It helps us see where we went wrong, and how much time we've lost in the process. It sounds like a lot of 'hindsight' stuff, but if it didn't matter, the word "lesson" wouldn't exist.
That entire episode was an example of us taking US ties for granted, not pushing our thought process beyond what was immediately apparent, and not leveraging all options in the absolute sense of the term. It also speaks to a culture of not questioning decisions, not inquiring why we didn't take alternative routes, how we understand 'high-risk' and 'low-risk', etc.
The argument of using the F-1 to start AZM is from a real-world example we have now. The last CAS clearly said that the Saab 2000 repair project was a trigger to pursuing AZM. Of course, the experienced gained from co-producing the JF-17 was a factor too.
Well, both things were on the table (i.e., manufacturing work, engineering work, etc) with the F-1 in the late 1980s. We also had ties with South Africa in the 1990s to acquire SOWs -- plus help on a strategic asset in ALCM -- so something conventional like BVR wasn't out-of-scope. Kentron had even offered us the T-Darter and A-Darter in 1999, so adding an older design like R-Darter to the Mirage F-1 (just as we had added H-2/H-4 to the Mirage III/5) was an option.
We now need to eat all those missed opportunities today. We need to come to terms with the fact that our leaders can -- and have -- made bad decisions. It means we need to set-up serious accountability and transparency mechanisms to ensure AZM moves forward, and doesn't end up failing because of bad decisions in the future.
What if we take ties with China for granted to the point of totally tying our supply channel to them? There are folks here who are OK with that, and they'll take AZM to the woodshed and make it happen. Likewise, what if we come across hard cash (e.g., an exceptional upswing in the economy), will we put it all to AZM, or buckle and import a fighter?
