Pakistan F-16 Discussions 2

[ziaulislam]

Well, when the French offered the F-1, they were done with that fighter.

So, their interest in what we do or don't do with it was about as much as the Mirage III/5. The only difference is that by taking on a production capability, we may have been able to design and implement the electronics upgrade on our own.

Otherwise, I don't think they would've stopped us from BVR-ing the F-1s, just as they didn't (or couldn't) prevent us fitting the Mirage III/5 with H-2/H-4 and Ra'ad.

would have still been an inferior design to super 7 with no further support creating critical part issues from engines to sub assemblies leading it become like mirage V dysfunctional(which is flying thanks to us window shopping virtually every mirage we can ind).
we could not have done both the jf17 and f1..we had to choose

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

would have still been an inferior design to super 7 with no further support creating critical part issues from engines to sub assemblies leading it become like mirage V dysfunctional(which is flying thanks to us window shopping virtually every mirage we can ind).
we could not have done both the jf17 and f1..we had to choose

The F-1 was the alternative option to the JF-17. However, my point was that we could've gotten and used it through the 1990s and 2000s. The production experience earlier on would've given us the base for our next-gen fighter program much earlier, so we could've started AZM in 1999 or even 2009.

As for supporting the F-1. It's a self-imposed limitation. We could've collaborated with the South Africans to build new parts if necessary. The advantage of working with an older gen design is that the learning curve is much flatter, so we could've gotten to it quicker and cheaper. South Africa was even designing a re-engine program with the RD-93 for the F-1.

The strategic impact of the F-1 would've been different too.

If we had the "grit" mentality in the early 1990s, then we would've worked to equip the Mirages (F-1/III/V) with BVR and SOW much earlier (not wait on the US for F-16s). Imagine having 100-150 BVR and SOW-equipped fighters by Kargil.

We would've been building fighters by 2000, so the capacity to move onto an NGFA could've come sooner -- 10-15 years earlier than AZM. Right now, we'd be talking about AZM's first prototype (or even small batch production), not blurry concepts.

 

[mshan44]

 

[MastanKhan]

When the PAF was exploring Project Sabre II, Dassault offered to set-up the Mirage F-1 line in Pakistan with a huge stockpile of ATAR turbojet engines.

Not sure if the PAF could've gotten new BVRAAMs from France, but it could've secured the R-Darter via South Africa (alongside H-2/H-4 and MUPSOW).

Basically, we'd have BVR and SOW in the 1990s, before Kargil.

And if the US still opts to sanction us over our nuclear program, we could've worked with South Africa to integrate the RD-33 to the F-1 and use a 'Super F-1' as an early 4th gen fighter in the 2000s and 2010s.

With that early exposure to aircraft design and integration, we may have started AZM in 1997, and have a FGFA prototype right now (after going through 20 years of R&D work, tech demonstrator work, etc).

The problem with us Pakistanis is that we daydream about how to excel individually, but not about nation-building, elevating our people, etc.

Hi,

Thank you for your post. If you have a rifle--you will find ways to get bullets for it. But you have to have a rifle first.

BVR capability was not an issue with the Paf at any stage during the 80's, 90's, or 2000.

Mirage F1 was the perfect aircraft to propel it to the 4/4.5/5th gen aircraft on a progressive scale of technology and technological advancements.

The F16 fetish of the Paf made them make bad decisions over the good ones.

 

[denel]

The F-1 was the alternative option to the JF-17. However, my point was that we could've gotten and used it through the 1990s and 2000s. The production experience earlier on would've given us the base for our next-gen fighter program much earlier, so we could've started AZM in 1999 or even 2009.

As for supporting the F-1. It's a self-imposed limitation. We could've collaborated with the South Africans to build new parts if necessary. The advantage of working with an older gen design is that the learning curve is much flatter, so we could've gotten to it quicker and cheaper. South Africa was even designing a re-engine program with the RD-93 for the F-1.

The strategic impact of the F-1 would've been different too.

If we had the "grit" mentality in the early 1990s, then we would've worked to equip the Mirages (F-1/III/V) with BVR and SOW much earlier (not wait on the US for F-16s). Imagine having 100-150 BVR and SOW-equipped fighters by Kargil.

We would've been building fighters by 2000, so the capacity to move onto an NGFA could've come sooner -- 10-15 years earlier than AZM. Right now, we'd be talking about AZM's first prototype (or even small batch production), not blurry concepts.

I completely support your argument. This would have lead to a strong base vs the assemblies that are in name only. F1 production if that option was exercised provided many turn key albiet from Atlas; SOW capabilities which eventually went to M3 via Cheetah as H2/H4. Similarly F1AZ by default had HMS from started with various Darter config. F1 was already capable of extensive upgrades not only on the airframe but technologically. French pursued M2K which is fine, this was a decent alternative if pursued would have given a very strong home advantage free of sanctions; like RM33 engine - been there done it; so many options were available but PAC/PAF never seem to get the head of out a chinese/US back hole (sorry for my language - it is imperative to call a dung a dung). In summary, a litany of lost opportunities and day dreaming.
I fear that Azm and others programs may be just that dreams and never come to fruition as soon as F-16 carrot is dangled with kickbacks.

 

[denel]

Hi,

Thank you for your post. If you have a rifle--you will find ways to get bullets for it. But you have to have a rifle first.

BVR capability was not an issue with the Paf at any stage during the 80's, 90's, or 2000.

Mirage F1 was the perfect aircraft to propel it to the 4/4/5/5th gen aircraft on a progressive scale of technology and technological advancements.

The F16 fetish of the Paf made them make bad decisions over the good ones.

100% on the mark. F16 will continue to make them take bad decisions.

 

[Irfan Baloch]

respected gents
F-1 discussion deserves a separate section. we continue to revisit it and talk about lost opportunity due to PAF F-16 experience.

if you like I can move the F-1 related posts to a new thread? or if we want to continue to talk about F1 or other jets in reference to F-16 within this thread then I can leave it here.

@Bilal Khan (Quwa) @MastanKhan @denel

 

[Raider 21]

The F-1 was the alternative option to the JF-17. However, my point was that we could've gotten and used it through the 1990s and 2000s. The production experience earlier on would've given us the base for our next-gen fighter program much earlier, so we could've started AZM in 1999 or even 2009.

As for supporting the F-1. It's a self-imposed limitation. We could've collaborated with the South Africans to build new parts if necessary. The advantage of working with an older gen design is that the learning curve is much flatter, so we could've gotten to it quicker and cheaper. South Africa was even designing a re-engine program with the RD-93 for the F-1.

The strategic impact of the F-1 would've been different too.

If we had the "grit" mentality in the early 1990s, then we would've worked to equip the Mirages (F-1/III/V) with BVR and SOW much earlier (not wait on the US for F-16s). Imagine having 100-150 BVR and SOW-equipped fighters by Kargil.

We would've been building fighters by 2000, so the capacity to move onto an NGFA could've come sooner -- 10-15 years earlier than AZM. Right now, we'd be talking about AZM's first prototype (or even small batch production), not blurry concepts.

How does the would've and could've translate to what is happening now. As the would've and could've never happened and it lies in the same theories basket.

Chances are with those would've and should've theories would have resulted in no AZM, and a probable chance of BVR-less capable Mirage F1s....

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

How does the would've and could've translate to what is happening now. As the would've and could've never happened and it lies in the same theories basket.

Chances are with those would've and should've theories would have resulted in no AZM, and a probable chance of BVR-less capable Mirage F1s....

It helps us see where we went wrong, and how much time we've lost in the process. It sounds like a lot of 'hindsight' stuff, but if it didn't matter, the word "lesson" wouldn't exist.

That entire episode was an example of us taking US ties for granted, not pushing our thought process beyond what was immediately apparent, and not leveraging all options in the absolute sense of the term. It also speaks to a culture of not questioning decisions, not inquiring why we didn't take alternative routes, how we understand 'high-risk' and 'low-risk', etc.

The argument of using the F-1 to start AZM is from a real-world example we have now. The last CAS clearly said that the Saab 2000 repair project was a trigger to pursuing AZM. Of course, the experienced gained from co-producing the JF-17 was a factor too.

Well, both things were on the table (i.e., manufacturing work, engineering work, etc) with the F-1 in the late 1980s. We also had ties with South Africa in the 1990s to acquire SOWs -- plus help on a strategic asset in ALCM -- so something conventional like BVR wasn't out-of-scope. Kentron had even offered us the T-Darter and A-Darter in 1999, so adding an older design like R-Darter to the Mirage F-1 (just as we had added H-2/H-4 to the Mirage III/5) was an option.

We now need to eat all those missed opportunities today. We need to come to terms with the fact that our leaders can -- and have -- made bad decisions. It means we need to set-up serious accountability and transparency mechanisms to ensure AZM moves forward, and doesn't end up failing because of bad decisions in the future.

What if we take ties with China for granted to the point of totally tying our supply channel to them? There are folks here who are OK with that, and they'll take AZM to the woodshed and make it happen. Likewise, what if we come across hard cash (e.g., an exceptional upswing in the economy), will we put it all to AZM, or buckle and import a fighter?

 

[Raider 21]

It helps us see where we went wrong, and how much time we've lost in the process. It sounds like a lot of 'hindsight' stuff, but if it didn't matter, the word "lesson" wouldn't exist.

That entire episode was an example of us taking US ties for granted, not pushing our thought process beyond what was immediately apparent, and not leveraging all options in the absolute sense of the term. It also speaks to a culture of not questioning decisions, not inquiring why we didn't take alternative routes, how we understand 'high-risk' and 'low-risk', etc.

The argument of using the F-1 to start AZM is from a real-world example we have now. The last CAS clearly said that the Saab 2000 repair project was a trigger to pursuing AZM. Of course, the experienced gained from co-producing the JF-17 was a factor too.

Well, both things were on the table (i.e., manufacturing work, engineering work, etc) with the F-1 in the late 1980s. We also had ties with South Africa in the 1990s to acquire SOWs -- plus help on a strategic asset in ALCM -- so something conventional like BVR wasn't out-of-scope. Kentron had even offered us the T-Darter and A-Darter in 1999, so adding an older design like R-Darter to the Mirage F-1 (just as we had added H-2/H-4 to the Mirage III/5) was an option.

We now need to eat all those missed opportunities today. We need to come to terms with the fact that our leaders can -- and have -- made bad decisions. It means we need to set-up serious accountability and transparency mechanisms to ensure AZM moves forward, and doesn't end up failing because of bad decisions in the future.

What if we take ties with China for granted to the point of totally tying our supply channel to them? There are folks here who are OK with that, and they'll take AZM to the woodshed and make it happen. Likewise, what if we come across hard cash (e.g., an exceptional upswing in the economy), will we put it all to AZM, or buckle and import a fighter?

If cash was there, and the best platform was picked then there would still be could've and should've theories.....

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

If cash was there, and the best platform was picked then there would still be could've and should've theories.....

Yep, and as a result, there'll be fewer blindspots and better decisions in the future.

 

[mingle]

I completely support your argument. This would have lead to a strong base vs the assemblies that are in name only. F1 production if that option was exercised provided many turn key albiet from Atlas; SOW capabilities which eventually went to M3 via Cheetah as H2/H4. Similarly F1AZ by default had HMS from started with various Darter config. F1 was already capable of extensive upgrades not only on the airframe but technologically. French pursued M2K which is fine, this was a decent alternative if pursued would have given a very strong home advantage free of sanctions; like RM33 engine - been there done it; so many options were available but PAC/PAF never seem to get the head of out a chinese/US back hole (sorry for my language - it is imperative to call a dung a dung). In summary, a litany of lost opportunities and day dreaming.
I fear that Azm and others programs may be just that dreams and never come to fruition as soon as F-16 carrot is dangled with kickbacks.

US offered F15E to replace AZM as one member of this forum said

 

[MastanKhan]

respected gents
F-1 discussion deserves a separate section. we continue to revisit it and talk about lost opportunity due to PAF F-16 experience.

if you like I can move the F-1 related posts to a new thread? or if we want to continue to talk about F1 or other jets in reference to F-16 within this thread then I can leave it here.

@Bilal Khan (Quwa) @MastanKhan @denel

Mr. Baloch.

The quality of the discussions on the board are dying due to to too much control---you cannot write here---you cannot write there---you cannot write this---you cannot write that.

 

[MastanKhan]

How does the would've and could've translate to what is happening now. As the would've and could've never happened and it lies in the same theories basket.

Chances are with those would've and should've theories would have resulted in no AZM, and a probable chance of BVR-less capable Mirage F1s....

Hi,

That is a strange comment---. AZM is in itself is a 5th gen program---.

A sound fundamental F1 base would have landed us in the 5th gen realm a longtime ago---alomost 20 years ago.

That is by the default of natural progression of being in fighter aircraft manufacturing industry---.

Now---where else would one have gone after learning about the 4th gen aircrafts---Obviously to 4.5 and 5th gen aircraft---.

If we were building the F1's---we would have also found ways to build the BVR's---.

Everything falls into place once the first right step is taken---.

 

[Danish Moazzam]

respected gents
F-1 discussion deserves a separate section. we continue to revisit it and talk about lost opportunity due to PAF F-16 experience.

if you like I can move the F-1 related posts to a new thread? or if we want to continue to talk about F1 or other jets in reference to F-16 within this thread then I can leave it here.

@Bilal Khan (Quwa) @MastanKhan @denel

I agree, No point in discussing what has been lost. It would be rather constructive to discuss what can be done now and in future.