Regarding the surrender
Dr. Junaid Ahmad| December 16, 1971, was an ominous day for Pakistan, because the Pakistani army’s scattered divisions sandwiched between an internal insurgency supported by Indian war machine and Indian army columns finally decided to surrender. To this day popular imagination and rhetoric is...
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“The total fighting strength available to me [Gen Naizi] was forty-five thousand – 34,000 from the army, plus 11,000 from CAF and West Pakistan civilian police and armed non-combatants”who were fighting against the insurgents. Even if the strength of HL, MLA, depots, training institutes, workshops, factories, nurses and lady doctors, non-combatants like barbers, cooks, shoemakers and sweepers are added, even then the total comes to only 55,000.
Air Marshal Rahim khan, CNC Pakistan Air Force (1969-1972), had stated:
“The number of regular Pakistani troops in East Pakistan never exceeded 33,000-34,000. The rest is just propaganda by India and the Awami League, to magnify their success….”
Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who commended Eastern Wing of Pakistan Air Forces had asserted the same in these words:
“At the maximum, our regular fighting force in East Pakistan in December 1971 stood at 34,000. This figure does not include paramilitary personnel, military police, etc. Even if you include the auxiliaries, the total does not cross 45,000”.
General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. Former Vice Chief of Army Staff, speaking on the 1971 conundrum stated
“It was impossible for the 34,000 Pakistani troops in East Pakistan or for that matter any army in the world to fight against the combined strength of 200,000 Indian army and 170,000 Mukti Bahini, If not more, that too in a hostile environment 1200 miles away from West Pakistan …… Keeping into account all this, if the Indians still feel that they achieved a stunning military victory against Pakistan, I can only say they have fallen prey to their own propaganda”.
US congressman, Charles Wilson (famous for Charlie Wilson’s War) in a discussion with Pakistani diplomats in Washington DC remarked.
“……In 1971, it was certainly not possible for the 35,000 Pakistani troops in Dhaka to fight against the combined strength of 200,000 Indian army and the more than 100,000 Indian-trained Bengali guerillas.”
Another US congressman, Stephen Solarz, commenting on the War of 1971 in June 1989, remarked,
“Pakistanis are energetic, vibrant, and resilient. We must not be misled by 1971. It was certainly not possible for the 40,000 odd Pakistani army in Dhaka to fight against much larger Indian army and Indian-trained Bengali Bahinis in a hostile territory ….”
K C Pant, Indian former Defense Minister in September, 1994 during a discussion on Indo-Pak relations held in New Delhi, said
“Peace is important between Pakistan and India. We respect the professional competence of the Pakistani soldier. Had democracy continued in Pakistan, Islamabad would not have suffered the debacle resulting in the surrender of its 40,000 military personnel to India in East Pakistan”.
Sarmila Bose, the famous Indian Bengali writer and Associate Researcher at Oxford University in her book Dead Reckoning published in 2011, asserts
“……
t appears that while the total figure in Indian custody is about right, to state that 93,000 soldiers were taken prisoner is wrong, and creates confusions by greatly inflating the Pakistani fighting force in East Pakistan”.
Javed Jabbar, former Pakistani Minister of Information in his article, Estranged siblings-Pakistan and Bangladesh, 40 years later, wrote
“Pakistan’s armed forces did not exceed 45,000 troops at optimal levels. The 90,000 prisoners-of-war held by India included over 50,000 non- combatant, unarmed West Pakistani civilians.”
S. M. Hali, a well-known Pakistani analyst in his article, Breaking myths of 1971 Pak-India war writes,
“The total strength of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan (in 1971) was 40,000….”
Regarding kargil
PAKISTAN soldiers perched at peak 5353, on the strategic Marpo La Ridge had a grandstand view of this year's Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the official end of the Kargil war. At least some of them must had wry smiles on their faces, for although peak 5353 metres is inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), Pakistani troops held the mountain through the Kargil war and continue to do so today.
Pakistani occupation of point 5353 means Operation Vijay's core objective in Drass, securing the highway, in effect failed. Officials in New Delhi attempt to argue that point 5353 is in an ambiguous location on the Line of Control, and that there are two peaks of the same height which are being confused, claims debunked by copies of the Army's own maps which are in Business Line's possession.
In mid-August, 1999, his efforts to bring about a deal bore fruit. Extended negotiations between the Brigadier and a Pakistani interlocutor, who called himself Colonel Saqlain, led to both sides committing themselves to leave points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.
Both Indian and Pakistani troops were now pulled back to their pre-Kargil position, leaving an arial distance of about a kilometre between the armies along most of the Marpo La ridge. The deal wasn't ideal, for point 5353 was of enormously more strategic importance to India than either 4251 or 4875 were for Pakistan, but it was better than nothing.
Towards the end of October, things began to go horribly wrong. Commander Aul tasked the 16 Grenadiers to take point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles to occupy 5353, choosing to violate the August agreement rather than risk the prospect that Pakistan might reoccupy these positions again. While the 16 Grenadiers attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons which are still not clear, never made their way up 5353. When Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 52 40, they promptly launched a counter assault on 5353. Seven days later, in early November, the Grenadiers unit on 5240 watched Pakistan take up positions on the more important peak.
Pakistan moved rapidly to consolidate its position on 5353. Concrete bunkers came up on the peak, and a road was constructed to the base of the peak from Benazir Post, Pakistan's most important permanent position in the area. In the meanwhile, Commander Aul considered plans to retake the peak. He didn't have much choice. India's positions on 5240 were under threat, along with positions of the 2 Naga in Mushkoh, the 2 Grenadiers in Drass, and the 8 Sikh in Bhimbet. Offensives were discussed in January an d February this year, and again in May and August, but had to be abandoned each time because of the risks involved.
Praveen Swami DRASS, Aug. 10 PAKISTAN soldiers perched at peak 5,353 metres, on the strategic Marpo La Ridge had a grandstand view of this year's Vijay Diwas celebrations, marking the
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What does rk anand say about kargil?
Also lmao at using wikipedia as your source
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