Road to 1965 war – Part 1

[fatman17]

No that must have been 200:1. They won did they not?

Yes

 

[Joe Shearer]

Ha ha ha .Like the last "demolished " part about the PAF. more like unscathed . anyway history is written, cannot change it.

Unscathed, if you like; there is no doubt that the moral victory was theirs, in 1965. I wasn't using either 'demolished' and am not accepting the using of 'unscathed' now in any antagonistic spirit.

 

[Hamza913]

Oh God the last time I discussed 1965 I got 2 negative ratings

Speaking of which @Joe Shearer and @Arsalan can I plz get those ratings removed lol

 

[Jackdaws]

I've heard from Pakistani sources that the Indian General claimed he will have a drink at the Lahore Gymkhana. Did he claim it to the media? Announce it over the radio?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Oh God the last time I discussed 1965 I got 2 negative ratings

Speaking of which @Joe Shearer and @Arsalan can I plz get those ratings removed lol

Delighted. Point me at the post, please.

I've heard from Pakistani sources that the Indian General claimed he will have a drink at the Lahore Gymkhana. Did he claim it to the media? Announce it over the radio?

This is purely mythical. I set out to track the silly story down, and the best I could do was when I came to a report from a reporter in, of all things, the Amrita Bazar Patrika, a defunct rag in Calcutta, saying that the rate of progress was such that the generals might easily have an evening drink in the Lahore Gymkhana.

That got picked up and converted into Chaudhuri's actual words; even though he never said anything of the kind, it was the sort of thing that generation of people might have said lightly, and it entered legend.

Every other source turned out to be a Pakistani source reverently quoting this incident as fact, without any link to any authentic report. It rates up there with the visions of horsemen on white horses brandishing scimitars in the defence of Lahore.

 

[fatman17]

I've heard from Pakistani sources that the Indian General claimed he will have a drink at the Lahore Gymkhana. Did he claim it to the media? Announce it over the radio?

Propaganda, but nevertheless the Indians didn't make to any gymkhana

 

[Hamza913]

Delighted. Point me at the post, please.

Huh, I never thought you'd actually offer, but since you insist, I guess I'll go digging..

Delighted. Point me at the post, please.



This is purely mythical. I set out to track the silly story down, and the best I could do was when I came to a report from a reporter in, of all things, the Amrita Bazar Patrika, a defunct rag in Calcutta, saying that the rate of progress was such that the generals might easily have an evening drink in the Lahore Gymkhana.

That got picked up and converted into Chaudhuri's actual words; even though he never said anything of the kind, it was the sort of thing that generation of people might have said lightly, and it entered legend.

Every other source turned out to be a Pakistani source reverently quoting this incident as fact, without any link to any authentic report. It rates up there with the visions of horsemen on white horses brandishing scimitars in the defence of Lahore.

Here, it's on this page:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/1965-war-documentary-fath-e-mobin.438854/page-16#post-8463416

There's another unrelated to this whole 1965 debacle, I might as well post it as well:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/puni...f-tirupur-isis-operative.438501/#post-8452183

If you change your decision I don't mind, and I must say for actually considering it, I'm VERY impressed.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Huh, I never thought you'd actually offer, but since you insist, I guess I'll go digging..



Here, it's on this page:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/1965-war-documentary-fath-e-mobin.438854/page-16#post-8463416

There's another unrelated to this whole 1965 debacle, I might as well post it as well:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/puni...f-tirupur-isis-operative.438501/#post-8452183

If you change your decision I don't mind, and I must say for actually considering it, I'm VERY impressed.

I am very impressive, actually
Just kidding. Let me explain the logic. A negative rating indicates disapproval; typically, in my book, disapproval of bad language, or an offensive remark (directed against whichever, whatever). That doesn't mean that someone who matures over time should be carrying the burden around till the end of his/her days. If you ask nicely, it shows you've reached a level of maturity that does away with the original need to rate someone, so off it goes.

Incidentally, I took off the one related to the 1965 war, not the other one. I'd like to discuss that before doing anything about it, if you agree.

 

[Jackdaws]

Propaganda, but nevertheless the Indians didn't make to any gymkhana

That's cool. My club is affiliated anyways - so if I am ever there, I'd definitely have a drink to make up.

 

[Hamza913]

I am very impressive, actually
Just kidding. Let me explain the logic. A negative rating indicates disapproval; typically, in my book, disapproval of bad language, or an offensive remark (directed against whichever, whatever). That doesn't mean that someone who matures over time should be carrying the burden around till the end of his/her days. If you ask nicely, it shows you've reached a level of maturity that does away with the original need to rate someone, so off it goes.

Incidentally, I took off the one related to the 1965 war, not the other one. I'd like to discuss that before doing anything about it, if you agree.

Wow, you did it. Cheers.

As for the other one, well, I'm still pretty strong in my views (as you may or may not know), but I'm more willing to understand others position.

Take for example, @SALMAN F , I disagree with him, but I listen to what he says. He thinks I'm insane, but now I do listen to what he says, rather than tell him to get lost like I used to or say he makes no sense.

I guess, I could understand why some Muslims would identify as Hindustanis pretty strongly, even if I disagree. So I guess it does compute now. I mean, Pakistan isn't an Islamic utopia yet so many people on here love Pakistan whilst being Muslim.

What I'm saying is, I disagree but still understand others view points, even if I come off as a little nasty. I have my reasons for my views, as do others.

 

[SQ8]

The PAF actually "lost" the 65 war compared to what it could have accomplished had certain higher command followed Asghar Khan's plans to the letter. Had his plan gone through, considering the flying club mentality the IAF actually showed, Israeli Operation Moked would have looked like a copycat trying to live up to this.

Either way, the issue is not whether the 65 war allowed Pakistani to barely make it through the sleeve but rather if anyone was ever held accountable for it.

 

[fatman17]

What happened on the Kasur front in the 1965 war?

September 6, 2017

Saleem Akhtar Malik |

In this sector, Pakistan’s 11 Division (21, 52, and 106 Brigade), with under command 15 Lancers and 32 TDU* were pitted against Indian 4 Mountain Division (7and 62 Mountain Brigade) with under command Deccan Horse. XI Corps reserve comprised 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments).

TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a euphemism for “armour regiment” to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new armour regiments through U.S funding. These were not tank- destroyer units, as erroneously reported by the Indian authors.

Though Pakistan Army suffered heavily In the Kasur Sector, in the final analysis, Indian attack to capture Kasur was not only repulsed, Pakistan Army took the war inside the Indian territory

Indians attacked all along the front on night 5th /6thSeptember. Whereas Pakistan’s 52 Brigade and 106 Brigade were to defend the Kasur Sector along the BRB canal, 21 Brigade was located at Luliani (northwest of Kasur along Road Lahore-Kasur) and was 11 Division reserve for the counter-attack. At around 0500 hours, 11 Division units hurried up to occupy their defensive positions along the BRB canal just as the Indian offensive was unfurling itself.


To the south of Ballanwala, Indian 62 Mountain Brigade (18 Rajputana Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles, and 13 Dogra) supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse captured Sehjra Salient and Rohi Nullah bund. To the north, 7 Mountain Brigade (4 Grenadiers, 7 Grenadiers, and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles), also supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse, failed to capture its assigned objectives – Ballanwala and the bridges to its north.

Fighting went on throughout the day. Counter-attacking all along the front, 11 Division regained balance, threw back the Indians and recovered the area on the far bank of BRB, including Sehjra Salient. During the battles on 6th September, Indian 7 Grenadiers (7 Mountain Brigade) and 13 Dogra (62 Mountain Brigade) suffered such heavy casualties that they ceased to exist as cohesive units. Meanwhile 4 Mountain Division managed to withdraw to general area Asal Uttar. According to Chakravorty (2014):

The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture

“The withdrawal took place on September 07, and our troops were able to dig defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbing it on September 07”.

Pakistan’s 11 Division could not interfere because it was haltingly attempting to establish a bridgehead across Rohi Nullah.

The Battles of Asal Uttar

Facing 1 Armoured Division (4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 24 Cavalry, 19 Lancers, and 12 Cavalry) were Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry) and 4 Mountain Division (2x mountain brigades and Deccan Horse). As for the infantry complement, 7 FF and 10 FF, were mechanized infantry battalions whereas 1FF was plain infantry.

It should be kept in mind that mechanized infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks. It assaults and clears the enemy defences over- run by tanks. If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armoured division a value of 3, and the independent armoured brigade a value of 2. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 6.25 for India and 9 for Pakistan or a 1.44 to 1 Pakistani superiority in Kasur sector.

Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by Deccan Horse, artillery fire, and tank hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated

Pakistan launched the counter-stroke with its 1 Armoured Division in Khem Karan area. According to the official history (Riza, 1984), 1 Armoured Division “was required to debouch from a bridgehead provided by 11 Division and cut Grand Trunk road in area Jullunder, an advance of approximately 100 miles into India”. This aim was beyond the capability of 1 Armoured. The actual motivation for launching the armoured division was to threaten Indian XI Corps left flank with a view to relieving pressure on 10 Division.

Indian war historians prefer to portray Asal Uttar as a monolithic battle. In fact, a series of armour battles took place at and around Asal Uttar between 8th and 11th September. The bridgehead on Rohi Nullah was made during night 6th /7thSeptember by 2FF, under command 52 Brigade. This was a holding brigade responsible for defending the area from inclusive road Kasur-Khem Karan to inclusive road Kasur-Ferozepur.

An armoured formation breaking out of the bridgehead is always followed in a zone by an infantry formation. At dusk the armour hands over the area up to the line of control (forward edge of the area cleared by the armour) to the follow in zone infantry formation which then establishes its defences along the line against enemy counter- attacks. Normally, the formation establishing the bridgehead also acts as follow in zone infantry after the armour has broken out. With the tasks given to 1 Armoured Division, there should have been an infantry division following in zone. We have seen that what to talk about.


The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate the enemy defences by carrying out an outflanking move. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes

With the tasks given to 1 Armoured Division, there should have been an infantry division following in zone. We have seen that, what to talk about follow in zone infantry, in this sector, there was not even enough infantry to establish the bridgehead. Hence, between 8th and 11th September, 1 Armoured Division had been advancing into the enemy territory, attacking the enemy, and then withdrawing at night due to the absence of infantry to hold ground won by the armour during the day. Talking about mechanized infantry, which followed own armour, it was sufficient only to clear minor enemy opposition. It also reinforced the night leaguer by deploying at its outer perimeter or getting tucked into the gaps between the tank positions.

Between 8th and 11th September, the brigades of 1 Armoured Division launched a series of attacks against the enemy dug up around Asal Uttar. 5 Armoured Brigade again broke out from the bridgehead at 0700 hours on 8th September. Under cover of artillery fire, the advancing tanks moved within 900 meters of the enemy’s defended area. At this point, they were engaged by tanks of Deccan Horse. The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate the enemy defences by carrying out an outflanking move. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes.

Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by Deccan Horse, artillery fire, and tank hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated. During most of the attacks, the tanks were disabled on the minefields and effectively engaged by artillery, anti-tank weapons, and Indian tanks lying in ambush under cover of sugar cane crops. Wherever they tried to outflank the defender, Pakistani tanks were either bogged down or were channelized by the inundations into killing areas. “Do not reinforce a failure” is a constant refrain during the exercises yet this dictum is quite often thrown overboard during an actual war.

TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a euphemism for “armour regiment” to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new armour regiments through U.S funding

By 11th September, Pakistan Army had suffered heavy losses in armour. According to Chakravorty (2014), Pakistan lost 97 tanks (including 32 tanks bogged down and captured in running condition) as against Indian losses of 5 tanks. According to Riza (1984), 24 Indian tanks were destroyed between 6th and 10th September, which appears to be a more realistic estimate. Indian tank losses are recorded below:

Table 4.5

SerialDateTimeTanks Destroyed Remarks1.6 Sep0600 hrs3Hit while the Indian tanks started shooting 7 Punjab position at Nathuwala Siphon (52 Brigade area)2.7 Sep1600 hrs2Shot up by 6 Lancers while attacking Khem Karan3.8 Sep1030 hrs5Deccan Horse tanks shot up by 24 Cavalry4.9/10- SepNight3Destroyed at Asal Uttar5.10 Sep9Destroyed by 24 Cavalry at Chima6.10 Sep1230 hrs2Destroyed by 4 Horse at Kalanjar UttarTotal24


Notwithstanding the alleged superiority of Pakistani armour, Patton tanks had the same fire power as Indian Shermans. But the Indian Centurians, with their 105 mm main gun, were superior to the Pakistani Pattons. Pakistani and Indian armour, as discussed earlier, possessed almost equal combat power in Kasur sector. The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture.

1 Armoured division was launched in an area unsuitable for armour. Though Pakistan Army suffered heavily In the Kasur Sector, in the final analysis, Indian attack to capture Kasur was not only repulsed, Pakistan Army took the war inside the Indian territory.

Saleem Akhtar Malik was a Lt Colonel in the Pakistan Army. He holds an honours degree in War Studies, an MBA and an M.Phil in Management Sciences. He is the author of the book Borrowed Power. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy.

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