Pakistani Military's Conventional Deterrence Against India's Cold Start Doctrine

[Signalian]

Compare each category

https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp

Manpower : 15%

Fos : 18%

Active personal :48%

Reserve personal : 8%

Total military personnel : 22%

Military budget : 13%

Air crafts: 46%

Flight interceptors : 44%

Attack aircraft : 38%

Transporters : 30%

helicopters : 47%

Tanks : 65%

Afv : 45%

Towed artillery: 38%

Rocket protectors: 46%

Aircraft carriers: 0%

Submarines: 50%

Frigets:70%

Destroyers: 0%

Corvettes:0%

Petrol craft: 12%

Mine warfare craft: 50%

https://www.globalfirepower.com/cou...untry1=india&country2=pakistan&Submit=COMPARE

So total Pakistani arsenal = 32% of Indian arsenal

Compared on paper, India can be a Paper Tiger

Reality is quite different.

 

[BetterPakistan]

I don't think that Pakistan will need nukes to deter any kind of aggression from India. We have always stood in front of them without our nukes back in 65 or kargil. Pakistan can defeat them conventionally and we have multiple solutions for CSD. I completely trust my armed forces and seeing their incredible fighting history I am sure they will dismantle those Indian cowards if they tried to cross the red line.

 

[khanmubashir]

http://www.riazhaq.com/2018/03/pakistani-militarys-conventional.html

It is widely assumed that India enjoys substantial conventional military superiority over Pakistan. Many speculate that the difference between the conventional military strengths of the two South Asian rivals is so great that Pakistan would be forced to quickly resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an Indian attack. Are these assumptions and speculations accurate? How has the situation evolved since the nations went nuclear in 1998? Are nukes Pakistan's only deterrence against Indian aggression? Let's examine the answers to these questions based on the recent work of several analysts and authors.


India-Pakistan Standoff 2001-2002:

Soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, there was an incident with several gunmen entering the Indian parliament building and killing 14 people on December 13, 2001. India immediately accused Pakistan of involvement in the attack and vowed to respond militarily. Pakistan categorically denied India's accusations.

What followed was a massive mobilization of Indian troops to the Line of Control in Kashmir and the international border with Pakistan. It was dubbed "Operation Parakram" by the Indian Army. Pakistan responded with its own major mobilization of troops on its side of the LoC and the international border. Thus began the longest standoff between the two neighbors.

By October 2002, India began to pull back its troops along her border and later Pakistan did the same, and in November 2003 a cease-fire between the two nations was signed. Why did India back off from its explicit threats to attack Pakistan? A recent book "Defeat is an Orphan" by Myra McDonald answers this question as follows:

"Since partition, the Indian Army--with 1.1 million men compared to 550,000 in the Pakistan Army--had the advantage in terms of numbers. But it was a lumbering beast. India's vast size meant the army was spread more thinly across the country than in Pakistan, acting as a brake on mobilization. Its three armoured strike corps, designed to strike deep into Pakistan territory, were based in central India and took nearly three weeks to maneuver into position because of their sheer size. The slowness of the mobilization gave Pakistan enough time to prepare its defenses....Much of the equipment pressed into frontline service, from Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage to even older artillery pieces, was barely suited to fighting a modern war. It was only when the Indian Army began to mobilize that its slowness and shortages ---of road vehicles for deployment, missiles, ammunition, and war stores---became apparent. "The very first few days of Operation Parakram exposed the hollowness of our operational preparedness," said General V.K.Singh, who was then with XI Corps in Punjab. Having lost the advantage of surprise because of its slow mobilization, the Indian Army did not have enough superiority in numbers and equipment to guarantee a decisive victory. Nor could it rely on air power to make up for its weakness on the ground. At independence, India had abolished the role of commander-in-chief of all armed forces, replacing it with three weaker, co-equal, service chiefs who each had a tendency to go their own way. Thus though India's air power was superior to that of Pakistan in 2001-2002, the different branches of its armed forces were not integrated enough to consider a ground assault backed by air strikes and close air support. Had India pressed ahead with an attack on Pakistan that January--and in such situation is with the defender--it risked becoming quickly bogged down. "The slender edge that India had could have led to nothing but a stalemate and...a stalemate between a large and much smaller country amounts to victory for the smaller country, " said Brigadier Kanwal in an analysis of India's military preparedness. Nor did India have the capacity to dig in for a long war where its greater size relative to Pakistan could have eventually triumphed. Thanks to cutbacks, it had run down stocks of ammunition to save money. Even without Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons to deter an Indian invasion, the balance of power in conventional forces was enough to give pause for thought."

India's Cold Start Doctrine:

The Failure of India's Operation Parakram forced some soul searching and a re-evaluation that gave birth to the Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). It is a limited-war strategy designed to quickly seize Pakistani territory without provoking a a nuclear conflict. Supposedly a secret strategy, Indian Army Chief General Rawat confirmed its existence in 2017. Here's an analysis by Indian analyst Meenakshi Sood of India's CSD and Pakistan's expected response:

"While Pakistan’s nuclear response to CSD (Cold Start Doctrine) has dominated the narrative, it is the conventional response that was devised first. In the last few years of General Musharraf’s presidency, especially between 2004 and 2007, India and Pakistan were engaged in backchannel negotiations and came tantalizingly close to finding a solution to the Kashmir issue. Then the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement forced Musharraf out of power and a new leadership took charge. With General Kayani as the new chief of army staff, the threat from India came back into focus, and so did the perceived risk of CSD. Given India’s military capability and its declared Cold Start Doctrine, Kayani believed that Pakistan could not afford to let its guard down as the country prepared according to “adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions.” He went on to give his assessment of the timeline by which India would be able to operationalize CSD — two years for partial implementation and five years for full — betraying the urgency he attached to a counter-response. Between 2009 and 2013, the Pakistan Army conducted military exercises codenamed Azm-e-Nau to formalize and operationalize a conventional response to CSD. At its conclusion, Pakistan adopted a “new concept of war fighting” (NCWF) that aims to improve mobilization time of troops and enhance inter-services coordination, especially between the Army and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). To this end, Pakistan Air Force’s aerial exercise High Mark was conducted alongside Azm-e-Nau III in 2010, which saw the participation of over 20,000 troops from all services in areas of southern Punjab, Sialkot, and Sindh along Pakistan’s eastern border with India. The 2010 exercises were the largest conducted by the Army since 1989. PAF’s exercise High Mark, conducted every five years, synchronizes the Air Force’s response with Army maneuvers, covering a vast area from Skardu in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. As per military sources, with the implementation of the NCFW, the Pakistan Army will be able to mobilize even faster than India. This should worry India as CSD’s raison d’etre lies in the short reaction time it requires to launch an offensive. If Pakistan is indeed able to mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot, literally and figuratively, it blunts the effectiveness of the Indian military doctrine."

India's Conventional Superiority:

Professor Walter Ladwig III of the Department of War Studies at London's Kings College says that India's conventional edge over Pakistan is overblown. In a 2015 paper, Ladwig wrote that Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against India in the near to medium term is "much better than the pessimists allege". Here's an excerpt of Ladwig's paper titled "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia":

"In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure".

Summary:

Common assumptions about India's insurmountable conventional superiority over Pakistan are not founded in reality, according to military experts. Professor Walter Ladwig of the War Studies Department at London's Kings College believes that Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against India in the near to medium term is "much better than the pessimists allege". Pakistan's NCWF (New Concept of War Fighting) developed in response to India's CSD (Cold Start Doctrine) is designed to "mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot", according to Indian analyst Meenakshi Sood. Ladwig sums it up well: "Despite a growing technological edge (over Pakistan) in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure".

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Is Pakistan Ready for War with India?

India's Israel Envy: What If Modi Attacks Pakistan?

Project Azm: Pakistan to Develop 5th Generation Fighter Jet

Pakistan Navy Modernization

Pakistan's Sea-Based Second Strike Capability

Who Won the 1965 War? India or Pakistan?

Pakistani Military's Performance in 1971 War

http://www.riazhaq.com/2018/03/pakistani-militarys-conventional.html

USA war of Iraq proved to be much more slow and difficult then expected and power difference between India and Pak is Much smaller than USA and iraq

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

With 16 years old incident you are determining deterrent is hilarious.

EXACTLY!!!!!!.........Pakistan is MUCH more technologically, scientifically, militarily and economically powerful now then it was in 2002........

So much so that a country that is more than 7x bigger than us and has abundant access to the world's most advanced weapons systems whilst we are denied this privilege CANNOT fight us despite outlandish claims by them..........

Which is ALSO why one of ONLY 2 global superpowers have invested in at least $62 billion in Pakistan with many more billions earmarked for further investments in the coming years and decades..............

 

[Sine Nomine]

That's newyork times , literally the most reputable news outlet in the world . Then again you only buy n.Korean tier propaganda

It literally is gospel of truth from N.Y times.

 

[patman]

It literally is gospel of truth from N.Y times.

You claimed it was a indian propaganda , I just provided the most reputable news source out there

Compared on paper, India can be a Paper Tiger

Reality is quite different.

 

[Trango Towers]

I gave a international source not a propaganda link like raq, don't get butt hurt over simple math. Pakistan has 13% of the Indian budget , obviously India will have better & more equipment

If budgets and size mattered Israel wouldn't exist. Alexander the great wouldn't have conquered half of the world. And India would be a super power. Reality and dreams are very different

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

If budgets want size mattered Israel wouldn't exist. Alexander the great wouldn't have conquered half of the world. And India would be a super power. Reality and dreams are very different

indian CANNOT defeat Pakistan in a war. If they could they would have attacked us by now, considering how much they hate us. The most extreme hatred in the world. All indians are is TALK. The only thing indians can do is blow hot air on the internet and make outlandish childish statements.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

indian CANNOT defeat Pakistan in a war. If they could they would have attacked us by now, considering how much they hate us. The most extreme hatred in the world. All indians are is TALK. The only thing indians can do is blow hot air on the internet and make outlandish childish statements.

With nearly seven times advantage in population/resources the asymmetry between the two countries in favour of India is same as tiny Belgium/Germany. And we know Germany looked at and used Belgium as a doormat to France etc. It never for second was contained by the Belgians.

Point being India should have 'squashed' Pakistan by now as Fair suggested but it has not. Indeed India has not even managed to retrieve Azad Kashmir from Pakistan let alone destroying Pakistan. Of course if we ignore when it joined the Banglas but we don't have any more Banglas.

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

comparing army's war wastage to a militaries arsenal

Pakistani military not only have inferior tech they are outnumbered with only 30% of Indian current arsenal

Fyi India defeated Pakistan in 71 in just 15 days

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971

comparing army's war wastage to a militaries arsenal

Pakistani military not only have inferior tech they are outnumbered with only 30% of Indian current arsenal

Fyi India defeated Pakistan in 71 in just 15 days

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971

Where is your evidence that Pakistan has inferior

With nearly seven times advantage in population/resources the asymmetry between the two countries in favour of India is same as tiny Belgium/Germany. And we know Germany looked at and used Belgium as a doormat to France etc. It never for second was contained by the Belgians.

Point being India should have 'squashed' Pakistan by now as Fair suggested but it has not. Indeed India has not even managed to retrieve Azad Kashmir from Pakistan let alone destroying Pakistan. Of course if we ignore when it joined the Banglas but we don't have any more Banglas.

The

With nearly seven times advantage in population/resources the asymmetry between the two countries in favour of India is same as tiny Belgium/Germany. And we know Germany looked at and used Belgium as a doormat to France etc. It never for second was contained by the Belgians.

Point being India should have 'squashed' Pakistan by now as Fair suggested but it has not. Indeed India has not even managed to retrieve Azad Kashmir from Pakistan let alone destroying Pakistan. Of course if we ignore when it joined the Banglas but we don't have any more Banglas.

Just looking at reality and nothing else, india CANNOT fight Pakistan. No matter what any indian says or does, whatever threats they make, it all comes back to 0. Because they NEVER do anything. Just talk. I have come to realize that indians are all mouth, nothing more. If india could do ANYTHING they would have done so by now. Instead Pakistan becomes more powerful and stronger each day.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Just looking at reality and nothing else, india CANNOT fight Pakistan.

With advent of nuclear weapons it was over. 1998 suited Pakistan. Nukes are great equalizer and suit the smaller party as they negate numerical advantage.

What I have never understood from the Indian perspective is India had vastly greater resources. As you state nearly 7 times greater population. Why did it not go all out in 1970s or even 1980s and just overwhelm Pakistan in a war of attrition? Similar to how allies defeated Germany through just shear numbers. Pakistan could have been exhausted and bled dry by India. But it did not. @AUSTERLITZ can perhaps can give reason why India utterly failed to use it's 'size' and 'numbers' advantage.

Now in the age of nukes that opportunity has been closed.

 

[patman]

Where is your evudence that Pakistan has inferior

30% arsenal

Just looking at reality and nothing else, india CANNOT fight Pakistan. No matter what any indian says or does, whatever threats they make, it all comes back to 0. Because they NEVER do anything. Just talk. I have come to realize that indians are all mouth, nothing more. If india could do ANYTHING they would have done so by now. Instead Pakistan becomes more powerful and stronger each day.

Sounds like
Something n.Korea would say.

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

30% arsenal





Sounds like
Something n.Korea would say.

EVIDENCE please...........


Also, are you suggesting that india is on par with america and that the military difference between Pakistan and india is the same as that between america and North Korea?????????.....WTF........

With advent of nuclear weapons it was over. 1998 suited Pakistan. Nukes are great equalizer and suit the smaller party as they negate numerical advantage.

What I have never understood from the Indian perspective is India had vastly greater resources. As you state nearly 7 times greater population. Why did it not go all out in 1970s or even 1980s and just overwhelm Pakistan in a war of attrition? Similar to how allies defeated Germany through just shear numbers. Pakistan could have been exhausted and bled dry by India. But it did not. @AUSTERLITZ can perhaps can give reason why India utterly failed to use it's 'size' and 'numbers' advantage.

Now in the age of nukes that opportunity has been closed.

Becuase the indians know that we the Pakistani people are the most deadliest and vicious creatures/weapons on earth when our backs are pushed to the wall. It's part of the same reason why the neo-cons didn't invade us despite them wanting to, like they did with Iraq, Afghanistan etc.

 

[Ultima Thule]

30% arsenal

And this 30% arsenal will destroy India Perfectly to Stonehenge, war is win by will not in numbers @patman and what happen in 65's there was a 1:3 ratio b/w India and Pakistan and still not capture Lahore lets forget Pakistan @patman

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

With advent of nuclear weapons it was over. 1998 suited Pakistan. Nukes are great equalizer and suit the smaller party as they negate numerical advantage.

What I have never understood from the Indian perspective is India had vastly greater resources. As you state nearly 7 times greater population. Why did it not go all out in 1970s or even 1980s and just overwhelm Pakistan in a war of attrition? Similar to how allies defeated Germany through just shear numbers. Pakistan could have been exhausted and bled dry by India. But it did not. @AUSTERLITZ can perhaps can give reason why India utterly failed to use it's 'size' and 'numbers' advantage.

Now in the age of nukes that opportunity has been closed.

Until 1965 Pakistan enjoyed qualitative superiority over Indian army in tanks,artillery and aircraft due to our idealistic nehruvian NAM stance while PA followed pragmatism and recieved enormous military aid from usa in form of sabre and starfighter jets,155mm artillery guns and hundreds of patton tanks.Indian military modernization only began after 1962 and was not complete before late 1960s.India got partly lucky in 1965 due to poor co-ordination between pak armour and airforce and command problems,and very spirited performance from IA.Until 1971 India didn't have requisite armour and airforce superiority to invade pakistan large scale.(due to acquiring large numbers of migs,sukhois,vijayantas and t-55s in the 1960s).

Second factor is terrain.Indo -pakistan border is actually pretty difficult for an invading army,the northern sector is mountain terrain and large deep advances are not possible,there it is a battle for ridges,ravines and passes.In the south You have the Thar desert which prevents large movement of infantry(India didn't have mechanized infantry until late 1980s).The rann of kutch area is swampy.These areas with 60s,70s and 80s tech levels were only suitable for tank skirmishes or at best tank probes of regiment/brigade size ,not large scale invasion involving multiple divisions.That left the only real gap -the punjab plains.Both armies tried to exploit this in 1965 ,and both failed at asal uttar and chawinda.Due to the numerous canals in the area ,it is favourable for the defender.Canal water can be easily diverted to bog down armour advances.

Another factor is global political environment.The whole rivalry took place in the era of the cold war.USA supporting Pakistan for most of it and USSR supporting India.None of the powers wanted a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the region.Indira Gandhi couldn't have invaded Western Pakistan in 1971 even if she wanted to because it could not be justified on the world stage at the UN and neither of the superpowers wanted it.She had to reassure moscow and washington on this point.China was a lesser problem,but one that still had to be accounted for because she could divert considerable resources from the western front.That is why 1971 operation was conducted after snow had begun to fall on the himalayan passes.meaning no chinese interference was possible.

Finally there was no political will for any such adventure.One,during this period before 1990s Indian economy was weak and most funds were spent on subsidies and basic infrastructure development.Until Green revolution,we had to import food to survive and there was food shortage.In a multi party democracy ,unlike a military dominated establishment in pakistan most important concern is how to win the next election,not the next war.During the 80s india was also busy with Khalistan insurgency in punjab and deployment of army in sri lanka.Moreover even the most right wing parties in India(which were negligible until the 90s in terms of political power) might engage in some empty akhand bharat rhetoric,but had no stomach to engage in attempting a conquest of pakistan,because even if somehow successful you would have a huge hostile population,and hundreds of millions of muslims which would dilute the dominance of the hindu majority votebank overall and create serious electoral problems for them.(as was case before partition)Another thing was until the 1990s ,there was no strategy by pakistan to send in infiltrators from accross LOC .So there were no daily gunfights on the border,no frequent killings.LOC was comparatively quiet.There existed no mass media except print and crappy doordarshan to inflame passions of the citizens of the 2 countries for profit.So intensity of hostility was lower.