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Pakistan warns against Indian nuclear tests

I'm extremely aware of the language but what you're saying is that it won't be India's fault if 123 dies. That's not my point. My point is "who cares?" India would be the one making the decision whether 123 dies or not simply by testing or not. And whether India suffers sanctions or not. Remember the Hyde Act declares 123 void in the event of a test and that means the automatic sanctions under the NPT automatically kicks in.

123 is no protection against further NPT sanctions in the event of any nuclear event.

Sir I'd like to see where Hyde act explicitely says 123 as void incase of the test (I'm sure it does but just wanted to see the clause), If you say Hyde act tells US to pull out of the agreement, fine then US have to compensate for each and every bricks imported from US. Obviously the point here is simple, If US wants to pull out of the agreement through its hyde following a test It needs to compensate us for each return to US we will send. Thus US being non-committed to 123 automatically means they either want to dissolve the deal or want to exercise right to return, remember there will be 'strategic fuel reserve for the whole life of a nuke plant' so, just dissolving the 123 and Hyde isnt going to do US any favour or punish us from using these LWR's.

Regarding sanctions, sir we are really not worried about sanction, the fact remains we are retaining our right to test and that right to test gives us the right to test, which will give us the right to defend ourselves in UN for any security council legislation that might have been activated citing an breach of the 123 agreement (but no it is hyde that breaches 123 and we are not bound by Hyde), hyde act making the 123 void not-withstanding.

Finally India is unlikely to test, It has done testing in the level to deploy 200KT~300KT boosted TN yields, surely If India wants to use >1 MT devices in future it may need to test, but such devices are deemed non-strategic these days and are useless, 200~300 KT TN yield in 3*MIRV with decoys et al or 6*MIRV configuration is what the Agni IV calls into action. India if needs to test can only be for pure diplomatic reason in future or some unfathomable reason which is beyond my reasoning as of now.
 
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One bad effect due to the vagueness of the wording for termination is this.

US can withdraw from this treaty at any time, i.e. it can at any time giving one year notice can stop all its cooperation. There need not be any nuke test or anything.

This is the price which we paid for having the "right to test nukes". We should never overlook this aspect.

At any point there is only guarantee that this 123 will be valid only for the next 1 year and nothing more than that.
 
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But India is counting on the increased Ur supply and that is where NPT sanctions will hurt. Also, I have less faith in India being able to do MIRV than what your scientists suggests. At this point in time, the Chinese, having decades more experience, have only managed to produce a warhead that is only MIRV capable in their DF-5s, not their DF-3s and JL-x.

Also, having just had 120V-15amps gone through my body, I don't have the nerves to go searching. My hands are litterally shaking at this point. I will tell you that armscontrolwonk.com | offline is the place to look for the revelent passages according to Hyde. You want to know the story about my shock, look at the random thread in WAB.
 
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if there is a very good reason for us to test the nuke, like if pak or china tests a nuke, then i dont think 123 will be void.

I hope there will be exempt clauses in the deal that will allow testing under threat of war
 
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if there is a very good reason for us to test the nuke, like if pak or china tests a nuke, then i dont think 123 will be void.

I hope there will be exempt clauses in the deal that will allow testing under threat of war

Read up the deal and the hyde act.

From the hyde act
A determination and any waiver under section 104(the whole exceptions for India lie in this section) shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

US derives its power to enact 123 under this hyde act. Which means 123 is dead the moment we detonate, but US cannot get any materials which have already been given to us without fair compensation.

So if we test
i)future nuclear cooperation with US-completely stopped
ii) effect on help already provided with US- can be controlled.

So if we test, we will be at the same position as we are in right now. However the point to note is, cooperation ceases with US only. How India plays in NSG is going to be the major point.
 
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But India is counting on the increased Ur supply and that is where NPT sanctions will hurt. Also, I have less faith in India being able to do MIRV than what your scientists suggests. At this point in time, the Chinese, having decades more experience, have only managed to produce a warhead that is only MIRV capable in their DF-5s, not their DF-3s and JL-x.

I am too ignorant to talk about nuclear research and stuff.

From what I understand, India is going to basically try to go for the three-step thorium approach in which Uranium plays a role only in the first part. The prototypes of second stage (FBR) are already up and running. I expect 40 years will be enough to cross the third stage also (just my wild a** guess).

The NPT sanctions will not hurt if we play our cards right, is all I am saying. That is where all the strategic fuel reserves, fair compensation and stuff come into picture. So in case we need to test for our strategic program (and not tit for tat say because Pakistan exploded where the decision to be taken is immediate), if we have time for preparation of 2-3 years for hoarding the uranium and spares, we should be good enough. So, due to this 123 in the next few years, we cant take a decision to explode tomorrow without repercussions. But it does not stop from carrying out well-planned tests.

I dont understand what this has to do with MIRV and stuff. What is the level of miniaturization of indian warhead, I dont think most of us (us does not include you sir) have any f*cking clue. If you could just tap into your sources and educate us........

P.S: Thanks for the advice on acronyms ;)
 
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40 years way too long for me to predict with any sort of confidence. At most I look at 5 years with 10 years as a weapons procurement life cycle. Thorium would have no impact during this period and thus 123 access to Ur is currently a must if India is do both - a civie energey program and a nuke weapons platform.

If AGNI-III is to come on as a MIRV platform in 10 years, then your warhead development must be now. They must go hand-in-hand or the AGNI-III will be a single warhead rocket (which is more likely).

There are several reasons to keep testing. One is development. The other is the reliability of the arsenal. Open source materials suggests a 40% failure rate of the world's nuclear arsenals from failure to launch to failed initialization of the device. Before the moratorium on testing by the N5, all five N5 powers rushed to complete a series of tests - not to develop new weapons but to determine the viability of their arsenals.

India has not even began to do that and maybe won't need to for another 10 years since the arsenal is relatively young but in 10 years time, the arsenal's reliability will come into question and India will have to answer that somehow.

The Paks are somewhat better off since they have Chinese designs and can rely on the Chinese for their help - maybe not in actually maintaining them but asking the Chinese whether they should test or not (the old joke of a sapper running away comes to mind - try and keep up with him).

PS - I'm shaving my head bald tonight. I look stupid when my hair won't go down.
 
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40 years way too long for me to predict with any sort of confidence. At most I look at 5 years with 10 years as a weapons procurement life cycle. Thorium would have no impact during this period and thus 123 access to Ur is currently a must if India is do both - a civie energey program and a nuke weapons platform.
When was our last test before 98? In 74, that is something like 26 years. It was not as if even before this 123 we were testing left, right and centre. We were at anytime limited in our tests.
At the present stage, we have enough of a deterrent for the next ten years against Pakistan or even china. They both know that we have credible nuclear system, credible could be a bit crude, but alright. So for the next ten years, I do not think it matters so much.


If AGNI-III is to come on as a MIRV platform in 10 years, then your warhead development must be now. They must go hand-in-hand or the AGNI-III will be a single warhead rocket (which is more likely).
I have seen BR interpret the agni to be already developed Mirv or atleast say that we are in advanced stages of it. In the open source material, they talk about this photo as proof of it.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Images/Agni3_Launch_Puff_PTI.jpg
Observe the cloud at the nose cone. I did not see the cloud in agni II or I.
There is a chance, just a chance, that the 10 years you are talking about is not the future, but the past.
There are several reasons to keep testing. One is development. The other is the reliability of the arsenal. Open source materials suggests a 40% failure rate of the world's nuclear arsenals from failure to launch to failed initialization of the device. Before the moratorium on testing by the N5, all five N5 powers rushed to complete a series of tests - not to develop new weapons but to determine the viability of their arsenals.

India has not even began to do that and maybe won't need to for another 10 years since the arsenal is relatively young but in 10 years time, the arsenal's reliability will come into question and India will have to answer that somehow.

Also increased computer capabilities do play a role in decreasing the number of actual tests required. I have heard people from nuclear industry professing numbers like 97% reliability of computer simulation on other forums. I dont know the veracity of these claims.

So yes if we can test, we will be definitely at a better position with respect to warheads. But we might just be able to manage without it. We anyway have NFU policy, so we need multiple layers of redundancy,just add another layer. I realize the conundrum of the above, because we have NFU, we need every thing remaining to be working good? But then we cant have everything in life.

The Paks are somewhat better off since they have Chinese designs and can rely on the Chinese for their help - maybe not in actually maintaining them but asking the Chinese whether they should test or not (the old joke of a sapper running away comes to mind - try and keep up with him).

ssssssssssshhhhhhhhhh, Dont you know that the Pakistanis have "indigenous" design?:woot:
 
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Words about hyde law from a lawyer
Dr Heckle & Mr Hyde- Hindustan Times
The Hyde Act was enacted by the US Congress in December explicitly to promote ‘nuclear cooperation’ between India and the US and enable them to sign an agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1954. It is highly significant that the Agreement does not mention the Hyde Act at all. This is all the more so because it mentions other documents such as the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, repeatedly; the IAEA’s statute, its document on ‘The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities’ and the convention on the ‘Physical protection of Nuclear Material’. These are international instruments accepted by both sides. References to them constitute, in legal parlance, incorporation into the agreement by reference. In contrast, India is not bound by the Hyde Act, which is why the agreement does not refer to it even once. The omission is deliberate and of legal consequence.

Prakash Karat, whom I respect, is wrong in holding that “to say that the Hyde Act is not binding to (sic) India is irrelevant. The point is that it is binding on the US.” The real point is that it is binding on the US alone. “The text states that ‘national laws’ will prevail.” This is a serious factual error. It states no such thing anywhere. ‘National laws’ are mentioned thrice. Article 2.1 says, “Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and licence requirement concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The words are used ejusdem generis (of the same kind). Generically grouped, each category acquires colour from the rest and from the context. They relate to implementation of precise undertakings recorded in the accord. Article 2.1 cannot be used to nullify them, bringing Mr Hyde by the back door. Indeed, under Article 5.6 (a) the US “is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws” in order to ensure for India “assured and full access to fuel for its reactors”.

The omission of any reference to the Hyde Act is striking because in one particular respect, the accord explicitly invokes ‘national laws’ as a bar to “the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement”, which their own laws bar them from transferring.

Article 16.4 clinches the matter. “This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law”. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties only restates a settled principle of the law. “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” More, Article 14.3 says that no breach of the accord would be considered “material” unless it meets the test of the Vienna Convention.

Article 2.4 affirms that agreement will not “affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either party” or interfere with “military nuclear facilities” built “independent of this Agreement for their own purposes”.

The US Congress Acts read like political manifestoes — the Cuban Democracy Act, 1992, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996, and the Iraq Liberation Act, 1998.

The Hyde Act, true to form, sets out in Section 102 ‘the sense of Congress’ in 13 propositions. Section 103 has 16 “Statements of Policy”. The Almighty was content with ten. Iran figures in them. So do China and Pakistan along with India for securing “a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purpose”. This has not caused any panic in Beijing. If we are to get hysterical over such non-legislative inanities, we might as well stop dealings with the US. Presidential excesses — passing off treaties as executive agreements to avoid ratification by the Senate — led to congressional overreach. In 1967, Congress asserted that “the executive and legislative benches of the United States government have joint responsibility and authority to formulate the foreign policy of the United States.”

In 1830, Andrew Jackson made the first statement while signing his assent to a Bill to indicate how he would implement it. The first 42 Presidents used it fewer than 600 times.

George W Bush made more than 800 signing statements in the first six years of his Presidency. The Supreme Court’s reliance on them has been “sporadic and unpredictable”. A Bill in Congress on “Presidential Signing Statements” (2006) bars courts from relying on them, yet asserts its right to inform them of its intentions underlying the Act.

Must we get involved in this crazy situation? President Bush’s signing statement on the Hyde Act, on December 18, 2006, is beyond reproach. It is pro-India. He said he was not bound by the ‘statements of policy’ in Section 103, nor by a provision that barred transfer to India of an item contrary to a guideline of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and he would construe sections which require him to furnish information about India in a manner consistent with his “authority to control and protect information that could impair foreign relations, national security”, etc. This constitutes the President’s commitment to India as well.

Understandably, while we assert that we are not concerned with the Hyde Act, US spokesmen affirm a duty to abide by it. Both are right.
Besides the Act, the agreement is silent on testing. We have agreed to differ. Consider the realities. Even if there was no agreement or the Act, nuclear tests would have entailed consequences — as in 1974 and 1998.{what I was trying to say} The BJP regime came close to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) then. We do not intend presently to conduct tests. Nor have we given up the right to do so. The US knows that and is prepared to go along while it can. When we conduct the tests, we will also have the clout to terminate the Agreement under Article 14. Even then the parties “agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination cessation resulted from a party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”. This applies to both sides, if India conducts any tests.

The US Under-Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, said on July 27, “the fact is also that we hope and trust that it won’t be necessary for India to test in the future”. The US’s right to return of supplied material “is preserved for the worst case hypothetical event in the future”.

On the same day, National Security Advisor MK Narayanan said that both sides understood “the limits of flexibility and how far we can go” while Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said, “It is for them to understand whether this agreement meets their laws or not. It is not for us to interpret their law,” and vice versa.

The concerns concerning the creeping Indo-US military relationship are legitimate. Neither ground justifies withdrawal of the Left’s support to the UPA, which, however, should allay the disquiet on both grounds. A mechanism comprising leaders on both sides, with the aid of professionals, should be set up, so that as Prakash Karat puts it, “the doubts are clarified and the implications of the Hyde Act evaluated”.

At the end, a White Paper should follow. The IAEA and NSG talks can proceed. The net result will speak for itself. Maar se pehle tauba is wasteful.
 
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Cross-Posting from another thread, originally posted by webmaster, all emphasis mine. Well basically the title is almost the same as what I stated in another thread.
IAEA and NSG will be no Cakewalk

..........................(blah blah about left opposition)

The negotiations on an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA Governing Board and talks with members of the NSG to seek an exception for India are likely to be long and hazardous. The United States has considerable influence in the IAEA Board and, as the founder of the NSG it has the necessary clout to determine the outcome of the informal group. But, over the years, positions of individual countries have crystallized in these bodies and they are likely to give us a hard time despite the US being our 'sherpa' on the climb.

The commitment to non-proliferation is strong in both these bodies and it will be difficult for members to change their mindsets by a mere nod from the United States. Moreover, the United States stands to gain from an orchestrated debate in both these bodies, so that the right stage is set for the hard days ahead of implementation of the deal.

There is much speculation about the stage of drafting of the two documents, which should emerge from the IAEA and the NSG before the US Congress proceeds to vote on the 123 Agreement. But this should be the least of the problems. Neither our mission in Vienna, nor the Department of Atomic Energy would have remained idle since July 2005.

In fact, they had not remained idle even before: It was quite normal for them to prepare plans for the eventuality of an accommodation with the non-proliferation regime. As for India-specific safeguards as different from full-scope safeguards, these already exist for Tarapur, Rajasthan and Kudankulam. It is simply a matter of concluding such an agreement in the case of designated civilian facilities.

The general contours of such arrangements have already been discussed between Dr R Chidambaram and Dr Mohamed ElBaradei on a couple of occasions and the members of the Board, who are directly interested in the issue must have given their inputs to the IAEA.

It should also not be difficult for the IAEA Board and the General Conference to meet at short notice to approve such agreements at very short notice, if there is political will.
Incidentally, Dr Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, leads our delegation to the General Conference, while our ambassador in Vienna is on the Board of Governors.

An important point to note is that the Board has to recognise that there will be a qualitative difference in the status of India in the IAEA when the new arrangements are in place. We are presently in the company of Pakistan and Israel when it comes to safeguards issues. The three countries vote against an Egyptian-sponsored call for all member States to accept full-scope safeguards even though there is language in the resolution that this will be in accordance with their respective international obligations. The vote is often preceded by long and hard negotiations with Egypt and its supporters.

Even after the adoption of India-specific safeguards, India cannot endorse full-scope safeguards, but we will have to work out a way in which we distance ourselves from Israel and Pakistan.
But the negotiations in the Board will be coloured by past acrimony on this issue.

Egypt and other countries, even while accepting the Indian arrangement, will maintain that India should eventually accept full-scope safeguards. They will also want to maintain their reservations on India's status till we become either a Nuclear Weapon State or a non-Nuclear Weapon State.

On the Indian side too, a change is imperative. In our bid to keep our distance from the regulatory role of the IAEA, we have devised a number of measures for ourselves. Though we are keen advocates of the technical cooperation programme, we do not accept technical assistance from it. (Pakistan and China accept such assistance.) We do not accept even safety inspections from the IAEA in our installations.

Our attitude to the department of safeguards of the IAEA should undergo a change. These changes will be slow in coming, considering our present regulations and attitudes.

The additional protocol to the safeguards agreement was devised by the IAEA to strengthen the inspection regime and most countries have routinely accepted the model protocol the Board has approved. We had considered signing an additional protocol to our own safeguards, but we found that it would be difficult to frame a protocol for our special circumstances.

By requiring India to sign 'an' additional protocol rather than 'the' additional protocol, the US negotiators are supposed to have shown flexibility in this regard. But it will take some time and effort to carry the Board with us on a text that recognises the new situation.


Another additional complication with the IAEA is that we do not want the Board to vote upon these documents before we are sure that the NSG and the US Congress are ready to follow through.

The NSG will be a particular challenge as negotiating for an exception for India from its guidelines will be like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire. The NSG was set up specifically to deny India nuclear fuel and technology after our explosion of 1974. France [Images], at that time a non-party to the NPT, had agreed to supply fuel to India and the formation of the group, originally of seven countries, including France, ended that deal.
...... (blah blah about history)

The regime is voluntary and there is no requirement for prior clearance of exports with the group, but as in the instance of Russia [Images]n supplies to India in 2001, the other members can exert pressure on individual countries, which violate the guidelines. Russia was able to supply in 2006 only with the implicit understanding of the US.
..........{talking about zangerr committee and stuff}
India had kept a distance from the NSG in the past as we did not want to give any impression that we had anything to do with the NPT institutions, even though we were using the NSG guidelines to regulate our own export of nuclear technology and materials. When the NSG began an outreach programme with non-NSG members in 2001, we participated in it once, but when we found that it was not aimed at accommodating our needs, we declined further contacts in Vienna.

We knew that we did not miss much as Israel and Pakistan, which went to such meetings, came back disappointed that the NSG had no intention to relax its guidelines. Under pressure from NSG members, who were otherwise friendly, we suggested that we would not be averse to talks in New Delhi.

Accordingly, a team of ambassadors from Vienna and some officials from NSG capitals came to New Delhi for an interaction. It was evident from these meetings that, unless there was a change in the US position, such meetings would be futile.

The NSG members at that time were aware of an Indian proposal to open up additional nuclear establishments for IAEA inspection in return for relaxation of the NSG guidelines, but the members, like the Americans, were not enthusiastic.

The atmosphere in the NSG improved after the India-US Joint Statement of 2005, though an American proposal to put the nuclear deal on the agenda of the NSG Plenary Meeting in May 2006 was not accepted as the deal had not become operational. On the Russian supply of fuel to India in 2006, the US State Department stated: 'Deals to supply that fuel should move forward on the basis of a joint initiative, on the basis of steps that India will take, but it has not yet taken.'

Japan [Images] and Australia were particularly firm on examining matters only after the India-US deal became operational. In the NSG, the general trend was for countries, which have nuclear power plants and other equipment to sell to be more positive than those, which had no business to transact under any new arrangement.

A fundamental premise of the NSG is that any country that receives supplies should accept full-scope safeguards.
China initially joined the Zangger Committee and not the NSG because China was at that time in the process of supplying a reactor to Pakistan. Since the NPT does not require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, China's membership of the Zangger Committee did not prevent them from supplying the reactor to Pakistan.

By joining the NSG at that time, China would have forsaken its right to supply nuclear equipment to Pakistan. A US representative to the NSG revealed this when China applied for NSG membership subsequently.

Since India will not accept full-scope safeguards under the deal, the NSG will need to make a change in its fundamental position. The India-specific safeguards, which the IAEA approves, will be subjected to an analysis to see whether it will have sufficient safeguards against diversion of nuclear material or dual use equipment.


For this reason, Russia is supposed to have advised India to circulate its draft of the safeguards to the members of the NSG in advance.

The strategy of the United States in the context of the NSG will be to ask the NSG members to take note of the steps that India has taken as a 'contributing partner' in the non-proliferation regime. It will also ask NSG members to transfer the trigger list items and related technologies only to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India as long as India continues to meet the other requirements of the NSG. The relaxation will be sought on the ground that India has accepted IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for its civilian nuclear facilities, it has a moratorium on testing in place, it will sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, it has stringent export controls and it will adhere strictly to the NSG guidelines on exports.

Here, interested governments will argue that India had no intention to be a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime as the Indian position is that the nuclear deal is merely an energy agreement.


Another requirement of the NSG is that adequate verification measures should be in place to ensure that the supplies of the participating states are not diverted to weapons purposes. The bilateral agreement between India and the US envisages IAEA inspections of civilian establishments in India and a certain amount of trust is an element in the agreement. A multilateral group like the NSG might want other verification measures, which may prove anathema to India.

China's position will be the most crucial in the entire NSG exercise. At the first NSG meeting after the India-US Joint Statement, China had pressed the US for a similar deal for Pakistan. China has been lying low, but it has not made secret of its opposition to the deal. But China tends to be eminently reasonable in the international arena and, therefore, may point out that the exception should be criteria based rather than country based. If other countries adopt similar measures as India has done, they should be treated in a similar manner.

Though the US position is that no other exception will be made, it may close its eyes to the advantage it may give to Pakistan and China to enhance their nuclear cooperation. The Chinese position may enjoy some support among the other NSG members. China will also look for some gains for itself in the light of the impression that the 123 Agreement with China is not as favourable to China as in the Indian case.

Although nuclear tests are not mentioned in the 123 Agreement, it is premised on an Indian moratorium on testing, which finds mention in the India-US Joint Statement of 2005. The debate in Parliament and elsewhere about the need for India to protect its sovereign right to test may well have created suspicion in the minds of the NSG members and they may well make a reference in the revised guidelines to the termination of the arrangements in the event of a nuclear test by India.

The US will naturally welcome such a provision, which, according to it, is already included in the 123 Agreement.

The extent of challenges within the NSG will depend on the degree of firmness with which the United States will defend the agreement and ensure that it is not changed to India's disadvantage.
But at the same time, the US will not favour a situation, which will dismantle the NSG and leave it to the member States to deal with India and others in accordance with their own interests.

Although an exception for India will end the rationale for the existence of the group{oh boy, what the world is turning into}, the US will favour continuation of the Group and will do everything possible to maintain the integrity of the NSG.

The US has promised all help to persuade their friends and allies to accommodate India, but India will have to work bilaterally with each of the 45 members, as implementation of the guidelines is an individual rather than a collective responsibility. The success we have accomplished in befriending Brazil [Images] and South Africa should help us in the NSG. In the past, they have been rather adamant about full-scope safeguards.

The ultimate compromise that the NSG should make is to accept India as a member of the group. It will be logical as no other country has better credentials than India in terms of the objective of the NSG to prevent exports that will lead to proliferation. Even in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, authorities on export controls had certified that India had an impeccable record in export control.

If the criteria for membership of the NSG alone were to be considered, without considering our NPT status, there was no reason to exclude India from the NSG. Since India will soon have the capacity to export not only components, but also reactors, the NSG should welcome India to its fold. It may be seen today as a revolutionary move like admitting Russia into NATO, but today's miracles may be tomorrow's reality.

T P Sreenivasan, a former member of the Indian Foreign Service, was India's ambassador to the United Nations, Vienna, and governor for India, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
IAEA and NSG will be no Cakewalk

Mods: If you feel that this should not be done, please do the needful.
 
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The question is at what point is theoretical data just theory? All along I've been hearing that the Indian nuclear arsenal is as reliable with the N5 without doing the testing the N5 has done. If you believe that, then, the 123 Agreement is no sweat. If you don't, then the 123 is the hindrance your opposition parties say it is.

I can, however, say India does not have the data sets the N5 does. It is extremely confident, bordering on arrogance, to say that 6 test produces the same results over a minimum of 200 tests per N5 power.
 
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Words about hyde law from a lawyer
Dr Heckle & Mr Hyde- Hindustan Times
Why should it be surprising? Senate Amendments to the SALT Treaties are not reflected in SALT at all, neither are any START treaties. In fact, if you look at NATO, Senate laws concerning NATO, especially funding, are not inclueded in NATO papers at all. American laws pertain to Americans and have no place in dictating how non-American treaty signatories should act. They only obligate Americans on how to act and nothing else.

Good God, Man, there is no better example than the Taiwan Relations Act. The US is obligated to come to defence of Taiwan, a country that they don't even recognize.

This idiot knows squat all.
 
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I am not denying what you are saying. I have also no doubt that the nuclear arsenal of N5 are more reliable, more potent and with less bugs than we have.

But we might just be able to manage without it.

The above statement you may have interpreted as arrogance. I just wanted to tell the "hope" we have.

Also sir, due to paucity of resources, India has always done things with less amount of testing. For example, agni II a major jump from agni I was productionalized after just two tests!!! I dont expect more than 4 tests for agni III(including the flop last year). The Indian scientist even before 1998 knew that in the next 20 years, it would be their last chance of testing.

Also sir, if you might have noted, in the 5 bombs we blew, 3 were low-yield variety of the missile warhead. Only one fusion bomb was blown. This clearly shows the priority which we gave for missile warheads.

Also why do we forget that the nuclear bomb's most important value is its deterrence? We have a usable delivary system on the present day.

Sir,
I would also like to hear about your sources view whether India has developed MIRV or not.
 
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Why should it be surprising? Senate Amendments to the SALT Treaties are not reflected in SALT at all, neither are any START treaties. In fact, if you look at NATO, Senate laws concerning NATO, especially funding, are not inclueded in NATO papers at all. American laws pertain to Americans and have no place in dictating how non-American treaty signatories should act. They only obligate Americans on how to act and nothing else.

Good God, Man, there is no better example than the Taiwan Relations Act. The US is obligated to come to defence of Taiwan, a country that they don't even recognize.

This idiot knows squat all.

It is surprising not to the lawyer. It is surprising to the general public in India. You might have noted the left's opposition to this. Their opposition is NOT based on 123 but on hyde. He is addressing that particular audience.

From that lawyers's column in last post.

This Prakash Karat is the head of the left buffoooons. So now you might understand the targeted audience.
Prakash Karat, whom I respect, is wrong in holding that “to say that the Hyde Act is not binding to (sic) India is irrelevant. The point is that it is binding on the US.” The real point is that it is binding on the US alone.
 
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I would also like to hear about your sources view whether India has developed MIRV or not.
There are two different issues concerning this - Warhead size and the re-entry vehicle. With a warhead size of 15-40 KT, the AGNI-III might be able to accept anywhere from 3-5 warheads. However, with such a small yield, accuracy becomes the more important and thus far, India has demonstrated nothing anywhere close to an acceptable CEP other than city busting which means that you want the bigger warheads. A 40kt warhead will kill about 15 city blocks - not really a city buster.

Armscontrolwonk and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists are the sources I mainly rely on for my data.
 
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