The two-day Nato summit in Chicago set to open tomorrow is an important moment for Afghanistan and Pakistan. For Afghanistan, what is at stake is nothing less than a road map for the drawdown of foreign troops and the post-war future of the country. When do the troops leave, how many resources will be left behind and how much money will be pumped in, who will pay for what, and how will stability and peace be made possible in a fractious Afghanistan — these are among the main questions that Chicago may go some way in answering. While the countries which have contributed to the Nato/Isaf forces in Afghanistan are in agreement that the latter cannot be abandoned and that the international commitment to it must remain firm over the next decade at least, there are disagreements over the pace and extent of the drawdown of troops, the cut-off date by which the mission there changes definitely towards a more supporting role, and how much money can be made available for Afghanistan.
Arguably, however, the country with the most to lose at Chicago, if the situation is mishandled, is Pakistan. Because for all the uncertainty over Afghanistan’s future, there is at least some determination to try and maintain a modicum of peace. In Pakistan’s case, the questions are likely to be more pointed; the time may have finally come for Pakistan to articulate what it can and will do to aid the international effort to stabilise Afghanistan in the years ahead. The summit has also come at a time where goodwill for Pakistan in the international community gathering there may be at an all-time low over the closure of the Nato ground supply routes through Pakistan. Pakistan can expect to be asked about what it will do about safe havens inside its territory, how it will strengthen border controls, whether it intends to aid or hinder the Afghan reconciliation process and if it will play by the rules of the international community in Afghanistan or those of its own making.
Critical as these questions are, what is worrying from a Pakistani point of view is that it is not clear that policymakers here are in a position to give satisfactory answers. International, including US, patience with Pakistan will eventually run out if it is continued to be seen as a spoiler in Afghanistan. From there, the distance to acute isolation for this country at a precarious economic and security moment would not be very long. If Pakistan has a defendable case to make, now is the time to do it.
