VCheng
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Why are these mistakes, Sir? Remaking the entire region is a huge and messy goal that will decade a few decades to achieve.
Retired U.S. general on how to handle IS and why we lost in Iraq, Afg
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Why are these mistakes, Sir? Remaking the entire region is a huge and messy goal that will decade a few decades to achieve.
haviZsultan
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Ali Khan or Abdul Quddus syndrome we should call them.
MastanKhan
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What is the purpose of these comments of yours?
VCheng
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I am just pointing out that regional military actions are best undertaken only as a part of a larger overall policy, that is all.
MastanKhan
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Hi,
Is this larger policy aimed at starting a war between the jews and muslims for the second coming of The Christ!
VCheng
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International geopolitics has no religion, Sir.
MastanKhan
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Hi,
That is for short term goals---for long term wars----it is always religion that is behind it---. Without the backing of religion---you can only kill so many for s long---but once you get the backing of religion behind you---then there is no limit to your killing and waging wars.
VCheng
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I will hold on to my view that international geopolitics has no religion, Sir. Please feel free to hold on to your contention as you wish. Religion is a mere tool in the bigger picture, nothing more.
gambit
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Whoever said that any criticisms leveled at US have to make sense ?
VCheng
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True that, but it seems to apply to PDF now more than ever for some reason.
gambit
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The Iraqi military self disbanded. All Bremer did was made it official.
Aside from the obvious fact that we would be labeled all sorts of names associated with conquerors, the US was not there to 'own' anything.
Yah...Blame US for the atrocious behaviors of the Iraqis.
MastanKhan
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Sir,
That is incorrect---the general in charge before Bremmer is on record to make statements to use Iraqi military to rebuild Iraq---even Israel was on board. Israelis were shocked to learn that the americans have let the military walk out---. Every nation was shocked at the momentuous stupidity of the americans---but not the americans.
Here is a military that you have humiliated in defeat----now you are sending trained soldiers walking home---no money---no resources---no food or water----slowly and gradually the anger is building---.
Boy---what a price to pay--- a defeat on two fronts from third rate enemies---. The afghans were not even third rate military----.
After the victory---Iraq was your domain for all practical purposes---the security of Iraqi assets was your responsibility---you failed.
You are great at building weapons of death and destruction and awesome technology but no clue of how to rule your conquests.
What I mean to say Gambit---winning a war is not a John Wayne movie---where in the end after victory he throws the rifle down and all is well---.
gambit
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Our troops were seeing discarded uniforms on the roadsides on the way to Baghdad.
U.S. army tanks roll into Iraqi capital | Daily Chronicle
So yes, we wanted no one else but the Iraqi military to rebuild Iraq. But what we did not know and understood -- at that time -- was how socially fractured the Iraqi military really were. We had vague ideas about how the Sunnis were favored over the Shias in Iraq, in civil and military governance, but when we actually saw the reality of that division, whatever idealism we had for the Iraqi military as a unifying force for the country -- went out the window.
The Iraqi military self disbanded regardless of whatever American general wanted or said. On the one hand, you called US stupid and incompetent, which I do not care anyway, but on the other hand, you cited an American general's wishes as if those wishes came from Allah himself. Make up your mind.
I would think that is a good thing.
But you talk as if every war ran by a script.
gambit
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http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/opinion/06bremer.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
September 6, 2007
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army
By L. PAUL BREMER III
“The Iraqi Army of the future cannot be an extension of the present army, which has been made into a tool of dictatorship.” — Report by the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project, May 2002
IT has become conventional wisdom that the decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s army was a mistake, was contrary to American prewar planning and was a decision I made on my own. In fact the policy was carefully considered by top civilian and military members of the American government. And it was the right decision.
By the time Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved. On April 17 Gen. John Abizaid, the deputy commander of the Army’s Central Command, reported in a video briefing to officials in Washington that “there are no organized Iraqi military units left.” The disappearance of Saddam Hussein’s old army rendered irrelevant any prewar plans to use that army. So the question was whether the Coalition Provisional Authority should try to recall it or to build a new one open to both vetted members of the old army and new recruits. General Abizaid favored the second approach.
In the weeks after General Abizaid’s recommendation, the coalition’s national security adviser, Walter Slocombe, discussed options with top officials in the Pentagon, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. They recognized that to recall the former army was a practical impossibility because postwar looting had destroyed all the bases.
Moreover, the largely Shiite draftees of the army were not going to respond to a recall plea from their former commanders, who were primarily Sunnis. It was also agreed that recalling the army would be a political disaster because to the vast majority of Iraqis it was a symbol of the old Baathist-led Sunni ascendancy.
On May 8, 2003, before I left for Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave me a memo titled “Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines” that specified that the coalition “will actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old enforcers — the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc.” and that “we will make clear that the coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime.” The next day Mr. Rumsfeld told me that he had sent the “Principles” paper to the national security adviser and the secretary of state.
Meanwhile, Walter Slocombe’s consultations with Americans officials in Washington and Baghdad showed that they understood that the only viable course was to build a new, professional force open to screened members of the old army. Mr. Slocombe drafted an order to accomplish these objectives. I sent a preliminary draft of this order to the secretary of defense on May 9. The next day I sent the draft to the Defense Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, as well as to Mr. Wolfowitz; the under secretary for policy, Douglas Feith; the head of Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks; and to the coalition’s top civil administrator at the time, Jay Garner, asking for comments.
On May 13, en route to Baghdad, Mr. Slocombe briefed senior British officials in London who told him they recognized that “the demobilization of the Iraqi military is a fait accompli.” His report added that “if some U.K. officers or officials think that we should try to rebuild or reassemble the old R.A. (Republican Army), they did not give any hint of it in our meetings, and in fact agreed with the need for vigorous de-Baathification, especially in the security sector.”
Over the following week, Mr. Slocombe continued discussions about the planned order with top Pentagon officials, including Mr. Feith. During that same period, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, the field commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, received and cleared the draft order. I briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the issue several times, and forwarded a final draft of the proposed order for his approval on May 19.
Walter Slocombe subsequently received detailed comments on the draft order incorporating the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, making clear that the top civilian and military staff in the Pentagon, as well as the commanders in the field, had reviewed the proposal. Another coalition adviser, Dan Senor, spent the night of May 22 coordinating the text of the announcement with Mr. Rumsfeld’s close adviser Lawrence Di Rita. Apart from minor edits to the order, none of the military or civilian officials raised objections to the proposal to create a new Iraqi army or to formally dissolve Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus.
On May 22, I sent to President Bush, through Secretary Rumsfeld, my first report since arriving in Iraq. I reviewed our activities since arrival, including our de-Baathification policy. I then alerted the president that “I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam’s military and intelligence structures.” The same day, I briefed the president on the plan via secure video. The president sent me a note on May 23 in which he thanked me for my report and noted that “you have my full support and confidence.”
The decision not to recall Saddam Hussein’s army was thoroughly considered by top officials in the American government. At the time, this decision was not controversial. When Mr. Slocombe held a press conference in Baghdad on May 23 to explain the decision, only two reporters showed up — neither of them Americans. The first I heard of doubts about the decision was in the fall of 2003 after the insurgency had picked up speed.
Moreover, we were right to build a new Iraqi Army. Despite all the difficulties encountered, Iraq’s new professional soldiers are the country’s most effective and trusted security force. By contrast, the Baathist-era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect.
L. Paul Bremer III was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from 2003 to 2004.
September 6, 2007
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army
By L. PAUL BREMER III
“The Iraqi Army of the future cannot be an extension of the present army, which has been made into a tool of dictatorship.” — Report by the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project, May 2002
IT has become conventional wisdom that the decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s army was a mistake, was contrary to American prewar planning and was a decision I made on my own. In fact the policy was carefully considered by top civilian and military members of the American government. And it was the right decision.
By the time Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved. On April 17 Gen. John Abizaid, the deputy commander of the Army’s Central Command, reported in a video briefing to officials in Washington that “there are no organized Iraqi military units left.” The disappearance of Saddam Hussein’s old army rendered irrelevant any prewar plans to use that army. So the question was whether the Coalition Provisional Authority should try to recall it or to build a new one open to both vetted members of the old army and new recruits. General Abizaid favored the second approach.
In the weeks after General Abizaid’s recommendation, the coalition’s national security adviser, Walter Slocombe, discussed options with top officials in the Pentagon, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. They recognized that to recall the former army was a practical impossibility because postwar looting had destroyed all the bases.
Moreover, the largely Shiite draftees of the army were not going to respond to a recall plea from their former commanders, who were primarily Sunnis. It was also agreed that recalling the army would be a political disaster because to the vast majority of Iraqis it was a symbol of the old Baathist-led Sunni ascendancy.
On May 8, 2003, before I left for Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave me a memo titled “Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines” that specified that the coalition “will actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old enforcers — the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc.” and that “we will make clear that the coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime.” The next day Mr. Rumsfeld told me that he had sent the “Principles” paper to the national security adviser and the secretary of state.
Meanwhile, Walter Slocombe’s consultations with Americans officials in Washington and Baghdad showed that they understood that the only viable course was to build a new, professional force open to screened members of the old army. Mr. Slocombe drafted an order to accomplish these objectives. I sent a preliminary draft of this order to the secretary of defense on May 9. The next day I sent the draft to the Defense Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, as well as to Mr. Wolfowitz; the under secretary for policy, Douglas Feith; the head of Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks; and to the coalition’s top civil administrator at the time, Jay Garner, asking for comments.
On May 13, en route to Baghdad, Mr. Slocombe briefed senior British officials in London who told him they recognized that “the demobilization of the Iraqi military is a fait accompli.” His report added that “if some U.K. officers or officials think that we should try to rebuild or reassemble the old R.A. (Republican Army), they did not give any hint of it in our meetings, and in fact agreed with the need for vigorous de-Baathification, especially in the security sector.”
Over the following week, Mr. Slocombe continued discussions about the planned order with top Pentagon officials, including Mr. Feith. During that same period, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, the field commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, received and cleared the draft order. I briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the issue several times, and forwarded a final draft of the proposed order for his approval on May 19.
Walter Slocombe subsequently received detailed comments on the draft order incorporating the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, making clear that the top civilian and military staff in the Pentagon, as well as the commanders in the field, had reviewed the proposal. Another coalition adviser, Dan Senor, spent the night of May 22 coordinating the text of the announcement with Mr. Rumsfeld’s close adviser Lawrence Di Rita. Apart from minor edits to the order, none of the military or civilian officials raised objections to the proposal to create a new Iraqi army or to formally dissolve Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus.
On May 22, I sent to President Bush, through Secretary Rumsfeld, my first report since arriving in Iraq. I reviewed our activities since arrival, including our de-Baathification policy. I then alerted the president that “I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam’s military and intelligence structures.” The same day, I briefed the president on the plan via secure video. The president sent me a note on May 23 in which he thanked me for my report and noted that “you have my full support and confidence.”
The decision not to recall Saddam Hussein’s army was thoroughly considered by top officials in the American government. At the time, this decision was not controversial. When Mr. Slocombe held a press conference in Baghdad on May 23 to explain the decision, only two reporters showed up — neither of them Americans. The first I heard of doubts about the decision was in the fall of 2003 after the insurgency had picked up speed.
Moreover, we were right to build a new Iraqi Army. Despite all the difficulties encountered, Iraq’s new professional soldiers are the country’s most effective and trusted security force. By contrast, the Baathist-era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect.
L. Paul Bremer III was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from 2003 to 2004.
he-man
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Iraqi mess is directly linked to USA,no matter how much @gambit tries to say otherwise.
Before invasion on utterly false and frivolous grounds it was a dictator ship for sure but a million times better and peaceful than now.Just because USA does not want a person selling oil in currencies other than dollars it was bombed to stone age and i will be correct when i say this.
It will break up into 2-3 pieces soon enough if it already has not with ISIS already controlling a huge chunk.
Usa did the same thing in libya and syria.EXACTLY the same tactics with the same results and destruction.The underlying middle east rivalries played a huge part in all these wars plus the animosity of shias and sunnis compounded the things too but the lead actor was USA alone.
As for iraqi army training goes,,if anyone believes that USA wanted this region to be peaceful to produce their own oil without any external pressure and american bases then i can say only one thing.lol
Before invasion on utterly false and frivolous grounds it was a dictator ship for sure but a million times better and peaceful than now.Just because USA does not want a person selling oil in currencies other than dollars it was bombed to stone age and i will be correct when i say this.
It will break up into 2-3 pieces soon enough if it already has not with ISIS already controlling a huge chunk.
Usa did the same thing in libya and syria.EXACTLY the same tactics with the same results and destruction.The underlying middle east rivalries played a huge part in all these wars plus the animosity of shias and sunnis compounded the things too but the lead actor was USA alone.
As for iraqi army training goes,,if anyone believes that USA wanted this region to be peaceful to produce their own oil without any external pressure and american bases then i can say only one thing.lol
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