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Miss/Sir is it possible you are non other than Dr Fair!
Pakistani Military's Conventional Deterrence Against India's Cold Start Doctrine
- Thread starter RiazHaq
- Start date
Kings College War Studies Prof Walter Ladwig on the impact of terrain in India-Pakistan conflict:
http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional Deterrence in South Asia.pdf
The 2,900km long Indo-Pak border is characterized by diverse and
varied terrain that has differential impacts on military operations. To
the north in Kashmir –—which has seen fighting in four wars –the
landscape is mountainous and heavily forested. When combined with a
lack of wide roads, the movement of vehicles and large military
formations is significantly hindered. Moreover, much of the highaltitude
territory suffers from significant snowfall in winter, high levels
of rain, and overall low visibility, the combination of which limit the
operability and payload of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well
as disrupting surveillance and surface communications.47 Depending on
the time of year, it is possible to conduct large-scale military operations
across the Line of Control (LoC) separating Indian and Pakistani
controlled Kashmir in the areas of Jammu south of the Pir Panjal
mountain range and the Kashmir valley.48 However, difficult terrain
and under-developed transport infrastructure in these areas hinders the
ability to concentrate forces, control dispersed units, and marshal
reinforcements and supplies.49 Consequently, as Jack Gill notes a
‘verity’ of combat in Kashmir is that ‘a combination of weather, terrain,
and logistical hindrances … makes swift, deep penetrations unlikely, if
not impossible, in the face of even minor resistance.’
50 This is hardly
ideal for a limited aims offensive that seeks to succeed by quickly
overwhelming or bypassing defending forces.
A second section of the border running from Southern Jammu and
Kashmir through the Punjab down to northern Rajasthan is marked by
a near continuous line of concrete irrigation canals that stretch for
2,000km. Not only does this network of canals and their tributaries –
which have a horizontal depth of up to several kilometers in some
places –form an obstacle in its own right, they have been turned into
defensive fortifications with the addition of large pilings of soil, concrete
bunkers, minefields, and fortified gun emplacements.51 This barrier
system –which runs as close as several kilometers to the international
border –significantly hinders the offensive operations of armored
vehicles while providing concealed fighting positions for defensive
troops who are protected from direct fire and artillery weapons.
Securing a bridgehead and mounting a cross-canal assault against a
dug-in opponent can be expected to be a time consuming and bloody
affair. Beyond the canals, many areas of Pakistani Punjab are densely
populated with several sprawling urban centers, which would also limit
the pace of military operations and the potential for battlefield
awareness.
This section of the border poses several problems for a limited aims
offensive. Regardless of whether the attacker achieves strategic surprise,
as Mearsheimer notes, the kind of forward defenses found here pose
problems for limited incursions on the ground because they allow even
thinly populated defenders to offer stiff resistance.52 Moreover, the
limited aims strategy is based on the belief that in the face of a
successful offensive a defender will either acquiesce or attempt a
counterattack against the aggressor turned defender that results in an
attritional stalemate so costly they eventually abandon it.53 In this
respect, it should be noted that both Kashmir and the Punjab hold great
political significance for both the Indian and Pakistani governments.
Loss of territory in these areas would be unacceptable to the defender,
who would be pressured to escalate the conflict either horizontally or
vertically instead of abandoning further military action.
The third section of the international border, where the Sindh and
Punjab meet, is often described as Pakistan’s major point of strategic
vulnerability. It is in this region, between Sukkur and Rahim Yar Khan,
where the country’s primary north–south transportation artery runs
extremely close to the international border. Consequently, some
analysts have suggested that this leaves Pakistan extremely vulnerable
to a central assault that would spilt the country in two.54 It would be a
significant reversal for the Pakistani government were Karachi and
Hyderabad in the south cut off from Lahore and Islamabad in the north
by a limited incursion. However, that historical risk has been signifi-
cantly alleviated by the construction of a largely parallel highway on the
western side of the Indus River that can facilitate the movement of
goods and military traffic while remaining screened from the international
border by a major river. Although this region lacks the extensive
fortifications described in the northern Punjab, the presence of irrigation
canals and the Indus River will constrain the available axes of
advance for a military force moving from the border towards the
Sukkur–Rahim Yar Khan region. This in turn will allow Pakistani
forces to fight from prepared positions, albeit not as hardened as those
found further north.
The southern-most sections of the international border, consisting
of the flat, barren deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat are extremely
suitable for mechanized military operations. Indeed, during the
2001–2002 Operation ‘Parakram’ the Indian Army reportedly concentrated
all of its offensive forces in Rajasthan, suggesting that the
Thar Desert and the Rann of Kutch is a likely location for either side
to undertake a large-scale armored offensive.55 Although the open
expanse of the Thar Desert lacks the kind of obstacles to a rapid
advance found further north, it also lacks the strategic value attached
to those regions. Irrigated and developed on the Indian side of the
border, on the Pakistani side areas of the harsh desert have been left
empty to provide a natural buffer-zone.
The story is similar in the Rann of Kutch, which depending on the
monsoons, is alternately a windswept desert or a salt marsh. In either
instance, the region has been described by one observer as ‘one of the
world’s least valuable pieces of real estate.’
56 Although relatively easy to capture in a limited aims offensive, neither of these two areas
would offer particularly useful leverage in post-conflict negotiations.
Loss of territory in this region would not impose a major cost on
Pakistan and if anything would allow it to trade space for time as it
readied a counterattack against Indian forces in significantly exposed
terrain.
The particular geography of the Indo-Pak border would inhibit an
RMA-enabled Indian limited aims offensive in two major ways. First,
the difficult terrain in the region north of the Thar Desert would prevent
modern sensor and weapons systems from operating at proving ground
effectiveness, while the presence of natural and man-made obstacles
would hinder a rapid advance. Second, the open spaces further south
that would allow an RMA-enabled force to shine lack the kind of
strategic objectives that would be worthwhile to target with a limited
offensive. Moreover, the vast, open expanse of the desert does not
provide significant advantages to an aggressor who subsequently has to
defend the territory they seized against a counterattack.
http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional Deterrence in South Asia.pdf
The 2,900km long Indo-Pak border is characterized by diverse and
varied terrain that has differential impacts on military operations. To
the north in Kashmir –—which has seen fighting in four wars –the
landscape is mountainous and heavily forested. When combined with a
lack of wide roads, the movement of vehicles and large military
formations is significantly hindered. Moreover, much of the highaltitude
territory suffers from significant snowfall in winter, high levels
of rain, and overall low visibility, the combination of which limit the
operability and payload of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well
as disrupting surveillance and surface communications.47 Depending on
the time of year, it is possible to conduct large-scale military operations
across the Line of Control (LoC) separating Indian and Pakistani
controlled Kashmir in the areas of Jammu south of the Pir Panjal
mountain range and the Kashmir valley.48 However, difficult terrain
and under-developed transport infrastructure in these areas hinders the
ability to concentrate forces, control dispersed units, and marshal
reinforcements and supplies.49 Consequently, as Jack Gill notes a
‘verity’ of combat in Kashmir is that ‘a combination of weather, terrain,
and logistical hindrances … makes swift, deep penetrations unlikely, if
not impossible, in the face of even minor resistance.’
50 This is hardly
ideal for a limited aims offensive that seeks to succeed by quickly
overwhelming or bypassing defending forces.
A second section of the border running from Southern Jammu and
Kashmir through the Punjab down to northern Rajasthan is marked by
a near continuous line of concrete irrigation canals that stretch for
2,000km. Not only does this network of canals and their tributaries –
which have a horizontal depth of up to several kilometers in some
places –form an obstacle in its own right, they have been turned into
defensive fortifications with the addition of large pilings of soil, concrete
bunkers, minefields, and fortified gun emplacements.51 This barrier
system –which runs as close as several kilometers to the international
border –significantly hinders the offensive operations of armored
vehicles while providing concealed fighting positions for defensive
troops who are protected from direct fire and artillery weapons.
Securing a bridgehead and mounting a cross-canal assault against a
dug-in opponent can be expected to be a time consuming and bloody
affair. Beyond the canals, many areas of Pakistani Punjab are densely
populated with several sprawling urban centers, which would also limit
the pace of military operations and the potential for battlefield
awareness.
This section of the border poses several problems for a limited aims
offensive. Regardless of whether the attacker achieves strategic surprise,
as Mearsheimer notes, the kind of forward defenses found here pose
problems for limited incursions on the ground because they allow even
thinly populated defenders to offer stiff resistance.52 Moreover, the
limited aims strategy is based on the belief that in the face of a
successful offensive a defender will either acquiesce or attempt a
counterattack against the aggressor turned defender that results in an
attritional stalemate so costly they eventually abandon it.53 In this
respect, it should be noted that both Kashmir and the Punjab hold great
political significance for both the Indian and Pakistani governments.
Loss of territory in these areas would be unacceptable to the defender,
who would be pressured to escalate the conflict either horizontally or
vertically instead of abandoning further military action.
The third section of the international border, where the Sindh and
Punjab meet, is often described as Pakistan’s major point of strategic
vulnerability. It is in this region, between Sukkur and Rahim Yar Khan,
where the country’s primary north–south transportation artery runs
extremely close to the international border. Consequently, some
analysts have suggested that this leaves Pakistan extremely vulnerable
to a central assault that would spilt the country in two.54 It would be a
significant reversal for the Pakistani government were Karachi and
Hyderabad in the south cut off from Lahore and Islamabad in the north
by a limited incursion. However, that historical risk has been signifi-
cantly alleviated by the construction of a largely parallel highway on the
western side of the Indus River that can facilitate the movement of
goods and military traffic while remaining screened from the international
border by a major river. Although this region lacks the extensive
fortifications described in the northern Punjab, the presence of irrigation
canals and the Indus River will constrain the available axes of
advance for a military force moving from the border towards the
Sukkur–Rahim Yar Khan region. This in turn will allow Pakistani
forces to fight from prepared positions, albeit not as hardened as those
found further north.
The southern-most sections of the international border, consisting
of the flat, barren deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat are extremely
suitable for mechanized military operations. Indeed, during the
2001–2002 Operation ‘Parakram’ the Indian Army reportedly concentrated
all of its offensive forces in Rajasthan, suggesting that the
Thar Desert and the Rann of Kutch is a likely location for either side
to undertake a large-scale armored offensive.55 Although the open
expanse of the Thar Desert lacks the kind of obstacles to a rapid
advance found further north, it also lacks the strategic value attached
to those regions. Irrigated and developed on the Indian side of the
border, on the Pakistani side areas of the harsh desert have been left
empty to provide a natural buffer-zone.
The story is similar in the Rann of Kutch, which depending on the
monsoons, is alternately a windswept desert or a salt marsh. In either
instance, the region has been described by one observer as ‘one of the
world’s least valuable pieces of real estate.’
56 Although relatively easy to capture in a limited aims offensive, neither of these two areas
would offer particularly useful leverage in post-conflict negotiations.
Loss of territory in this region would not impose a major cost on
Pakistan and if anything would allow it to trade space for time as it
readied a counterattack against Indian forces in significantly exposed
terrain.
The particular geography of the Indo-Pak border would inhibit an
RMA-enabled Indian limited aims offensive in two major ways. First,
the difficult terrain in the region north of the Thar Desert would prevent
modern sensor and weapons systems from operating at proving ground
effectiveness, while the presence of natural and man-made obstacles
would hinder a rapid advance. Second, the open spaces further south
that would allow an RMA-enabled force to shine lack the kind of
strategic objectives that would be worthwhile to target with a limited
offensive. Moreover, the vast, open expanse of the desert does not
provide significant advantages to an aggressor who subsequently has to
defend the territory they seized against a counterattack.
patman
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Aha yes , 1 Pakistani xyz = 7 indian xyz logic . Sorry but I can't reason with retarded logics
Got to love Pakistani logic , when the entire world says they lost a war they somehow claim otherwise. I'm sure your textbooks told your military defeated advance aliens militaries too
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp
Manpower : 15%
Fos : 18%
Active personal :48%
Reserve personal : 8%
Total military personnel : 22%
Military budget : 13%
Air crafts: 46%
Flight interceptors : 44%
Attack aircraft : 38%
Transporters : 30%
helicopters : 47%
Tanks : 65%
Afv : 45%
Towed artillery: 38%
Rocket protectors: 46%
Aircraft carriers: 0%
Submarines: 50%
Frigets:70%
Destroyers: 0%
Corvettes:0%
Petrol craft: 12%
Mine warfare craft: 50%
https://www.globalfirepower.com/cou...untry1=india&country2=pakistan&Submit=COMPARE
So total Pakistani arsenal = 32% of Indian arsenal
U.S. has will still have a much larger arsenal if you combined Russia + China + India together.
India that between america and North Korea?????????.....WTF........
30%
0
%
Signalian
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EVIDENCE please...........
Also, are you suggesting that india is on par with america and that the military difference between Pakistan and india is the same as that between america and North Korea?????????.....WTF........
Becuase the indians know that we the Pakistani people are the most deadliest and vicious creatures/weapons on earth when our backs are pushed to the wall. It's part of the same reason why the neo-cons didn't invade us despite them wanting to, like they did with Iraq, Afghanistan etc.
Try not to feed the troll.
PAKISTANFOREVER
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A major flaw. You havn't factored in our nukes........
.......condsidering the fact that india is 7× bigger than Pakistan, the 30% figure is actually quite favourable to us. But ultimately these figures are of no consequence as they are not DECISIVE. If they were then india would have attacked Pakistan by now. As long as india is all talk and remains powerless to fight Pakistan, those figures are just junk. When india gathers the courage and ability to fight Pakistan then come and talk. Otherwise keep dreaming bollywood style....
http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/08/detailed-account-of-fear-and-panic.html
Indian Cowardice and Panic:
Mr. Pradhan has devoted an entire chapter of his book to how General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri, the Indian Army Chief, badly panicked when Pakistani forces mounted a fierce counter-attack during 1965 war. At one point, Gen Chaudhuri ordered Gen Harbakhash Singh to pull back behind the Beas, essentially leaving much of Indian Punjab to Pakistan.
In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic" of his book "1965 War-The Inside Story", R.D. Pradhan describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Kasur sector. When Pakistan Defense Forces counter-attacked the intruding Indian military and the general was fired upon on Sept 6, 1965, he "ran away". Here's an excerpt:
"On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga (Nissan P60 Jeep) to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."
Retreat to Beas:
Chapter 12 of Pradhan's book is titled "Retreat to Beas" in which there is detailed discussion of Indian COAS's proposal for the Indian Army to retreat behind Beas in the face of Pakistan's fierce counter-attacks after India's attempted incursion in Lahore. Pradhan argues in this chapter that during the 1965 war with Pakistan, Indian COAS General Chaudhuri feared that "a major battle the west of the Beas would end in the destruction of the Indian Army and thereafter allow the enemy (Pakistani) forces to push to the gates of Delhi without much resistance".
Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads:
Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.
Harbakhash Singh Memoirs:
In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, according to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only "did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation".
According to Shekhar Gupta, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.
India was the first to accept UN sponsored ceasefire (page 100 of RD Pradhan's book) on Sept 21 followed by Pakistan on Sept 22, bringing the 1965 war to an end on Sept 22, 1965. As the ceasefire took effect, Indian Defense Y.B. Chavan wrote in his diary as follows:
"The ball is now in the political court again--where it should be--and not in the military one. I hope we have the vision and courage to (our) political leadership."
Summary:
Alas, the core issue of Kashmir still remains unresolved 48 years since Mr. Chavan wrote his words of wisdom. And, unfortunately, India's Hindu Nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi refuses to even talk about the Kashmir issue, much less resolve it.
http://www.riazhaq.com/2016/09/performance-of-pakistan-armed-forces-in.html
Talking with Karan Thapar on BBC's Face-to-Face about the 1971 India-Pakistan war, India's Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw said as follows:
"About the 5th day of the (1971) conflict in (East Pakistan)...everything had gone wrong (for India); the (Indian) Navy had lost the Khukri; Our (India) Air Force has lost a lot of aircraft on the ground; my (Indian Army's) advances in Bangladesh were halted......The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan fought very gallantly but they had no chance; they were a thousand miles away from their base; I had 8 or 9 months of preparation; I had almost 50:1 advantage; they had no chance but they fought very gallantly."
Clearly, Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw was the victor of the 1971 war but he also was honest in acknowledging the fact that he had all the advantages over his enemy Pakistan....in fact, he said he had "almost 50:1 advantage".
In addition to praising Pakistan Army's gallantry, the Field Marshal also mentioned the losses suffered by the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. Let's look at what he was talking about.
Sinking of Indian Navy Frigate INS Khukri:
Pakistan Navy submarine PNS Hangor sunk Indian warship INS Khukri off the coast of Diu, Gujarat on December 9, 1971, the first such sinking of a warship since WW2 by a submarine. 194 Indian Navy sailors died in the sinking that has been described in detail by the Indian Defense Review in 2014.
INS Kirpan, another Indian warship which was close by when the attack took place fled the scene rather than attempt to rescue the sailors on board Khukri. Had Kirpan mounted rescue, at least some of the lives of the194 people (18 officers and 176 sailors) who perished in the sinking of INS Khukri could have been saved.
A book by retired Major General Ian Cardozo of the Indian Army on the sinking of Khukri has recorded the dismay of some of survivors at the cowardice INS Kirpan's captain and staff.
“We were hoping that Kirpan, our sister ship would come to rescue us but we saw her sailing away from the area”, Commander Manu Sharma, a survivor of Khukri, has been quoted by Cardozo.
“An early rescue was what everyone hoped for. We thought that at least INS Kirpan would send boat for our rescue, but no rescue boat came from INS Kirpan” Lt Commander SK Basu, who was aboard Khukri and survived the Pakistani attack, told Cardozo.
Prior to the Khukri sinking, Indian Navy had launched missile attacks on Karachi port and destroyed an oil terminal causing a huge oil fire that lit up the night sky.
After the sinking of Khukri, the Indian Navy ceased its attacks on Karachi and moved the focus of its operations to East Pakistan ports like Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. To date, INS Khukri is the only ship lost in combat in the history of the Indian Navy.
Indian Air Force Losses:
Pakistan Air Force struck Indian air bases and destroyed scores of Indian Air Force fighter aircraft sitting on the ground as acknowledged by Field Marshall Manekshaw in his interview with Karan Thapar.
Legendary USAF pilot General Chuck Yeager observed the performance of the Pakistan Air Force in 1971 war. Here's what he wrote in his autobiography "The Right Stuff":
"This air force (the PAF), is second to none...The (1971) air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below...They were really good, aggressive dogfighters and proficient in gunnery and air combat tactics. I was damned impressed. Those guys just lived and breathed flying. "
Ground War on the Western Front:
There is a myth that Pakistan lost the 1971 war not just in the East but also on the western front. India did take territory in farflung, desolate and uninhabited areas of negligible importance but lost more of the fertile land in strategic areas.
Here's an except from Indian Defense Review on 1971 ground war on western front:
"The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert. In both regions these gains lay in farflung, desolate, uninhabited and difficult areas of negligible economic, strategic and political value which could hurt the rulers of Pakistan only in their prestige. On the other hand, Sartaj Singh lost the area of Chhamb, where the aftermath of the refugee problem still haunts the Jammu and Kashmir administration. The loss of the Kasowala bulge, the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agricultural belt in Punjab could not be equated with marginal gains in the Sehjra bulge and the Mamdot enclave in economic, military or political terms. The Indian occupation of the major portion of the Shakargarh bulge was somewhat embarrassing to the Bhutto government.....Rawlley lost more than he gained in Punjab. The loss of Hussainiwala, the Fazilka cotton track and Chhina Bidhi Chand were inexcusable. The battle in this sector was a peripheral loss and gain of border outposts and nothing more."
Summary:
Pakistan Army fought gallantly against an Indian Army which had an "almost 50:1 advantage" in East Pakistan as acknowledged by Indian Army Chief Sam Maneckshaw who led the Indian military to victory over Pakistan in 1971.
At the same time, Pakistani Army, Navy and Air Force scored major successes against India on the western front. Pakistanis not only captured territory of greater economic and strategic value from India but also inflicted disproportionately heavy damage to Indian Air Force and Navy in 1971.
Here's a video clip of Sam Maneckshaw speaking with Karan Thapar on 1971 war:
patman
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Your links are cancer tier propaganda , anyone who can google can debunk you .http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/08/detailed-account-of-fear-and-panic.html
Indian Cowardice and Panic:
Mr. Pradhan has devoted an entire chapter of his book to how General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri, the Indian Army Chief, badly panicked when Pakistani forces mounted a fierce counter-attack during 1965 war. At one point, Gen Chaudhuri ordered Gen Harbakhash Singh to pull back behind the Beas, essentially leaving much of Indian Punjab to Pakistan.
In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic" of his book "1965 War-The Inside Story", R.D. Pradhan describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Kasur sector. When Pakistan Defense Forces counter-attacked the intruding Indian military and the general was fired upon on Sept 6, 1965, he "ran away". Here's an excerpt:
"On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga (Nissan P60 Jeep) to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."
Retreat to Beas:
Chapter 12 of Pradhan's book is titled "Retreat to Beas" in which there is detailed discussion of Indian COAS's proposal for the Indian Army to retreat behind Beas in the face of Pakistan's fierce counter-attacks after India's attempted incursion in Lahore. Pradhan argues in this chapter that during the 1965 war with Pakistan, Indian COAS General Chaudhuri feared that "a major battle the west of the Beas would end in the destruction of the Indian Army and thereafter allow the enemy (Pakistani) forces to push to the gates of Delhi without much resistance".
Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads:
Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.
Harbakhash Singh Memoirs:
In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, according to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only "did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation".
According to Shekhar Gupta, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.
India was the first to accept UN sponsored ceasefire (page 100 of RD Pradhan's book) on Sept 21 followed by Pakistan on Sept 22, bringing the 1965 war to an end on Sept 22, 1965. As the ceasefire took effect, Indian Defense Y.B. Chavan wrote in his diary as follows:
"The ball is now in the political court again--where it should be--and not in the military one. I hope we have the vision and courage to (our) political leadership."
Summary:
Alas, the core issue of Kashmir still remains unresolved 48 years since Mr. Chavan wrote his words of wisdom. And, unfortunately, India's Hindu Nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi refuses to even talk about the Kashmir issue, much less resolve it.
http://www.riazhaq.com/2016/09/performance-of-pakistan-armed-forces-in.html
Talking with Karan Thapar on BBC's Face-to-Face about the 1971 India-Pakistan war, India's Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw said as follows:
"About the 5th day of the (1971) conflict in (East Pakistan)...everything had gone wrong (for India); the (Indian) Navy had lost the Khukri; Our (India) Air Force has lost a lot of aircraft on the ground; my (Indian Army's) advances in Bangladesh were halted......The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan fought very gallantly but they had no chance; they were a thousand miles away from their base; I had 8 or 9 months of preparation; I had almost 50:1 advantage; they had no chance but they fought very gallantly."
Clearly, Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw was the victor of the 1971 war but he also was honest in acknowledging the fact that he had all the advantages over his enemy Pakistan....in fact, he said he had "almost 50:1 advantage".
In addition to praising Pakistan Army's gallantry, the Field Marshal also mentioned the losses suffered by the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. Let's look at what he was talking about.
Sinking of Indian Navy Frigate INS Khukri:
Pakistan Navy submarine PNS Hangor sunk Indian warship INS Khukri off the coast of Diu, Gujarat on December 9, 1971, the first such sinking of a warship since WW2 by a submarine. 194 Indian Navy sailors died in the sinking that has been described in detail by the Indian Defense Review in 2014.
INS Kirpan, another Indian warship which was close by when the attack took place fled the scene rather than attempt to rescue the sailors on board Khukri. Had Kirpan mounted rescue, at least some of the lives of the194 people (18 officers and 176 sailors) who perished in the sinking of INS Khukri could have been saved.
A book by retired Major General Ian Cardozo of the Indian Army on the sinking of Khukri has recorded the dismay of some of survivors at the cowardice INS Kirpan's captain and staff.
“We were hoping that Kirpan, our sister ship would come to rescue us but we saw her sailing away from the area”, Commander Manu Sharma, a survivor of Khukri, has been quoted by Cardozo.
“An early rescue was what everyone hoped for. We thought that at least INS Kirpan would send boat for our rescue, but no rescue boat came from INS Kirpan” Lt Commander SK Basu, who was aboard Khukri and survived the Pakistani attack, told Cardozo.
Prior to the Khukri sinking, Indian Navy had launched missile attacks on Karachi port and destroyed an oil terminal causing a huge oil fire that lit up the night sky.
After the sinking of Khukri, the Indian Navy ceased its attacks on Karachi and moved the focus of its operations to East Pakistan ports like Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. To date, INS Khukri is the only ship lost in combat in the history of the Indian Navy.
Indian Air Force Losses:
Pakistan Air Force struck Indian air bases and destroyed scores of Indian Air Force fighter aircraft sitting on the ground as acknowledged by Field Marshall Manekshaw in his interview with Karan Thapar.
Legendary USAF pilot General Chuck Yeager observed the performance of the Pakistan Air Force in 1971 war. Here's what he wrote in his autobiography "The Right Stuff":
"This air force (the PAF), is second to none...The (1971) air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below...They were really good, aggressive dogfighters and proficient in gunnery and air combat tactics. I was damned impressed. Those guys just lived and breathed flying. "
Ground War on the Western Front:
There is a myth that Pakistan lost the 1971 war not just in the East but also on the western front. India did take territory in farflung, desolate and uninhabited areas of negligible importance but lost more of the fertile land in strategic areas.
Here's an except from Indian Defense Review on 1971 ground war on western front:
"The major Indian gains claimed in terms of area were about 3,200 square kilometres in the Ladakh region under Lt Gen Sartaj Singh and 1,200 square kilometres. under Lt Gen G G Bewoor in the Rajasthan Desert. In both regions these gains lay in farflung, desolate, uninhabited and difficult areas of negligible economic, strategic and political value which could hurt the rulers of Pakistan only in their prestige. On the other hand, Sartaj Singh lost the area of Chhamb, where the aftermath of the refugee problem still haunts the Jammu and Kashmir administration. The loss of the Kasowala bulge, the Hussainiwala enclave and the Fazilka agricultural belt in Punjab could not be equated with marginal gains in the Sehjra bulge and the Mamdot enclave in economic, military or political terms. The Indian occupation of the major portion of the Shakargarh bulge was somewhat embarrassing to the Bhutto government.....Rawlley lost more than he gained in Punjab. The loss of Hussainiwala, the Fazilka cotton track and Chhina Bidhi Chand were inexcusable. The battle in this sector was a peripheral loss and gain of border outposts and nothing more."
Summary:
Pakistan Army fought gallantly against an Indian Army which had an "almost 50:1 advantage" in East Pakistan as acknowledged by Indian Army Chief Sam Maneckshaw who led the Indian military to victory over Pakistan in 1971.
At the same time, Pakistani Army, Navy and Air Force scored major successes against India on the western front. Pakistanis not only captured territory of greater economic and strategic value from India but also inflicted disproportionately heavy damage to Indian Air Force and Navy in 1971.
Here's a video clip of Sam Maneckshaw speaking with Karan Thapar on 1971 war:
In fact I'll do it now in front of everyone using international sources
BBC.
At the end of the war, this is what India said the tally looked like:
- India won 1,920 sqkm of territory; Pakistan won 540 sqkm
- 2,862 Indian soldiers were killed; Pakistan lost 5,800 soldiers
- India lost 97 tanks; 450 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or captured
- Retired American diplomat Dennis Kux: "......India had the better of the war. Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated."
- American author Stanley Wolpert: "The war ended in what appeared to be a draw .....India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the ceasefire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to [Pakistani president] Ayub's chagrin."
- English historian John Keay: "The war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate."
Russia bth
https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger...war-why-india-quit-when-it-was-winning_394095
Indian troupes in lahore
Dawn
https://www.dawn.com/news/1204953
"
the celebration of the victory in the 1965 war round the corner, there can be no bigger lie [than] that Pakistan won the war,” he was reported to have said. “We lost terribly in the 1965 war.”
And all while India was still recovering from the 62 war with China
Why does that matter? Pakistan is the 5th most populous country yet they are not in the top ten militaries . Your military is smaller then south KoreaA major flaw. You havn't factored in our nukes........
Lol
India is not a military puppet like Pakistan to invade its neighbors, We gave back all the territories we won in both 65 & 71 war. Ironically we could have annexed p.0.k any time post 71 as a nuclear country , yet we didn't
Kim is that you?
PAKISTANFOREVER
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Your links are cancer tier propaganda , anyone who can google can debunk you .
In fact I'll do it now in front of everyone using international sources
BBC.
At the end of the war, this is what India said the tally looked like:
least three independent authors believed India had an upper hand in the war:
- India won 1,920 sqkm of territory; Pakistan won 540 sqkm
- 2,862 Indian soldiers were killed; Pakistan lost 5,800 soldiers
- India lost 97 tanks; 450 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or captured
- Retired American diplomat Dennis Kux: "......India had the better of the war. Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated."
- American author Stanley Wolpert: "The war ended in what appeared to be a draw .....India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the ceasefire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to [Pakistani president] Ayub's chagrin."
New York Times
- English historian John Keay: "The war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate."
Russia bth
https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger...war-why-india-quit-when-it-was-winning_394095
Indian troupes in lahore
Dawn
https://www.dawn.com/news/1204953
"
the celebration of the victory in the 1965 war round the corner, there can be no bigger lie [than] that Pakistan won the war,” he was reported to have said. “We lost terribly in the 1965 war.”
And all while India was still recovering from the 62 war with China
Why does that matter? Pakistan is the 5th most populous country yet they are not in the top ten militaries . Your military is smaller then south Korea
Lol
India is not a military puppet like Pakistan to invade its neighbors, We gave back all the territories we won in both 65 & 71 war. Ironically we could have annexed p.0.k any time post 71 as a nuclear country , yet we didn't
Kim is that you?
indians are all mouth. Just looking for strawman arguments for your weakness and inability to fight Pakistan. All talk no action. indians are all united and eager on the issue of destroying Pakistan and the Pakistani race. Making daily threats but NEVER carrying them out against a nation that is more than 7× smaller than india.
You talk about capture of land but you forget August the 14th 1947 when a Pakistani minority was able to dismember india and annex 30% of indian territory to create our nation. india cannot EVER get that conquered territory back again......
PS is Kim the guy pleasuring your wife or mama due to your little weaner......
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Indus Pakistan
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Appreciate your detailed response. My thoughts on this subject -
- Up to late 1960s the conventional disparity was insufficient for India to 'cull' Pakistan. Although india still had superiority in numbers but it was nominal and this is reflected in how Pakistan was the aggressor in 1965.
- However from 1971 the disparity increased. From mid 1970s onwards was opportune time for India to destroy - not conquer/annex as that is beyond India but to destroy the Pakistani state. [India has over half a million soldiers stationed to pacify few million Kashmiri's]. This window lasted from 1971 on to early 1990s. Nothing ever is perfect. No war as been fought in ideal circumstances. From perspective of India it was 'the moment' missed. I think this was down to internal weakness in the Indian society. Both countries are not suited for long term, heavy wars of attrition like Europe/Japan were in both WWs.
- Post 1998 and the nuclear dawn the possibility of India attacking or posing a existential threat is in my opinion zero. I cannot see India attacking now when the cost of such mis-adventure would be nuclear war. If India did not do this when the 'window was open' from 1971 to 1990 when the military disparity was the greatest the chance of that now is zero.
- However I think the rivalry between both countries will focus on geo-strategy and the economic field. The critical factor will be which of these countries creates a fair, social, economic, safe, secure and stable internal environment. This is where the rivalry will be played out. This is where Pakistan is losing. We have a reputation as terrorist, radical, misogynist, crazed country on earth and this is reflected in the stock value of Pakistan's passport which lingers right at the bottom with Afghanistan and Syria. This makes Pakistam's position in my estimation even worse then both those countries. At least they are at war and have foreign armies trampling ove them.
- The problem in Pakistan is there is little appetite to tackle this problem. To begin with the in your face use of religion as a commodity has to stop. But the problem is the very elite that should tackle the problem has been cultivating this beast. Religion has been the red flag that has been used to distract and hypnotize the bull called the Pakistani masses. However the good news is with increasing Chinese influence we have a outside party that has the means and the reasons to push the elite to sort out the madhouse we call Pakistan. I am placing lot of store on the China factor in taming the rampent fake religious piety that has wrought destruction and obfuscated from what needs to be done instead Pakistan. Some of that is apparent even on this forum.
- To be sure Pakistan should have enjoyed the nuclear dividend. That is with MAD in place and Indian threat efectively checkmated the conventional size of Pak military should have been drastically cut by as much as 30%. We do not need masses of armour when huge tank protracted tank battle will not take place as soon the nuclear 'click' will kick in. However because of no civilian oversight of Pak armed forces and the institutional inertia - no organizations likes saying 'look we need to downsize' this has not happened. The resources saved could be spent on beefing up internal security forces and establish the effective law and order within the country.
- I think the rivalry between Pakistan and India is not neccassrily a bad thing. Only we need to focus on the economic, health and sports. This can only help both peoples to rise. We have too many poor people.
- On another note your post brings out what I have been saying for a long time. Pakistan does have a geographic reality underpining it. You alluded to it. The Indus Valley is effectively differantiated from rest of South Asia by first the Rann of Kutch which I have shown as red and the [ii]Thar Desert which I have shown as yellow. Only in the northern portion of both Punjabs does the divide become fuzzy. For vast majority of Pakistan/India border there exists the real physical differantiation.
@Cybernetics @Joe Shearer
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Your links are cancer tier propaganda , anyone who can google can debunk you .
In fact I'll do it now in front of everyone using international sources
BBC.
At the end of the war, this is what India said the tally looked like:
least three independent authors believed India had an upper hand in the war:
- India won 1,920 sqkm of territory; Pakistan won 540 sqkm
- 2,862 Indian soldiers were killed; Pakistan lost 5,800 soldiers
- India lost 97 tanks; 450 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or captured
- Retired American diplomat Dennis Kux: "......India had the better of the war. Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated."
- American author Stanley Wolpert: "The war ended in what appeared to be a draw .....India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the ceasefire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to [Pakistani president] Ayub's chagrin."
New York Times
- English historian John Keay: "The war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate."
Russia bth
https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger...war-why-india-quit-when-it-was-winning_394095
Indian troupes in lahore
Dawn
https://www.dawn.com/news/1204953
"
the celebration of the victory in the 1965 war round the corner, there can be no bigger lie [than] that Pakistan won the war,” he was reported to have said. “We lost terribly in the 1965 war.”
And all while India was still recovering from the 62 war with China
Why does that matter? Pakistan is the 5th most populous country yet they are not in the top ten militaries . Your military is smaller then south Korea
Lol
India is not a military puppet like Pakistan to invade its neighbors, We gave back all the territories we won in both 65 & 71 war. Ironically we could have annexed p.0.k any time post 71 as a nuclear country , yet we didn't
Kim is that you?
The above source you quote is indian so it is invalid. Need genuine, independent, irrefutable, reliable and concrete proof of your claims. An indian source discredits your them.
TMA
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The neocons are clever. A direct invasion of a nuclear armed state is pretty much impossible or at least too risky. So set up a base next door and promote 5th Gen warfare to soften up the target slowly until the time is right....EVIDENCE please...........
Also, are you suggesting that india is on par with america and that the military difference between Pakistan and india is the same as that between america and North Korea?????????.....WTF........
Becuase the indians know that we the Pakistani people are the most deadliest and vicious creatures/weapons on earth when our backs are pushed to the wall. It's part of the same reason why the neo-cons didn't invade us despite them wanting to, like they did with Iraq, Afghanistan etc.
patman
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30%
- 1947
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Pak major
When did India threaten Pakistan it will invade them ? Dfuk
Pakistan was created by the British from British-raj , not republic of India.
indian cannot EVER get that conquered territory back again......
Why would we invade Pakistan , seriously wtf , imperial era is dead , we don't need more ppl to mooch out of rest of India . Even if we invade Pakistan we will never control it , we will just spit ir into smaller sovereign countries, giving India a decent buffer zone .
Don't impose your family pleasures on othersPS is Kim the guy pleasuring your wife or mama due to your little weaner......
PAKISTANFOREVER
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More strawman arguments. No evidence to back your claims. Just opinions from youtube.........
..............clutching at straws in trying to explain why india is too weak and powerless to do anything to Pakistan despite being 7x bigger than us and having abundant access to the world's most advanced weapons systems whilst we are denied this privilege.......PS like all indians you make many outlandish claims but always fail to back them up with real evidence or real actions.....
True. Americans only attack super weak nations like Iraq or Afghanistan.
patman
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.Just opinions from youtube.........
That's your Pakistani airforce major , so now you know more than your own military?
Yes mighty like cuba vs nato , U.S. vs north Korea , China vs Vietnam , China vs Bhutan, Russia vs Ukraine
despite being 7x bigger than us and having abundant access to the world's most advanced weapons systems whilst we are denied this privilege.......
*insert generic copy-paste reply*
-blitzkrieg-
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Since you deliebrately didnt share the URL ..here it is ..BBc india page
Are India's plans to celebrate 1965 war 'victory' in 'bad taste'?
bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33815204
Those are Indian govt. figures. What about our figures, which we didnt choose to respond bbc india when they tried approaching us on as the same article claims.
*Pakistan has not responded to attempts by the BBC to verify the numbers.*
The overall narrative is that Pakistan got pushed back on kashmir front and India got pushed back on the Lahore,kasur,sialkot and rajisthan fronts.
Technically and by definition a war is fought across international borders not LOC (claimed by both sides)..With that in mind Pakistan India had only two wars, where Pakistan won the 65 onslaught for occupying more Indian territory across international border and India won 71 because of its intrusion into Bangladesh.What happens across disputed borders is a 'confliuct' not 'war'..
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