Pakistan's Special Operations Forces: SSG | SSGN | SSW | SOW | SOG
Mujahid,
To me you seem like an extremist of some sort. You have been posting terrorist multimedia on the forum, and supporting terrorists from the back side. I will request that you put end to that immediately, or you will be banned forever.
Its sad to see that your terrorist militia is cutting the heads of our soldiers, protectors of our fatherland because we are supporting USA and not allowing these extremists to hurt our country and misguide our children?
To me you seem like an extremist of some sort. You have been posting terrorist multimedia on the forum, and supporting terrorists from the back side. I will request that you put end to that immediately, or you will be banned forever.
Its sad to see that your terrorist militia is cutting the heads of our soldiers, protectors of our fatherland because we are supporting USA and not allowing these extremists to hurt our country and misguide our children?
Mujahid
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Assalamu Alaykum,
I AM NOT AN EXTREMIST
neither I had supported Al-Qaeda or any of their Takfiri minded people like Lal Masjid etc. in any of my posts, I have also posted the facts of the crimes of Al-Qaeda.
Yes, I posted a resistance video of Al-Rashedeen Army from Iraq who are not extremists and they are fighting the American criminal occupation for the defence of Islam and their country as shown in their video, thats truely Islamic and every muslim should support them just like they support Hamas.
I am now posting about the mass level disinformation of chemical weapons use on Lal Masjid which the mullahs are making to defame our army and show that they are the only good muslims.
than I will post the assessment of Pakistani Think Tank BRASSTACKS about the the Lal Masjid exposing the realities.
if its possible restore the video "The code of silence"
I AM NOT AN EXTREMIST
neither I had supported Al-Qaeda or any of their Takfiri minded people like Lal Masjid etc. in any of my posts, I have also posted the facts of the crimes of Al-Qaeda.
Yes, I posted a resistance video of Al-Rashedeen Army from Iraq who are not extremists and they are fighting the American criminal occupation for the defence of Islam and their country as shown in their video, thats truely Islamic and every muslim should support them just like they support Hamas.
I am now posting about the mass level disinformation of chemical weapons use on Lal Masjid which the mullahs are making to defame our army and show that they are the only good muslims.
than I will post the assessment of Pakistani Think Tank BRASSTACKS about the the Lal Masjid exposing the realities.
if its possible restore the video "The code of silence"
A very good article on the SSG!
The phantom soldiers at the Lal Masjid
By Javed Hussain
IN the first week of August 1965, in the early hours of the morning, Indian soldiers guarding a vital bridge in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) came under a sudden attack from close quarters. Five minutes later, they and their bridge were no more.
On a sultry night in September 1965, a convoy of heavy trailers carrying tanks was moving on a road in IHK when it suddenly came under rocket and machine gun fire. A dozen tanks exploded and burst into flames.
In early December 1971, shortly after midnight, a column of Indian infantry was moving towards the front in IHK to reinforce one of their positions that was under attack, when it was hit from a flank by sweeping machine gun fire. Within minutes of the attack, the column had perished.
In all three cases the phantom soldiers who conducted these attacks were the chosen ones of the Pakistan Army commandos of the Special Service Group (SSG). Skilled in the use of weapons, they handle machine guns, sub-machine guns and pistols as if these were an extension of their hands, firing from the hip with speed and accuracy, even on the move. They are masters of the close quarter battle.
Designed to conduct operations behind the enemy lines, SSG also specialises in guerrilla, anti-guerrilla and anti-terrorist operations. Of these, the most demanding operations are the ones that are carried out deep behind the enemy lines. Such operations require the highest state of physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness, and the ability to remain cool and motivated, far beyond the bounds of conventional human endurance.
Selection for service with the SSG is, therefore, tough. Volunteers from all over the army apply but two-thirds are rejected during the selection phase, and one-third of the selected during the training phase. Those who finally make it, earn the distinction to wear the maroon beret and the coveted SSG badge on their chest. These men are too precious to be wasted on activities of conventional soldiers, yet those who should know better, continue to misuse them on guard duties and personal security functions.
Occasionally, SSG troops too, tend to misuse their skills! One of the SSG units was due to be inspected by a GHQ team. There was a growing sense of anxiety in the unit as many of their jeeps had become unserviceable for want of spare parts, and these were not forthcoming. They solved the problem their way. A night before the inspection, a few men stealthily penetrated the motor park of an artillery unit, some 20 kilometres away, and went about removing the required parts from the jeeps parked there, quickly and in silence. Job done, they returned to base, and come inspection time, the unserviceable jeeps were ready and running.
The following morning, when the commanding officer of the artillery unit learned that his jeeps had been mysteriously cannibalised, he nearly collapsed and had to undergo overnight hospitalisation. SSG commandos are trained to find a way or make one they had done just that but GHQ was not amused.
Conducted in five phases (planning, preparation, infiltration, attack, and exfiltration), an SSG operation depends entirely on the achievement of surprise to succeed. When the plan is not based on precise and accurate intelligence, the element of surprise is compromised, as happened to the SSG operations in September 1965 against the Indian airbases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. Planned hastily and based on outdated intelligence and maps, they had ended in disaster. The topographical changes that had taken place in the area of operations, were missing from the maps.
The result was that most of the commandos had landed in settlements that were not supposed to be there. As a consequence, within minutes of their landing, the alarm was raised. With surprise lost, the odds were now stacked against them. The next 48 hours saw them fighting running battles with their pursuers until their ammunition ran out. The cream of the army had been sacrificed in a needless operation against targets that were subsequently taken out by the PAF, many times over.
SSG teams are infiltrated behind the enemy lines either by land, air or sea. Insertion by land is hazardous and time-consuming as it involves crossing the frontlines, whereas the air option, in which the preferred means is by helicopter, is the least hazardous and quickest.
But when helicopter insertion is precluded, freefall parachutes are used to make either HALO (high altitude, low opening) or HAHO (high altitude, high opening) jumps. HALO jumps are made inside the enemy territory, with the parachute being opened low, while HAHO jumps are made inside ones own territory close to the border, with the parachute being opened high, and then manoeuvred towards the area designated for landing inside the enemy territory.
Having landed, whether by helicopter or parachute, they begin the final approach to the target, and once they get within striking distance, all hell is let loose. Minutes later, they are gone as suddenly as they had come, leaving behind a trail of blood and destruction.
Now begins exfiltration, the most challenging of all phases. The quickest way is extraction by helicopter. But the real challenge starts, especially in the plains, when this is ruled out. It is now that their physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness and the ability to remain cool and motivated, come under severe test, as they struggle to get back across a broad expanse of hostile territory with the enemy in hot pursuit.
SSG is a small force, but when employed correctly, it can create effects on the enemy out of all proportion to its size. When viewed against the fact that the Pakistan army will have to fight a future conventional war outnumbered and win it, SSG is a force multiplier. Therefore, it is best used in support of the armys strategic offensives to create a strategic impact on the enemy.
For instance, in 1965, if the army had followed up Operation Grand Slam with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor, the SSG could have been employed simultaneously against the headworks on River Ravi and the crossings on River Beas, ahead of the offensive. These actions would have isolated the Ravi-Chenab corridor and delayed the induction of Indian army formations into the Ravi-Beas corridor, thus giving a decisive lead to Pakistani war directors in all the dimensions of operational strategy.
Having missed the opportunity to win the war in 1965, they should have atoned for it by doing the same in October 1971 when the build-up of Indian forces against East Pakistan was well underway. Unfortunately for Pakistan, they missed this opportunity too. In the two wars directed by them, their performance was marked by lack of imagination and daring. Stated simply, they had the force, but did not know how to use it. But, that is another story. Fortunately for Pakistan, the Indian captains of war too, were equally incompetent, if not more.
Operation Silence, the SSG operation against Jamia Hafsa/Lal Masjid complex was quite unlike Operation Nimrod, the British SAS (Special Air Service) operation in May 1980 against six terrorists who had seized the Iranian embassy in London and made 26 people hostage. The SAS had complete information about the terrorists, hostages and the 50-room six-storeyed embassy, and had carried out rehearsals on full size replicas. The result was that the operation involving 50 SAS troops, took only 17 minutes to eliminate the terrorists and rescue the hostages.
On the other hand, the SSG operation against the Jamia Hafsa was launched on what was at best, sketchy information about the people holed up inside the complex. Even today a controversy is raging about the number of people present in the complex at the time of the operation. How many were there and how many among them were hostages? If there were hostages, were they lodged separately, if so, where? How many militants were armed and what weapons were held by them? Where were the militants deployed?
These questions must have been raised by the SSG, but were clearly left unanswered. The fact that none inside the complex survived the attack, clearly shows that the SSG was given to understand that everyone inside was armed and dangerous.
That those inside were able to resist the SSG for so long and inflict casualties on them, is a testimony to their preparadness and grit, as much as it is to the courage, dash and skill of the SSG under adversity.
DAWN - Opinion; August 28, 2007
The phantom soldiers at the Lal Masjid
By Javed Hussain
IN the first week of August 1965, in the early hours of the morning, Indian soldiers guarding a vital bridge in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) came under a sudden attack from close quarters. Five minutes later, they and their bridge were no more.
On a sultry night in September 1965, a convoy of heavy trailers carrying tanks was moving on a road in IHK when it suddenly came under rocket and machine gun fire. A dozen tanks exploded and burst into flames.
In early December 1971, shortly after midnight, a column of Indian infantry was moving towards the front in IHK to reinforce one of their positions that was under attack, when it was hit from a flank by sweeping machine gun fire. Within minutes of the attack, the column had perished.
In all three cases the phantom soldiers who conducted these attacks were the chosen ones of the Pakistan Army commandos of the Special Service Group (SSG). Skilled in the use of weapons, they handle machine guns, sub-machine guns and pistols as if these were an extension of their hands, firing from the hip with speed and accuracy, even on the move. They are masters of the close quarter battle.
Designed to conduct operations behind the enemy lines, SSG also specialises in guerrilla, anti-guerrilla and anti-terrorist operations. Of these, the most demanding operations are the ones that are carried out deep behind the enemy lines. Such operations require the highest state of physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness, and the ability to remain cool and motivated, far beyond the bounds of conventional human endurance.
Selection for service with the SSG is, therefore, tough. Volunteers from all over the army apply but two-thirds are rejected during the selection phase, and one-third of the selected during the training phase. Those who finally make it, earn the distinction to wear the maroon beret and the coveted SSG badge on their chest. These men are too precious to be wasted on activities of conventional soldiers, yet those who should know better, continue to misuse them on guard duties and personal security functions.
Occasionally, SSG troops too, tend to misuse their skills! One of the SSG units was due to be inspected by a GHQ team. There was a growing sense of anxiety in the unit as many of their jeeps had become unserviceable for want of spare parts, and these were not forthcoming. They solved the problem their way. A night before the inspection, a few men stealthily penetrated the motor park of an artillery unit, some 20 kilometres away, and went about removing the required parts from the jeeps parked there, quickly and in silence. Job done, they returned to base, and come inspection time, the unserviceable jeeps were ready and running.
The following morning, when the commanding officer of the artillery unit learned that his jeeps had been mysteriously cannibalised, he nearly collapsed and had to undergo overnight hospitalisation. SSG commandos are trained to find a way or make one they had done just that but GHQ was not amused.
Conducted in five phases (planning, preparation, infiltration, attack, and exfiltration), an SSG operation depends entirely on the achievement of surprise to succeed. When the plan is not based on precise and accurate intelligence, the element of surprise is compromised, as happened to the SSG operations in September 1965 against the Indian airbases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. Planned hastily and based on outdated intelligence and maps, they had ended in disaster. The topographical changes that had taken place in the area of operations, were missing from the maps.
The result was that most of the commandos had landed in settlements that were not supposed to be there. As a consequence, within minutes of their landing, the alarm was raised. With surprise lost, the odds were now stacked against them. The next 48 hours saw them fighting running battles with their pursuers until their ammunition ran out. The cream of the army had been sacrificed in a needless operation against targets that were subsequently taken out by the PAF, many times over.
SSG teams are infiltrated behind the enemy lines either by land, air or sea. Insertion by land is hazardous and time-consuming as it involves crossing the frontlines, whereas the air option, in which the preferred means is by helicopter, is the least hazardous and quickest.
But when helicopter insertion is precluded, freefall parachutes are used to make either HALO (high altitude, low opening) or HAHO (high altitude, high opening) jumps. HALO jumps are made inside the enemy territory, with the parachute being opened low, while HAHO jumps are made inside ones own territory close to the border, with the parachute being opened high, and then manoeuvred towards the area designated for landing inside the enemy territory.
Having landed, whether by helicopter or parachute, they begin the final approach to the target, and once they get within striking distance, all hell is let loose. Minutes later, they are gone as suddenly as they had come, leaving behind a trail of blood and destruction.
Now begins exfiltration, the most challenging of all phases. The quickest way is extraction by helicopter. But the real challenge starts, especially in the plains, when this is ruled out. It is now that their physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness and the ability to remain cool and motivated, come under severe test, as they struggle to get back across a broad expanse of hostile territory with the enemy in hot pursuit.
SSG is a small force, but when employed correctly, it can create effects on the enemy out of all proportion to its size. When viewed against the fact that the Pakistan army will have to fight a future conventional war outnumbered and win it, SSG is a force multiplier. Therefore, it is best used in support of the armys strategic offensives to create a strategic impact on the enemy.
For instance, in 1965, if the army had followed up Operation Grand Slam with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor, the SSG could have been employed simultaneously against the headworks on River Ravi and the crossings on River Beas, ahead of the offensive. These actions would have isolated the Ravi-Chenab corridor and delayed the induction of Indian army formations into the Ravi-Beas corridor, thus giving a decisive lead to Pakistani war directors in all the dimensions of operational strategy.
Having missed the opportunity to win the war in 1965, they should have atoned for it by doing the same in October 1971 when the build-up of Indian forces against East Pakistan was well underway. Unfortunately for Pakistan, they missed this opportunity too. In the two wars directed by them, their performance was marked by lack of imagination and daring. Stated simply, they had the force, but did not know how to use it. But, that is another story. Fortunately for Pakistan, the Indian captains of war too, were equally incompetent, if not more.
Operation Silence, the SSG operation against Jamia Hafsa/Lal Masjid complex was quite unlike Operation Nimrod, the British SAS (Special Air Service) operation in May 1980 against six terrorists who had seized the Iranian embassy in London and made 26 people hostage. The SAS had complete information about the terrorists, hostages and the 50-room six-storeyed embassy, and had carried out rehearsals on full size replicas. The result was that the operation involving 50 SAS troops, took only 17 minutes to eliminate the terrorists and rescue the hostages.
On the other hand, the SSG operation against the Jamia Hafsa was launched on what was at best, sketchy information about the people holed up inside the complex. Even today a controversy is raging about the number of people present in the complex at the time of the operation. How many were there and how many among them were hostages? If there were hostages, were they lodged separately, if so, where? How many militants were armed and what weapons were held by them? Where were the militants deployed?
These questions must have been raised by the SSG, but were clearly left unanswered. The fact that none inside the complex survived the attack, clearly shows that the SSG was given to understand that everyone inside was armed and dangerous.
That those inside were able to resist the SSG for so long and inflict casualties on them, is a testimony to their preparadness and grit, as much as it is to the courage, dash and skill of the SSG under adversity.
DAWN - Opinion; August 28, 2007
Always Neutral
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10 soldiers killed in Pakistan - Yahoo! News
QUOTE[Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad, the spokesman for Pakistan's army, confirmed to Pakistan's private Geo news channels that 10 soldiers were killed and six wounded, but he would not say what caused the blast.
The two intelligence officials also said the victims belonged to the army's Karar commando group, which has participated in operations against militants in various parts of the country in recent years.]QUOTE
Its just breaking news. I wonder if the suicide bomber was an outsider or SSG man. There are speculations that 3 CIA americans nationals died.
Best Regards
QUOTE[Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad, the spokesman for Pakistan's army, confirmed to Pakistan's private Geo news channels that 10 soldiers were killed and six wounded, but he would not say what caused the blast.
The two intelligence officials also said the victims belonged to the army's Karar commando group, which has participated in operations against militants in various parts of the country in recent years.]QUOTE
Its just breaking news. I wonder if the suicide bomber was an outsider or SSG man. There are speculations that 3 CIA americans nationals died.
Best Regards
F.O.X
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What ever it is it is really bad we r loosin our men buy the hands of our men what the hell is this, when it is gona end ?. Clear these Terrorists at once or we will be having more casualities.
END IT AT ONCE no mercy.
Regards
Wilco
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Maybe the SSG men were not the targets but the CIA men who were dining in the SSG mess were.
Regards
karpov
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Would you like to reveal how should this be "ended at once", with "no mercy".
karpov
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No sir, blast took place in Jawans' mess. CIA men would be sitting in officers mess.
Cheetah786
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15 killed in Tarbela Cantt blast
ISLAMABAD (September 14 2007): At least 15 elite commandos were killed in a suspected suicide blast in the dining area of a high-security army camp in Tarbela, officials said on Thursday. Eleven others were wounded, six seriously, in the explosion which coincided with heavy fighting in north Waziristan and the visit of US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.
"The commandos were taking dinner in their mess at Tarbela town when a suspected suicide bomber blew himself up at its gate," a security official told AFP. Chief military spokesman Major General Waheed Arshad, however, said the authorities were investigating the incident. "We are checking the cause of the blast which occurred in the dining hall for the army unit," he told AFP.
Pakistan has suffered a string of attacks since the raid of Red Mosque in Islamabad in July, piling pressure on key US ally in "war on terror" President Pervez Musharraf as he struggles with a political crisis ahead of general and presidential elections. Interior ministry spokesman Brigadier Javed Cheema said the attacks had suspected links to pro-Taliban militants backed by al Qaeda who are fighting the military in tribal areas.
ISLAMABAD (September 14 2007): At least 15 elite commandos were killed in a suspected suicide blast in the dining area of a high-security army camp in Tarbela, officials said on Thursday. Eleven others were wounded, six seriously, in the explosion which coincided with heavy fighting in north Waziristan and the visit of US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.
"The commandos were taking dinner in their mess at Tarbela town when a suspected suicide bomber blew himself up at its gate," a security official told AFP. Chief military spokesman Major General Waheed Arshad, however, said the authorities were investigating the incident. "We are checking the cause of the blast which occurred in the dining hall for the army unit," he told AFP.
Pakistan has suffered a string of attacks since the raid of Red Mosque in Islamabad in July, piling pressure on key US ally in "war on terror" President Pervez Musharraf as he struggles with a political crisis ahead of general and presidential elections. Interior ministry spokesman Brigadier Javed Cheema said the attacks had suspected links to pro-Taliban militants backed by al Qaeda who are fighting the military in tribal areas.
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