Pakistani Army has espoused a doctrine of limited "offensive-defense" which it has tried to refine consistently ever since 1989 when it was pushed out to the formations during "Exercise Zarb-e-Momin". The main purpose of this strategy is to launch a sizeable offensive into enemy territory rather than wait to be hit from the enemy's offensive attack. The doctrine is based on the premise that while on the offensive, the enemy can be kept off-balance while allowing Pakistani Army to be able to seize enemy territory of strategic importance which can be used as a bargaining chip on the negotiating table. In order to do this, currently Pakistani Army maintains two sizeable strike Corps which will be backed up by holding Corps forming the defensive tier behind the strike corps. By pushing the offensive into the enemy territory, the Pakistani Army hopes to consolidate its gains inside the enemy's territory and will attempt to keep the war on the enemy side of the border rather than giving ground on the Pakistani side.
In the
1990s, the Army created a strong centralized corps of reserves for its formations in the critical semi-desert and desert sectors in southern
Punjab and
Sindh provinces. These new formations were rapidly equipped with assets needed for mechanized capability. These reserve formations are dual-capable, meaning they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (holding) purposes.
Pakistan, today has a 45 day reserve of
ammunition and fuel as compared to only 13 days in
1965 and has fairly effective and
efficient lines of communication and can fully mobilize its formations in less than 96 hours owing to the lack of depth in the country's North South axis.