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Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments

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This is an old video of Russia shipping T62s to Syria
Probably just to illustrate as no pics/vid could be taken, there are multiple sources confirming the Orcs are now sending obsolete tanks as they're running out of T-72/80/90... Well, I'd like to see if T-14 Armata does great at the turret throwing world contest
 
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You truly are detached from reality of nuclear war and talk about it as if it is a solution to all Europe's problems. Once nukes are used it will be the beginning of a catastrophe and suffering not seen in human history. What sort of like have you lived where you hate life so much that that you want to end it for yourself and others?
War is a lot of deaths
 
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Detached from reality? That's ABSOLUTELY the principle of the M.A.D. !!!
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You start a war, you sign your own death warrant!:suicide:
So you don't start a war because it's suicidal:suicide2:
Had Ukraine kept its 1700(?), 3000(?) nukes in the 90's, Butcher-Putler would NEVER had dared to invade !!! Without US stupidity in the 80's, PRC wouldn't be constantly rattling sabre about Taiwan...
The fact we made Israel a nuclear power in the 60's was the MAJOR point that made Anwar el-Sadat opt for a genuine peace treaty, and later being followed by king Hussein... This is NOT detached from reality of nuclear war!

Mark my words, it wouldn't take more than Zelen announcing that they've found a hidden stockpile of a few warheads, then doing a little demo, e.g. blowing the Crimea bridge with a 50 kilotons one, which would end with no casualties except if there are ppl using the bridge when blown, would be enough to absolutely decide to pull out rather than escalating : someone with just a few warheads and being back to the wall is way more dangerous than having a large arsenal, and in such a case, there has already been a warning shot sending a message like... Moscow or St.Petersburg may follow...
The other side doesn't know how few you may have and what yield, but you've just shown you're determined to use it!
This is the Dirty Harry's "Go ahead! Make my day!" thing...
Tell me, if you were Putin, even if you can blow a continent, would you think the invasion of Ukraine worths seeing Moscow and St. Pete razed and with 30,000 km² around becoming too radioactive to live in for many centuries, because this is how you proceed when you have few nukes : surface bursts will cover gigantic areas with fallouts, while an airburst will just be a gigantic boom, for sure, with huge damages but the area is re-useable...
THIS IS ABSOLUTELY HOW A NUCLEAR DETERRENT WORKS FOR MANY DECADES AND THAT IS WHY NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT NEVER ENTERED A DIRECT FIGHT...

And this is also why I absolutely promote an EU NUCLEAR SHARING but not based on 100 outdated B61 with 20 per each of the 5 countries...
I want 500 ASMPA-R : 300 kiloton, Mach3, stealth, range has been extended again, the ASMP ranged 300km+, ASMPA ranged 500km+ so the most likely now is about 750km, but it may be as high as 1000km...
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Moreover, MBDA proposed to convert the retired old ASMP to what they were intended first : replacing the Exocet!!! We have something similar to the BrahMos/Oniks for 32 years, and our idiots at the govt didn't even considered we could make huge money selling a conventional version... Moreover, huge advantage on the BrahMos/Oniks : 900kg instead of 2500kg... even LCAs have 900kg+ weapons-stations...

Putin's nuclear blackmail is all about USA or France won't trade NYC or Paris for Helsinki" and 💩 like that, in fact, he may be right about the US, about France, it's way more risky : the French are way more likely to consider that if you go after any EU country, their asses are on the line any way...
500 ASMPA-R won't cost big: only €9bn which is peanuts at EU level, in fact, considering there are gaps in EU jet fighters inventories since our poorest => weakest members (militarily speaking) are at the EU's borders, even purchasing 60 squadrons of Rafales and 60 of Gripen (1080 of each) wouldn't be an issue...
From there, even those without any jet fighter now can start operating a significant air force and with nuclear missiles available,
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Moreover, ground launching would just require a booster... We retired the Hades SRBM in 1997, it was similar to the Iskander, but there were two per TEL... Ever seen the kind of TEL we used?
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There's a Swede company proposing to house missile systems into ISO containers now...
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No need for NATO and Turkey can veto what it wants, they're not in the EU and with their leaders behaviours,it's nowhere near from happening.

Now, look at this...If you're Putler, still want to threaten Finland or the Baltic states knowing THIS? :
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And I also advocate that the EU shall purchase 10 Triomphant class SSBNs with 160 M51.3 stealth SLBMs and 1600 MIRVs, to add to the 4 French owned ones...

Oh, as we are...
There are others proffering threats against EU members and claiming ownership on our lands,
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So, Yup, nukes, as well as no more having idiots believing that soft power is enough or that NATO is enough, or that only NATO can protect Europe, are part of the solution.
We also must adopt a mandatory 2% GDP military spending in the EU, this may not forcedly mean an EU army, but it's clear that a rapid reaction force should be considered, as well as a gear pool...
And it'd be a good idea to inaugurate such RFF in Cyprus added with a naval blockade of the TRNC puppet state...

I may surely look like hawkish, I'm not. Those who are hawkish are those proferring nuclear threats on Finland, Sweden, Germany, Ireland, as well as invasion threats on Baltic States, as well as on Greece and Bulgaria as well as what remains of Cyprus, and kicking out their illegal occupation from the island... Some in countries like Ukraine, India, Israel, the Philippines, Vietnam, etc may tolerate the illegal occupation of parts of their countries for many decades, I consider that at EU level, we shall stop compromising and to no more tolerate even one square centimetre to remain illegally occupied.

So , it is ok for everyone to have nukes as a deterrent, and if they have an issue then they should use nukes? Why are you Europeans so detached from humanity and peace that you don't want to live and let others live? Crazy man, crazy.
 
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So , it is ok for everyone to have nukes as a deterrent, and if they have an issue then they should use nukes? Why are you Europeans so detached from humanity and peace that you don't want to live and let others live? Crazy man, crazy.
I could be wrong, but are you insinuating us Europeans are any different than the rest of the world?
 
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I am not insinuating I am stating my belief. Why are you Europeans trying to take the world to a nuclear holocaust?
Are we? Seems to me only Russia is mentioning their nuclear capabilities. I have not seen France or the UK doing that.
Nuclear armed countries outside Europe have conflicts too. Doesnt mean any if these countries are seeking nuclear holocaust.
Russia is not going nuclear because Russia is not fighting an existential war. The russian leadership is just trying to scare the rest of us from helping Ukraine. They want to annex as they please.
Me personally, I think NATO should have send a few hundred planes and surface to air defence systems to cover western Ukraine the moment Russia attacked.
 
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LEVI 🌍
The main events of May 25

⚡Briefing by Russian Defence Ministry

💥High-precision long-range air- and sea-based missiles have destroyed the production facilities of Motor Sich plant, which produced aircraft engines for combat aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force, including UAVs.

▫️In addition, units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reserve deployed to reinforce the grouping of Ukrainian troops in Donbass have been destroyed near Pokrovskoe railway station in Dnepropetrovsk Region.

💥High-precision air-based missiles have hit 3 command posts, including 1 command post of the 14th Mechanised Brigade and 1 communications hub , 1 AFU radio technical centre near, 1 logistics centre of the 72nd Motorised Infantry Brigade, 2 fuel bases, 2 air defence radar posts and military equipment, and 16 areas of AFU manpower and military equipment concentration

✈️💥Operational-tactical and army aviation have hit 2 missile-artillery weapons and ammunition depots , the territorial defence headquarters and 46 areas of manpower and military equipment concentration.

▫️The attacks have resulted in the elimination of more than 300 nationalists and up to 46 armoured and motor vehicles.

💥Missile troops and artillery have hit 51 command posts, 385 areas of AFU manpower and military equipment concentration, as well as 53 artillery and mortar units at firing positions.

Dollar/Euro - Ruble exchange rate

Dollar - 55
Euro - 57

Liberated territory

⚡❗Putin signed a decree on a simplified procedure for obtaining citizenship of the Russian Federation for residents of the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions of Ukraine.

▫️The centers for issuing passports of the Russian Federation in the Kherson region are already ready, in Zaporozhye they‘ll be ready in a few days.

Mariupol

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Investigative-operational groups began to work in Mariupol to collect evidence of war crimes committed by Azov.

▫️DPR regional police departments began work in Mariupol

Russia

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MFA rejects possibility of exchanging Azov fighters before trial

▫️The beta version of RuStore, a Russian app store for Android , has been launched, it has more than 100 applications, including those that have been sanctioned e.g banks.

▫️The upper age limit for those wishing to serve in the army under (first) contract has been canceled

▫️The minimum wage and pensions will increased by 10% from June 1.

▫️Putin instructed the government to increase payments to Russian military personnel operating in Ukraine

▫️Support for female military personnel with children will be doubled and amount to more than 30 thousand rubles

▫️A large family in the Russian Federation should establish itself as the norm

Daily Dose of Diarrhea - Poland

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The Polish authorities proposed introducing an additional duty for countries that continue to buy oil from the Russian Federation after other states refuse such supplies.

Daily Dose of Diarrhea - EU

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The European Commission officially proposed to consider the circumvention of sanctions as a crime at the EU level

Daily Dose of Diarrhea a - Ukraine

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The General Staff of Ukraine proposes to start mass arrests of soldiers who film and publish videos of appeals, crises and problems in the army

▫️Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba said that the situation in Donbas is extremely bad for Ukrainian troops

▫️Kuleba said that Kiev has no "preconditions" for the resumption of diplomatic negotiations with Russia

China + Russia + India + Iran

▫️Russia and Iran are discussing the joint implementation of oil and gas projects

▫️Russia and Iran will make maximum use of national currencies in mutual settlements

▫️Russia and Iran will unite their national payment systems, which will operate on the territory of both countries

▫️The Russian Federation welcomes China's proposal to expand BRICS

▫️Iran may become the main transport hub for imports and exports from Russia
 
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You truly are detached from reality of nuclear war and talk about it as if it is a solution to all Europe's problems. Once nukes are used it will be the beginning of a catastrophe and suffering not seen in human history. What sort of like have you lived where you hate life so much that that you want to end it for yourself and others?

A lot of sofa generals here
 
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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 25​

May 25, 2022 - Press ISW
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Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
May 25, 7:15 pm ET

Some pro-Russian milbloggers on Telegram continued to criticize the Kremlin for appalling treatment of forcefully mobilized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) servicemen–contradicting Russian information campaigns about progress of the Russian special military operation.
Former Russian Federal Security Service officer Igor Girkin (also known by the alias Igor Strelkov) amplified a critique to his 360,000 followers from a smaller milblogger discussing a video wherein a DNR battalion appealed to DNR Head Denis Pushilin about maltreatment of forcefully mobilized forces.[1] The milblogger blamed Russian leadership, not Pushilin, for beginning the invasion with insufficient reserves and unprepared, forcefully mobilized forces. The milblogger added that Russia did not provide the soldiers of its proxy republics with new weapons, despite claiming that Ukrainian forces prepared to attack occupied Donbas areas for a year prior to Russian invasion. The milblogger also claimed that the Kremlin failed to mobilize and adequately prepare the next batch of reserves, while Ukrainian forces are successfully preparing their troops for counteroffensives. Girkin also criticized the Kremlin for failing to pay the DNR battalion for three months. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces staged the video, but the video still gathered attention of pro-Russian Telegram users.[2]
The incident highlights a continuing shift in the Russian-language milblogger information space regardless of the video’s authenticity. Milbloggers would likely have either attacked or dismissed such a video loudly and in near-unison earlier in the war, when they all generally focused on presenting optimistic pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The response to this video in the Russian-language milblogger space demonstrates the strong resonance anti-Kremlin narratives can now have. It is impossible to know what effect this change in this information space might have on general perceptions of the war in Russia, but it is one of the most visible and noteworthy inflections in the attitudes of previously strongly pro-Kremlin ostensibly independent Russian voices speaking to Russians that we have yet seen.
Today’s statement by DNR Militia Head Eduard Basurin explaining that Russian forces would focus on creating “smaller cauldrons” rather than on a single large encirclement is likely in part a response to a critique that surfaced both in the milblogger space and in the Russian Duma that Russian forces had failed to form and reduce “cauldrons” of the sort they used in 2014.[3] Basurin’s statement, along with other changes in the ways in which Russian officials have spoken about cauldrons and Russian operations in the east following those critiques suggest that the Russian and proxy leadership is sensitive to shifts in this information space.[4]
Russian forces are increasingly facing a deficiency in high-precision weaponry. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that due to an increasing lack of high-precision weapons Russian forces are seeking other methods of striking critical infrastructure and have intensified the use of aircraft to support offensives.[5] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) noted that up to 60% of Russia’s high-precision stockpile has already been exhausted, which is consistent with previous reports by Western defense officials that Russian forces have been increasingly relying on “dumb bombs” because they are facing challenges replenishing their supplies of precision munitions in part due to sanctions targeting Russia’s defense-industrial production.[6] A lack of high-precision weapons will likely result in an increase in indiscriminate attacks on critical and civilian infrastructure.
The Kremlin is attempting to expand the pool of Russian passport-holders in occupied areas. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 25 that will simplify the procedure for obtaining a Russian passport within Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[7] This renewed campaign of so-called ”mass passportization” is occurring in occupied territories and likely represents an effort to set conditions for some sort of post-conflict political arrangement (the precise form of which Putin prefers remains unclear) through manipulating access to Russian citizenship.[8] Occupation authorities may additionally attempt to exploit this new decree to carry out covert mobilization in occupied areas, as having a Russian passport would make conscription-eligible residents of occupied territories subject to forced military service.
The Kremlin and Russian military commanders are introducing new regulations aimed at addressing the diminishing level of combat-ready reserves. The Russian State Duma and the Russian Federation Council passed a bill raising the maximum age for voluntary enlistment into the Russian military from 40 to 50.[9] Russian Telegram channels also reported that Russian leadership forced operational officers and commanders of the Russian Border Guards of southern Russian regions including Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea to indefinitely cancel all summer vacations--a rather unsurprising step in light of the military situation in principle, but an indication of the next source of manpower to which Putin will apparently turn.[10] Russian Border Guards will reportedly deploy to training grounds for unspecified exercises in late May. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are forming new reserve units within the Southern Military District.[11]
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces prioritized advances east and west of Popasna in order to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) southwest of Severodonetsk and complete encirclement efforts in Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces have likely entered Lyman and may use this foothold to coordinate with advances southeast of Izyum to launch an offensive on Siversk.
  • Russian forces may start the Battle of Severodonetsk prior to completely cutting off Ukrainian GLOCs southwest and northwest of Severodonetsk.
  • Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City in an attempt to disrupt a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the east.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Militia Head Eduard Basurin confirmed that Russian forces have adopted an approach of creating smaller cauldrons to deprive Ukrainian troops of logistics and reinforcements, rather than pursuing a single large-scale encirclement on the Donetsk Oblast administrative border.[12] ISW has previously assessed that Russian commanders have likely abandoned the objective of completing a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Donbas.[13]
Russian forces prioritized three advances east and west of Popasna in an effort to cut Ukrainian GLOCs southwest of Severodonetsk and complete the Luhansk Oblast cauldron. Russian forces continued to advance east of Popasna to seize settlements on the T1303 highway to Lysyschansk, northeast to cut Ukrainian access to T1302 highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk, and southwest along the T0504 highway from Popasna toward Bakhmut.[14] Russian forces reportedly made advances towards Bakhmut from Svitlodarsk, a settlement just north of Debaltseve, and continued heavy shelling likely in preparations for a ground offensive.[15]
Russian forces seem to be prioritizing efforts to cut the two highways to Severodonetsk over launching offensive operations on Bakhmut at this time.[16] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai refuted reports that Russian forces had cut off or blocked the T1302 highway on May 25.[17] Russian forces are unlikely to completely isolate Ukrainian forces from GLOCs just by seizing the southwestern T1303 and T1302 highways to Severodonetsk given the network of alternate if smaller roads in the region and will need to block or disrupt Bakhmut and Siversk to complete the Luhansk cauldron.
Russian efforts to isolate Severodonetsk and Lysychansk may not be well synchronized in time and space with an impending direct Russian assault on Severdonetsk, although it is too soon to tell. The Russians are likely some days away from even cutting off the GLOCs to Severdonetsk and Lysychansk, and it would likely take some time for the disruption of those GLOCs to affect the cities’ defenders’ abilities to continue fighting. The intensity of Russian artillery and air attack, however, combined with the massing of Russian forces drawn from elsewhere in theater for the assault on Severodonetsk suggests that the assault could be launched before the GLOCs have been cut or before their disruption could have a material effect. The drive to cut the GLOCs could also be an effort to create an outer encirclement ring, however, to prevent Ukrainian forces from attempting to reinforce Severodonetsk as it is attacked or to relieve it if it is isolated or falls.
Russian forces may need to conduct a ground offensive on Severodonetsk in upcoming days to maintain their pace after committing a significant portion of personnel, artillery, aviation, and logistics to the front.[18] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk on May 25.[19] Haidai stated that Russian forces will lose the momentum of their heavy shelling and motivation if they do not launch an attack on Severodonetsk by Sunday.[20] Haidai reported that Russian forces already committed over 10,000 troops - approximately 25 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) composed on 300 to 500 servicemen each - and military equipment including S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.[21] Russian military commanders likely had to withdraw these forces from other axes, slowing down Russian advances in Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Russian forces have also reportedly reached mortar range of Severodonetsk.[22]
Russian forces continued unsuccessful attempts to improve tactical positions in the direction of Slovyansk and advance southeast of Izyum on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to launch another ground assault on Dovhenke, approximately 18km south of Izyum.[23] Russian forces also tried to advance towards Lyman from the Izyum area but did not gain any new ground from this direction.[24]
Social media videos of Russian soldiers claiming to have entered Lyman from the east suggest that Ukrainian forces could have withdrawn from the settlement on May 25.[25] Russian forces in Izyum could possibly try to coordinate efforts with Russian units in Lyman to launch an offensive on Siversk, a settlement located on a major highway 30km west of Severodonetsk. An offensive on Siversk would assist Russian forces in cutting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Severodonetsk from the northwest.
Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize settlements east and west of Avdiivka, and did not achieve any territorial gains on Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[26] Russian forces reportedly shelled railway tracks near Avdiivka on May 25, likely to further shake up Ukrainian fortifications in the area.[27] Unconfirmed social media reports reiterated that Russian forces made advances to encircle Ukrainian positions from the northwest, but ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[28]



Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces intensified artillery attacks against Ukrainian positions and focused on maintaining and regaining control of territory north of Kharkiv City on May 25.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces shelled Ternova, Ruski Tyshky, and Rubizhne and that Russian troops attempted a ground offensive near Ternova, indicating that control of settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast remains contested.[30] Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances on this axis on May 25.


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on improving their tactical positions and conducted air, rocket, missile, and artillery strikes along the Southern Axis on May 25.[31] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian troops clashed with Ukrainian defense in northeastern Mykolaiv Oblast while attempting to advance towards Kryvyi Rih.[32] Russian forces conducted a rocket strike against residential areas of Zaporizhzhia City, which the Russian Defense Ministry claimed was an attack on Ukrainian production workshops at the Motor Sich plant.[33] The direct attack on Zaporizhzhia City is likely intended to disrupt a key logistics hub for the Ukrainian army operating in the east. Russian forces additionally fired on areas Kryvyi Rih and elsewhere in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Mykolaiv, and Kherson Oblasts.[34] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that the Russian grouping in Crimea continued to bolster air defense and deployed two additional S-400 anti-aircraft missile divisions to the northwestern part of Crimea.[35]


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Occupation authorities continued to take measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories on May 25. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 25 that simplifies the procedure for obtaining Russian passports in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts.[36] The Ukrainian Resistance Center referred to this decree as an attempt at “mass passportization,” which is likely an indicator that occupation authorities could seek to facilitate annexation directly into the Russian Federation and strengthen administrative control over occupied areas.[37] Russian occupiers in Kherson Oblast are reportedly trying to force locals into occupied areas to cooperate with occupation organs and are attempting to mobilize Ukrainians into the Russian army.[38] Russian forces around occupied Berdyansk and Vasylivka are reportedly blocking exits from the cities with concrete slabs, indicating that occupation authorities seek to stem the flow of people from occupied territories and allow for the implementation of further controls.[39]
Russian forces continued to strengthen occupation control in Mariupol on May 25. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian and proxy forces completed the demining of the seaport and that the city is beginning to function on more regular basis.[40] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are beginning a new policy in Mariupol wherein citizens will be eligible to directly obtain Russian passports without obtaining DNR passports.[41] Such “passportization” measures may be intended to further set conditions for the direct annexation of Mariupol into the Russian Federation. Occupation authorities additionally continued filtration and deportation measures in Mariupol under the supervision of Federal State Security (FSB) agents and Russian “volunteers.”[42]
Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive towards the Russian border. Russan forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to Northern Kharkiv in the near future.
  • Russian forces are prioritizing cutting off two major highways to Severodonetsk but may start to storm the city before they successfully cut GLOCs.
  • Occupation forces in Mariupol will continue to strengthen administrative control of the city but are likely unsure as to what the ultimate annexation policy will be.
  • Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.
 
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