Although I am taking a risk posting this since AM has not given me sanctuary to express my thoughts, I found what the article says between lines to be more interesting than the lines themselves.
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The ISI: AN EXCEPTIONAL SECRET SERVICE
By Lt. General Asad Durrani
In the process, from a small time player that undertook to punch above its weight, rubbing shoulders with the best in the game, the Americans, catapulted the Agency into the big league. Unsurprisingly, the ISI became a matter of great concern not only for its foes.
So the CIA built up the the ISI in order to serve its goals.
The shared objective - defeat of the occupation forces - was one reason; respect for each other's turf, the more important other.
But then it cannot follow that the CIA would respect any "turf". It was out to get the USSR and the ISI was a useful tool.
It did not mean that they trusted each other.
Of course. "Trust" between secret services is an impossibility by definition.
Twice these vilification campaigns led, under American pressure, to major purges of ISI's rank and file.
And the leadership of the ISI caved in twice to let these purges happen? What better example to illustrate that the subservience in the one-way relationship, rather than the "rubbing shoulders" with the big leagues.
In the early 1990s, we in the ISI understood this shift in American attitude as a big-brother's desire to establish hegemony, but more crucially - now that the Soviet Union after its withdrawal from Afghanistan had ceased to exist - to cut this upstart service to size.
So the useful tool built up to serve a particular purpose was not longer needed. Should this not have been clear much before the nineties?
But what seemed to have caused the most anguish amongst our American friends were the prospects of an increasingly confident ISI, vain enough to throw spanners in the work of the sole surviving superpower. These apprehensions were not entirely ill-founded as the Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990-91 was soon to show.
"Increasingly confident" and "vain enough" on the basis of playing as a temp in the big leagues, without any resources of its own to sustain such dreams? This would suggest cockiness peaking just before the downfall.
Sometimes in 1992, General Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor to US Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush, reportedly conceded that the ISI's assessment of Saddam's forces was closer to the mark than their own, which highly exaggerated Saddam's capacity. Now, if anyone else in the business too was to broadcast its account every time the CIA "sexed-up" a threat to suit American objectives (next time on Iraq's WMD holding for example), some pre-emption was obviously in order.
So what was to follow was to punish the ISI for a better assessment of Saddam's forces? Or for appearing to be smarter? This would be too naive an interpretation to work as any tangible reason.
Soon thereafter the ISI was cleansed of the old guard, most of them ostensibly for their infatuation with the "Jihadists" in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
So here comes Purge #3 in a relatively short period of time, washing away the veneer of confidence and vanity.
These purges must have served a few careers but when it came to taking decisions and making policies, the new guard had no choice but to put its shoulder behind the Taliban bandwagon.
So after three purges carried out by the ISI leadership at the CIA's behest, we are now to beleive that the survivors, no doubt carefully vetted by the CIA, chose to put their shoulders behind their favoured factions of the the Taliban, out of the independent conviction that they had no choice? Or does this mean that they were out-maneuvered and cornered into this position, right where the CIA wanted them to be?
The ISI was thereafter subjected to another purge in the hope that the refurbished setup would put its heart and soul behind the new decree: 'chase anyone resisting the American military operations in Afghanistan all the way to hell'.
So the ISI leadership carried out Purge #4 at the CIA's behest.
So, this time around as well, it is not any "rogue elements" in the ISI but the complexity of the crisis that necessitates selective use of force; essentially against the "rogue groups", some of them undoubtedly planted or supported by forces inimical to our past and present policies.
Of course, after the fourth purge, how can there be any "rogue" elements still left within the ISI? To me, this claim describes a classic set-up operation that the ISI swallowed, hook, line and sinker.
Indeed, the ISI suffers from many ailments, most of them a corollary of its being predominantly a military organisation and of the Army's exceptional role in Pakistani politics.
A military mind is not good at all for operating a spy agency, specially in the "big leagues", and the "exceptional" role in politics guarantees lots of easily manipulated influence for outside masters such as the CIA.
The most important takeaway from this fascinating snapshot of the ISI, the Taliban, and Pakistan's view of America and its strategic choices is that Pakistan will never be a predictable puppet of US interests.
This snapshot is not fascinating at all, being consistent with easily deducible facts in evidence for those who know where to look.
In summary:
"Pakistan will never be a predictable puppet of US interests,
but a puppet nonetheless".
Discussing the comments but mot my person welcomed!
