KRAIT
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And what did PA targeted.....lemme guess...hmm...my point will derail the threads...talk facts not fiction...
Pakistan's Nuclear Submarine Development | News and Discussions
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K-Xeroid
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Facts and Fictions ? Yea! right , Mate! Indian members started that Fact and fiction Game. , So! Wat the point of bringing Russian style india frigate in this thread?
KRAIT
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Leave it bro....i just want to say that both nations didn't do anything by themselves, it all comes down to resources and money....that's what matter at the end of the day, copy , cheat, develop by own, everything is fair in war or national defense.
And how did you think it sunk when it is very near to Indian coast ? Tell that when it sank some where else . Go tell that to kids , they will believe that . Rajput successfully brought down your submarine
It was clarified by the then chief of Naval staff that PNS Ghazi was sunk dut self laid mines.. no need to fight on that.
Thorough Pro
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This post only exposes your physical and mental age. thaks for letting us know.
Just for fun....Nuclear Submarines of world...no intention of hurting my **** brothers....
kurup
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Ya ........this must be the most idiotic post in the thread ....a classic one ......
So now world doesn't give much respect for those who build their own frigates , corvetes , submarines , etc .....why because pakistan can't .....
can you give some link .....
In 1971 war, Pak Sub sunk for 'unknown reasons':Ex-Navy chief - Indian Express
i personally spoke to one of retired high ranking Naval officer & he has also clarified the same way.
In 1971 war, Pak Sub sunk for 'unknown reasons':Ex-Navy chief - Indian Express
i personally spoke to one of retired high ranking Naval officer & he has also clarified the same way.
Ghazi sank due to internal explosion: Ex-Navy Chief - YouTube
video link of you tube
Areesh
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World doesn't respect such wheel reinventions. When you can get the same kind of stuff from some other source no need to behave like an idiots of a particular country and waste time and resources on it. You aren't going to win noble prize over it.
kurup
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The fact is that all the major military powers thinks it is worth to reinvent that wheel including US ,EU , Russia , China , etc ..... They all must be idiots according to you .....
The only reason pakistan is not building any major ships indigenously is because right now they donot have the technical capability or finance for that ......
The only reason you are still continuing this conversation in circles is because you cannot accept the obvious fact .....
satishkumarcsc
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Can anyone clarify and tell me which company/organization makes warship grade A steel?
In India SAIL and Tata Steel can make it....In Pakistan which company makes it or is it imported?
In India SAIL and Tata Steel can make it....In Pakistan which company makes it or is it imported?
AZADPAKISTAN2009
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Why do you plan to sabotage that company
regular
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In Pakistan Peoples Steel Mills at Karachi makes any grade kind of steel needed by our country.We never need to import it but instead we can export it. and We have some more steel mills manufacture any kinda steel as well...
Malik Usman
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there is no race. pakistan cant design a single navy ship on its own to be honest. this is stealthy 17 a frigate designed by indian engineers. nuclear sub is much more complex than this simple boat. if pakistan cant design a simple boat boomer is out of question. dont start a race u cant even play alone in. india today has some of the biggest shipyards in asia and is currently building tons of new shipyards dedicated for ship building. the new l&t shipyard will be asia's biggest and will be used to build navy ships. sorry but no race with pakistan.
Yes right only Indians are the Geneous peoples in this area rest all are dumps.......
......even Indians consider them better themselves from China in Technology........but reality is all their weapons and programs are either from Russia or Israel.....
Dash
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15:33 GMT, July 2, 2012 Recent reports from Pakistan seem to suggest the Pakistan Navy (PN) may be on the cusp of developing a naval nuclear missile capability, even as its plans for acquiring a nuclear submarine capability gradually become clearer. The first indication of this came in May 2012 when Pakistan tested the Hatf VII (Babur)an indigenously developed Cruise Missile with high precision and manoeuvrability. Reports suggested that the missile was launched from a state-of-the-art multi-tube Missile Launch Vehicle (MLV), which significantly enhances the targeting and employment options of the Babur Weapon System in both the conventional and nuclear modes. Importantly, this is the third test of the Babur in the recent past, of different capacities and loads.
Then, in another significant development, on May 19, the PN inaugurated the Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A statement from the Pakistan militarys Inter Services Public Relations said that the NSFC will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force, and was the custodian of the nations 2nd strike capability presumably for use against India, in case the need ever arose. This is noteworthy because Pakistan is not known to have a sea-based second strike capability. Therefore, a public statement that the NSFC would be in-charge of such a capability is an open admission of sorts that Pakistan is in the process of developing a naval variant of a strategic nuclear missile.
For long, the Pakistan Navy has viewed the Indian Navy (IN) with suspicion. The INs sustained growth over the past few years has, in fact, become an excuse for the PN to push for its own development and expansion of assets. In an article written for a Pakistan daily in May 2012, Tauqir Naqvi, a retired Vice Admiral of the PN, suggested that the hegemonic elements of the Indian Navys maritime strategy have been the main drivers of the resurgence of the Pakistan Navy. The article, when read closely, is a dead give-away of Pakistans real ambitions with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines.
Naqvi writes extensively about Indias strategic vision, characterising it as a hegemonic impulse that has led the IN to aim for control of the seas over an area extending from the Red Sea in the West to Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. While Pakistan, he contends, is a peace-loving nation, India has never been serious about developing friendly relations, fixated as it has been with the idea of projecting power. Surprisingly, he showers Indian scientists and the IN with some unexpected, even if motivated praise, by mentioning the sterling efforts of the Indian scientific community and shipyard workers in operationalising a strategic maritime capability. The complimentary references are, in effect, a none-too-disguised message to Pakistan's political leadership and mandarins in the defence ministry about the ineluctable need for Pakistan to buttress its own strategic arsenal with naval nuclear missiles and a nuclear submarine, without which, the PN can forget about countering the evil designs of the Indian Navy.
It is, however, Naqvis references to Indias two nuclear submarinesINS Chakra (SSN) and INS Arihant (SSBN)that dispel all doubts about the real intentions behind the avidly rendered piece. Naqvi opines that the threat that the two nuclear platforms collectively pose to the security of Pakistan, is near-existential. It is the completion of the Triad (land, air and sea based nuclear weapons), he observes, that gives India the confidence to respond with nuclear weapons, even if it is made to absorb a first nuclear strike. INS Arihant is that crucial second strike capability which could give India the vital edge during a conflict. The SSBN, he concludes, is an essential component of a nuclear arsenal, one that Pakistan must singularly pursue.
However, in his enthusiasm to convince Pakistans defence establishment about the need for a SSBN, Naqvi overstates his case when he mentions the diplomatic advantage that may accrue to India on account of its nuclear submarine. There is hardly any modern precedent of a nuclear submarine (by itself) being an effective instrument of diplomatic persuasion, as he suggests. Nor does it really help in negotiating with other states possessing similar capability, as cooperation and negotiation in the strategic realm has to do with bottom-line naval capacities in securing maritime interests and an overlap in strategic interests. While maritime cooperation does lead to economic benefits, it is not on account of possessing a ballistic nuclear weapon submarine capability, which is purely for the purposes of strategic deterrence.
The Arihant is a significant addition to the Indian Navys arsenal but it does not introduce a strategic imbalance in the India-Pakistan context, as India, by embracing a No First Use doctrine, has already renounced the strategic advantage. The Arihants introduction does not alter this basic reality and is unlikely to tilt the strategic balance drastically. If anything, its gives India a measure of greater confidence in securing its own maritime interests, which does not necessarily translate into overwhelming dominance of the Indian Ocean or greater vulnerability of Pakistan to Indias strategic weapons.
Given Indias territorial expanse and the spread of its nuclear weapon sites, even if Pakistan did get a nuclear missile capable submarine, it would not be able to neutralise Indias broader nuclear weapon capability, with or without the Arihant. As regards the comparison of combat capabilities of conventional submarines and SSNs/SSBNs, it is well established that the former are not inferior operational combat platforms merely on account of the absence of nuclear propulsion or nuclear weapons. Both these capabilities (though vital strategically) rarely come in handy in a tactical scenario. Admiral Naqvi again exaggerates his case by suggesting that the Pakistan Navys conventional submarines would not be able to stand up to Indias SSBN.
Interestingly, signs that the PN has been thinking seriously about nuclear submarines have been around for some time now. As early as in 2008, in an interview to a Pakistan daily, the then PN Chief, Admiral Noman Bashir, had said that Pakistan was quite capable of building a nuclear submarine and would do so if required. Pakistan, he said, is a recognized nuclear power and if the government made a decision, the nation would develop a nuclear weapon. In February 2012, Admiral Asif Sandhila, the present Chief of the PN, stated to the Pakistani media that the PN was mindful of Indias plans to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean region.
Questions, however, remain on Pakistans capability to design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile. Even China, which is known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not possess a credible submarine-launched missile. The odds that Pakistan will succeed in developing its undersea nuclear ballistic missile without assistance from China are highly unfavourable. Even if it did manage to get an SSBN, it is not certain whether the Pakistan Navy will be in a position to undertake the responsibility of the nations second-strike capability.
Therefore, the recent drive by PNs senior serving and retired naval officers to persuade the security establishment as well as the man on the street of the necessity of a nuclear submarine capability appears ill-founded, if not disingenuous. Outwardly, it may serve to create a sense of insecurityvital in persuading politicians about the need for a new capabilitybut the manifest lack of strategic logic will eventually convince few.
Pakistans naval leadership will also be aware of the risks and financial costs of developing and operating a nuclear submarinethe need to constantly refine equipment and train personnel; of razor-sharp communications and command and control systems; and the requirement of mastering safety procedures. In the final analysis the SSBN is not an asset if it is not mastered well and operated optimally. Merely possessing one offers no strategic advantages.
defence.professionals | defpro.com
I really want Pakistan to have somee nuke subs, so that India can speed up its sub constructions even faster.
Then, in another significant development, on May 19, the PN inaugurated the Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A statement from the Pakistan militarys Inter Services Public Relations said that the NSFC will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force, and was the custodian of the nations 2nd strike capability presumably for use against India, in case the need ever arose. This is noteworthy because Pakistan is not known to have a sea-based second strike capability. Therefore, a public statement that the NSFC would be in-charge of such a capability is an open admission of sorts that Pakistan is in the process of developing a naval variant of a strategic nuclear missile.
For long, the Pakistan Navy has viewed the Indian Navy (IN) with suspicion. The INs sustained growth over the past few years has, in fact, become an excuse for the PN to push for its own development and expansion of assets. In an article written for a Pakistan daily in May 2012, Tauqir Naqvi, a retired Vice Admiral of the PN, suggested that the hegemonic elements of the Indian Navys maritime strategy have been the main drivers of the resurgence of the Pakistan Navy. The article, when read closely, is a dead give-away of Pakistans real ambitions with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines.
Naqvi writes extensively about Indias strategic vision, characterising it as a hegemonic impulse that has led the IN to aim for control of the seas over an area extending from the Red Sea in the West to Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. While Pakistan, he contends, is a peace-loving nation, India has never been serious about developing friendly relations, fixated as it has been with the idea of projecting power. Surprisingly, he showers Indian scientists and the IN with some unexpected, even if motivated praise, by mentioning the sterling efforts of the Indian scientific community and shipyard workers in operationalising a strategic maritime capability. The complimentary references are, in effect, a none-too-disguised message to Pakistan's political leadership and mandarins in the defence ministry about the ineluctable need for Pakistan to buttress its own strategic arsenal with naval nuclear missiles and a nuclear submarine, without which, the PN can forget about countering the evil designs of the Indian Navy.
It is, however, Naqvis references to Indias two nuclear submarinesINS Chakra (SSN) and INS Arihant (SSBN)that dispel all doubts about the real intentions behind the avidly rendered piece. Naqvi opines that the threat that the two nuclear platforms collectively pose to the security of Pakistan, is near-existential. It is the completion of the Triad (land, air and sea based nuclear weapons), he observes, that gives India the confidence to respond with nuclear weapons, even if it is made to absorb a first nuclear strike. INS Arihant is that crucial second strike capability which could give India the vital edge during a conflict. The SSBN, he concludes, is an essential component of a nuclear arsenal, one that Pakistan must singularly pursue.
However, in his enthusiasm to convince Pakistans defence establishment about the need for a SSBN, Naqvi overstates his case when he mentions the diplomatic advantage that may accrue to India on account of its nuclear submarine. There is hardly any modern precedent of a nuclear submarine (by itself) being an effective instrument of diplomatic persuasion, as he suggests. Nor does it really help in negotiating with other states possessing similar capability, as cooperation and negotiation in the strategic realm has to do with bottom-line naval capacities in securing maritime interests and an overlap in strategic interests. While maritime cooperation does lead to economic benefits, it is not on account of possessing a ballistic nuclear weapon submarine capability, which is purely for the purposes of strategic deterrence.
The Arihant is a significant addition to the Indian Navys arsenal but it does not introduce a strategic imbalance in the India-Pakistan context, as India, by embracing a No First Use doctrine, has already renounced the strategic advantage. The Arihants introduction does not alter this basic reality and is unlikely to tilt the strategic balance drastically. If anything, its gives India a measure of greater confidence in securing its own maritime interests, which does not necessarily translate into overwhelming dominance of the Indian Ocean or greater vulnerability of Pakistan to Indias strategic weapons.
Given Indias territorial expanse and the spread of its nuclear weapon sites, even if Pakistan did get a nuclear missile capable submarine, it would not be able to neutralise Indias broader nuclear weapon capability, with or without the Arihant. As regards the comparison of combat capabilities of conventional submarines and SSNs/SSBNs, it is well established that the former are not inferior operational combat platforms merely on account of the absence of nuclear propulsion or nuclear weapons. Both these capabilities (though vital strategically) rarely come in handy in a tactical scenario. Admiral Naqvi again exaggerates his case by suggesting that the Pakistan Navys conventional submarines would not be able to stand up to Indias SSBN.
Interestingly, signs that the PN has been thinking seriously about nuclear submarines have been around for some time now. As early as in 2008, in an interview to a Pakistan daily, the then PN Chief, Admiral Noman Bashir, had said that Pakistan was quite capable of building a nuclear submarine and would do so if required. Pakistan, he said, is a recognized nuclear power and if the government made a decision, the nation would develop a nuclear weapon. In February 2012, Admiral Asif Sandhila, the present Chief of the PN, stated to the Pakistani media that the PN was mindful of Indias plans to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean region.
Questions, however, remain on Pakistans capability to design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile. Even China, which is known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not possess a credible submarine-launched missile. The odds that Pakistan will succeed in developing its undersea nuclear ballistic missile without assistance from China are highly unfavourable. Even if it did manage to get an SSBN, it is not certain whether the Pakistan Navy will be in a position to undertake the responsibility of the nations second-strike capability.
Therefore, the recent drive by PNs senior serving and retired naval officers to persuade the security establishment as well as the man on the street of the necessity of a nuclear submarine capability appears ill-founded, if not disingenuous. Outwardly, it may serve to create a sense of insecurityvital in persuading politicians about the need for a new capabilitybut the manifest lack of strategic logic will eventually convince few.
Pakistans naval leadership will also be aware of the risks and financial costs of developing and operating a nuclear submarinethe need to constantly refine equipment and train personnel; of razor-sharp communications and command and control systems; and the requirement of mastering safety procedures. In the final analysis the SSBN is not an asset if it is not mastered well and operated optimally. Merely possessing one offers no strategic advantages.
defence.professionals | defpro.com
I really want Pakistan to have somee nuke subs, so that India can speed up its sub constructions even faster.
kurup
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Was posted dude ........ http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-navy/191237-pakistan-navy-s-nuclear-aspirations.html
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