Pakistan's New F-16s Can Beat India's Su-30s; Rafales Are The Counter

[Styx]

For Air Force Precision Strike Capabilities are Measured in such scenarios and if UAVs and UCAVs are available in the arsenal it becomes even more important for Air Force to check how well their equipment performs in a real Battle Field and how they could be improved as well.

you bought your equipment from the best , I imagine those JDAMs and paveways are serving your air force well

 

[Gazi]

you bought your equipment from the best , I imagine those JDAMs and paveways are serving your air force well

Of course they arent Minted new stuff rather old ones upgraded so need to check how reliable they are as well and this Military Operations provide us with this opportunity.

 

[Styx]

Of course they arent Minted new stuff rather old ones upgraded so need to check how reliable they are as well and this Military Operations provide us with this opportunity.

well, better off killing terrorists than rotting in a warehouse..
























..waiting for the IAF to drop a bomb on it

 

[surya kiran]

Still India is 15 Years behind in Tactical area as they have started much Later then Pakistan focusing on Human Factor while Pakistan has develop its Top Gun like institution in 1976 by the Name CCS which covers DACT (Dissimilar Aircraft Combat Tactics) while India still doesnt have something as notable as that one till yet AFAIK

Actually, we have it much before you. Its called TACDE. Established in 1972. Based out of Jamnagar AFB.

Next time don't assume, if you do not know.

As for servicability, its gone up past year. It was close to 60% early this year, and is expected at 75% by year end.

 

[Gazi]

Actually, we have it much before you. Its called TACDE. Established in 1972. Based out of Jamnagar AFB.

Next time don't assume, if you do not know.

For your info CCS was replaced by another school called Fighter Leader School back in 1976 so it wasnt the first Fighter Pilot school after all and as for TACDE there isnt much info available about it on the other hand CCS is offering something similar to TOPGUN is offering in fighter Pilot Training and it also cater foreign cadets as well.

 

[surya kiran]

For your info CCS was replaced by another school called Fighter Leader School back in 1976 so it wasnt the first Fighter Pilot school after all and as for TACDE there isnt much info available about it on the other hand CCS is offering something similar to TOPGUN is offering in fighter Pilot Training and it also cater foreign cadets as well.

TACDE was preceded by something called TC or something like that. Point is do not assume, that something is not present with the IAF, just because you do not know about it.

TACDE takes in the top 1% of the IAF and hones their skills further. Earlier set up in Jamnagar, today it operates out of Gwalior AFB. AFAIK, no foreign pilots are allowed.

 

[NIA]

because they know something that we dont know!
half of their SUs will be crashed by their pilot in next decade

when compared to last year how many aircraft su-30 crashed? realy you guys need brains

if the Su30mki can beat the Typhoon 12 nil in a dog fight partly due to indian pilots superior training in WVR and partly due to the fact that SU30MKI with its TVC engines HMS and IRST package makes it far superior to Typhoon in close range combat. THEN surely the same applies to the much older F16 .

The simple fact is the TVC HMS IRST and weapons load GIVES THE MKI a very potent capability that most fighters cant get near...

In a KNIFE FIGHT its well documented the S30MKI will have the edge over the F16.

" where SU30MKI loses is its RCS and in a high speed long range BVR fight"

HAS THE PAKISTANIS KEEP TELLING US BVR ENGAGEMENT WILL NOT MATTER IN INDO PAK WAR..

For this reason india has the perfect fighter the SU30MKI

During BVR exercise ...our su-30 mki pilots were asked not to use flares and radars at any cost.It means they have to engage USAF pilots with out any radar.This is the main point which western neighbours have missed.

Why PAF didn't participated in kargil ?

ASk windjammer

 

[gambit]

if the Su30mki can beat the Typhoon 12 nil in a dog fight partly due to indian pilots superior training in WVR and partly due to the fact that SU30MKI with its TVC engines HMS and IRST package makes it far superior to Typhoon in close range combat. THEN surely the same applies to the much older F16 .

There is no 'surely' about this. You places too much emphasis on thrust vectoring (TVC). That is not to say that TVC is no good and have no value, but there are SITUATIONAL limits on TVC.

In order to understand TVC, you have to understand basic flight control concepts and philosophies to start, let alone getting down and dirty into the technologies that make possible human control of an aircraft.

To change an aircraft's attitude, there are two ways: aerodynamic exploitation and thrust redirection (TVC).

Where TVC is more common ? Rocketry. The WW II era Nazi Germany's V-2 have thrust vanes that redirect the rocket's exhaust. Even to this day, modern rockets still uses minute swiveling of the nozzles to maintain flight attitude for the rocket.

Spaceflight Now | Atlas Launch Report | Atlas 3 rocket achieves success in debut launch

The Atlas 5s will also use the RD-180, and Lockheed Martin has ordered 101 engines valued at $1 billion.

Each $10 million RD-180 has two thrust chambers and two bell-shaped nozzles that swivel during the launch to steer the rocket.

Because of the aircraft's utility, aerodynamic exploitation is the most common because this concept is the easiest to engineer and execute. Aerodynamic exploitation actually gives better controls over an aircraft than TVC. Aerodynamic exploitation features flight control surfaces such as wings of varying sizes, shapes, and locations on the flying body. It uses differential air pressures over these surfaces to make attitude changes, which results in the aircraft changes its direction.

Depending on the aircraft's design, airborne airspeed varies from aircraft to aircraft. Basically, this value is the minimum moving velocity the aircraft must achieve in order for full flight, as in off the ground, to take effect. When I learned to fly in a Cessna 152, in a headwind, the plane could be airborne in less than 80 mph, or about 115 km/h.

http://www.faa.gov/regulations_poli...on/pilot_handbook/media/phak - chapter 05.pdf

At these slower airspeeds aerodynamic pressure on control surfaces are low and larger control inputs are required to effectively maneuver the airplane.

The slower these air flow across the flight control surfaces, the lower these differential pressures, hence the greater amount of surface deflections are necessary in order to make the aircraft change its direction. Basically, the slower the airspeed, the greater the amount of surface area must be exposed to incoming airstream. The corollary is that the higher the airspeed, the higher the differential pressures, the less surface areas required to make the aircraft change its direction. Weight and drag affects the required ground speed to create the necessary pressure differential to make the aircraft airborne.

This means...The higher the airspeed, the less of the need for thrust redirection. And when an aircraft is purposely designed to impose the highest possible g-force level the human body could withstand and survive, that aircraft will have little use for thrust redirection -- EXCEPT AT CERTAIN AIRSPEED.

What airspeed is that ? It is an airspeed so low that no matter how much surface area is presented to the incoming airstream, the pilot cannot make the aircraft change its attitude in a specified amount of time. What kind of time is that ? Combat time.

An F-22 can fly at just above stall airspeed and if the pilot want to change direction, he will have to do it very carefully and the jet will change its direction slowly, slow enough to get him killed. For a combat aircraft, being airborne is not enough. A combat aircraft must be able to attain an airspeed that can make direction changes, at least to its airframe limits. So when a combat aircraft like the F-22, for any reason, got into a situation where its airspeed is barely above stall, it must have an alternate mean to make direction changes and that alternate method is thrust redirection -- TVC.

No combat pilot, regardless of what he flies, want to engage his opponent at his own stall airspeed, even if he has TVC capability. No F-22 pilot want to goad his F-16 opponent into the F-22's stall region. No F-22 pilot is that stupid and I doubt that any Su-TVC pilot is that stupid as well. And no F-16 pilot would be so stupid as to leave an airspeed that will give him that 9g turn capability.

A one-on-one fight against one F-16 is a bad enough situation where airspeed is life, but in a many-on-many fight against multiple F-16s, any drop in airspeed where TVC is called upon, whatever god you believe in had better be watching over you because if you managed to escape one F-16, his companion will be readied for you as you struggled to regain lost airspeed.

When the flight control surfaces are enough to create near-instantaneous 9g turn, any inputs from TVC would at best be useless and at worst induce oscillations during the turn, making the pilot vulnerable in entering the dreaded 'departure from controlled flight' situation.

What this mean is that against an F-16, if the F-16 pilot is smarter than you, he will kill you, and your TVC will not help you.

 

[raazh]

When the flight control surfaces are enough to create near-instantaneous 9g turn, any inputs from TVC would at best be useless and at worst induce oscillations during the turn, making the pilot vulnerable in entering the dreaded 'departure from controlled flight' situation.
you.

It is always a pleasure reading your comments even though at times they get way too technical for non-aerospace engineers like me. I would like to know your view on the aerodynamic DESIGN features of JF17 vs a canard + delta config in an air superiority role? Also in your opinion did PAF make the right decision to develop JF17 as a cheap, reliable multirole fighter to replace aging planes in 150~200 nos or should Pakistan have joined J10 with China and have compromised with 70~100 number (considering the price difference).

 

[Agent Smith]

By Arming India Correspondent

NEW DELHI, AUG.1, 2015: Pakistan's latest fleet of F-16 Block 52 variants can beat India's front line Sukhoi Su-30MKIs in a one-on-one dogfight, a top Indian government official told Arming India, in an admission that the Indian Air Force (IAF) lacks a counter to its enemy number one's air combat platform.

That's precisely why India had chosen French Rafales as its Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) that can counter the F-16's capabilities. India's Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar had told Parliament last week that the government had earlier this year withdrawn a 2007 tender for 126 MMRCA, a contest in which Rafale was chosen by India.

The two squadrons of F-16C/D variants of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) have superior electronic warfare capabilities and that's what is worrying the IAF commanders, the highly-placed government official, who did not wish to be identified, citing service rules, said in a tête-à-tête with Arming India on July 30, 2015.

"It is not the BVR (Beyond Visual Range) air battles, but the close air battles that the Su-30s can't match up with the F-16C/D variants. The PAF planes have superior electronic warfare capabilities and the contemporary air battles rely more on EW capabilities to beat an enemy combat plane in a one-on-one dogfight," the official said.

The contemporary air battle strategies revolve around neutralizing enemy planes at beyond visual range. But there is a possibility that some enemy plane would sneak in through the air defense measures in place. In such a scenario, the enemy plane could wreak havoc on the Indian troops and assets on the ground. As a counter, fighter jets may have to be scrambled to take on the enemy plane one-on-one.

The official also noted that for every one F-16 that PAF has, India has to deploy two Su-30s if the enemy fleet is to be beaten. "If the F-16 goes after one Su-30, it can run and the other Su-30 can get a go at the enemy F-16. That way, the IAF has to deploy too many of its Su-30 resources for just countering the F-16s."

PAF currently operates four F-16 squadrons, of which two deploy the F-16 Block 52 variants. India has inducted 10 Su-30 squadrons in its fleet till date and plan to have four more of the Russian-origin, India-built planes in the fleet soon.

In July 2015, American original equipment manufacturer Lockheed Martin received a follow-on foreign military sale contract to produce and upgrade Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP) for the PAF's F-16 fleet. The contract includes the production of 15 Sniper ATPs and upgrades to the Pakistan Air Force’s existing 22 Sniper ATPs, according to an announcement from the company on July 14, 2015.

To meet the PAF's urgent operational need, pod deliveries will begin in late 2015. Upgrades, which will increase compatibility with the aircraft and enable enhanced features, will also begin in late 2015.

IAF Needs At Least Five More Rafale Squadrons

The Rafales, the official said, would be the F-16 beaters in the IAF fleet and the present lot of 36, to be bought off-the-shelf, would meet the requirement of only two squadrons of the IAF. "The Rafales are far superior to the F-16s in all forms of combat, including the one-on-one dogfights and the electronic warfare. That's why we need the Rafales," the official said.

The two squadrons of Rafales for which India is negotiating with France at present will be the counter to the PAF's F-16s. "But we need at least five more squadrons of the Rafales. A decision on whether to go in for more Rafales, beyond the 36 announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April this year, is yet to be taken," the official said.

Parrikar had told Parliament on July 28, 2015 that "the RFP issued earlier for procurement of 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) has been withdrawn."

"In this multi-vendor procurement case, the Rafale aircraft met all the performance characteristics stipulated in the Request for Proposal (RFP) during the evaluation conducted by Indian Air Force," he had said in a written reply to questions from parliamentarians that were released on July 30.

The India-France joint statement issued during Modi's visit to Paris had mentioned that the Indian government conveyed to the French government that "in view of the critical operational necessity for multirole combat aircraft for Indian Air Force (IAF), India would like to acquire 36 Rafale jets in fly-away condition as quickly as possible."

The two nations had then agreed to conclude an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for supply of the aircraft on terms that would be better than conveyed by Dassault Aviation as part of the now cancelled RFP process. The Rafales delivery would be in the time-frame that would be compatible with the operational requirement of IAF. The aircraft and associated systems and weapons would be delivered on the same configuration as had been tested and approved by IAF under the previous tender, and with a longer maintenance responsibility by France.

"A Negotiating Team has been constituted to negotiate the terms and conditions of the procurement of 36 Rafale jets and recommend a draft agreement. The meetings of the Indian Negotiating team with the French side have commenced," Parrikar said.

LCA, The Silver Lining

The silver lining is that India's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has superior capabilities than Pakistan's JF-17, the official said, but did not explain why he thought so.

The IAF is now waiting for the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to deliver the first four LCA Mk-I planes so that it could raise a new squadron of the indigenous combat aircraft. "But the LCA Mk-1 is yet to obtain its Final Operational Clearance (FOC)."

The Indian government has approved the induction of two LCA Mk-1 squadrons and is waiting for the Mk-2 to be ready to place an order for five more of that variant for the IAF. "LCA Mk-2 is still far away."

On January 10, 2015, an advanced electronic warfare suite (EW suite) developed by Defense Avionics Research Establishment (DARE), a DRDO laboratory, was deployed for the first time on the LCA. The Tejas-PV1 aircraft used the EW suite while flying in Bengaluru and HAL made a huge splash of this news that day.

In addition to the radar warner, the EW suite tested also has a jammer. It gives to the pilot an additional capability of nullifying the effect of detected radar threat by appropriate mode of jamming. Existing EW systems fitted on various combat aircraft are basic EW equipment known as Radar Warner Receiver to provide warning to the aircraft pilot in case of detection of a Radar threat.

Just seven days later, HAL delivered the first 'Tejas' LCA Mk-1 to the IAF, ahead of the aircraft achieving its FOC, which has been delayed beyond its schedule of December 2015 and is expected to only in later part of 2016. The LCA presented to the IAF was the first of the series production, with five more targeted to be produced in 2015-16. HAL would subsequently scale up production to eight and later to 16 aircraft. India has spent Rs.17,269 crore (Rs.172.69 billion/$2.8 billion) as development costs on the LCA program.

Shortcomings In LCA Mk-1

Parrikar also told parliament on July 31, 2015 that certain shortcomings were reported in LCA Mk-1 and that these would be addressed in the Mk-2 version of the combat plane.

The shortcomings found in LCA Mk-1 are:

1. Absence of Internal Jammer affecting survivability
2. Aircraft performance shortfalls.
3. Maintainability issues.

The above shortcomings were primarily due to following reasons:

1. Internal jammer technology at that time was based on TWT amplifier which needed about 1000 liter volume space for integration on aircraft. Hence it could not be accommodated at the time of development of LCA ‘Tejas’ Mk-I.

2. The maintainability issues were raised by Indian Air Force (IAF) late in 2009, when design and drawings were already frozen for Mk-I. However, many of the safety critical maintenance issues are already addressed in Mk-I.

"The government has sanctioned the project for development of LCA Mk-II in 2009. Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) is the prime agency for development of LCA Mk-II with the public and private partnerships. All the above mentioned shortcomings in LCA Mk-I have been addressed in LCA Mk-II version," Parrikar said in a written reply to questions from parliamentarians.

MiGs Phase Out

The LCAs are the aircraft that IAF intends to use as a replacement of the existing fleet of erstwhile Soviet-origin MiG-21s and MiG-27s. IAF has targeted the number-plating of two of its MiG-21 squadrons and one MiG-27 squadron in the second half of 2015, the government official told Arming India. This will be followed by the phasing out of one each of the MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons in 2016. IAF currently operates 15 squadrons of MiG-21 and MiG-27 combat planes.

Arming India

LOL............. first beat mig 29s with your "f16s". your air force fled the fight in Kargil when faced with IAF Mig 29s.

besides common sense is something that you cannot expect in an average pakistani, our air force claims that its frontline aircraft can be beaten by by an outdated aircraft which miserably lost MMRCA bid and failed to impress officials luks like another attempt to fool pakistanis

 

[Thunder Bolt]

LOL............. first beat mig 29s with your "f16s". your air force fled the fight in Kargil when faced with IAF Mig 29s.

besides common sense is something that you cannot expect in an average pakistani, our air force claims that its frontline aircraft can be beaten by by an outdated aircraft which miserably lost MMRCA bid and failed to impress officials luks like another attempt to fool pakistanis

isn't this your mouse licking dust lol

 

[Agent Smith]

isn't this your mouse licking dust lol

heh, handleld weapon se ek aircraft kya shoot kar diya apne ap ko topche samajhne lage
ye he tumhare air force ki okat.
MiGs over Kargil: How the Fulcrum buzzed the Falcons | Russia & India Report

The Indian Air Force’s employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions during the 1999 Kargil War at Himalayan heights of 18,000 ft – unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare – achieved three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.

Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war – and again during the 2002 border standoff – the Pakistan Air Force’s “psyche took a big beating”, says Strategy Page report.

While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAF’s plight. “Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the Pakistan Army, angering the latter,” says the report.

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.”

The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: “One Pakistani military expert observed that the PAF’s perceived inability to defend Pakistan’s airspace and even put up a token fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders’ warnings that any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAF’s psyche took a big beating.”

In the report “Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground engagements.”

Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.”

Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s strict injunction that Indian forces not cross the LoC, years later IAF chief Anil Tipnis recalled he had “personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy fighters in aerial combat”.

Operation Vijay

It was when an IAF reconnaissance aircraft sustained a direct hit from a Chinese made Anza shoulder-fired surface to air missile launched by Pakistani intruder, that the IAF launched Operation Vijay to clear the Himalayan peaks. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.

The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN and MiG-27ML squadrons, while additional squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s deployed northward to Avantipur.

While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.

An example of Indian jugaad – or improvisation – was the use of stopwatches and handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in “Mountain Warfare and Tri-Service Operations”, another novel technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.

Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R – which normally flies at 80,000 ft – in a medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the aircraft’s Russian designers may not have thought possible.

Laser strikes

However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s – lacking modern weapons – were not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasn’t suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods.

On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, “For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting.”

The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N. Ganesh in “Indian Air Force in Action”.

Check or checkmate?

The effectiveness of the IAF’s operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, rushed to New Delhi on June 12, and implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes.” You don’t get more desperate than that.

However, the most telling statement on the war was made by India’s then defence minister, George Fernandes. In January 2000, he observed that in precipitating the Kargil War, Pakistan “had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation – that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.”

In this backdrop, when the current air chief says India might have to look at “some other options” to make Pakistan behave, it is no empty boast.

And you can take that to the bank.

 

[Thunder Bolt]

heh, handleld weapon se ek aircraft kya shoot kar diya apne ap ko topche samajhne lage
ye he tumhare air force ki okat.
MiGs over Kargil: How the Fulcrum buzzed the Falcons | Russia & India Report

The Indian Air Force’s employment of airpower against Pakistan Army positions during the 1999 Kargil War at Himalayan heights of 18,000 ft – unprecedented in the history of aerial warfare – achieved three key objectives: it ensured an early Indian victory, demoralised the Pakistani military and showed the limitations of nuclear deterrence.

Because of the aerial superiority achieved by the IAF in the war – and again during the 2002 border standoff – the Pakistan Air Force’s “psyche took a big beating”, says Strategy Page report.

While a number of IAF aircraft took part in the Kargil campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 Fulcrum armed with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAF’s plight. “Analyses by Pakistani experts revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the Pakistan Army, angering the latter,” says the report.

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.”

The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis between India and Pakistan. Strategy Page adds: “One Pakistani military expert observed that the PAF’s perceived inability to defend Pakistan’s airspace and even put up a token fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders’ warnings that any Indian attack would lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil and 2002 experiences, PAF’s psyche took a big beating.”

In the report “Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the ongoing ground engagements.”

Lambeth quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence to mount CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that I was ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.”

Although IAF fighters never joined in aerial combat with the PAF F-16s due to the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s strict injunction that Indian forces not cross the LoC, years later IAF chief Anil Tipnis recalled he had “personally authorised his escorting fighter pilots to chase any Pakistani aircraft back across the LoC in hot pursuit were those pilots to be engaged by enemy fighters in aerial combat”.

Operation Vijay

It was when an IAF reconnaissance aircraft sustained a direct hit from a Chinese made Anza shoulder-fired surface to air missile launched by Pakistani intruder, that the IAF launched Operation Vijay to clear the Himalayan peaks. In the early hours of May 26, 1999 six attacks in succession by MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighters were launched against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes in the areas overlooking Dras, Kargil and Batalik.

The MiG-21bis squadron at Srinagar was joined by additional MiG-21M, MiG-23BN and MiG-27ML squadrons, while additional squadrons of MiG-21Ms and MiG-29s deployed northward to Avantipur.

While the MiG-29s kept the F-16s bay, the other IAF aircraft carried out ground sorties.

An example of Indian jugaad – or improvisation – was the use of stopwatches and handheld GPS receivers in their cockpits by MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites. According to Prasun K. Sengupta in “Mountain Warfare and Tri-Service Operations”, another novel technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign entailed selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder supply lines.

Air Marshal Patney said one of his younger pilots decided to carry a small video camera with him in a fighter and to film the area of interest so that an immediate reconnaissance report was available and at an expanded scale. On another instance, the IAF used the MiG-25R – which normally flies at 80,000 ft – in a medium altitude role to improve the resolution of its pictures, something that the aircraft’s Russian designers may not have thought possible.

Laser strikes

However, the MiG-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s – lacking modern weapons – were not making a significant impact on hard to locate enemy positions. MiG-23 and MiG-27 pilots were used to manual dive bombing runs, and this tactic wasn’t suited in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. At this point, the IAF introduced the Mirage 2000H equipped with day and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods.

On June 24, two Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. According to Lambeth, “For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting.”

The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes. Radio intercepts by Indian intelligence revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded, writes D.N. Ganesh in “Indian Air Force in Action”.

Check or checkmate?

The effectiveness of the IAF’s operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, rushed to New Delhi on June 12, and implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes.” You don’t get more desperate than that.

However, the most telling statement on the war was made by India’s then defence minister, George Fernandes. In January 2000, he observed that in precipitating the Kargil War, Pakistan “had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation – that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war.”

In this backdrop, when the current air chief says India might have to look at “some other options” to make Pakistan behave, it is no empty boast.

And you can take that to the bank.

your copy pasting skill is good enough lol

 

[Agent Smith]

your copy pasting skill is good enough lol

yeah the best, but there is more to it, unlike you people I don't copy paste BS

 

[abdulbarijan]

LOL............. first beat mig 29s with your "f16s". your air force fled the fight in Kargil when faced with IAF Mig 29s.

besides common sense is something that you cannot expect in an average pakistani, our air force claims that its frontline aircraft can be beaten by by an outdated aircraft which miserably lost MMRCA bid and failed to impress officials luks like another attempt to fool pakistanis

Hi there --

Isn't it ironic, that the people bringing up common sense are the ones that lack it the most -- let me explain --

-This article was written by an Indian website related to defense i.e "Arming India" -- yet Pakistanis are the idiots for discussing it ... common sense right ?

-F-16 vs Mig-29, there are several other incidences besides the Mig-29 lock on F-16's -- they go something like F-16's chasing Mig-29's without them even knowing and the GCI filling you guys in like "yo brothas -- hate to bring this up -- but you've got a couple of F-16's trailing yo a$$ so better run while you still can" -- and since we've accepted the Mig-29 lock story at Kargil as a reality why not accept the F-16's locking on the SU-30 MKI's and escorting them back in 08 ... or does that hurt that little ego of yours, a little too much?

-As far as the MMRCA goes, it's funny you bring that up here looking at how big of a failure its been -- BTW, did you look at the reasons why the F-16 wasn't short listed -- besides the fact that a certain neighbor was operating it for 20+ years with actual it's use in air to air combat... besides I keep bringing this up -- PAF has evaluated Rafale, EF-2000 and Saab Gripen as well -- The bottom line is,there are alot more factors then simple performance that go in to a final decision ---

But since we're assuming that rejecting F-16's would make them completely inferior and something that the IAF can overwhelm in its sleep -- then what do you have to say about Myanmar going for JF-17, while it could have easily gone for more Mig-29's ----

A sincere advise, please don't copy paste the same BS you find on Bharat Rakshak, the same guys that were too disturbed that their little myths were being busted a little too much to the point they denied access to Pakistani based IP addresses -- and look up a couple posts of Gambit -- an ex USAF pilot and his opinion on the matter --