RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 15
Jun 15, 2022 -
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and Grace Mappes
June 15, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Western officials announced additional military aid for Ukraine on June 15. US President Joe Biden pledged $1 billion worth of military aid, including coastal defense weapons, advanced rocket systems, artillery, and ammunition to support Ukrainian operations.[1] NATO members additionally announced they will additionally continue to provide Ukraine with heavy weapons and long-range systems and plan to agree on a new assistance package after consultations with Ukraine’s Defense Ministry.[2] This newest round of military aid will be invaluable to support Ukrainian operations, especially in the face of increasingly protracted and artillery-heavy fighting against Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine, though Ukraine will require further sustained support.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces launched ground assaults in Severodonetsk and settlements in its vicinity but have not taken full control over the city as of June 15.
- Russian forces launched largely unsuccessful offensive operations around the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway in an effort to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lysychansk.
- Russian forces continued efforts to advance along the E40 highway to Slovyansk and southeast of Izyum.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to fight in northeastern settlements around Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces continued to fortify fallback positions in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, while undertaking defensive measures to strengthen Russian presence in the Black Sea.
- The Kremlin and proxy republics continue to pursue ad hoc annexation policies in occupied territories.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk but have not yet captured the Azot industrial plant or taken full control of the city as of June 15.[3] Russian forces have largely isolated Ukrainian troops in Severodonetsk from their lines of communication and are attacking Severodonetsk from multiple directions.[4] Russian troops also conducted an unsuccessful assault in Toshkivka, likely to drive northwards towards Lysychansk instead of conducting an opposed river crossing after having destroyed bridge access to Lysychansk from Severodonetsk.[5] Russian forces continued to fire on settlements surrounding Severodonetsk to further isolate Ukrainian troops and complicate their withdrawal or re-supply efforts.[6]
Russian forces continued offensive operations towards Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and made incremental gains on June 15.[7] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces captured Dolyna, about 20 kilometers northwest of Slovyansk along the E40 (also known as the M03) highway.[8] Russian forces additionally continued fighting in Dolyna in Krasnopillya and are likely using their positions around Bohorodychne to launch operations to the southeast along the E40 highway.[9]
Russian forces continued ground assaults east of Bakhmut and made marginal gains along the critical T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on June 15. Russian forces reportedly broke through Ukrainian defenses in Vrubivka and are fighting for control of Mykolaivka, Yasylivka, Yakovlikva, and Berestove, all settlements within 10 kilometers of the T1302.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally noted that Russian forces re-deployed one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Bakhmut area from Kupyansk and deployed unspecified elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to the Komyshuvakha-Popasna area.[11] This deployment to the Bakhmut area indicates that Russian forces are increasingly prioritizing their force grouping around Bakhmut in order to drive up the T1302 highway and complete the encirclement of Lysychansk and Severodonetsk.
Russian forces may be staging false flag attacks around Donetsk City to dissuade pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Local residents of Donetsk City and Makiivka reported heavy shelling of infrastructure within both cities.[12] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) authorities accused Ukrainian forces of conducting the artillery strikes, but social media users and the Ukrainian Center for Counteracting Disinformation denied these claims and stated that they were likely perpetrated by Russian troops in order to foster anti-Ukrainian sentiments or encourage mobilization into proxy forces.[13] These potential false flag attacks may be a response to statements made by Western officials on June 15 announcing increasing military aid for Ukraine.[14]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kharkiv City to push Ukrainian troops away from occupied frontiers near the Russian border on June 15.[15] Russian forces are likely fighting in Rubizhne (in Kharkiv, not Luhansk Oblast), Tsupivka, Ternova, Staryi Saltiv, and Verkhnii Saltiv.[16] Russian troops continued to fire on settlements around Kharkiv City.[17]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to focus on defensive operations in preparation for potential Ukrainian counterattacks along the Southern Axis on June 15.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are improving their engineering equipment around two settlements just southeast of Davydiv Brid, where Ukrainian forces are still conducting limited counterattacks.[19] Russian forces are additionally regrouping in Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] The Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration reported that Russian troops are fortifying positions in Dniprorudne (western Zaporizhia Oblast) with equipment from Crimea and regrouping around Vasylivka to support operations along the Vasylivka-Orikhiv-Huliapole line.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces additionally deployed an electronic warfare complex to Melitopol, likely to further support their defensive presence in Zaporizhia and counter ongoing partisan actions.[22]
Russian forces are likely attempting to strengthen their presence in the northwestern Black Sea. Satellite imagery from June 14 shows an increase in fortifications and military equipment on Snake Island.[23] The Russian-appointed Kherson occupation administration stated that the Kherson Commerical Sea Port has resumed operations and will begin cargo transport.[24] While Ukrainian forces still control the critical coastline location of Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and can possibly interdict Russian shipping, Russian forces likely intend to strengthen control over port access in the Black Sea under the protection of a fortified naval presence on Snake Island.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin continued attempts to establish economic partnerships between occupied areas of Donetsk Oblast with Russian territories. Pushilin met with the governors of Chelyabinsk Oblast and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in order to agree on a patronage framework for cooperation with occupied Volnovakha and Yasinuvata.[25] Pushilin additionally met with governor of St. Petersburg to arrange for the restoration of Mariupol.[26] Pushilin is likely seeking to arrange for infrastructure assistance to restore these cities, but his continuous pursuit of ad hoc arrangements with Russian territorial bodies indicates continued inconsistencies between annexation policies pursued by DNR authorities.
Russian authorities are continuing to face difficulties implementing their occupation agendas due to pro-Ukrainian pressure in occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that unidentified Ukrainian partisans targeted employees of the Russian Emergency Ministry in Mariupol on June 9 and 11.[27] The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally claimed that Russian occupation authorities are unable to open schools in occupied Berdyansk due to resistance from Ukrainian teachers, who are refusing to teach under Russian curricula.[28] Such pro-Ukrainian action will likely continue to disrupt Russian efforts to consolidate full-scale administrative control of occupied areas and Russian annexation agendas.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 16
Jun 16, 2022 -
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Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, George Barros, and Grace Mappes
June 16, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The leaders of Germany, France, Italy, and Romania committed to Ukrainian officials that the West would not demand any concessions from Ukraine to appease Russia and will support Ukraine to the end of the war during a visit to Kyiv on June 16. French President Emmanuel Macron declared that France, Germany, Italy, and Romania are “are doing everything so that Ukraine alone can decide its fate.”[1] Macron added that Ukraine “must be able to win” and pledged to provide six more self-propelled howitzers.[2] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Germany will continue to provide financial, humanitarian, and weapons assistance for “Ukraine’s war of independence.”[3] Macron, Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis additionally vowed to back Ukraine’s bid to become an official candidate for European Union membership.[4] Sustained Western military support to Ukraine will be essential to enable Ukrainian forces to liberate Russian-occupied territory.
Ukrainian defense officials explicitly requested Western heavy artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) ahead of a protracted war. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Denys Sharapov and Land Force Command Logistics Commander Volodymyr Karpenko stated that Ukrainian forces need hundreds of artillery systems, including infantry fighting vehicles and tanks, as Ukrainian forces have suffered 30% to 50% equipment losses in active combat.[5] Sharapov and Karpenko noted that Ukrainian forces need Predator drones and loitering munitions to accurately strike Russian forces. Sharapov and Karpenko also asked for long-range precision weapons such as MLRS to defend the entire 2,500 km frontline in Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces have already committed about 330,000 servicemen to their invasion of Ukraine without conducting partial or full-scale mobilization in Russia. Ukrainian General Staff Main Operations Deputy Chief Oleksiy Gromov stated that Russian forces grouped 150,000 servicemen into battalion tactical groups (BTGs) and other formations and involved additional 70,000 troops from air and sea elements, with the remaining personnel staffing non-combat support units.[6] Gromov noted that Russian forces committed more than 80,000 servicemen of the mobilized reserve, up to 7,000 reservists of the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS-2021), up to 18,000 members of the Russian National Guard (Rosguardia), and up to 8,000 troops from private military companies. Gromov did not specify if Ukrainian officials included information about forcibly mobilized servicemen in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) in these numbers. Gromov noted that the Kremlin may still increase the number of Russian military personnel in Ukraine by executing covert or full mobilization.[7] Gromov noted that while it is unknown if the Kremlin will declare mobilization, Russian forces will still need time to execute the deployment and training of the new personnel whether or not the Kremlin announces full mobilization.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces continued to launch ground assaults on Severodonetsk and settlements along the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lysychansk. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces are no longer operating as concrete battalion tactical groups (BTGs), as ISW previously assessed.
- Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northwest of Slovyansk, while Ukrainian forces reportedly resumed preparations for counteroffensives west of Izyum.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in clashes north and northeast of Kharkiv City, though no significant territory changed hands.
- Russian forces continued to fortify fallback positions in northwestern Kherson Oblast, likely in anticipation of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the region.
- Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin continued to discuss and sign patronage agreements with Russian regional officials.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces are prioritizing operations to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lysychansk from several directions. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valeryi Zalyzhnyi said that Russian forces are simultaneously launching assaults in Donbas in nine directions, presented as a two-part direction including the main location Russian forces are attacking from and their intended objective: Popasna-Komyshuvakha, Popasna-Mykolaivka, Popasna-Berestove, Bohorodychne-Slovyansk, Izyum-Slovyansk, Popasna-Svitlodarsk, Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Severodonetsk-Metolkine, and Komushuvakha-Toshkivka.[8] Ukrainian General Staff Main Operations Deputy Chief Oleksiy Gromov noted that Russian forces are committing smaller elements (company or platoon-sized assault groups) rather than full-fledged battalion tactical groups (BTGs) for offensive operations.[9] Gromov added that Russian forces are not conducting offensive operations at night. The UK Defense Ministry also stated that Russian forces are operating in “increasingly ad hoc and severely undermanned groupings” in Donbas that typically advance by foot.[10]
Russian forces conducted ground assaults in Severodonetsk in a grinding effort to establish control over the city.[11] Gromov reported that Ukrainian forces continue to resist Russian attacks in Severodonetsk and are halting Russian operations to capture Metolkine and Syrotyne, just southeast of Severodonetsk.[12] Russian forces likely intend to capture Metolkine and Syvrotyne, rather than strictly concentrating on Severodonetsk, to push back Ukrainian forces on the western bank of Siverskyi Donets River and secure access to the eastern riverbank. Gromov clarified that Ukrainian forces retain several logistics routes to Severodonetsk despite the destruction of four bridges over the Siverskyi Donets River, pushing back on recent media reports and Russian claims that Ukrainian forces in the city are completely cut off.[13] Head of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Leonid Pasechnik stated that Ukrainian forces still control the territory of the Azot Chemical Plant but that Russian and proxy forces entered the premises of the facility on June 16.[14]
Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian GLOCs around Popasna on June 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repulsed Russian assaults on Berestove, situated on the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway.[15] Pro-Russian milblogger and Russian military journalist Yevgeniy Poddubnyi claimed that Russian forces control unspecified segments along the T1302 and have interdicted transfer of Ukrainian reserves from Bakhmut but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[16] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense additionally claimed to have established control over Novoluhanske, Luhanske, Rozsadky, and Shakhtarsk, southeast of Bakhmut.[17]
Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults northwest of Slovyansk and made incremental territorial advances southeast of Izyum. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces failed to seize Dolyna (on the E40 highway to Slovyansk) and retreated to previously occupied positions.[18] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces targeting Russian heavy artillery attempting to advance from the east and the northwestern outskirts of Bohorodychne, approximately 25 km southeast of Izyum.[19] Ukrainian forces may be resuming counteroffensive operations west of Izyum. Pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Ukrainian forces established a pontoon bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River, approximately 26 km west of Izyum, on June 15.[20] Continued Russian artillery fire west and northwest of Izyum is also likely an indicator of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area.[21] If confirmed, this Ukrainian counteroffensive is likely intended to sever Russian lines of communication to the Izyum and Lyman areas.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces reportedly continued to engage in localized clashes with Ukrainian elements to maintain their occupied positions near the international border on June 16.[22] Pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces fought Ukrainian units in Dementiivka and Ruska Lozova along the Belgorod-Kharkiv City highway and in Rubizhne and Ternova, approximately 45 km northeast of Kharkiv City.[23] NASA FIRMS data observed significant high-temperature anomalies in Dementiivka but did not confirm any anomalies in Ruska Lozova.
[Source: NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System over Dementiivka for June 16]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to fortify fallback positions in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts, likely in response to local Ukrainian counterattacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian engineering elements improved defensive positions around Bezvodne and Ishchenka, just southeast of the contested town of Davydiv Brid on the Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[24] Ukrainian General Staff Main Operations Deputy Chief Oleksiy Gromov noted that Russian forces are also dismantling concrete irrigation structures in Kherson Oblast to conceal heavy artillery from Ukrainian strikes.[25] Russian forces reportedly shelled Ukrainian positions on the Kherson-Mykolaiv and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast borders, likely in a counter-battery attempt to hinder Ukrainian advances.[26] Odesa Oblast Civil-Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk claimed that Ukrainian forces had unspecified successes on the Southern Axis, but ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[27]
Russian forces may be staging false flag attacks around Kherson City to discourage civilian support for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported civilian casualties during an explosion on June 15 at a local market in Chornobaivka, a settlement just north of Kherson City known for Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots in the area.[28] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces seek to destabilize public opinion in Kherson City and blame Ukrainian forces for launching strikes on civilian infrastructure.[29]
Russian forces reportedly performed demonstrative assaults on settlements in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast to fix Ukrainian units in place.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces eliminated a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group operating on the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border on June 16.[31]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin continued to pursue ad hoc cooperation arrangements with Russian regional officials at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 16.[32] Pushilin signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov under which Moscow Oblast will offer patronage to Tel’manivskyi and Novoazovsk districts, just east of Mariupol.[33] Pushilin signed another memorandum with Tula Governor Alexei Dyumin for the restoration of Mariupol’s Left Bank district.[34] Pushillin also discussed patronage over occupied Khrestivka (northeast of Donetsk City) with the Republic of Sakha Head Aisen Nikolaev and unspecified Donetsk Oblast settlements with the Tver Oblast Governor Igor Rudenya.[35] Pushilin is likely attempting to secure Russian financial assistance to restore occupied settlements in Donetsk Oblast, but his cooperation agreements with Russian local officials further indicate the DNR‘s lack of coherent annexation policies.
The Kremlin is introducing more measures to establish permanent societal control over occupied Ukrainian territories. Self-proclaimed Deputy Head of the Kherson Military-Civil Administration Kiril Stremousov announced that all children born in Kherson Oblast after February 24 will automatically receive Russian citizenship.[36] The Russian Internal Ministry also announced that Ukrainian “refugees” (many of whom were likely forcibly relocated to Russia) from occupied territories must receive proper documentation before August 17 to remain in Russia.[37] The Kremlin likely seeks to coerce illegally deported Ukrainian citizens in Russia to accept Russian citizenship or return to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine.
Russia is going to continue humiliate NATO and US in Ukraine
