Peace in Afghanistan Will Not be Possible Until Kabul Acknowledges The Durand Line'

[MultaniGuy]

Sitting from here you don't know that.
Heck if you are from some city, you don't even know about your country.
But if you go deep Inside Afghanistan, the phustun and non phustun fights runs deep..

I am aware the Pathans, Tajiks, and Harazars hate each other.

Nevertheless, They still want a country of their own.

They will never accept disintegration of their country.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Absolutely. I can acknowledge that my views, like those of many others, are always going to have a degree of bias given my country of origin and loyalties - so it's always good to have opposing views on an issue. We may not agree at the end, but I always enjoy a civilized debate.

I am most obliged.

My immediate thought on reading your posts was that the British had left a large number of loose ends at the time of their departure, a hasty departure, it has to be remembered. That was not just Mountbatten bringing the date forward to 1947 - it had been intended to be later - but also the total disarray in which many British officers from services, the Civil Service and the Police, the Forest Service, the Railways, and the Political Service, just to name a few, found themselves. They had planned on a tidy tenure and a well-deserved rest back home, in snug little bungalows; the days of the Nabobs were admittedly over, and nobody expected to retire to a Tudor mansion any more.

Perhaps due to the abruptness of their departure - perhaps - both the Dominions they left behind found a number of tangled knots on their borders. India had no end of trouble, continues to have trouble with her borders with China, formerly Tibet, currently the ruthlessly heeled province of Xijang. There is no doubt that there were anomalies; Aksai Chin was never a realistic claim, was in fact due to the cartographic privateering of renegade British geographers busy earning a dishonest coin from a gullible Maharaja. Tawang, too, was controversial, to say the least; it was a well-known appanage of Xigatse (Shigatse that was) and the entire territory had never been explored or penetrated other than by Bailley of Bailley's Trail fame.

That is where I see your problems with the Durand Line. That was exactly the same case as elsewhere, a line dictated without any understanding of local conditions, and imposed on a militarily disadvantaged opponent. It was immoral, some would say that, worse, it was impractical. The Durand Line should never have been imposed as a boundary between two integrated nation-states, as the British sought to present it, to nobody's conviction. Not even their own.

There is reason to sympathise with Afghan resentment of this line. The alternative to holding out on them on this point, however, was to give in completely. To jointly produce a boundary well within the Frontier Territory, and abandon everything west of that to the tribes that Afghanistan so bewilderingly embraced.

So should Pakistan cave in completely? No, not at all, or rather, not without gaining substantially from any arrangement. It is difficult to see a solution to this issue, for the simple reason that the ethos of those parts is strongly positioned on the tribe, not on the nation-state; sometimes, there seems to be room for doubt about the existence of the concept of the nation-state in the minds of the inhabitants of the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. Can they be dominated and progressively converted to law-abiding, tolerant and peacefully engaged citizens?

The imagination boggles.

 

[MultaniGuy]

I am most obliged.

My immediate thought on reading your posts was that the British had left a large number of loose ends at the time of their departure, a hasty departure, it has to be remembered. That was not just Mountbatten bringing the date forward to 1947 - it had been intended to be later - but also the total disarray in which many British officers from services, the Civil Service and the Police, the Forest Service, the Railways, and the Political Service, just to name a few, found themselves. They had planned on a tidy tenure and a well-deserved rest back home, in snug little bungalows; the days of the Nabobs were admittedly over, and nobody expected to retire to a Tudor mansion any more.

Perhaps due to the abruptness of their departure - perhaps - both the Dominions they left behind found a number of tangled knots on their borders. India had no end of trouble, continues to have trouble with her borders with China, formerly Tibet, currently the ruthlessly heeled province of Xijang. There is no doubt that there were anomalies; Aksai Chin was never a realistic claim, was in fact due to the cartographic privateering of renegade British geographers busy earning a dishonest coin from a gullible Maharaja. Tawang, too, was controversial, to say the least; it was a well-known appanage of Xigatse (Shigatse that was) and the entire territory had never been explored or penetrated other than by Bailley of Bailley's Trail fame.

That is where I see your problems with the Durand Line. That was exactly the same case as elsewhere, a line dictated without any understanding of local conditions, and imposed on a militarily disadvantaged opponent. It was immoral, some would say that, worse, it was impractical. The Durand Line should never have been imposed as a boundary between two integrated nation-states, as the British sought to present it, to nobody's conviction. Not even their own.

There is reason to sympathise with Afghan resentment of this line. The alternative to holding out on them on this point, however, was to give in completely. To jointly produce a boundary well within the Frontier Territory, and abandon everything west of that to the tribes that Afghanistan so bewilderingly embraced.

So should Pakistan cave in completely? No, not at all, or rather, not without gaining substantially from any arrangement. It is difficult to see a solution to this issue, for the simple reason that the ethos of those parts is strongly positioned on the tribe, not on the nation-state; sometimes, there seems to be room for doubt about the existence of the concept of the nation-state in the minds of the inhabitants of the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. Can they be dominated and progressively converted to law-abiding, tolerant and peacefully engaged citizens?

The imagination boggles.

Even if you are correct that it was wrong to impose a treaty on a militarily weaker country and divide a society, does it really matter now after nearly a century of the division.

Durand Line is not the same as the Kashmir dispute.

Durand line is not the same as disputed territory.

And there is no expiry date to the Rawalpindi Treaty.

Why should I sympathize with Afghanistan? The Amir of Afghanistan signed the treaty so their independence could be recognized.

There was a give and take with the treaty.

 

[My-Analogous]

"While many falsely accuse Islamabad of taking an ideological view on the political turbulence of its Afghan neighbour, the reality is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the reason why some in Islamabad were naturally sympathetic to the Mujaheddin and later to the Taliban was for one simple reason – the goal of the Afghan Taliban was to establish a state based on religious rather than nationalist characteristics. Because so much of both leftist and secular-conservative Afghan nationalism was framed around the concept of a “greater Afghanistan”, a concept which necessarily threatens Pakistan’s peace and unity, it was only natural for Islamabad to be sympathetic with those who did not hold such beliefs."

"before any all-parties peace conference can happen, all parties in Afghanistan must agree to acknowledge and respect the Durand line. If this does not happen, it risks having Pakistan negotiate from a position where it could set itself up to be taken advantage of by forces that have done so in the past (including the very recent past). If Pakistan and Afghanistan are to co-exist in peace, it is a fundamental requirement that Afghanistan understands where its borders end and where Pakistan’s begin."

https://eurasiafuture.com/2018/12/0...ble-until-kabul-acknowledges-the-durand-line/

Finally, an absolutely spot on article from the West that looks at the Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions and conflict dispassionately, outside of the usual, shallow Western & Indian prism of 'Pakistan's motivations are some sort of twisted, extremist, terrorism exporting pan-Islamist ideology'.

What this article states is something many Pakistanis have been arguing for years, and points to the absolute strategic incompetence (or deliberate subterfuge, depending on which theory you believe) on the part of the United States in Afghanistan.

Where have you been. I saw your post after very long time

 

[ziaulislam]

I am most obliged.

My immediate thought on reading your posts was that the British had left a large number of loose ends at the time of their departure, a hasty departure, it has to be remembered. That was not just Mountbatten bringing the date forward to 1947 - it had been intended to be later - but also the total disarray in which many British officers from services, the Civil Service and the Police, the Forest Service, the Railways, and the Political Service, just to name a few, found themselves. They had planned on a tidy tenure and a well-deserved rest back home, in snug little bungalows; the days of the Nabobs were admittedly over, and nobody expected to retire to a Tudor mansion any more.

Perhaps due to the abruptness of their departure - perhaps - both the Dominions they left behind found a number of tangled knots on their borders. India had no end of trouble, continues to have trouble with her borders with China, formerly Tibet, currently the ruthlessly heeled province of Xijang. There is no doubt that there were anomalies; Aksai Chin was never a realistic claim, was in fact due to the cartographic privateering of renegade British geographers busy earning a dishonest coin from a gullible Maharaja. Tawang, too, was controversial, to say the least; it was a well-known appanage of Xigatse (Shigatse that was) and the entire territory had never been explored or penetrated other than by Bailley of Bailley's Trail fame.

That is where I see your problems with the Durand Line. That was exactly the same case as elsewhere, a line dictated without any understanding of local conditions, and imposed on a militarily disadvantaged opponent. It was immoral, some would say that, worse, it was impractical. The Durand Line should never have been imposed as a boundary between two integrated nation-states, as the British sought to present it, to nobody's conviction. Not even their own.

There is reason to sympathise with Afghan resentment of this line. The alternative to holding out on them on this point, however, was to give in completely. To jointly produce a boundary well within the Frontier Territory, and abandon everything west of that to the tribes that Afghanistan so bewilderingly embraced.

So should Pakistan cave in completely? No, not at all, or rather, not without gaining substantially from any arrangement. It is difficult to see a solution to this issue, for the simple reason that the ethos of those parts is strongly positioned on the tribe, not on the nation-state; sometimes, there seems to be room for doubt about the existence of the concept of the nation-state in the minds of the inhabitants of the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. Can they be dominated and progressively converted to law-abiding, tolerant and peacefully engaged citizens?

The imagination boggles.

what is afghan resentment, afghans fight in between when asked issue of national cards and afghans are brought together, the current afghanistan has 45-55 split pushtoon non pushtoon population, non pushtoons are going to loose everything if durand line is revisited, Afghanistan pushtoon belt cannot swallow Pakistan, Pakistan can swallow the pushtoon belt, 2/3 of pushtoons are in pakistan, more in sindh and punjab than most parts of Afghanistan..no matter how you look at it will be Afghanistan that will loose here..

pushtoon in majority, overwhelming majority want to associate it self with Pakistan because of its population dispersion in Pakistan and its economical dependence on Pakistan

so why do afghan still support it..it more has to do with foreign support from india and old rivalry as well freedom of movement for opium than afghan interest..every afghan leader who has been sincere has pointed out the above..

durand line is the win situation for afghans currently...

frankly, i am sure afghanistan going to split into pushtoon non pushtoon soon, if afghans dont give up this fairy tale, and this is exactly whats happening now, this cannot happen in pakistan because of dispersion and economic dependence of pushtoons within pakistan

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Where have you been. I saw your post after very long time

Busy, work, life, etc.

Pop in now and then when things calm down on the personal front or heat up on the geo-political front.

@Joe Shearer

Beautifully articulated.

As you mentioned in your post, the Pashtun population in the border regions of Afghanistan & Pakistan has more loyalty to tribe than any 'Greater Pashtunistan' concept. Afghan 'resentment' towards Pakistan is largely confined to sections of the Afghan Pashtun population. Large parts of the non-Pashtun Afghan population don't desire being marginalized by an overwhelming Pashtun majority and an overwhelming majority of the Pakistani Pashtun (more than the entire population of Afghanistan) are well integrated into Pakistan and there are no indications they desire becoming part of Afghanistan.

Further, there is the Baloch complication. The Pashtun belt extends into large parts of Balochistan and the Pashtun population in Balochistan has increased significantly due to a variety of factors. Afghan claims over the Pakistani Pashtun belt will impact Balochistan, and the Baloch, with their myriad existing issues of being marginalized in Pakistan, will have issues with a significant part of Balochistan being broken away.

While I agree that the British demarcations in South Asia were far from perfect, Afghan claims (all territory West of the Indus) aren't any better when one views the ethnic dynamics in the territories they claim - they're based more on a historical Afghan empire that was forged and demarcated through force, much like what the British did. Some commentators have compared the Pashtun to the Kurds, but there is little Pashtun nationalism driving a movement for an independent Pashtunistan visible in Pakistan, likely because of the aforementioned integration into Pakistani society.

At this point Afghan 'resentment' is just that - localized Afghan resentment for a solution that has insignificantly low takers among the Pakistani Pashtun population that Afghanistan claims. It's a solution that doesn't even have support from the other Afghan ethnic groups. From a human perspective, Pakistan as a State cannot abandon millions of Pakistani Pashtun to a broken, war torn State that they don't wish to be part of.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Busy, work, life, etc.

Pop in now and then when things calm down on the personal front or heat up on the geo-political front.

@Joe Shearer

Beautifully articulated.

As you mentioned in your post, the Pashtun population in the border regions of Afghanistan & Pakistan has more loyalty to tribe than any 'Greater Pashtunistan' concept. Afghan 'resentment' towards Pakistan is largely confined to sections of the Afghan Pashtun population. Large parts of the non-Pashtun Afghan population don't desire being marginalized by an overwhelming Pashtun majority and an overwhelming majority of the Pakistani Pashtun (more than the entire population of Afghanistan) are well integrated into Pakistan and there are no indications they desire becoming part of Afghanistan.

Further, there is the Baloch complication. The Pashtun belt extends into large parts of Balochistan and the Pashtun population in Balochistan has increased significantly due to a variety of factors. Afghan claims over the Pakistani Pashtun belt will impact Balochistan, and the Baloch, with their myriad existing issues of being marginalized in Pakistan, will have issues with a significant part of Balochistan being broken away.

While I agree that the British demarcations in South Asia were far from perfect, Afghan claims (all territory West of the Indus) aren't any better when one views the ethnic dynamics in the territories they claim - they're based more on a historical Afghan empire that was forged and demarcated through force, much like what the British did. Some commentators have compared the Pashtun to the Kurds, but there is little Pashtun nationalism driving a movement for an independent Pashtunistan visible in Pakistan, likely because of the aforementioned integration into Pakistani society.

At this point Afghan 'resentment' is just that - localized Afghan resentment for a solution that has insignificantly low takers among the Pakistani Pashtun population that Afghanistan claims. It's a solution that doesn't even have support from the other Afghan ethnic groups. From a human perspective, Pakistan as a State cannot abandon millions of Pakistani Pashtun to a broken, war torn State that they don't wish to be part of.

This was to have been the second part of my point of view, but you've taken care of the salient points, and added something that would never have occurred to someone not a Pakistani: the Baloch complication.

The most important part of this is of course the folly of the Afghans dabbling in Pashtun ethno-nationalism, when they contain, within their own 'nation-state', Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, to name only the prominent 'others'. Are they thinking this through? What happens when these nationalities/ ethnic groupings/ sub-Afghan identities feel that they are hard pressed by an overwhelming mass of Pashtun, and seek comfort in the warm embrace of their own kind just the other side of a porous border?

So that was point two.

Points three and four, that perhaps do not lend themselves to elaboration in my hands, for fear of misconstruction by the brave, negating any acceptance by the brainy, would be (3) the unfortunate insecurity of Pakistan about her own physical configuration, and her unfortunate, consequential vulnerability to the Great Enemy always lurking with dhoti-girded loins to pounce the moment an opportunity presents itself to quaff their pink gins in the Lahore Gymkhana (before I kick the bucket, I hope somebody invites me to the damn' place, so that I can see for myself why that stirs the loins of both the dhoti-clad and the dhoti-unclad); and (4), the lurking fear of knocking down national boundaries by one side leading to the co-opting of the situation by enthusiasts and the fervently religious of an even larger non-national boundary-less jurisdiction. It should be treated with ginger respect, IMHO. I will not go deeper into that; Heere Be Dragonnes, it might be said, wisely.

 

[Solomon2]

Absolutely not - Pakistan, despite its reservations on the interpretations of the IWT & several decisions against it during arbitration, has stuck to the treaty.

The IWT's comparative success shows both sides can profit from negotiations on borders and national sovereignty.

It is Afghanistan that needs to similarly respect the Durand Agreement, the borders demarcated by that agreement, and subsequently ask for negotiations over easing the movement of peoples across the border.

To my point - and the Afghans point - that Pakistan altered what their border meant - what is your reply? It's not like you're disputing the facts.

A lack of capacity to implement border control measures in the past does not constitute an 'agreement' -

If you check the record, the Brits and Afghans demarcated the border rather promptly. It was Pakistan that changed the border from one of mere political control to one dividing peoples.

...Once the resources became available, Pakistan had every right under international law to start enforcing border control measures.

Regardless, you might want to ponder whether or not enforcing rights is the same thing as pursuing the national interest.

Afghanistan has a legal option here, to take her case to the UN if she thinks it has merit, until then the Af-Pak border, as demarcated under the Durand Agreement, is the internationally recognized legal border -

Afghanistan did just that:

...(15) Another instance [regarding succession rights] is the Treaty of Kabul concluded between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan in 1921 which, inter alia, defined the boundary between the then British Dominion of India and Afghanistan along the so-called Durand line. On the division of the Dominion into the two States of India and Pakistan and their attainment of independence, Afghanistan questioned the boundary settlement on the basis of the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. The United Kingdom's attitude in response to this possibility, as summarized by it in Materials on Succession of States, was as follows:

The Foreign Office were advised that the splitting of the former India into two States—India and Pakistan—and the withdrawal of British rule from India had not caused the Afghan Treaty to lapse and it was hence still in force. It was nevertheless suggested that an examination of the Treaty might show that some of its provisions being political in nature or relating to continuous exchange of diplomatic missions were in the category of those which did not devolve where a State succession took place. However, any executed clauses such as those providing far the establishment of an international boundary or, rather, what had been done already under executed clauses of the Treaty, could not be affected, whatever the position about the Treaty itself might be*192

Here therefore the United Kingdom again distinguishes between provisions establishing a boundary and ancillary provisions of a political character. But it also appears here to have distinguished between the treaty provisions as such and the boundary resulting from their execution—a distinction made by a number of jurists. Afghanistan, on the other hand, contested Pakistan's right in the circumstances of the case to invoke the boundary provisions of the 1921 Treaty., It did so on various grounds, such as the alleged "unequal" character of the Treaty itself. But it also maintained that Pakistan, as a newly independent State, had a "clean slate" in 1947 and could not claim automatically to be a successor to British rights under the 1921 Treaty...

- UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, 1977 & 1978

 

[MultaniGuy]

The IWT's comparative success shows both sides can profit from negotiations on borders and national sovereignty.

To my point - and the Afghans point - that Pakistan altered what their border meant - what is your reply? It's not like you're disputing the facts.

If you check the record, the Brits and Afghans demarcated the border rather promptly. It was Pakistan that changed the border from one of mere political control to one dividing peoples.

Regardless, you might want to ponder whether or not enforcing rights is the same thing as pursuing the national interest.

Afghanistan did just that:

...(15) Another instance [regarding succession rights] is the Treaty of Kabul concluded between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan in 1921 which, inter alia, defined the boundary between the then British Dominion of India and Afghanistan along the so-called Durand line. On the division of the Dominion into the two States of India and Pakistan and their attainment of independence, Afghanistan questioned the boundary settlement on the basis of the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. The United Kingdom's attitude in response to this possibility, as summarized by it in Materials on Succession of States, was as follows:

The Foreign Office were advised that the splitting of the former India into two States—India and Pakistan—and the withdrawal of British rule from India had not caused the Afghan Treaty to lapse and it was hence still in force. It was nevertheless suggested that an examination of the Treaty might show that some of its provisions being political in nature or relating to continuous exchange of diplomatic missions were in the category of those which did not devolve where a State succession took place. However, any executed clauses such as those providing far the establishment of an international boundary or, rather, what had been done already under executed clauses of the Treaty, could not be affected, whatever the position about the Treaty itself might be*192

Here therefore the United Kingdom again distinguishes between provisions establishing a boundary and ancillary provisions of a political character. But it also appears here to have distinguished between the treaty provisions as such and the boundary resulting from their execution—a distinction made by a number of jurists. Afghanistan, on the other hand, contested Pakistan's right in the circumstances of the case to invoke the boundary provisions of the 1921 Treaty., It did so on various grounds, such as the alleged "unequal" character of the Treaty itself. But it also maintained that Pakistan, as a newly independent State, had a "clean slate" in 1947 and could not claim automatically to be a successor to British rights under the 1921 Treaty...

- UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, 1977 & 1978

You are very clever and dishonest. You expect me to read through a 202 page document?

@Dubious please come here. And you too @waz.

Show us proof that Pakistan altered the border.

There is no expiry date to the treaty of Rawalpindi. So what is your point?

Pakistan has nothing to concede here.

The IWT's comparative success shows both sides can profit from negotiations on borders and national sovereignty.

To my point - and the Afghans point - that Pakistan altered what their border meant - what is your reply? It's not like you're disputing the facts.

If you check the record, the Brits and Afghans demarcated the border rather promptly. It was Pakistan that changed the border from one of mere political control to one dividing peoples.

Regardless, you might want to ponder whether or not enforcing rights is the same thing as pursuing the national interest.

Afghanistan did just that:

...(15) Another instance [regarding succession rights] is the Treaty of Kabul concluded between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan in 1921 which, inter alia, defined the boundary between the then British Dominion of India and Afghanistan along the so-called Durand line. On the division of the Dominion into the two States of India and Pakistan and their attainment of independence, Afghanistan questioned the boundary settlement on the basis of the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. The United Kingdom's attitude in response to this possibility, as summarized by it in Materials on Succession of States, was as follows:

The Foreign Office were advised that the splitting of the former India into two States—India and Pakistan—and the withdrawal of British rule from India had not caused the Afghan Treaty to lapse and it was hence still in force. It was nevertheless suggested that an examination of the Treaty might show that some of its provisions being political in nature or relating to continuous exchange of diplomatic missions were in the category of those which did not devolve where a State succession took place. However, any executed clauses such as those providing far the establishment of an international boundary or, rather, what had been done already under executed clauses of the Treaty, could not be affected, whatever the position about the Treaty itself might be*192

Here therefore the United Kingdom again distinguishes between provisions establishing a boundary and ancillary provisions of a political character. But it also appears here to have distinguished between the treaty provisions as such and the boundary resulting from their execution—a distinction made by a number of jurists. Afghanistan, on the other hand, contested Pakistan's right in the circumstances of the case to invoke the boundary provisions of the 1921 Treaty., It did so on various grounds, such as the alleged "unequal" character of the Treaty itself. But it also maintained that Pakistan, as a newly independent State, had a "clean slate" in 1947 and could not claim automatically to be a successor to British rights under the 1921 Treaty...

- UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, 1977 & 1978

You are being intellectually dishonest, even in your article it is mentioned that the Afghan Treaty does not lapse, and then you bolded that Afghanistan has the right to protest Pakistan's right.

Afghanistan can protest as much as they like.

Treaty of Rawalpindi has no expiry date. Pakistan has no need to concede anything.

@Areesh, please take care of @Solomon2, he is rather ludicrous in his arguments.

 

[Flash_Ninja]

I'm sure settling the border would be a big help but I've never perceived why doing so would guarantee that Pakistan cease its desire to keep Afghanistan a mess if free, or a satellite state if not.

I think the DL issue can and should be addressed separately. I think there are grounds for concessions by both sides. Specifically, while the DL was a "border" between Afghanistan and British India it never became a controlled border until a few years after Pakistan was established. That meant, for example, that shepherds who used to shuttle their flocks between the Afghan highlands in summer and Pakistani lowlands in winter were suddenly cutoff from their time-honored usual pasturage.

The 1783 U.S.-Britain peace treaty had a similar issue. It was settled by granting Americans very specific and limited extra-territorial rights in Canada and agreeing to peaceably settle the remaining border dispute through discussion - which took until 1842, even though there were one or two minor armed conflicts in the disputed region in the meantime.

Theres a big difference between signing a treaty knowing limited border migration/grazing will still go on, and claiming all of the area between that border and the indus river which the treaty explicitly denies them the right to.

Pakistan can live with and has accepted the first point for about 50-60 years, but Afghans never even dared to think about the second point until the British left. They are purely motivated by greed and ethno-nationalism, not on some crusade to correct any injustice.

 

[M. Sarmad]

Here therefore the United Kingdom again distinguishes between provisions establishing a boundary and ancillary provisions of a political character. But it also appears here to have distinguished between the treaty provisions as such and the boundary resulting from their execution—a distinction made by a number of jurists. Afghanistan, on the other hand, contested Pakistan's right in the circumstances of the case to invoke the boundary provisions of the 1921 Treaty., It did so on various grounds, such as the alleged "unequal" character of the Treaty itself. But it also maintained that Pakistan, as a newly independent State, had a "clean slate" in 1947 and could not claim automatically to be a successor to British rights under the 1921 Treaty...

- UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, 1977 & 1978

At the international level, issues pertaining to the succession of states are dealt with by the “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (VCSSRT).” Article 11 of VCSSRT explicitly states that succession of states cannot impact (a) international border agreed upon in result of an agreement, and (b) rights and obligations concerning international border created through an agreement. Thus, under this agreement, the cessation of British India and the birth of Pakistan as its successor in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent does not affect the legality of the border


As far as the question whether Pakistan is the legal successor of a part of British India is concerned, the British Government had clarified, in the Indian Independence Act (1947), that the “Rights and obligations under international agreements having an exclusive territorial application to an area comprised in the Dominion of Pakistan will devolve upon that Dominion”. Thus, Pakistan is legally the rightful successor of the British rule before 1947 and therefore any binding bilateral agreement defining an international border adjacent to their territory signed by the British should be legally passed onto them.

 

[MultaniGuy]

Theres a big difference between signing a treaty knowing limited border migration/grazing will still go on, and claiming all of the area between that border and the indus river which the treaty explicitly denies them the right to.

Pakistan can live with and has accepted the first point for about 50-60 years, but Afghans never even dared to think about the second point until the British left. They are purely motivated by greed and ethno-nationalism, not on some crusade to correct any injustice.

You pretty much spelled it out to @Solomon2 letter by letter.

@BHarwana please take care of @Solomon2

 

[Solomon2]

...Afghans never even dared to think about the second point until the British left -

Because until then the Afghans were not forbidden to migrate to and from what became Pakistani territory.

 

[MultaniGuy]

Because until then the Afghans were not forbidden to migrate to and from what became Pakistani territory.

And why should we let Afghans come into our land, when they signed the treaty of Rawalpindi 1919.

I have checkmated you! lol

Durand line is the official border recognized by the United Nations.

They way you ignore my posts show your intellectual dishonesty.

 

[Pakistansdefender]

I am aware the Pathans, Tajiks, and Harazars hate each other.

Nevertheless, They still want a country of their own.
For thousand years the uzbiks, tajiks and Turkmen wanted to dump the phustun and create their own homeland unless they would be fighting for another decade.
The idea is there.
But no one ready to help or egg them on.

They will never accept disintegration of their country.