Martian2
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No need 50 years, only few seconds, remember how they erased Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
You seem to have forgotten that China is the world's third-largest thermonuclear power with at least 294 megatons in thermonuclear weaponry.
In the following post, I only discussed China's DF-31A. I haven't addressed China's DF-31, DF-5, and the upcoming 10-MIRVed DF-41. Also, I did not cover the submarine-launched JL-1s and JL-2s. Furthermore, I haven't discussed China's 5,000km Underground Great Wall and the potential number of ICBMs hidden in there.
China's DF-31As deter 144 cities
China's DF-31A launch
Let's do the math to see if China's DF-31A mobile ICBM retaliatory force is sufficient to provide a nuclear deterrent.
"Britain`s International Institute of Strategic Studies notes" there are "24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009." China is increasing her DF-31A ICBM force by approximately 12 missiles/one brigade a year.
We will add 12 more missiles from 2009 to 2010 and another dozen missiles from 2010 to 2011. A reasonable estimate of China's DF-31A force is 48 ICBMs (e.g. 24 at end of 2009; 36 at end of 2010; and 48 at end of 2011).
If Richard Fisher's information is correct and China's DF-31A is MIRVed with three warheads then that means the 48 DF-31As are armed with a total of 144 warheads (e.g. 48 DF-31As x 3 MIRVed warheads = 144 warheads).
We know China possesses the technology for a W-88 class warhead with a yield of 475 kilotons. The conclusion is that China's DF-31A nuclear force is capable of retaliating against 144 cities. That does seem to be a formidable second-strike capability.
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China and START. Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize
"China and START
By Richard D. Fisher Jr.,
The Washington Times,
20 September 2010
...
In its latest report to the Congress on China`s military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year`s report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain`s International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.
...
This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads."
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The most interesting and controversial debate regarding China's reverse-engineering was the development of China's W-88 class miniaturized thermonuclear warhead. The U.S. claims China appropriated the designs and reverse-engineered the W-88 warhead. China says that isn't true.
China says this is a case of convergent engineering. For example, an airplane must have two wings to provide lift and an engine to provide thrust in the rear. Another example of convergent engineering is all rockets are long and thin. In other words, form must follow function. There is only a very limited way to create a massive thermonuclear explosion using a compact warhead.
Here is the crux of the problem. "U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs." The Chinese nuclear tests data are "similar," but not identical to U.S. nuclear tests on the W-88.
W88 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"The W88 is a United States thermonuclear warhead, with an estimated yield of 475 kiloton (kt), and is small enough to fit on MIRVed missiles. The W88 was designed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1970s. In 1999 the director of Los Alamos who had presided over its design described it as "The most advanced U.S. nuclear warhead."[1]
The Trident II SLBM can be armed with up to 8 W88 (475 kt) warheads (Mark 5) or 8 W76 (100 kt) warheads (Mark 4), but it is limited to 4 warheads under SORT."
NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: China
"...According to the Cox Committee Report, suspicion of China's nuclear espionage started after the U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs. This similarity, combined with other information derived from classified sources, led the Cox Committee to claim that China had stolen several bomb designs, including the U.S.' most advanced W-88 design and a design for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). Yet, the Cox Report has been severely criticized by both experts and officials in the United States as a political document that has several technical inaccuracies."
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China has an estimated 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence
Rankings of world thermonuclear powers by megatons of firepower:
1. Russia - 1,273 megatons
2. United States - 570 megatons
3. China - 294 megatons (China has over half the nuclear firepower of the United States)
4. France - 55 megatons
5. Britain - 16 megatons
References:
Russia: http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_russia.html
United States: http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_usa.html
China: http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_china.html
France: http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_france.html
Britain: http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_uk.html
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China's "possible warhead assembly and production facilities" (source: NTI)
http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_china.html
People's Republic of China (PRC)
NPT Nuclear Weapon State
1. Arsenal Size:
Most opaque of the nuclear weapons state; limited open source information.
Operational strategic warheads: ~176 (Warheads in stockpile: 240)[1]
2. Key Delivery Systems:[2,3,4,5]
* Land-based missiles: Approximately 120.(ICBM: DF-4, DF-5A DF-31, DF-31A; MRBM: DF-3A, DF-21)
* Aircraft: 20 (Hong-6)
* SLBM: 1 Xia-class sub carrying12 JL-1s, never fully deployed; 2 Jin-class subs deployed, 1 under development can each carry 12 JL-2; however the JL-2s have not yet been deployed
* Cruise missiles: DH-10 (nuclear capable) 50-250 deployed
* No credible evidence to confirm that non-strategic weapons still remain in operational force
3. Estimated Destructive Power: 294 [megatons][6]
4. Military Fissile Material Stockpile: (estimates)
Plutonium: 4 mt (+/- 20 %)[7]
HEU: 20 mt [8]
5. Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size:
Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT[9]
Future Commitments:
In support of verifiable FMCT negotiation. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles[10]
6. Nuclear Weapons Policies
1. Nuclear testing:
* Observed nuclear testing moratorium since July 1996.[12]
* Signed but not ratified CTBT[13]
2. Use of nuclear weapons:
* Adopted no-first use policy[14,15]
* Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members:
Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of:
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok, but reiterates its support.[16]
* Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).[17]
* Expressed its support for legally binding unconditional negative security assurances.[18]
Sources:
[1] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, http://thebulletin.metapress.com.
[2] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, http://thebulletin.metapress.com.
[3] Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Space Intelligence Center, April 2009, www.fas.org.
[4] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, www.defense.gov.
[5] Chinese Nuclear Forces, Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.
[6] Eliminating Nuclear Threats, ICNND Report, www.icnnd.org.
[7] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, www.fissilematerials.org.
[8] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, www.fissilematerials.org.
[9] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, www.nti.org.
[10] Statement by Ambassador Jingye Cheng to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 17 May 2006, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[11] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, www.defense.gov.
[12] CTBTO website, Nuclear Testing page, www.ctbto.org.
[13] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, www.nti.org.
[14] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[15] Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Security Assurances at the Third Session of the Preparatory committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 7 May 2009, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[16] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial Protocol Chart, www.nti.org.
[17] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial, Chapter 3, Security Assurances, www.nti.org.
[18] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.