kdastgirkhan #Technology #Pakistan #EmergingPakistan https://t.co/YmdmupSjtJ
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Well being religious is not a crime it should be considered a positive attribute as a person who is religious, pious would also be honest with his people, the nation and would be more resilient and resistant to any corruption or foul play. We should be more concerned about the person who is morally, financially, authoritatively corrupt, who has more tendency of selling the national secrets or causing a severe security breach from within. IMHO the Civilian nuclear projects under PAEC are not that much safe and secured as they should be due to deeply embedded a variety of corruption amongst the personnel etc. and lack of rule of law prevalence eg SPD, PAEC etc. May be the actual military nuclear warheads, missile program, silos, bunkers etc. would be better protected. But reality is in this modern age of advanced security threats the actual capability, efficiency and security of SPD and its related agencies is still lacking far behind than comparable contemporary militaries around the globe.
And remember corruption always has a trickle down effect. It always seeps through from top to bottom in any system not the other way around.
As these are our very respectable and strong national security departments that no one in this country ever dares to touch them or ask a question about them just like the sacred cows. How could we? They run this country and all the military might and Intelligence agencies are at their disposal. Anyone who would speak would have to take a huge risk because he would never know that the question he is raising may very well be against that very much officer sitting in front of him or even on higher civil/military hierarchy with immense influence.
And remember corruption always has a trickle down effect. It always seeps through from top to bottom in any system not the other way around.
As these are our very respectable and strong national security departments that no one in this country ever dares to touch them or ask a question about them just like the sacred cows. How could we? They run this country and all the military might and Intelligence agencies are at their disposal. Anyone who would speak would have to take a huge risk because he would never know that the question he is raising may very well be against that very much officer sitting in front of him or even on higher civil/military hierarchy with immense influence.
