U.S India nuclear deal is a reality, efforts to influence the U.S. were a no starter to begin with - While many Pakistanis see this as moved aimed them, it is really aimed against the Chinese. But what options exist for Pakistan? Appeal for a fair deal, Appeal for restrictions on the supply of fuel and reactors and of course threats.
This is not a strong agreement, much depends on Chinese diplomacy and the nature of the Pakistani State, in particular it's willingness and indeed, it's ability to solve the psychosis of it's political class.
India gets a blank cheque?
Gulfnews: India gets a blank cheque?
07/24/2008 11:37 PM | By Tariq Osman Hyder Special to Gulf News
The US-India agreement for cooperation in civil nuclear energy is the high water mark of the strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington.
Only a few isolated voices in the international arms control community voiced concerns. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment perceptively inter alia noted that two US objectives were that a more powerful India would balance China's growing power and influence in Asia, and that changing national and international laws on nuclear cooperation would also help bolster India's strategic capabilities, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which will further balance China's strategic power.
India would get access to nuclear fuel, technology and reactors for its ambitious nuclear power development programme which was already facing problems due to limited uranium reserves. The Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Agency, Dr Anil Kakodkar, stated on July 4 that India's long term energy security faces a huge energy gap if India is unable to import nuclear reactors or nuclear fuel under international cooperation, leading in its absence for the necessity to import 1.6 billion tonnes of coal in the year 2050 alone.
The opportunity was missed to introduce a criteria based non-discriminatory system bringing both India and Pakistan fully into the global non-proliferation regime while encouraging strategic restraint in South Asia and furthering global non-proliferation objectives. India should have been asked to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
While India has pledged to work for a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, the agreement enhances rather than restrains its fissile production capabilities.
Reactors
Indian power reactors will remain outside safeguards with the capacity to produce 1,400 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, sufficient for around 280 nuclear weapons. India's ambitious breeder reactor programme, which has also been kept outside safeguards, will have the eventual capacity to produce some 500-800 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year. This compares with the estimated 33 kg annual production of India's existing military reactors.
The Indian separation plan states that India would include in the civilian list of facilities for safeguards only those determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme. The agreement, while fulfilling India's energy requirements, frees its limited 60,000 tonnes of uranium reserves for its strategic programme and objectives, an outcome lauded by India's leading strategist K. Subrahmanyam. India is moving fast towards a nuclear submarine based second strike capability, as well as an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability which will require plutonium for missile warheads. The United States' justification that the agreement is placing additional Indian reactors under safeguards is scraping the bottom of the non-proliferation barrel.
As a condition of this bilateral agreement, a draft umbrella safeguards agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and India is being examined at the end of this month by the Board of Governors of the IAEA. It becomes a concern of the international community as to how far it accords with global non-proliferation objectives. This is also true for subsequent discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Now is the time for the Board of Governors and the NSG to use their leverage to get it right. If the Board of Governors succumbs to pressure, as is likely, even more responsibility devolves on the NSG, which was set up to prevent or at least to restrict proliferation, if it is to retain any credibility.
All IAEA safeguards agreements are facility specific agreements, with safeguards in perpetuity, without any conditionalties, with the exception of the P5 Voluntary Offer agreements, placing certain facilities under safeguards, which they can withdraw at any time for reasons of national security.
The draft India-IAEA agreement is a hybrid between the two models. India retains the right to take unspecified corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
A high level Indian team briefing the IAEA Board Members in Vienna last Friday was unable to clarify what this meant. The agreement subsumes existing and stricter safeguards agreements on Indian reactors. By mentioning its military nuclear facilities and programmes, India seeks legitimisation to grow its military programme.
India's concurrence of safeguards is dependent on continuous access to fuel supplies as well as for an Indian strategic reserve of fuel over the life time of India's reactors. There is no mention of moving towards an additional protocol with the IAEA which is another requirement of the agreement with the United States. No list of facilities has been listed, although the separation plan is a public document. There is no safeguard against transfer or replication of imported nuclear technology to the military side. In effect the draft agreement is a blank cheque. It should be brought in line with the unconditional permanent safeguards standard model, with no room for interpretive ambiguity.
The objective of the international community should be to link supporting India's legitimate energy needs with extending safeguards to all its power generation and breeder reactors, leaving a limited military capacity, and to use it as a model for other non-NPT states. To do otherwise would be a grave disservice to nonproliferation objectives, and to regional and international peace and security.
Tariq Osman Hyder, a former Pakistani diplomat headed Pakistan delegations in nuclear CBMs talks with India from 2004-2007.
