India already controls the territory in question, it is Pakistan that has the history of attempting to acquire it through warfare. Given the context of military engagements your point is still moot. The reigns to stop these conflicts are in the hands of Pakistan, not India. The latter has not tried to use military might to "absorb" Pakistani territory; in fact it has returned all of the captured areas at the end of each conflict. The Indian government went so far as to not bomb the supply lines of the Pak Army across the LOC during Kargil, which was the IAF's first recommendation and instead sacrificed the lives of thousands of soldiers fighting an uphill battle (literally). The only valid argument I can see pointing towards Indian mobilization has been that involving the Siachen glacier; however the LoC was not defined around the glacier in the Simla accords and there was no bombing or shelling of any sort indicating a hostile intrusion of Pakistani territory (demarcated beyond the LoC)
The level of hostility around 4 decades ago was a lot different than it is today; and yes, having two hostile Pakistans on either side was a risk which needed to be neutralized; and the West Pakistani blunder in the East certainly provided a good reason. However, no Pakistani territory was ever occupied or "absorbed" by India despite the overwhelming military victory; which if I'm not mistaken is still the premise of this argument. I'm sorry for not giving any credence to your source MBI Munshi, the editor and part author of "India Doctrine" a comical compilation of the 'who's who list of disgruntled losers' bemoaning the great Indian tyrant which makes for some truly entertaining reading provided one gives up on reality. You're giving way too much credit to the Akhand Bharat movement by repeatedly quoting sources like MBI Munshi and Quarashi who need to get their Haloperidol prescriptions refilled. If you are taking Indira Gandhi's supposed rhetoric at the height of tensions literally, then why aren't you wondering about the existence of Bangladesh, her decision not to completely destroy western Pakistan despite complete air dominance and returning all the captured land? I'm sorry, but your bogeyman hypothesis has way too many holes in it.
Energon,
I am not sure why you continuously ignore the context in which my comments were made, even though it should have been clear after my exchange with IPF that I was referring to limited territorial ingress by India (capture/absorb whatever) for gaining a bargaining or coercive advantage for whatever goal it had in mind.
And you are wrong, India does not control all of JK while its claim extends to the territory under Pakistan's control. So long as the dispute remains unresolved and India claims the entire territory, the threat of an Indian attack to "absorb/capture" Kashmir remains. That India has not done so so far does not mean anything - the intention to damage Pakistan has already been illustrated beyond a shadow of doubt by virtue of its support for a violent anti-State group and military aggression in East Pakistan, and so long as normalization eludes India and Pakistani relationship, Pakistan has an extremely strong reason to learn from history and maintain a credible military deterrent.
Your argument on Kargil is flawed - India did not initiate strikes in Pakistani territory for the same reason Pakistan severely limited its support for the fighters in Kargil - preventing an escalation of the conflict into a full fledged official war, and resulting in an eventual factoring in of the Nuclear factor.
There was a reason why Indian officials took pains to deny that the IAF ever crossed the LoC when the two Migs were shot down - officially here was no war between India and Pakistan, and Pakistani soldiers had not crossed the LoC.
But even in that restraint was the understanding that Pakistan's conventional deterrent would not allow a cakewalk into Kashmir or Pakistan, allowing for the room Pakistan would need to play the nuclear card.
In East Pakistan India very wisely did not occupy because it had already supported and armed a seperatist movement. There was no way the Bengali nationalists would trade one "occupation" for another. The East Pakistan aggression did however indicate that India would strike Pakistan where it was weak and seek to destroy or dismember it, and that lesson, as I mentioned above, should not be forgotten so long as the relationship remains hostile. Nonetheless, your use of "absorb/capture" is a continued contextual distortion which I clarified in my first paragraph above.
Your continued digression into "Akhand Bharat" references is getting quite irritating honestly. This is the second instance (the other in the history thread) where you have sought to impose views expressed by me in an entirely different context and thread onto the discussion, where I never ventured into the Akhand Bharat issue.
Your accusation of resorting to Munshi and Quraishi quotes is rubbish - at no point have I ever quoted Quraishi or Munshi. Even here the only thing I have borrowed is a quote attributed to Indira Gandhi, and that to point out that what India did in 1971 was nothing but pure calculated aggression backed up by an intensely hostile Indian leadership.
I am not really interested in dealing with this horse pukey in every response of yours where you disagree with me.
I have read this NPEC analysis, and although its fairly decent does not make mention of most facts outside the realm of military posturing which played a big part in the 2002 standoff. Nonetheless it clearly states that Vajpayee's decision not to go to war based on the Pakistan Army's counter mobilization is mere speculation. Also, it does not take into account the fact that Vajpayee was clearly aware that India in 2002 was in absolutely no position to engage in a war (given his administrations economic goals); Colin Powell's intervention with the help of all the CEOs of companies with major stakes in India (The world is Flat- Tom Freedman); or that the grand mobilization was merely a theatrical show of force for which there is a historical precedence; or that Pakistan's not having a no first use policy unlike India actually left the nuclear question totally open. Furthermore, if India truly wanted to be the aggressive tyrant you say it is who refuses to accept Pakistan's right to exist or what have you, then its entire army would be amassed along the border and not harbored in cantonments located in Madhya Pradesh which was the main reason for the longer mobilization time (refer to the Cold Start doctrine literature). In fact, the Cold Start doctrine was adopted after the 2002 episode because it was clear that there was no point in having the cantonments away from the borders; but again, this was reactionary move.
Not just the NPEC, but almost every single analysis of the Cold Start I have read recognizes the importance of the Pakistani conventional deterrent working as planned in conjunction with flaws in the Sundarji doctrine as being responsible for the creation of Cold Start. While US intervention may have been what made India blink first and withdraw, it was the Pakistani conventional deterrent that created the space for that external pressure, as well as the spectre of nuclear war, to come into play.
Some Indians have chosen to go into la la land and buy into the myth of "US business leaders" single handedly making India withdraw. If Friedman actually draws this conclusion then he is ridiculously off keel, though the conclusion might fit in better with the premise of his book and hence might have been drawn with a particular bias and goal in mind.
The Cold Start doctrine was created to address failures that occurred in Op. Parakram, and as such it gives us an insight in to what India actually wanted to achieve, and would want to achieve in a future conflict.
Most analysts agree that it revolves around holding tracts of territory in Pakistan for bargaining strength (hence my argument of absorbing/capturing territory) and/or destroying vital targets, and that leads us to my original argument that a nuclear deterrent is not enough.
The Pakistani terrorism in India goes way beyond the attack on the Parliament. It includes the financial, logistical, spiritual and material support of many a terrorist outfit operating across the border in addition to one of the longest and most expensive insurgency in history. The Parliament attack was merely one incident; but it did at the time put Pakistan at the top of the differential list for a very good reason.
Pakistan has sponsored no terrorism in India. We supported a freedom movement in Kashmir.We did no more than what the CIA did in Latin America, Africa and Afghanistan, or what India did with the Mukti Bahini or what Pakistani intelligence and law enforcement suspects it is doing in Balochistan.
One of the unfortunate consequences of supporting rebels is that you can never control every action they make. The mujahideen committed atrocities in Afghanistan, while the US was supporting them, as did the rebels and regimes supported by the US in Latin America, as did the Mukhti Bahini in East Pakistan.
There has never been institutional support for the attacks on civilians by some rebel groups, though the involvement of rogue officers cannot be ruled out..
These efforts should be commended and promoted. The success of Pakistan in curbing their support for cross border militancy has reduced tensions, finger pointing and reactionary mobilizations; again, for a good reason.
Interestingly one of the Cold Start papers mentions how violence in kashmir actually rose after Operation Parakram, placing even more doubt as to what that exercise achieved.
Over the long run however, infiltration into IOK has declined, and that is to be commended and continued as the two nations work towards normalization.