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Pathetic Indian Police- FBI analysis of 26/11

I agree that we dont give them enought money and facility and things should be improved..but its not in my hand..i m just a common man who will..who knows when...get struck in mumbai like situations...i mean all of us can jus debate till the time another mumbai type incident happens and govt. learns something.

Then apportion blame correctly, to the politicians, to society at large, maybe even senior police officers, don't just beat up on the little fella in the equation.


But still i have to say if they respect us more they can be our heroes..like most of us love the army.

You know what? Nobody blames the army for 1962. They blame & correctly so, the politicians in charge for neglecting the army. show the police a little bit of the respect you show the army.
@ Bang galore......chill madi :) you sober head ;) !!!

:D :cheers:
 
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Adam let me tell U one thing I dont know in what context you are speaking, but I do feel it is really hurting us all.
My dad is SI in RPF even now he doesnt have proper timing for work. If a train stops for just 10 min extra at the designated station then he has to be at the spot.(even it is 00.00hrs)
If there is any Terror alert sounded across the country then he cant return home. There are Police men Who consider their duty first man, please it is hurting. ( there are also policemen who hesitate to even do their duty, forget them)
In the FBI article they didn't mention the name of the Police constable? Why? They were right to bash the loop holes but what of the sacrifice of this brave man?
If any one are to be blamed then it is the leaders who still use the NSG for their Security.
Regards Just My opinion.
Bravery is not lacking but the infrastructure......
 
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Adam let me tell U one thing I dont know in what context you are speaking, but I do feel it is really hurting us all.
My dad is SI in RPF even now he doesnt have proper timing for work. If a train stops for just 10 min extra at the designated station then he has to be at the spot.(even it is 00.00hrs)
If there is any Terror alert sounded across the country then he cant return home. There are Police men Who consider their duty first man, please it is hurting. ( there are also policemen who hesitate to even do their duty, forget them)
In the FBI article they didn't mention the name of the Police constable? Why? They were right to bash the loop holes but what of the sacrifice of this brave man?
If any one are to be blamed then it is the leaders who still use the NSG for their Security.
Regards Just My opinion.
Bravery is not lacking but the infrastructure......

To all fellows here!!

If you wish to blame police then I just want to say one thing ,"BLAME THE SYSTEM, BLAME THE SUPERIORS, BLAME THE POLITICIANS..."
As like me, like illuminatidinesh, like Adam and many other friends whose fathers are in defence but in middle or low level knows thewhole reality. Thats all!
 
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Adam let me tell U one thing I dont know in what context you are speaking, but I do feel it is really hurting us all.
My dad is SI in RPF even now he doesnt have proper timing for work. If a train stops for just 10 min extra at the designated station then he has to be at the spot.(even it is 00.00hrs)
If there is any Terror alert sounded across the country then he cant return home. There are Police men Who consider their duty first man, please it is hurting. ( there are also policemen who hesitate to even do their duty, forget them)
In the FBI article they didn't mention the name of the Police constable? Why? They were right to bash the loop holes but what of the sacrifice of this brave man?
If any one are to be blamed then it is the leaders who still use the NSG for their Security.
Regards Just My opinion.
Bravery is not lacking but the infrastructure......

I apologise for hurting your sentiments brother.

I was talking of those few who dont do their duty...not of people like ur father and other dedicated guys...maybe i took it too far..i am sorry.

And one thing i have learnt here that blame should go to politicians for not providing adequate funds..and to some extent to senior police officers for the training.
 
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hi nokss, I was comparing the .303 to Ak-47 to justify that its not gud to blame whole force.. and see my post at first page, where in I have mentioned the supreme sacrifice of Martyr Omble.

Yes buddy i understood ur point but i was replying to Kinetic
 
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I apologise for hurting your sentiments brother.

I was talking of those few who dont do their duty...not of people like ur father and other dedicated guys...maybe i took it too far..i am sorry.

And one thing i have learnt here that blame should go to politicians for not providing adequate funds..and to some extent to senior police officers for the training.
Yes You were right in blaming who dont do their duty after all I see them daily, but they dont have the respect to be discussed. No need for any apology please.
 
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Thanx everyone....it was a learning experience...thanx for providing me the knowledge on something i was ignorant..now i will look at the police with some respect knowing these guys do with very little available...hope no hard feelings.. :)
 
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Thanx everyone....it was a learning experience...thanx for providing me the knowledge on something i was ignorant..now i will look at the police with some respect knowing these guys do with very little available...hope no hard feelings.. :)

Oh!! c'mmon Bro!! No hard feelings at all!! we are alike and belongs to same class and we all have same mentality towards the system...So :cheers:
 
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WHAT HAPPENED OUTSIDE CAMA HOSPITAL---VINITA KAMTE'S ACCOUNT

“We are proud of you, you are our hero,” says a small board in the Kamte living room in Pune’s Rakshak Society. A garlanded picture of Ashok Kamte, Additional Commissioner of Police, Mumbai East, who was gunned down by terrorists in the November 26 attack near Cama Hospital is next to it. His ceremonial swords and caps are in front along with a collage of pictures.

In this quiet yet poignant manner, Vinita Kamte, 43, and her two sons mourn the death of a man they believe died a hero’s death that night.

Yet Ms. Kamte, a labour lawyer by training, feels that neither her husband nor the two senior police officers who were killed along with him — Hemant Karkare and Vijay Salaskar — have got their due. “The police should have come out with the true facts much earlier, on the next day, instead of waiting for me to uncover the facts,” she told The Hindu in an interview.

In fact, after the incident, she and her sister who is a practising lawyer, spent several days meeting eye-witnesses and people involved in the Cama Hospital incident and they have come up with some shocking facts. In the police force you need all kinds of people and that day, she says, only the brave were leading from the front. “My husband always carried his AK 47, handling weapons was second nature to him. Once someone asked him why he always carried a weapon and he said in Mumbai you never know what will happen,” recalls Ms. Kamte. He would even carry a weapon to a restaurant, keep one in his bedroom, and he would keep saying he would hate to go down unarmed in the event of an attack.

On that night he was called to the Oberoi Hotel by Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor, she said. At the last minute he went to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) and from there to Cama Hospital where he met up with Mr. Karkare and the others at the gate of the hospital. Ms. Kamte believes he was summoned from his residence at Chembur because somewhere the police knew he would deliver the goods. “When I heard the news of his death, the first thing I asked was did he hit back. I was told he shot Kasab and he had injured him in both the hands,” she says.

However, it was made out that the three senior policemen went into the attack quite by coincidence and without any thinking. “I felt these three men along with others had given their lives, don’t make them look like amateurs,” she points out. “My husband fired towards the Cama terrace where the terrorists were firing and that deterred them.”

“That’s why they rushed down. No one else there knew how to handle a weapon like the AK 47. They then spent nearly 40 minutes planning a strategy. It was all dark there and they tried to figure out how to enter Cama and knocked on many doors there. However, there was no help and no reinforcements were sent,” she says, after her own investigations.
Worse still, there were many calls made to the control room by people near the Cama Hospital who saw the two terrorists. Yet no one told these police officers that they were there. Once the jeep carrying Mr. Karkare and the others was in the lane near Cama, they were sitting ducks. Ms Kamte says she is a very private person and was not keen on any publicity. Yet she feels those who did their duty must be projected as such.

“You know, once Ashok had got hurt on his face and did not even go to hospital. He got himself stitched up in office. I did not even know about it till later. That’s the kind of man he was, he would never push his men to the front. He was a one man army,” she says.

“Outside the Cama Hospital, my husband understood the gravity of the situation along with the other officers, and he spoke to someone saying they needed the Army and extra reinforcements. That did not come and, worse, his escort vehicle carrying tear gas shells and ammunition was stopped by a police cordon from going near him and helping out,” she reveals. “That escort car could have saved their lives,” she points out.

Yet after all this, it is being made out that the three officers were impulsive. “I feel such acts of bravery should not be questioned … if anything, question the acts of incompetence,” she says. In fact, Mr. Kamte took a house on rent in Chembur so that he could be in his region and if there was something, his reaction time would be swift.

He was so conscientious, he would ask his seniors permission to go for dinner to South Mumbai, says his wife. His uniform would always be ready so that he could get going in a minute, she recalls. He used to even keep his wireless set in his bedroom at one point. “We used to practice firing with an air gun sometimes, shooting cans. I was surprisingly good at it,” she adds. He was known for his bluntness and often said he was not a politician and there was no need for him to be nice to anyone.

He used to tell his sons Rahul and Arjun to join the Army. In fact, at heart he was more of an armyman than a cop, feels Ms. Kamte.

Yet she attaches no blame to the police. “Despite all their shortcomings, the police caught one terrorist alive,” she says.

But definitely she wants some answers from the authorities on the many questions she has raised. A tough, no nonsense officer, Mr. Kamte had a different side to him at home.

“The kids thought he was very cute and he was really a very attentive father,” she says. She also said he was a perfectionist, he hated anything going wrong. “He had the most gentle heart and was very proud of his uniform,” she adds with pride.

The rooms in the house in Pune have many books on weapons, training and manuals on arms. Mr. Kamte loved weapons, caps, uniforms and badges. His wife has made a collage of all the badges he collected from all over the world including his tenure in Bosnia as part of the Special Forces.

His grandfather Narayanrao Marutirao Kamte was the first Indian inspector general of police. “He’ s a chip of the old block,” she smiles. He won many friends during his year’s tenure at Bosnia and in fact one of them, a police officer, has named his son Ashok, after him.

Vinita Kamte, wife of ACP Ashok Kamte, who was shot on 26/11. | Facebook
 
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CAMA HOSPITAL ATTACK TIMELINE---INVESTIGATION BY IBN LIVE

Anti-Terrorism Squad chief Hemant Karkare, additional commissioner Ashok Kamte and senior inspector Vijay Salaskar were all gunned down near the Cama Hospital on the night of 26/11.

Six months later, a CNN-IBN investigation has sifted through police call records on that fateful night to reveal some startling facts.

Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar all reached the Cama Hospital separately on the night of November 26, 2008.

At 1124 hrs IST, when Pakistani terrorists Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab and Ismail Khan had already been inside Cama Hospital for 25 minutes, Karkare called the control room from his position at the rear entry of the hospital.

"I am at Cama Hospital. There is firing going on here.. Blasts are taking place... three-four grenade blasts have taken place in front of us in the last five minutes. It is important to encircle Cama Hospital. We are next to Special Branch office. Send a team to the front side of Cama Hospital and this needs to be co-ordinated to ensure that there is no cross firing," Karkare told the Control Room.

Four minutes later, Karkare called again.

"ATS, QRT (Quick Response Team) and Crime Branch's team are on the side of SB2 office. So a team on the front side of Cama. We need to encircle Cama Hospital. Surround it. Ask Mr Prasad {Joint Commissioner (Law and Order)} to request Army authorities," Karkare said.

The Control Room responded by saying, "Sir, noted."

Meanwhile, Additional Commissioner of Police Sadanand Date was battling Kasab and Ismail inside the hospital.

Date had arrived at Cama soon after the terrorists, and was taking them on with other officers. Starting at 2319 hrs IST, at regular intervals, Date kept telling his wireless operator to ask the Control Room for reinforcements.

Date's conversation with the Control Room:

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At 2319 hrs IST: Firing going on in Cama Hospital. Send commandos immediately.

*

At 2320 hrs IST: Firing going on, on the sixth floor. Help quickly.
*

At 2323 hrs IST: Two-three blasts have taken place. Help immediately.

*

At 2325 hrs IST: Firing is going on, on sixth floor of Cama. Need reinforcements.

*

At 2326 hrs IST: Shortage of striking at Cama.
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At 2327 hrs IST: Send striking to Cama, running short of men.
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At 2328 hrs IST: Heavy firing. We are all injured. Need help. Please need reinforcements.

Date's right eye was injured, his left leg badly wounded during the gunbattle. Yet he continued to shoot. At around midnight, Kasab and Ismail left Cama Hospital from the front entrance

They went to hide in the Rang Bhavan lane, nearby and when they saw Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar looking for them in their car, they shot them dead.

The crucial question is: Why were Karkare's orders for encircling Cama and securing its front gate not followed promptly? Did Sadanand Date's repeated calls for help go unheard?

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/mumbai-polices-laxity-let-kasab-slip-out-of-cama/95040-3.html
 
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thanks to daaniyal for drawing my attention to the article.

12 July 2010,Monday
tehelkahindi.com tehelkafoundation.org criticalfutures.org

From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 7, Issue 18, Dated May 08, 2010
CURRENT AFFAIRS
cover story

Cover Storysoldiers of MISFORTUNE

BEFORE THE HOME MINISTRY RAISES NEW PARAMILITARY BATTALIONS, IT NEEDS TO ASK WHY THE OLD ONES ARE QUITTING IN DROVES. RAMAN KIRPAL REPORTS ON A BREWING CRISIS
Cover Story
SITTING DUCKS Jawans look out after a car-bomb explosion near a CRPF camp in Srinagar
Photo: AFP

SURINDER KANG joined the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as a constable in 1990. Twenty years later, he’s risen no more than just one rank: he’s a havaldar now. What has risen dangerously over the years, though, are his chances of dying on duty.

So Kang, at 40, has sought voluntary retirement. He wants his pension (even if it is just 2/3rd of what he would otherwise get), an easier job — and he does not want to die. Needless to say, Surinder Kang has a different real name.

What makes Kang’s story extremely disturbing is that it is not an individual story of disillusionment: it is symptomatic of a rampant and growing feeling in the paramilitary. At a time when the Home Minister is speaking of raising dozens of new paramilitary battalions, apart from Kang, hundreds of other men with real names and real fears and real grievances are queuing up to quit the services. In fact, according to official data, an unprecedented 14,422 jawans applied for premature voluntary retirement from service (VRS) in 2009 — up 85 percent from the previous year and 112 percent from 2007. Compare this with the fact that only 4,622 soldiers sought voluntary retirement from the Indian Army — which is three times larger than all the paramilitary forces put together — in the same period, and the contrast becomes painfully stark.

So, why the exodus?

A few days ago, EN Rammohan, former Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF), submitted his one-man enquiry report to Home Minister P Chidambaram on what went wrong in the recent Dantewada massacre, in which Maoists ambushed and killed 76 CRPF jawans. Predictably, the report blamed “leadership failure” and “a lack of coordination between the CRPF and the state police”. Based on this, a few individual heads down the ranks will roll. But if the government stops at that, it will have misread the crisis and lose a crucial opportunity for introspection and drastic overhaul.

The truth is the Dantewada massacre is only one kind of cautionary tale about what ails the Indian paramilitary. The cautionary tale of Surinder Kang runs much deeper and is more alarming.
Kang has realised that India doesn’t honour its jawans. He’d rather be a private guard

IF ONE were merely to read the surface signs, it might seem a fear of dying is propelling the exodus. The year 2010 has barely begun and already 79 CRPF men have died. The number was 58 in 2009. The stark contrast with Indian Army VRS figures also seems to suggest that battling one’s own countrymen has become much tougher and more wearisome than battling enemies outside — both physically and psychologically. As Gautam Kaul, a retired IPS officer who served as Additional Director General of CRPF in 1997-98, says, “Both death in action and voluntary retirement are higher in the CRPF and BSF than in the Army. The spurt in political and civil unrest in the country does not match [the] planning and preparedness of these paramilitary forces. The demand is massive and the paramilitary forces just can’t meet the demand.”

But fear of dying does not seem to be the key reason Surinder Kang wants to leave the CRPF. Something deeper nags him. Kang has 20 long years of fighting guerilla wars and insurgencies. He has been posted thrice in Jammu and Kashmir, twice in the Northeast, and two times each in Lalgarh and Bastar. Besides this, he has been on election duty in Gujarat, Bihar, Delhi, West Bengal and Orissa. Kang is 40 now and has grayed a little. He is extremely fit and no amount of training can bring you his experience. But Kang has queued up for VRS. He is resolved to leave the forces and work as a small-time private guard at some ATM or private industry. Kang has realised the country does not honour those who serve it. Now, he wants to be with his family at any cost.
Disillusion simmers like an epidemic. 14,422 want to quit the paramilitary forces

“I spent one third of my 20 years in the CRPF just travelling. Of these 20 years, I could spend only three years with my children. I took medical leave to get married. I could only reach my village five days after I received news of my father passing away. I am the eldest in my family but I couldn’t even perform the last rites. I couldn’t COVERSTORY attend three of my four sisters’ marriages. I had to arrange a separate house for my wife and kids after my father’s death because my brother threw them out from the joint family house. But if you take any of these problems to your officers, they just shoo you away.”

Kang is not the only one. Disillusion is simmering like an epidemic beneath the disciplined skin of the paramilitary, and its reasons straddle a wide spectrum: poor work conditions; demeaning terms of service; long years away from families; arbitrary orders and a niggling sense that their life is cheap and death would come without honour.
THE FALLING RANKS
While the army, which has more personnel than all paramilitary forces combined, has seen a gradual fall in attrition rates, it has shot up exponentially in the latter
Cover Story

JUST WALK around the paramilitary headquarters in Delhi and this honour fatigue begins to unravel. Talk to a constable under a tree and word spreads that someone is asking about their troubles. The jawan inside the canteen, the jawan walking with heaps of files to the grievance department, the jawan loading trucks, all stop to listen in. Everyone wants your number on a scrap of paper. They can’t talk now, but they all have a story to tell. Of how they have lived in torn tents with no drinking water. Of how the holes were big enough for heat waves and pouring rain. Of how the officers live in concrete houses with three servants. Of how it’s not the government, but their own departments that ensure the welfare schemes never reach them. Of how salaries are cut even when they are injured on duty. Of how a jawan does not get paid if he is in hospital for more than six months. The recurring theme is “pressure: — of how there is too much “dabav” from commanders to blindly follow orders. Of how most of these orders are things that fall outside the purview of duty. Of how they are never consulted even while their lives are at stake. Of how they all plan to take voluntary retirement as soon as they complete 20 years of service.

There’s a jawan from Uttaranchal who has been trying to get a transfer to his home state of Gujarat for the last five years. His wife is mentally ill and unable to look after his three young children. “The officers tell me to get my wife treated in Uttaranchal,” says he. “But our camp is in the mountains, in the middle of a jungle. How is this possible?” Once he returned a few days late from a visit home. His wife’s ill-health was not a good enough shield. He lost an entire month’s pay.

Another jawan has spent 16 years in the CRPF — six in Jammu and Kashmir, three in Assam, three in Tripura, and three in Manipur. Too scared to talk at the CRPF headquarters, he calls late at night to share his story. During a posting in Srinagar, he was charged with indiscipline and lost 15 days of pay for daring to complain about inedible food and cockroaches in his dal. When he fell sick in Tripura, he couldn’t get a car to get to hospital. “I had to hire a jeep,” says he. “Only if 15-20 constables fall sick and need a car together, there’s a chance of us getting it. Otherwise the cars are busy ferrying the officers’ children. This country got independence in 1947, but we still live like slaves. Our officers order us to do unauthorised things; we have no right to express ourselves. They tell us to barge into people’s homes and pick up bricks and cement and construct our quarters. They pocket lakhs of welfare money; they take commissions from ration shops.

We pay Rs 1,326 per month for food. The bills are for A-grade rations but we get C-grade food. The commander is like the king of a battalion. He runs it the way he wants. As a driver, I am sent all the time for unauthorised pick ups. All the risk of being caught is on me. You live under so much pressure, you either shoot yourself or shoot someone else. I am just waiting to complete 20 years so I can get a part of my pension and then I’ll quit."
A wise administration would retain these men, but the dominant mood is complacency

THE ANGRY stories duplicate endlessly. A jawan from Gorakhpur with 17 years of service behind him speaks of how he was not granted leave to be in time for his first child’s delivery, though he was posted just a few hours away in Allahabad. When he reached a week later, his son was dead. “After the 6th Pay Commission, we were supposed to be given Rs 2,000 education allowance and a travel allowance, but I haven’t got it yet,” says he. “The officers find ways to make sure we don’t get this education allowance. Just a school certificate is not enough. They ask for bills for the child’s uniform, shoes, notebooks. How are we going to run around getting all this when we barely get leave?”

(A jawan is entitled to two months of earned leave in a year but they rarely get leave on time. “A battalion has seven companies and all the seven companies are located at different locations. The battalion commandant sits at Chandigarh. How can a jawan get leave on time if he is located in Dantewada and his commandant is in Chandigarh,” says Gautam Kaul. “Better systems have to be thought through.”)
‘The Naxalites never repeat mistakes, but we never learn from ours,’ says a forlorn jawan

Clearly, the issue of family — and an inability to provide adequately for them — looms large for the jawan. “We had witnessed an exodus in the paramilitary forces in 1991 too when violence had escalated in Jammu and Kashmir,” says Prakash Belgamkar, retired DIG (Operations), CRPF. “We had discovered then that a soldier’s motivation revolves around his family. But he becomes a nomad after joining the forces. The nucleus of his nuclear family goes away. He has no fixed address, his life gets fragmented.”

But no lessons seem to have been learnt since 1991. Far from any internal memos in the Home Ministry sounding alarm signals about the surge in VRS applications, or directives in paramilitary headquarters urging officers to motivate jawans, the dominant mood seems to be callous complacency: there’s more where those came from. “Yes, we have seen a spurt in voluntary retirements,” says CRPF spokesperson Ajay Chaturvedi. “But there are enough applications coming in of boys who want to join. We have filled in the vacancies. We have raised six new battalions in a year. We don’t have a crunch anymore. There’s nothing to worry.”
Cover Story
NO RESPITE CRPF jawans patrol in Gaganpalli village in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district
Photo: MISHRA V

A wise administration would stop men like Kang, if it could. Their experience is hard won, and no training course can duplicate that. But the official position seems to be just about numbers. Building morale, quality and pride in work is not on the radar. Retaining experience seems unnecessary. In a poor country, there will always be replacements. There will always be fresh fodder for all cannons.

TO GET a real sense of the implications of the diving morale of the paramilitary jawan, one needs to understand first the nature and work of the paramilitary forces. India has about 7 lakh paramilitary forces which include the Central Reserve Police Force (strength 2.30 lakh); Border Security Force (strength 2.15 lakh); Central Industrial Security Force (strength 1.12 lakh); Assam Rifle (strength 50,000); Indo- Tibetan Border Police (strength 74,000) and a Sashastra Seema Bal (strength 29,000). The tasks of these battalions range across fighting internal counter-insurgencies, protecting heritage sites and national installations, providing relief during calamities, controlling riots, providing VIP security and executing election duties. (Their motto is ‘Any Task, Any Time, Any Where’ and ‘Duty unto Death’ — as opposed to the army’s which is ‘Shoot to Kill’. But far from pride, this seems to evoke cynical scorn in jawans now.)

Though law and order are State subjects that, ideally, should be handled by the State police, the National Crime Record Bureau confirms there is a shortage of two lakh policemen in the country. This places an added burden on the paramilitary forces. As former Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta says, “There is a diversity of challenges from terrorism to insurgency today, which has affected rotation and training of these paramilitary forces. This does lead to stress. The private security business has also attracted them away from the forces. This is an evolving situation and the government has to take major initiatives to improve things.”

The story about the diving morale of the jawan then is not just a story about individual griping. It should be of national concern. The jawan is the primary interface between civilians and the State in a conflict zone. Their conduct is crucial to the history of these conflicts. They need to be sensitised not brutalised. Kashmir, the Northeast, Chhattisgarh, Lalgarh (in West Bengal), Narayanpatna (in Orissa) are all rife with stories of malafide behaviour by jawans. But how can any virtuous cycles set in? As a jawan in Lalgarh says after his friend was refused a visit to his pregnant wife, “I was so angry, I wanted to shoot someone.” (See box Case Study 1)

Difficulty in getting leave and family anxieties though are not the only reasons jawans are quitting in droves. The terms of service, over all, seem to need a major revision. A retired IPS officer who has served in the CRPF, ITBP and CISF in different capacities says, “Why shouldn’t the paramilitary jawans leave? I pity them for sacrificing their lives when our pay commissions do not even recognise them as ‘skilled’ workers.”
Cover Story
TRANSIT HOME Paramilitary forces at a local school in Lalgarh, West Bengal. In conflict zones, the troops are stationed inside unused government buildings, schools, old godowns and cloth tents
Photo: INDIAN EXPRESS ARCHIVE

This seems merely the tip of a huge iceberg of service dissatisfactions. Army men are considered skilled workers, while paramilitary jawans trained to fight in some of the most dangerous and difficult circumstances are not considered “skilled” enough. A jawan gets a salary ranging from Rs 12,000 to Rs 15,000 (same as a civilian clerk); and an additional Rs 3,000 if he is on a ‘hard posting’ in a ‘difficult area’. (It is typical of Indian bureaucracy that while J&K and the Northeast are considered ‘difficult areas’, Chhattisgarh, Bastar and Lalgarh are yet to feature in this category though many more jawans have been killed in service here than elsewhere.) A jawan also gets Rs 1,100 — Rs 1,300 for rations but has to pay for his own mess expenses on the field, often having to find rations and cook for themselves.

Apart from these living conditions, many veterans say the essential command structure of the paramilitary forces is flawed. Kaul believes too many agencies have authority over a jawan and that contributes hugely to the low morale. “As director general of a paramilitary force, I am only entitled to perform house-keeping jobs for a jawan. I can train him and monitor his service record, but I have no powers to decide on his battalion movement and deployment,” says he. Only Home Ministry officials perform this critical job: they have the list of battalions, they assess the demand and assign locations.

This can lead to many Kafkaesque situations. One retired jawan remembers a tortuous journey in 2004 that stretched 8,000 kilometers over two months as the Home Ministry ordered his company like a pawn to move from Agartala to Gujarat via Bangladesh, Delhi, Kashmir and back to Agartala. Crowded trains, no reservations, no accommodations, no sense of why they were being deployed anywhere, and, most of all — no sense of respect. “I have fought insurgents for 20 years,” says the jawan bitterly, “but this one journey showed me my standing in my country’s eyes. How can you fool around with so many human beings on the pretext of an emergency situation?” (See box Case Study 2) Other jawans speak of being summoned to places for six months and being asked to stay for six years.

“Battalion movements are very frequent in the CRPF and this often leads to individual hardship. The very nature of their duty is temporary and is bound to dislocate them constantly. In the army, soldiers undertake an operation then go back to the base camp; the CRPF jawans have no fixed place to return. They are always on the move,’’ says Kaul.

THIS SENSE of the ad-hoc permeates every aspect of their lives. (For instance, it appears the Home Ministry had no idea that the CRPF had only three satellite phones till former Home Minister Shivraj Patil went to Amarnath and had a sudden desire to speak to his family from the shrine. A phone was found with great difficulty for him. This is the only reason he came back to Delhi and remembered to sanction 68 satellite phones for the CRPF and an equal number for other paramilitary battalions.)
Cover Story
BODY COUNT A jawan on guard outside a barricaded CRPF camp in Lal Chowk, one of Srinagar’s high-risk zones
Photo: SHAILENDRA PANDEY

But often, this can have much more ominous implications. Kang speaks of his dread in being asked to go on an ‘area domination’ exercise in Chhattisgarh. “We hadn’t slept for days. We landed, and our induction was cut short midway, because there were no policemen for patrolling. We had no clue about the local language, culture, terrain, and most importantly, we had no intelligence about the enemy. We were there physically but had to rely on local intelligence. The paramilitary does not even have its own intelligence. So if the input is good, we succeed; if not, we become sitting ducks.”

This idea of being a ‘sitting duck’ is a powerful and repetitive leitmotif. Another retired jawan who has seen service in J&K, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand, says, “Naxalites fight with military precision. They commit mistakes but they never repeat them.” He recalls an incident in Erabore in 2005 when 200 Naxalites tried to bomb a police armory and the CRPF bunker near it. The jawans resisted the attack and informed their base camp. Help came quickly and the Naxals were repulsed. Three months later, the CRPF battalion raided a Naxal hideout and found a document titled: Why we failed in the Erabore Police Armory Operation. The document said they had failed because they had underestimated the strength of the armory and bunker wall, and so had taken insufficient explosives, and, secondly, they had not anticipated that the CRPF’s base camp could send help that fast. A few months later, Naxals killed 23 CRPF jawans in a landmine attack. The jawans were on their way to rescue policemen trapped in an attack: the Naxals had anticipated this and laid landmines to blow the vehicle.

“We are never debriefed so thoroughly,” says the jawan. “We are constantly pushed into mindless ‘area domination’ exercises without any intelligence. We never seem to learn from our mistakes.”

What can reverse the tide then? What can stop the attrition and turn this force into a humane, yet proud and efficient line of defence? Former Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta says some initiatives were underway in his time: raising more police force, providing housing, reducing telephone rates for calls home, and counselling (when more than 10 jawans from a company apply for VRS). Prakash Belgamkar re-emphasises the need for this: “A jawan has other alternatives today. If the State wants to retain him, it has to free him of his worries about his family. If this is done, he’ll be yours for the rest of his life.” That might be only the first of many urgent correctives. The most primary one will have to be an essential change of attitude — wherein retaining men begins to matter more than merely replacing them.

Case Study 1“MY PATRIOTISM IS DEAD”

ANONYMOUS, West Bengal

AFTER 12 YEARS of serving in the paramilitary forces, Ashok Ray, 34, wants to quit. He joined the forces in 1998, inspired by his grand father — a freedom fighter who later served in the Indian Army. Ray’s father, a CPWD electrical operator in Howrah, West Bengal, had warned him against it — “It’s a terrible life away from your family.”

Today, serving as a constable holed up in a broken house in West Bengal’s Naxal-hit forests, putting up plastic packets on his window to keep away the scorching heat, Ray wishes he had taken the advice. Ask Ray what it’s like working in these jungles, searching for the elusive Maoist, and he repeats the one word you didn’t expect to hear from a jawan — human rights. “We have no human rights,” he whispers, asking you to ensure his identity remains hidden. “If an officer wants water or cold drinks, 10 cars will go to get it. But if a jawan wants to go on leave, it’s a big risk to give him a car to get out of Jangalmahal.” Ray earns a salary of Rs 15,000 a month and stays in a camp with 100 other jawans. They were offered cloth tents and two old godowns with no ventilation. The squad found an old house, once used for a government scheme, and converted it into a camp. Four people stay in a room. Those who couldn’t get these rooms sleep outside in tents. There are no toilets. Ray bathes at the nearest well and pays Rs 32 a day for rice and dal cooked in the mess, run by the jawans themselves.

One of the defining moments for Ray came when he had a motorbike accident as he was returning to his base camp. “I could have died of a haemorrhage,” he says. “My eyes were bleeding and my bones were fractured.” It was past sunset, and too late to make the 15 kilometre journey through dense forests. When Ray tried to stay at the nearest police station, he was turned away. “We need orders,” he was told by the inspector.

But the lowest point came when he was returning after treatment in Howrah, having spent Rs 50,000. Still weak from surgery, he asked his brother, a security guard in a private company, to accompany him. After a train and bus ride, he reached a point in the forest where public transport ends. From here, jawans must call their base camp for a vehicle. “The inspector refused to send a car if I came with my brother and luggage.” Ray had to spend his own money to hire a taxi. Once at the camp, his brother was refused a place to stay. “Where would I find him a hotel in this dense Maoist area?” The human rights violations didn’t end there. The doctor had issued Ray a medical certificate that said he could do “light” work. “The inspector asked me to get a certificate saying I am fit.”

Another shocking incident Ray remembers is when a colleague asked for leave to see his pregnant wife. “Will you deliver the baby yourself?” the jawan was told. “Tell her to go to her in-laws.” That’s when Ray began to lose all faith in the system. “I was so angry, I wanted to shoot.”
‘AS JAWANS, WE HAVE NO HUMAN RIGHTS. I FEEL I WILL BE DYING FOR NOTHING,’ RAY SAYS, READY TO QUIT THE JOB

His most recent tenure in Jangalmahal, West Bengal, has made Ray question the old ideas of patriotism. “I always wanted to be a sainik to serve my country,” he says, “but now I feel I will be dying for nothing. I have seen so many illegal things happening. We have to blindly follow orders. When we go for operations, we don’t know who a Maoist is. Poor Adivasis are being beaten and innocents are being killed. I don’t feel that I am doing anything for the nation. My patriotism is dead.”

Clearly disillusioned, Ray admits the morale of the forces is at the lowest. “What is this operation? What is success? What have we achieved in all these months of being here,” he asks.
 
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For those who are blaming policemen, do they expect to fight a terrorist with AK47 with bare hands and lathis and refiles which does not work?

Mumbai police never expected to fight terrorist like that as it was first time they had such attack, so they were not prepared.

Also there were weapons like AK47 and carbines with Mumbai Police kept in locker and strict procedure to be followed to release them.

There were 100 faults at the time of 26/11 but I will blame the system and not the men.
 
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Oh!! c'mmon Bro!! No hard feelings at all!! we are alike and belongs to same class and we all have same mentality towards the system...So :cheers:

Dear Sir,

I am sorry, I cannot join you in your sentiments. What Mr. 'Adam Gilchrist' did was unpardonable. We don't need paper tigers, Monday morning quarterbacks to tell people on the spot what to do. Let him put up or shut up; if he's from a defence family, what's he doing in civvy street? And if he's in civvy street, and hasn't heard a shot fired in anger in his life, what business does he have to comment?

If it is a question of flaunting our defence background, as if it makes a difference to the quality of our comments, those who do so might pause to reflect that inevitably there might be those in the audience who have a different orientation. Personal prejudice is not a suitable foundation on which to make these puerile observations.

It is galling to hear a popinjay strut about and offer free advice on how a or b or c should have behaved; this is a 'tale, full of sound and fury, signifiying nothing'. Those in this forum who have an exposure to Shakespeare may fill out the preceding part of the quotation to get a full measure of the contempt that I have for such egregious behaviour.

Sincerely,
 
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Mumbai police never expected to fight terrorist like that as it was first time they had such attack, so they were not prepared.

Then what did it expect??..that terrorists will call them and say...bhai jaan are you locked and loaded..coz we are going to attack your city??

I think what i have felt today after debating here is that...

Firstly the politicians are to be blammed coz for their protection they need the best armed force known as SPG and NSG and for common people they give lathis in the hands of not vry well trained gentlemen and ask them to fight.

Secondly..senior police officers are to be blammed for the lack of modernisation of police force...maybe they should take an approach our generals are taking...ie to go to the media and tell everything honestly.

It is the people at the bottom who have to pay in the end..ie common men and women and policemen doing their duty.
 
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