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The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan :: Middle East Quarterly
NATIONS IN THE MAKING
Once they came into existence as states, both Pakistan and Israel experienced similar sorts of problems as nations in the making, involving boundaries, migration, language, identity, and the legal order.
Geography. Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the happenstance of war and led to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography, for it consisted of west and east wings separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory. Those two halves "were remote from each other in everything from language and high cultural tradition to diet, costume, calendar, standard time and social customs."16 The cession of the east wing in 1971, though very painful, did provide geographic contiguity and national focus to Pakistan.
In-migration. Between 1948-51, more than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, doubling the Jewish population and drastically altering Israel's cultural map, as most of the new immigrants came from Arab countries. Pakistan's formation was accompanied by the influx and outflow of huge numbers of refugees, estimated at fifteen million, the vast majority of whom arrived with little property (those with possessions tended to stay behind in India). Absorbing this refugee population proved a monumental task for both Israel and Pakistan (and India too). Besides having to provide for housing, employment, education, and distribution of wealth and opportunities, and having to allow for social and cultural adjustments, each new state had to provide a sense of belonging and national identity. The challenge was heightened in Israel's case by the immigrants' worldwide origins and in Pakistan's by the ethnic diversity of its native population as well as the Mohajirs (immigrants from India).
Language. In both countries, few spoke the language that served as official tongue. Hebrew, revived from millennia past as a vernacular, had to be learned by nearly everyone. In many families, parents continued with their diverse mother tongues while Hebrew became the language of the children. Had demographic considerations predominated in Pakistan, Bengali would have been the national language, spoken as it was by more than half of Pakistan's original population. Instead, Urdu -- spoken primarily in the Gangetic belt that lay outside its borders17 and not the principal language of any province that composed Pakistan -- became the country's official language.18
Establishing a national identity. Internal disagreements among both Israelis and Pakistanis are acute. The religious-secular debates are at times extremely intense and eventually could damage the state. Tensions between the Ashkenazi (i.e., Europeans) and the Sephardi (Middle Easterners) has a lesser role but played a crucial role in the defeat of the Labor alignment in 1977. Pakistan was anything but a homogeneous entity at the time of its formation; other than being Muslims, the citizens had very little in common -- and even as Muslims, the Sunnis, Shi`is, Ahmadis, and Isma`ilis differed ferociously among themselves. Establishing a Pakistan identity among a divided population was the primary task of the new state, one not fully achieved, for the country remains riven by these divisions, especially the Sunni-Shi`i one.
Who is a Jew, a Muslim? Who is an Israeli or a Pakistani? What is a Jewish or Islamic state? Both states have struggled to define their core identity. Internal divisions prevent a consensus on the question of who is a Jew or Muslim. As a nation committed to "the ingathering of the exiles," one would expect a general agreement on the Jewish identity. On the contrary, "who is a Jew?" has become among the most controversial and contentious issues in Israel and the passage of time only intensifies the tension. For example, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union led to major disagreements when, on halachic grounds, the religious establishment questioned the Jewish credentials of many immigrants. Because of their questionable Judaism, those who fought and died in defense of the country have at times been refused burial in Jewish cemeteries. Likewise, conversions to Judaism under Conservative or Reform auspices are not accepted in Israel.
In Pakistan, a fundamentalist Jamaat-i Islami group put this issue on the national agenda in 1953 by demanding that Ahmadis19 be declared non-Muslims. When the government rejected this demand, the Jamaat engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Mohammed Munir, headed an commission of inquiry that drew an interesting observation: the ulema (religious authorities) could not agree on the question of who is a Muslim.20 The fundamentalists lost this battle but not the war; to retain their support, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973 conceded to include an amendment to the newly promulgated constitution that declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims. Take the case of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a political and legal luminary who consciously opted to live in Pakistan and make it his home: he served the new Islamic Republic as its first foreign minister, skillfully articulated Islamic positions in international fora, took Pakistan into the SEATO alliance, and became the first Pakistani judge at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Yet the 1973 constitution of Pakistan declared Sir Zafrulla a non-Muslim and he died in 1985 a kafir (infidel) in his own country.
Constitutions. In Israel, domestic differences impeded a written constitution; for the same reason, Pakistan had too many of them. Conflict over the role and position of halacha (religious law) in the Jewish State significantly inhibited Israel from enacting a constitution. What began as a compromise British model of not having a written constitution gradually became a Pandora's box. With the growing influence of religious parties, writing a constitution has become more distant than ever. In its five decades, Pakistan has had seven constitutional arrangements -- those of 1935, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1985.
SECULARISM VS. THEOCRACY
Secular movements. The parallel religious response to the new states holds particular interest. Supporters of the Zionist and Pakistani enterprises came primarily from the secular middle-class and neither intended to create a theocratic polity. Reflecting on the Declaration of Independence, David Ben-Gurion later remarked that it
said something that I know conflicts with the Halacha, universal and equal suffrage without distinctions of sex, religion, race or nationality; and this was adopted even though according to the Halacha women do not have equal rights.... We must undoubtedly respect any Jew who is faithful to the Halacha, but the Halacha does not obligate every Jew.21
At a press conference on July 4, 1947, just a month before partition, Jinnah remarked that it was "absurd" to think that Pakistan would be a religious state.22 On the eve of partition, he categorically told members of the Constituent Assembly,
You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims --not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.23
According to first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world."[24] The recognition of the centrality of Islam in the new state was not aimed at making its Shari`a the guiding principal. In the words of Paul Brass,
The League leaders were oriented towards achieving secular political power in a modern constitutional-bureaucratic state structure, in which the shari'a would be respected but would not prevent legislatures from acting in a sovereign manner and in which secular political leaders would be dominant in a representative regime. In both their goals and their political skills, the Muslim League leaders were more oriented towards and ultimately more successful in the secular political arena in which the political choices had to be made.25
Early opposition. In both cases, religious leaders responded negatively to nationalist demands for a religiously-based state. Orthodox Jewry found Zionism unattractive because it contradicted their view that the Jewish state must be formed by the Messiah and not by some nonobservant Zionist mortals. Even today, a substantial body of the Orthodox rejects the state, some going so far as to consort with its enemies. This applies even to government functionaries: a former chief rabbi remains seated and studies a religious text while the audience at an official function sings the national anthem; a deputy mayor of Jerusalem dismisses the Israeli flag as a rag.
The idea of a separate Islamic political entity runs counter to the universal brotherhood preached by Islam; if Islam is the authentic nationality of the Muslims everywhere, then political divisions within the Islamic world can only be temporary. If were Pakistan somehow attained, it would confine the sway and glory of Islam to mere corners of the country, Muslims remaining in India would be weakened, and Pakistan would not be a truly Islamic state.26 Thus, the principal "opposition to the Pakistan demand and to the Muslim League among Muslims came from that segment of the Muslim elite most concerned with the protection of Islam and Muslim culture, from the ulama."27 In addition, their opposition had much to do with self-interest; the ulema did not see in the Muslim League and in the Pakistan idea an appropriate leadership position for themselves as the true protectors of Islam and Shari`a.28 They also opposed Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan was an unrealistic goal.
As a result, influential elements of the ulema, especially the Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, sided with the Congress Party and against the Muslim League.29 Kifayatullah (1872-1952), mufti of Delhi and founder of Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, also raised doubts in his fatwas about Jinnah's Islamic credentials.30 He pointed out that Jinnah was expert "of English law, not of Islamic law of British politics, not Islamic policies." He lacked even an elementary acquaintance with Islamic jurisprudence. Other of the ulema of the Barelvi school pointed out that as a Shi`i, Jinnah should not lead the faithful. Even those who sought a theocratic state in the sub-continent, like Maulana Abul A`la Maududi (1903-79), had reservations over Jinnah's non-Islamic orientation and approach. Jinnah, whom Indian Muslims had hailed as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Maududi once dubbed Kafir-i-Azam (Great Unbeliever) because he felt Jinnah "was not a practising Muslim."31
The religious reconsider. Oddly, some of those initially indifferent or even hostile to a state based on religion latterly became among its most fervent advocates and then ambitious to seize control of it. The non-Zionist Orthodox Jews "soon realized that, in a western style democracy, a determined minority has the power to prevent the government from passing laws that ostensibly threaten their sacred principles."32 Before long, they became key players in the Zionist Knesset and at times indispensable coalition partners. Once Pakistan was created as a "homeland" for the subcontinent's Muslim minorities, religious elements would inevitably try to take control of it.33Besides making Pakistan an Islamic Republic the ulema played a crucial role in the legitimization of military rule. An otherwise powerful dictator like Ayub Khan had to make concessions to the ulema and declare Pakistan an Islamic republic. Democracy has been good to the growing ambitions of the religious, with elections enhancing their strength and influence as rival secular parties are compelled to court and solicit the support of the religious leaders and establishment. Religious activists in both countries want such personal and community functions as marriage, divorce, adoption, conversion, burials, and food and travel regulations to come under religious control.
Religion's increased role. The year 1977 was a major landmark in the approach to religion in both countries, as unprecedented political changes compelled rulers to be more accommodating to the religious conservatives. The ninth Knesset elections of that year abruptly ended the Labor Party's perpetual domination of Israeli politics and when Menachem Begin became prime minister, he was joined, after a gap of over two decades, by the Agudat Israel, a non-Zionist party.34 Begin conceded various demands made by the religious establishment that previous Israeli governments had hitherto denied. For example, he gave the National Religious Party control of the coveted education ministry, with its ample financial resources and extensive education network. Pakistan also underwent serious change in 1977 with the imposition of martial law and the overthrow of Zulfiqar Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled until 1988. In need of ways to legitimize his rule, Zia ul-Haq looked to Islam. Projecting himself as a pious Muslim seeking to promote the cause of Islam, he introduced a series of legislative acts toward this end.
Today, both countries face severe fundamentalist pressures. Religious parties made significant gains in the 1996 elections, to the point that Binyamin Netanyahu, a secular, modern, and American-educated leader, had to court the religious establishment to ensure his election as prime minister. The Oxford-educated Benazir Bhutto's alienated the religious establishment in Pakistan partly contributed to her downfall as prime minister on two occasions.
The historical circumstances of their creation mean that secularism is not an option for Israel or Pakistan; that would question their very raison d'être. Israel and Pakistan both fall somewhere between theocracy and secularism. Both engage in intrusive scrutiny of individual and collective behaviors; yet greater religious influence would accentuate internal discord and divisions.
NATIONS IN THE MAKING
Once they came into existence as states, both Pakistan and Israel experienced similar sorts of problems as nations in the making, involving boundaries, migration, language, identity, and the legal order.
Geography. Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the happenstance of war and led to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography, for it consisted of west and east wings separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory. Those two halves "were remote from each other in everything from language and high cultural tradition to diet, costume, calendar, standard time and social customs."16 The cession of the east wing in 1971, though very painful, did provide geographic contiguity and national focus to Pakistan.
In-migration. Between 1948-51, more than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, doubling the Jewish population and drastically altering Israel's cultural map, as most of the new immigrants came from Arab countries. Pakistan's formation was accompanied by the influx and outflow of huge numbers of refugees, estimated at fifteen million, the vast majority of whom arrived with little property (those with possessions tended to stay behind in India). Absorbing this refugee population proved a monumental task for both Israel and Pakistan (and India too). Besides having to provide for housing, employment, education, and distribution of wealth and opportunities, and having to allow for social and cultural adjustments, each new state had to provide a sense of belonging and national identity. The challenge was heightened in Israel's case by the immigrants' worldwide origins and in Pakistan's by the ethnic diversity of its native population as well as the Mohajirs (immigrants from India).
Language. In both countries, few spoke the language that served as official tongue. Hebrew, revived from millennia past as a vernacular, had to be learned by nearly everyone. In many families, parents continued with their diverse mother tongues while Hebrew became the language of the children. Had demographic considerations predominated in Pakistan, Bengali would have been the national language, spoken as it was by more than half of Pakistan's original population. Instead, Urdu -- spoken primarily in the Gangetic belt that lay outside its borders17 and not the principal language of any province that composed Pakistan -- became the country's official language.18
Establishing a national identity. Internal disagreements among both Israelis and Pakistanis are acute. The religious-secular debates are at times extremely intense and eventually could damage the state. Tensions between the Ashkenazi (i.e., Europeans) and the Sephardi (Middle Easterners) has a lesser role but played a crucial role in the defeat of the Labor alignment in 1977. Pakistan was anything but a homogeneous entity at the time of its formation; other than being Muslims, the citizens had very little in common -- and even as Muslims, the Sunnis, Shi`is, Ahmadis, and Isma`ilis differed ferociously among themselves. Establishing a Pakistan identity among a divided population was the primary task of the new state, one not fully achieved, for the country remains riven by these divisions, especially the Sunni-Shi`i one.
Who is a Jew, a Muslim? Who is an Israeli or a Pakistani? What is a Jewish or Islamic state? Both states have struggled to define their core identity. Internal divisions prevent a consensus on the question of who is a Jew or Muslim. As a nation committed to "the ingathering of the exiles," one would expect a general agreement on the Jewish identity. On the contrary, "who is a Jew?" has become among the most controversial and contentious issues in Israel and the passage of time only intensifies the tension. For example, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union led to major disagreements when, on halachic grounds, the religious establishment questioned the Jewish credentials of many immigrants. Because of their questionable Judaism, those who fought and died in defense of the country have at times been refused burial in Jewish cemeteries. Likewise, conversions to Judaism under Conservative or Reform auspices are not accepted in Israel.
In Pakistan, a fundamentalist Jamaat-i Islami group put this issue on the national agenda in 1953 by demanding that Ahmadis19 be declared non-Muslims. When the government rejected this demand, the Jamaat engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Mohammed Munir, headed an commission of inquiry that drew an interesting observation: the ulema (religious authorities) could not agree on the question of who is a Muslim.20 The fundamentalists lost this battle but not the war; to retain their support, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1973 conceded to include an amendment to the newly promulgated constitution that declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims. Take the case of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a political and legal luminary who consciously opted to live in Pakistan and make it his home: he served the new Islamic Republic as its first foreign minister, skillfully articulated Islamic positions in international fora, took Pakistan into the SEATO alliance, and became the first Pakistani judge at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Yet the 1973 constitution of Pakistan declared Sir Zafrulla a non-Muslim and he died in 1985 a kafir (infidel) in his own country.
Constitutions. In Israel, domestic differences impeded a written constitution; for the same reason, Pakistan had too many of them. Conflict over the role and position of halacha (religious law) in the Jewish State significantly inhibited Israel from enacting a constitution. What began as a compromise British model of not having a written constitution gradually became a Pandora's box. With the growing influence of religious parties, writing a constitution has become more distant than ever. In its five decades, Pakistan has had seven constitutional arrangements -- those of 1935, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1985.
SECULARISM VS. THEOCRACY
Secular movements. The parallel religious response to the new states holds particular interest. Supporters of the Zionist and Pakistani enterprises came primarily from the secular middle-class and neither intended to create a theocratic polity. Reflecting on the Declaration of Independence, David Ben-Gurion later remarked that it
said something that I know conflicts with the Halacha, universal and equal suffrage without distinctions of sex, religion, race or nationality; and this was adopted even though according to the Halacha women do not have equal rights.... We must undoubtedly respect any Jew who is faithful to the Halacha, but the Halacha does not obligate every Jew.21
At a press conference on July 4, 1947, just a month before partition, Jinnah remarked that it was "absurd" to think that Pakistan would be a religious state.22 On the eve of partition, he categorically told members of the Constituent Assembly,
You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims --not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.23
According to first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world."[24] The recognition of the centrality of Islam in the new state was not aimed at making its Shari`a the guiding principal. In the words of Paul Brass,
The League leaders were oriented towards achieving secular political power in a modern constitutional-bureaucratic state structure, in which the shari'a would be respected but would not prevent legislatures from acting in a sovereign manner and in which secular political leaders would be dominant in a representative regime. In both their goals and their political skills, the Muslim League leaders were more oriented towards and ultimately more successful in the secular political arena in which the political choices had to be made.25
Early opposition. In both cases, religious leaders responded negatively to nationalist demands for a religiously-based state. Orthodox Jewry found Zionism unattractive because it contradicted their view that the Jewish state must be formed by the Messiah and not by some nonobservant Zionist mortals. Even today, a substantial body of the Orthodox rejects the state, some going so far as to consort with its enemies. This applies even to government functionaries: a former chief rabbi remains seated and studies a religious text while the audience at an official function sings the national anthem; a deputy mayor of Jerusalem dismisses the Israeli flag as a rag.
The idea of a separate Islamic political entity runs counter to the universal brotherhood preached by Islam; if Islam is the authentic nationality of the Muslims everywhere, then political divisions within the Islamic world can only be temporary. If were Pakistan somehow attained, it would confine the sway and glory of Islam to mere corners of the country, Muslims remaining in India would be weakened, and Pakistan would not be a truly Islamic state.26 Thus, the principal "opposition to the Pakistan demand and to the Muslim League among Muslims came from that segment of the Muslim elite most concerned with the protection of Islam and Muslim culture, from the ulama."27 In addition, their opposition had much to do with self-interest; the ulema did not see in the Muslim League and in the Pakistan idea an appropriate leadership position for themselves as the true protectors of Islam and Shari`a.28 They also opposed Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan was an unrealistic goal.
As a result, influential elements of the ulema, especially the Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, sided with the Congress Party and against the Muslim League.29 Kifayatullah (1872-1952), mufti of Delhi and founder of Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, also raised doubts in his fatwas about Jinnah's Islamic credentials.30 He pointed out that Jinnah was expert "of English law, not of Islamic law of British politics, not Islamic policies." He lacked even an elementary acquaintance with Islamic jurisprudence. Other of the ulema of the Barelvi school pointed out that as a Shi`i, Jinnah should not lead the faithful. Even those who sought a theocratic state in the sub-continent, like Maulana Abul A`la Maududi (1903-79), had reservations over Jinnah's non-Islamic orientation and approach. Jinnah, whom Indian Muslims had hailed as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Maududi once dubbed Kafir-i-Azam (Great Unbeliever) because he felt Jinnah "was not a practising Muslim."31
The religious reconsider. Oddly, some of those initially indifferent or even hostile to a state based on religion latterly became among its most fervent advocates and then ambitious to seize control of it. The non-Zionist Orthodox Jews "soon realized that, in a western style democracy, a determined minority has the power to prevent the government from passing laws that ostensibly threaten their sacred principles."32 Before long, they became key players in the Zionist Knesset and at times indispensable coalition partners. Once Pakistan was created as a "homeland" for the subcontinent's Muslim minorities, religious elements would inevitably try to take control of it.33Besides making Pakistan an Islamic Republic the ulema played a crucial role in the legitimization of military rule. An otherwise powerful dictator like Ayub Khan had to make concessions to the ulema and declare Pakistan an Islamic republic. Democracy has been good to the growing ambitions of the religious, with elections enhancing their strength and influence as rival secular parties are compelled to court and solicit the support of the religious leaders and establishment. Religious activists in both countries want such personal and community functions as marriage, divorce, adoption, conversion, burials, and food and travel regulations to come under religious control.
Religion's increased role. The year 1977 was a major landmark in the approach to religion in both countries, as unprecedented political changes compelled rulers to be more accommodating to the religious conservatives. The ninth Knesset elections of that year abruptly ended the Labor Party's perpetual domination of Israeli politics and when Menachem Begin became prime minister, he was joined, after a gap of over two decades, by the Agudat Israel, a non-Zionist party.34 Begin conceded various demands made by the religious establishment that previous Israeli governments had hitherto denied. For example, he gave the National Religious Party control of the coveted education ministry, with its ample financial resources and extensive education network. Pakistan also underwent serious change in 1977 with the imposition of martial law and the overthrow of Zulfiqar Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled until 1988. In need of ways to legitimize his rule, Zia ul-Haq looked to Islam. Projecting himself as a pious Muslim seeking to promote the cause of Islam, he introduced a series of legislative acts toward this end.
Today, both countries face severe fundamentalist pressures. Religious parties made significant gains in the 1996 elections, to the point that Binyamin Netanyahu, a secular, modern, and American-educated leader, had to court the religious establishment to ensure his election as prime minister. The Oxford-educated Benazir Bhutto's alienated the religious establishment in Pakistan partly contributed to her downfall as prime minister on two occasions.
The historical circumstances of their creation mean that secularism is not an option for Israel or Pakistan; that would question their very raison d'être. Israel and Pakistan both fall somewhere between theocracy and secularism. Both engage in intrusive scrutiny of individual and collective behaviors; yet greater religious influence would accentuate internal discord and divisions.
