I would like to build on what
@Oscar stated in his post and address some misconceptions. He is correct in asserting that we adopted a sound strategy to conceal our nukes but his statement may also give the wrong impression.
It is virtually impossible to conceal location of a nuclear facility (and) weapons storage compound on the land from the surveillance system of the US because it is a comprehensive network of different types of assets on land, sea and space that collectively work to identify targets of high value on the land (and underground) around the world. In-fact, American surveillance system is so powerful that it can track anything physical, even targets in motion. However, technical details are understandably scarce and actual capability is deliberately understated in documents released for public consumption. Another thing is that experts working with the surveillance system have considerable know-how of everything nuclear related and are able to figure out nuclear related developments in any part of the world because the fundamentals of such developments do not change much. For example, it is a given for a centrifuge to emit heat and that emission will be instantly picked up by a spy satellite out there. In the end, if a single sensor type won't work, another type might and a network of them is impossible to fool.
Food for thought:
https://intelnews.org/2014/11/06/01-1590/
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/these-are-the-doomsday-satellites-that-detected-the-exp-1737434876
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB439/
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/1970s-spy-satellite-better-than-google-earth.480906/
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.905.1619&rep=rep1&type=pdf
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/radiant-mist.htm
Anyways, credible sources reveal that a large number of Pakistani nukes are kept disassembled and components are moved from one location to another from time-to-time in ordinary vehicles in order to minimize attention. Reason is that a stationary target will not escape detection for long and an ordinary vehicle is unlikely to draw much attention. This strategy sounds risky but it makes the task of neutralizing nuclear assets much harder in a single attempt for a potential enemy.
So if anybody asserts that American spy satellites can be fooled or jammed, his knowledge is limited. There are so many satellites out there that it is impossible to fool all of them at the same time. In-fact, a spy satellite is a silent observer and never registers its presence. We are not talking about GPS here. A genuine expert would tell you why it came down to moving nuclear components in ordinary vehicles in the end.
When it came to our attention that Americans have a contingency plan to seize our nuclear assets should they fall into wrong hands, a number of Pakistani naively boasted that they are fools and such. However, this leak was deliberate to send a statement to those in power in Pakistan that we are watching. To sane minds, this was an eye-opener and a wake-up call.
On a positive note, it is virtually impossible for the India to neutralize Pakistani nuclear capability on its own. I would say that the author of the relevant article is naive. So yes, MAD with India is far from over.
Anyhow, Pakistan is moving in the right direction by developing a seaborne nuclear capability. This would be a force-multiplier.