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another problem is Russia has a serious issue with C2 which many are ignoring is this:Russia's military tactic is outdated.
It's great on paper, it's great on military specification, but they don't know how to use it.
Or perhaps they didnt film it
So... it means Russia doesn't have much to show ? If they had,they would.
Breaking: following heavy losses to aerial assets - this previously unseen image shows Russian reinforcements from specialised fighter jets:
2022 Ukrainian war? At least six Su-25s, four Su-34 and two Su-30s in two weeks. And don't ask about helicopters.
Most of people probably remember that this twitter account is one of the well-known trolls of the Syrian war. Even in this message, she talking so illogical.
Unfortunately the NATO Western parties are not interested in a peaceful resolution right now. This is their planned knee-jerk response by Russia and they will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.
Zelensky is playing the role perfectly as the "hero" who never surrenders.
another problem is Russia has a serious issue with C2 which many are ignoring is this:
Russia has a serious problem of communication - they are allegedly relying of unencrypted baofeng and Motorola hf radios which are notoriously unreliable in mission critical communication.
Baofeng UV 82HP
View attachment 822621
Secondly the encrypted radios that Russia do have apparently rely of 4G enabled BTS (Base Tower Stations) - as Russians have targeted Ukrainian Teleco BTS - they have discovered they cannot use their shiny encrypted radios.
Russian Encrypted VHF/UHF Azart Radio:
Azart 187-P1
View attachment 822623
The Azart a sixth-generation digital tactical SDR with built-in encryption designed to provide Russian troops with secure and jam-resistant communications.
It operates in the very high frequency (VHF)/ultra high frequency (UHF) bands, has a range of 18 km in ground communications depending on configuration, can be used as a repeater station and can utilise GLONASS or GPS to provide positioning.
R168-25UE:
The Russians also utilise the R168-25UE at a battalion level which can provide a range of up to 300km depending on configuration:View attachment 822622
The Russians and indeed the Ukrainians too have been utilising satellite phones and ordinary cellphones to communicate.
Videos from the Russian War Report Wargonzo shows Russian commanders using the Thurya Sat Seleve:
View attachment 822624
So why is there such a lack of encrypted military grade communication kit in the Russian military? Reading some Russian radio forums shows that there is a case of rampant corruption in the delivery and procurement of the Azart family of radios in the Russian army:
Link the the forum for your own reading pleasure: http://www.radioscanner.ru/forum/topic48460-2.html
An account provided by a captured Russian soldier states, ‘The officers started stationing themselves further and further away from the fighting … they are out of radio range at this point, and no one can contact them’.
The soldier proceeds to explain that a lack of long-range communications equipment was preventing anyone from contacting the Central Command of the deployed forces.
It follows that some Russian soldiers may have resorted to the use of mobile phones to communicate with officers and each other in order to gain some situational awareness.
Radios like the BaoFeng UV-82HP will be relatively easy for electronic warfare (EW) practitioners to exploit. Firstly, their lack of discernible military-grade COMSEC/TRANSEC means the radios should be relatively susceptible to straightforward jamming.
Secondly, this lack of COMSEC/TRANSEC could make it easy to feed false or misleading traffic into networks depending on these radios. This could pay tactical dividends for the Ukrainians, allowing them to sow disorganisation, doubt and demoralisation into Russian units.
It is highly likely these radios are being used for squad communications at the tactical edge by dismounted infantry. Attacking networks at the tactical edge using these radios could help blunt or slow Russian manoeuvres.
Moreover, transmissions from these radios could be relatively easy to detect using rudimentary communications intelligence (COMINT) equipment.
Once these transmissions are detected, COMINT systems could be used to follow the movement of the transmissions, and hence the movements of troops.
The communication of the Russians is so vulnerable that I was able to pick up a Russian transmission using SDR software where Ukrainians had hijacked comms and played the Ukrainian National Anthem over their transmission:
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Some say it cant get detect by radars because the Iman power. It is 7th generation.
Some say it cant get detect by radars because the Iman power. It is 7th generation.
Very well said and personally Russia should accept the off ramp being provided during negotiations.What Russia wanted to avoid is just happening before our eyes.
Putin bet on a clean and swift operation,the quick surrender of Ukraine and eastern Ukraine rallying on the Russian cause,towns falling one by one,welcoming Russian troops as liberators,a quick war that would limit the worldwide outrage and the world's response to the Russian invasion as well as the cost of the operation. (in terms of money and human lives)
The exact opposite happened. Ukraine is resisting,more united than ever,majority Russian speaking towns are the ones resisting the most to Russian assaults,Zelensky didn't surrender,Ukrainians living under Russian occupation haven't welcomed Russian as liberators,but are protesting against the occupier.
Meanwhile the operation is pretty much stalling,what Putin didn't want. Because the longer the operation lasts,the higher the cost is in Russian lives (already thousands killed,even more wounded....) and for Russian finances. (You've got to fund that 200K strong force.... and they can't forever).
The longer the conflict lasts,the more destructions Ukraine will suffer,higher the international outrage would be and higher the sanctions would be,higher the international support for Ukraine would be...
What has Putin achieved so far is ruining Russia's economy,turning Russia into a pariah state on par with North Korea,getting Europe and NATO even more united,making more and neutral countries wanting to join NATO (NATO expension which the Russians do not want) and last but not least showing the whole world the questionnable performance and quality of the Russian armed forces on the ground.
@LeGenD @RescueRanger
And I enjoyed listening to it. This just confirms how much overrated the Russian military has been all these years. Don't get me wrong no country even the mighty USA cannot take Russia head on but these small conflicts define and establish a precedent, Russia and Russian commanders have been seriously a let down.another problem is Russia has a serious issue with C2 which many are ignoring is this:
Russia has a serious problem of communication - they are allegedly relying of unencrypted baofeng and Motorola hf radios which are notoriously unreliable in mission critical communication.
Baofeng UV 82HP
View attachment 822621
Secondly the encrypted radios that Russia do have apparently rely of 4G enabled BTS (Base Tower Stations) - as Russians have targeted Ukrainian Teleco BTS - they have discovered they cannot use their shiny encrypted radios.
Russian Encrypted VHF/UHF Azart Radio:
Azart 187-P1
View attachment 822623
The Azart a sixth-generation digital tactical SDR with built-in encryption designed to provide Russian troops with secure and jam-resistant communications.
It operates in the very high frequency (VHF)/ultra high frequency (UHF) bands, has a range of 18 km in ground communications depending on configuration, can be used as a repeater station and can utilise GLONASS or GPS to provide positioning.
R168-25UE:
The Russians also utilise the R168-25UE at a battalion level which can provide a range of up to 300km depending on configuration:View attachment 822622
The Russians and indeed the Ukrainians too have been utilising satellite phones and ordinary cellphones to communicate.
Videos from the Russian War Report Wargonzo shows Russian commanders using the Thurya Sat Seleve:
View attachment 822624
So why is there such a lack of encrypted military grade communication kit in the Russian military? Reading some Russian radio forums shows that there is a case of rampant corruption in the delivery and procurement of the Azart family of radios in the Russian army:
Link the the forum for your own reading pleasure: http://www.radioscanner.ru/forum/topic48460-2.html
An account provided by a captured Russian soldier states, ‘The officers started stationing themselves further and further away from the fighting … they are out of radio range at this point, and no one can contact them’.
The soldier proceeds to explain that a lack of long-range communications equipment was preventing anyone from contacting the Central Command of the deployed forces.
It follows that some Russian soldiers may have resorted to the use of mobile phones to communicate with officers and each other in order to gain some situational awareness.
Radios like the BaoFeng UV-82HP will be relatively easy for electronic warfare (EW) practitioners to exploit. Firstly, their lack of discernible military-grade COMSEC/TRANSEC means the radios should be relatively susceptible to straightforward jamming.
Secondly, this lack of COMSEC/TRANSEC could make it easy to feed false or misleading traffic into networks depending on these radios. This could pay tactical dividends for the Ukrainians, allowing them to sow disorganisation, doubt and demoralisation into Russian units.
It is highly likely these radios are being used for squad communications at the tactical edge by dismounted infantry. Attacking networks at the tactical edge using these radios could help blunt or slow Russian manoeuvres.
Moreover, transmissions from these radios could be relatively easy to detect using rudimentary communications intelligence (COMINT) equipment.
Once these transmissions are detected, COMINT systems could be used to follow the movement of the transmissions, and hence the movements of troops.
The communication of the Russians is so vulnerable that I was able to pick up a Russian transmission using SDR software where Ukrainians had hijacked comms and played the Ukrainian National Anthem over their transmission:
SndUp | Post Info
Record, upload, share! SndUp is a social network, for audio! We enable you to upload audio clips and share them with the world. Sharing your talent is simple!sndup.net