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Pakistan takes major action against Jamaat-ud-Dawaa camp


Pakistan arrests Mumbai mastermind, reports say

Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, named by sole surviving attacker as ringleader, held in raid on militant camp in Pakistani Kashmir


* Haroon Siddique
* guardian.co.uk, Monday December 8 2008 11.00 GMT

The suspected planner of last month's Mumbai terror attacks has been arrested in a raid on a militant group in Pakistan, an official close to the extremist organisation said today.

The official from Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the charity and education arm of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, told Reuters that Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was among four men taken into custody after a raid yesterday on a camp outside Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir.

Lakhvi, one of Lashkar's operations chiefs, was named as a ringleader in the Mumbai plot by Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone surviving gunmen captured after the attacks, according to Indian officials

"Yes, Lakhvi is among four or five people arrested in a raid yesterday," the JuD official told Reuters.

There has been no official confirmation of the raid but Pakistani intelligence officers told Reuters six men were arrested. No names were given. The Associated Press reported that more than 12 people were arrested.

Troops briefly exchanged fire with people at the camp and several injured people were being treated at a military hospital, AP reported.

"I saw an army helicopter hovering over the area and around 5pm I heard two or three loud explosions," a woman who lives in the area told the Pakistani newspaper Dawn.

The attacks in Mumbai, which began on November 26, left 163 people dead. Indian police say 10 gunmen were responsible.

Yesterday's operation appears to be the first action by Islamabad in response to the attacks, which sharply raised tensions between Pakistan and India. The Pakistani government has sought to play down any domestic links to the killings, despite the fact Kasab is from Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the attacks, Islamabad refused a demand by India to hand over 20 suspected terrorists believed to be in Pakistan, although the president, Asif Ali Zardari, has called for the countries to work together on combating terrorism.

Pakistan arrests Mumbai mastermind, reports say | World news | guardian.co.uk
 
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Its really good news for not only India but for whole world and Pakistan itself. I think Zaradari is also victim of terrorism. He can understand the collateral damage caused by this Holi(****) War. I am in favour of Zardari govt, Indian govt should grant him more time to curb this situation there and also provide assistance of RAW, and other agencies to make easier his act against terrorism...
Zardari holds key for this war against terrorism..
 
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Well now that he's "held", what are they planning to do with him exactly?
 
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I don't believe anyone is being 'handed over' to India.

They will likely be detained and tried in Pakistan. India and Pakistan have no extradition treaty and there is already a lot of anger at the GoP transferring suspects into US custody - it would be political suicide for any government to hand over Pakistani nationals to India.
 
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So earlier we use to get pressurised by the US alone, now guess what India has joined in the league too. Good going by the GOP. What else should we expect, Hamid Gul??

By the way shouldnt Pakistanis be worried about what proof exactly did the Indians handed over to the GOP according to which they acted? Also during Musharraf era, a few pakistanis were handed over to the US including the famous Dr.Afia, should we expect the same this time, the only difference would be, instead of the US, it will be India.
 
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Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege

WASHINGTON — Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based militant group suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, has quietly gained strength in recent years with the help of Pakistan’s main spy service, assistance that has allowed the group to train and raise money while other militants have been under siege, American intelligence and counterterrorism officials say.

American officials say there is no hard evidence to link the spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, to the Mumbai attacks. But the ISI has shared intelligence with Lashkar and provided protection for it, the officials said, and investigators are focusing on one Lashkar leader they believe is a main liaison with the spy service and a mastermind of the attacks.

As a result of the assault on Mumbai, India’s financial hub, American counterterrorism and military officials say they are reassessing their view of Lashkar and believe it to be more capable and a greater threat than they had previously recognized.

“People are having to go back and relook at all the connections,” said one American counterterrorism official, who was among several officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because the investigation was still progressing.

Pakistani officials have denied any government connection to the siege on Nov. 26-29, in which nine gunmen and 163 other people were killed. A Pakistani official confirmed on Sunday that security forces had initiated an operation against at least one Lashkar camp.

The Associated Press, citing militants and an unidentified senior official, reported Monday from Islamabad, Pakistan, that Pakistani troops had seized a former Lashkar camp, in the Pakistani part of Kashmir, that is now used by the group’s charity wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa. “More than 12 people” were arrested, The Associated Press said.

The official who spoke to The New York Times gave no details about the operation he confirmed, Pakistan’s first known response against the group implicated in Mumbai. “The government of Pakistan has always said it would act on any evidence that is presented to us,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss details about security operations. “We will make sure that nobody uses Pakistani territory to carry out militant activity.”

While Al Qaeda has provided financing and other support to Lashkar in the past, their links today remain murky. Senior Qaeda figures have used Lashkar safe houses as hide-outs, but Lashkar has not merged its operations with Al Qaeda or adopted the Qaeda brand, as did an Algerian terrorist group that changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, American officials said.

Unlike Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants, who have been forced to retreat to mountain redoubts in western Pakistan’s tribal areas, Lashkar commanders have been able to operate more or less in the open, behind the public face of a popular charity, with the implicit support of official Pakistani patrons, American officials said.

American and Indian officials believe that one senior Lashkar commander in particular, Zarrar Shah, is one of the group’s primary liaisons to the ISI. Investigators in India are also examining whether Mr. Shah, a communications specialist, helped plan and carry out the attacks in Mumbai. “He’s a central character in this plot,” an American official said.

For years, American intelligence analysts have described Lashkar as a group with deadly, yet limited, ambitions in South Asia. But terrorism experts said it clearly had been inspired by the success of Al Qaeda in rallying supporters for a global jihad.

“This is a group that years ago evolved from having a local and parochial agenda and bought into Al Qaeda’s vision,” said Bruce Hoffman, a professor and terrorism expert at Georgetown University who has followed Lashkar closely for several years.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, which means “army of the pure,” was founded more than 20 years ago with the help of Pakistani intelligence officers as a proxy force to challenge Indian control of Muslim-dominated Kashmir.

Indian officials have publicly implicated Lashkar operatives in a July 2006 attack on commuter trains in Mumbai and in a December 2001 attack against the Indian Parliament. But in recent years, Lashkar fighters have turned up in Afghanistan and Iraq, fighting and killing Americans, senior American military officials have said.

As American, European and Middle Eastern governments crack down on Al Qaeda’s finances, Lashkar still has a flourishing fund-raising organization in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, counterterrorism officials say. The group primarily uses Jamaat-ud-Dawa to raise money, ostensibly for causes in Pakistan.

The Mumbai attacks, which included foreigners among its targets, seemed to fit the group’s evolving emphasis and determination to elevate its profile in the global jihadist constellation.

Lashkar also has a history of using local extremist groups for knowledge and tactics in its operations. Investigators in Mumbai are following leads suggesting that Lashkar used the Students’ Islamic Movement of India, a fundamentalist group that advocates establishing an Islamic state in India, for early reconnaissance and logistical help.

An Indian man arrested in connection with the attacks, Fahim Ahmad Ansari, had been described beforehand by Indian newspaper reports as a former member of the Students’ Islamic Movement who met with Lashkar operatives in Dubai in 2003.

American officials said investigators were looking closely at the likelihood that the attackers had local support in Mumbai.

Mr. Hoffman said that Lashkar had developed particularly sophisticated Internet operations, and that intelligence officials believed the group had forged ties with regional terrorist organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia by assisting them with their own Internet strategies.

Although Pakistan’s government officially banned Lashkar in 2002, American officials said that the group had maintained close ties since then to the Pakistani intelligence service. American spy agencies have documented regular meetings between the ISI and Lashkar operatives, in which the two organizations have shared intelligence about Indian operations in Kashmir.

“It goes beyond information sharing to include some funding and training,” said an American official who follows the group closely. “And these are not rogue ISI elements. What’s going on is done in a fairly disciplined way.”

Still, officials in Washington said they had yet to unearth any direct link between the Pakistan spy agency and the Mumbai attacks. “I don’t think that there is compelling evidence of involvement of Pakistani officials,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on CNN’s “Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer” on Sunday. “But I do think that Pakistan has a responsibility to act.”

She said evidence showed “that the terrorists did use territory in Pakistan.”

An American counterterrorism official said: “It’s one thing to say the ISI is tied to Lashkar and quite another to say the ISI was behind the Mumbai attacks. The evidence at this point doesn’t get you there.”

Moreover, some terrorism analysts said that Lashkar’s dependence on its original sponsors had lessened in recent years. With wealthy donors in no short supply, an established recruiting pipeline and a series of training camps, Lashkar “has outgrown ISI’s support,” said Urmila Venugopalan, a South Asia analyst for Jane’s Information Group.

The protection that Lashkar operatives enjoy inside Pakistan has allowed the group to thrive at the same time that Al Qaeda’s leaders have been forced to hide in caves and occasionally transmit messages to one another using donkey couriers.

In a public statement in May, Stuart Levey, the under secretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, called Lashkar a “dangerous Al Qaeda affiliate that has demonstrated its willingness to murder innocent civilians.”

But other terrorism analysts offer a more nuanced view of the group’s Qaeda ties.

On the one hand, Al Qaeda and Lashkar share many positions: a belief in a strict interpretation of the Koran, a desire to establish a government based on strict Islamic laws and a priority to evict United States troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Lashkar has helped Qaeda fighters move in and out of Afghanistan. In March 2002, a Qaeda lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah, was captured in a Lashkar safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, according to a State Department terrorism report. Eleven detainees currently at the American prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, are suspected of having some kind of connections to Lashkar.

But Lashkar and Al Qaeda do not always see eye to eye, terrorism analysts said. While Lashkar strives for the creation of a pan-Islamic state across South Asia, Al Qaeda aims to create an even larger entity. Al Qaeda is wary of Lashkar’s relationship with the ISI, an American official said. A spokesman for Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar’s charity wing, denied last week that the group or its founder, Haffiz Muhammad Saeed, had any connection to the Mumbai attacks. The surviving gunman in Mumbai has claimed to have met Mr. Saeed at a training camp in Pakistan.

On Friday, Mr. Saeed gave his regular sermon at his mosque in Lahore, Pakistan, where thousands listened to him denounce Hinduism, praise Islam and criticize Ms. Rice for visiting the region. Surrounded by security guards, Mr. Saeed, 63, a stocky man with a huge, untrimmed beard, spoke for 50 minutes to a rapt congregation that sat on the wide lawns of the Qadisiyyah Center in central Lahore.

“Now Condoleezza Rice has rushed to India and Pakistan because infidels are united,” he said. “If infidels do not stop their anti-Muslim activities, the Muslims are second to none in taking revenge.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/world/asia/08terror.html?_r=1&hp
 
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IceCold,

Apparently the US has been sharing intelligence with Pakistan, the Indians have refused to.

Whether the GoI joins in the prosecution of the arrested individuals and shares evidence when they are taken to trial remains to be seen, though it would be in their best interests to do so to ensure guilty verdicts.

Please read the comments by Ambassador Haqqani related to US intelligence cooperation with Pakistan:

Pakistani Envoy Details Government's Response to Mumbai Investigation | Online NewsHour | December 4, 2008 | PBS
 
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Pakistan militant group builds web of Western recruits

Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamic militant group blamed in the Mumbai attacks, has actively recruited U.S.- and British-born contacts who have gone on to execute attacks for Al Qaeda.

By Sebastian Rotella
December 8, 2008

Reporting from London -- The Pakistani extremist group suspected in the Mumbai rampage remains a distant shadow for most Americans. But the threat is much nearer than it seems.

For years, Lashkar-e-Taiba has actively recruited Westerners, especially Britons and Americans, serving as a kind of farm team for Islamic militants who have gone on to execute attacks for Al Qaeda, a close ally. The Pakistani network makes its training camps accessible to English speakers, providing crucial skills to an increasingly young and Western-born generation of extremists.

Briton Aabid Khan was one of them. When British police arrested him at Manchester International Airport on his return from Pakistan in June 2006, they found a trove of terrorist propaganda and manuals on his laptop that the trial judge later described as "amongst the largest and most extensive ever discovered." The haul included maps and videos of potential targets in New York City and Washington.

One video, shot deep in Pakistani extremist turf, shows the then-21-year-old Khan with a grinning young man who says he's from Los Angeles -- a mysterious figure in a case that apparently illustrates Lashkar's dangerous reach.

In August, a court here sentenced Khan to 12 years in prison on charges of possession of articles for use in an act of terrorism and making records useful for terrorism.

As a hub of a cyber-constellation of extremist cells, the Briton organized training expeditions to Pakistan for his confederates, computer-obsessed youths who, whatever their mother tongue, communicated in the fractured English slang of the Internet and hatched plots against their homelands in the West, according to his trial and related prosecutions.

"These camps are ideal for people who speak English," said Evan Kohlmann, an independent U.S. investigator who was a paid consultant for the prosecution team in the Khan case and was integral to building the case against him.

"Newbie militants can make real contacts. They perceive that Lashkar-e-Taiba . . . are below the radar. They are less likely to attract negative attention. It's an easier ladder rung to reach. Lashkar is seen as a rung to get to Al Qaeda."

Lashkar's Western-oriented propaganda attracts converts such as David Hicks, an Australian whom the group trained, then provided with a letter of introduction to Al Qaeda in 2000. Hicks ended up meeting Osama bin Laden at an Afghan camp; he complained to Bin Laden about the lack of English-language terrorist manuals and translated such materials before his capture in late 2001, according to his admission in court.

Hicks was released from the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, last year after pleading guilty to providing material support for terrorism.

Other Al Qaeda figures who "graduated" from Lashkar camps: the leader of the suicide bombers who killed 52 people in attacks on the London transport system in 2005, and a group convicted of preparing a 2004 truck bomb plot in London.

Early disaffection

Khan grew up in the large Pakistani immigrant community of the industrial city of Bradford. At age 12, he was already immersed in the rage and gore of extremist websites, according to trial evidence.

Khan helped form a global crew of several dozen young men who met on radical Islamic forums on the Internet. Most have since been arrested. They include two American college students in Atlanta now charged with terrorism, a Toronto man on trial on charges of plotting to attack the Canadian Parliament, and a Moroccan Al Qaeda computer expert convicted last year of ties to bomb plots in London, Copenhagen and Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. A defendant convicted along with Khan was 15 when they first met.

"Aabid Khan was very much the 'Mr Fix-it' of the group," said Karen Jones, a supervising prosecutor of the Crown Prosecution Service Counter Terrorism Division, in a news release after the August verdict. "He preyed on vulnerable young people and turned them into recruits to his cause, using Internet chat to lure them in, then incite them to fight. He arranged their passage to Pakistan for terrorism training, and talked about a 'worldwide battle.' "

The group spent untold hours spewing hate. "You dont know how much fury i have towards these american dogs," Khan wrote in an online chat, according to court records.

In 2005, Khan began organizing travel to training camps run by Lashkar-e-Taiba and an allied group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, near the border of the disputed territory of Kashmir. It was easier and safer to connect with the Pakistani groups than the secretive compounds of Al Qaeda's Arabic-speaking operatives.

Although Lashkar was officially banned in 2002, Khan's crew was convinced that Pakistani authorities tolerated its anti-India guerrilla campaign and permitted its camps, schools and offices to function, according to trial evidence.

"I was thinking, we should be with LT, due to them . . . fighting against Hindus," wrote one of the Atlanta students in a communication used as evidence. "So [the Pakistani government] shouldn't bother us."

In May 2005, as his confederates squabbled about timing and itineraries, Khan asked an unidentified Pakistani operative for assistance. "I was meaning to ask if you can help arrange for the training of a few brothers from abroad, amongst them are non-pakistan nationals," he wrote.

Khan and several others spent that summer in Pakistan. He returned for six more months in 2006. Investigators did not pin down details of how many actually were trained and where. But as prosecutors pointed out in court, after his arrest at the airport, Khan's hands tested positive for explosives residue.

Police found evidence of dark intentions on Khan's laptop, including notes about reconnaissance for hijacking a bank truck at Manchester airport and encyclopedic material on bomb-making. A glossary for "terrorists" provided translations of terms used in training such as "kill him" and "shoot him." There was an alleged scouting video of targets in Washington -- the Capitol, the World Bank, a Masonic temple -- shot by the Atlanta college students, footage used as evidence against both Khan and the Moroccan computer expert.

Los Angeles link?

The search of Khan's luggage at Manchester airport also turned up a video revealing the apparent Los Angeles angle. A week before his return, Khan and half a dozen friends took a four-day trip into the mountains north of Balakot, a hotbed of Lashkar and Jaish-e-Muhammad activity.

Khan shot video of the trip that was shown in court. It includes images of a Lashkar propaganda poster on a wall in Balakot. Soon two young men appear who were described by Khan in court as students from Karachi. Khan testified that he met the two for the first time on the trip and they all decided to share a taxi into the mountains.

One of the "students" in the video is a short, bespectacled youth in jeans and a blue-and-white-striped shirt. Speaking English with a clear American accent, he identifies himself as "Humayun." He says he is from Los Angeles. He poses with Khan, smiling. The person holding the camera says, "Where is this terrorist from?"

Prosecutors and defense attorneys questioned Khan about the encounter with Humayun. Prosecutors found it curious that the pair appeared so friendly when they had supposedly just met. Defense attorneys had Khan detail his assertions that there was nothing sinister going on.

Khan insisted in testimony that he and the others on camera were just joking around and that he parted ways with Humayun soon afterward.

"Khan is the kind of a person who looks like a fanatic," Kohlmann said. "That he would pick up a random American at a taxi stop is hard to believe. This is a guy who was talking about killing Americans. He had concerns about the CIA, the FBI, and he would bring a random American guy with him? That doesn't make a lot of sense."

After the video was aired during the trial this summer, British police alerted U.S. counterparts about the mystery American, Kohlmann said. Asked last week, federal authorities in Los Angeles declined to say whether they had opened an investigation to identify the purported Los Angeles resident.

If Khan's account of a chance encounter is true, Humayun has quite a story to tell. But if he was a knowing associate of an extremist subsequently convicted of terrorism, he could be someone to worry about, Kohlmann said.

"He could be an innocent American tourist who befriends someone who is a fanatically anti-American extremist -- not the safest situation," Kohlmann said. "They don't know who he is and what he was doing there."

Pakistan militant group builds web of Western recruits - Los Angeles Times
 
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IceCold,

Apparently the US has been sharing intelligence with Pakistan, the Indians have refused to.

Whether the GoI joins in the prosecution of the arrested individuals and shares evidence when they are taken to trial remains to be seen, though it would be in their best interests to do so to ensure guilty verdicts.

Please read the comments by Ambassador Haqqani related to US intelligence cooperation with Pakistan:

Pakistani Envoy Details Government's Response to Mumbai Investigation | Online NewsHour | December 4, 2008 | PBS

Whatever Haqqani has to say, i'll take it with a pinch of salt. Apparently he's the ambassador of Pakistan to US, but it looks the very much opposite. So whatever he says, or for that matter the GOP says, i'll pass.
 
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Whatever Haqqani has to say, i take it with a pinch of salt. Apparently he's the ambassador of Pakistan to US, but it looks the very much opposite. So whatever he says, or for that matter the GOP says, i'll pass.

Ice Cold,

Like it or not, the military is deferring to the Civilian government on most issues right now. The two institutions have disagreed extremely rarely, and disagreements have been related to primarily military matters, such as the ridiculous decision to put the ISI under the interior ministry or sending the DG ISI off to India for god knows what.

Beyond that I would argue that the Civilian government's statements carry the full weight of the establishment. Gen. Kiyani does not in anyway seem interested in upsetting the applecart at the moment.
 
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I don't believe anyone is being 'handed over' to India.

They will likely be detained and tried in Pakistan. India and Pakistan have no extradition treaty and there is already a lot of anger at the GoP transferring suspects into US custody - it would be political suicide for any government to hand over Pakistani nationals to India.

Sad but true.

Unfortunately, it is also equally likely that Pakistan will simply play cat-and-mouse to please the US, and these guys will most probably resume their activities under a different name.

Lets see if Pakistan takes some concrete action apart from raiding a camp or two.
 
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Risk Factors

by George Packer

A few days after well-armed men mowed down scores of helpless people in Mumbai, an American commission released a report on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. “World at Risk” is one of those conscientious, bipartisan efforts, its importance signalled by publication as a trade paperback, whose sober findings and pragmatic recommendations momentarily give you the sense that every problem—even one as alarming as the likelihood that “a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013”—has a common-sense solution. The report includes chapters on biological and nuclear risks, and one titled “Pakistan,” which would seem to suggest that the nation itself is a kind of W.M.D.

According to intelligence reports, the attacks in Mumbai were carried out by terrorists who had received extensive training from the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure. Its agenda has been to force India to give up control over the disputed northern mountain region of Jammu and Kashmir. More recently, the group’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, spoke of creating a Muslim south Asia—thus, the band that carried out the killings called itself the Hyderabad Deccan Mujahideen, implying a holy war extending down to the south-central Indian region that, in the late eighteenth century, marked the farthest limit of the Mughal empire.

The name has the ring of nostalgic grandeur common among jihadist groups elsewhere, with their historical claims on far-flung places like Al Andalus, also known as Spain. And the designated targets in Mumbai suggested an ambition on the terrorists’ part extending well beyond the local troubles of Kashmir: hotels, a café, a hospital, a train station; foreign visitors, well-heeled Indians, Jews. The terrorists tortured their Jewish victims. They demanded to know the caste and home state of Indians. They held conference calls with their superiors in Lahore and Karachi to determine whether or not a certain hostage should be killed. When the goal is a Muslim south Asia, the answer is almost always yes.

The operation was so skillful and deadly, complete with a maritime landing by inflatable craft, that one security expert said that Navy SEALs would have had a hard time pulling it off. The sophisticated tactics, as well as electronic evidence, point to the involvement of top Lashkar figures, and also, according to Indian sources, of current or former officers of Pakistan’s intelligence and military. So the murders have led to a familiar volley of accusations, denials, counter-accusations, and threats between the nuclear-armed governments of India and Pakistan. They have also inspired a degree of restraint on India’s part and pledges of coöperation on Pakistan’s that are less familiar and more encouraging.

In one sense, the most appropriate response—articulated by commentators and ordinary people after the terror was over—is to express solidarity with the victims, and also with the idea of Mumbai, which, like the idea of New York, represents a vision of society that is the opposite of the vision behind names like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hyderabad Deccan Mujahideen: impure, secular, modern, open. But moral revulsion doesn’t suggest an intelligent course of action. The attacks in Mumbai reveal the vexing complexity of the interconnected conflicts throughout south Asia. At the urging of the United States, Pakistan had moved six divisions from its eastern frontier with Indian Kashmir to fight militants on its western border with Afghanistan; now the terrorists have succeeded in inducing Pakistan to threaten to cut back its pressure on the tribal areas and redeploy its troops to the east. Islamist radicalism is the main spark that keeps inflaming these conflicts.

Some commentators have simply demanded that Pakistan rid itself of the virus of extremism that threatens its own security as well as its neighbors’. But which Pakistan is going to do it? The weak civilian government of President Asif Zardari? The two-faced security services? The tribal leaders along the Afghanistan border? The huge, overwhelmingly poor, tumultuous population? The core problem is that Pakistan is no longer really a country, if it ever was. “Our Pakistan strategy is hopelessly at odds with reality,” David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency adviser to the State Department, said. “We treat it as an earnest but incapable ally in the war on terrorism.” In fact, some civilian elements of the government are American allies; some military elements are American enemies. The wild northwest, where Islamist militants have extended their control and created a safe haven for Al Qaeda, has thwarted those who would govern it for a long time. Lord Curzon, the British viceroy of India at the turn of the last century, fumed, “No patchwork scheme—and all our present recent schemes . . . are mere patchwork—will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steam-roller has passed over the country from end to end, will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start that machine.”

American policymakers must be tempted to agree. Years of U.S. efforts in Pakistan—military aid, air strikes, Special Forces operations, bilateral diplomacy, coaxings, warnings—have been patchwork, and they have failed. Different approaches, including ones suggested in “World at Risk,” such as putting more effort into development and governance in Pakistan’s northwest, or bringing other regional countries to the table, offer some promise. But, in Kilcullen’s words, “Iraq might be easier than this. It’s a very, very difficult problem, and we don’t have much leverage in it.”

In the days after the Mumbai attacks, the Washington Post reported that the Obama transition team was considering Richard Holbrooke as a special envoy to the region. The position would create a kind of civilian counterpart to General David Petraeus, the head of Central Command, filling a diplomatic void in U.S. foreign policy that the military has occupied throughout the Bush years. The Administration has always regarded terrorism in the narrow terms of war, and this myopia led it to deal with the region’s countries in isolation from one another, so that the policy in Kabul sometimes contradicted the one in Islamabad, which in turn was undermined by the growing partnership with New Delhi, and all of them were hampered by the refusal to talk to Tehran, whose role in the affairs of its neighbors to the east receives little attention. A special envoy would have to see the problem whole.

Holbrooke is the most experienced diplomat in the Democratic Party, and the aggressive negotiating skill he showed in brokering the Dayton accords that ended the war in Bosnia is badly needed in south Asia. But a legacy of the Bush Administration is that America can no longer sweep in and impose a solution on a crisis. The answers for Pakistan lie largely in its own hands—that’s the most frightening thing of all.” ♦

Risk Factors: Comment: The New Yorker
 
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