By Rasul Bakhsh Rais
If all or most of the Iranian gas is used for the power sector, as stated by the government, then our energy mix will remain lopsidedly dependent on imported fuel
After more than a decade of negotiations and many ups and downs, Iran and Pakistan signed the framework on the Iran-Pakistan peace pipeline during President Asif Ali Zardaris visit to Tehran, pushing the much-delayed project a notch forward. The gas pipeline project makes economic sense: Iran has surplus gas to sell and Pakistan needs gas.
But situations, particularly in the extended Southwest Asian region, dont always follow economic logic; instead, they are determined by politics, strategic interests, rivalries and conflicting views, particularly about Afghanistan.
Since the pipeline project presently concerns Iran and Pakistan, it would be better to comment on the nature of Pak-Iran ties and whether or not moving forward with pipeline will also move forward the somewhat troubled relationship between the two states. The answer lies in how we read the nature of this relationship and how it is likely to develop in the context of the larger context of power between a variety of players Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the United States.
The smiles and tight embraces of diplomats and political leaders of Iran and Pakistan dont tell much about the hidden tensions, mistrust and cloak-and-dagger behaviour between the two countries. All the talk about common cultural and civilisational roots doesnt carry much weight for territorialised nation states, which have their own interests.
It is the conflict or congruence of these interests that can either cause rifts between states or bring them closer together. And in todays world, specific issues drive relations between states like Iran and Pakistan, and within the context of the larger strategic vision of each country.
We are not sure if the strategic visions or regional and outside powers and the games they play create any groundswell for comprehensive partnerships beyond certain specific issues. The strategic partnership between Iran and Pakistan was shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War, and American dominance in Iran ended three decades ago with the Iranian clergys capture of the state.
The Iranian clergymen, like their counterparts in Pakistan, have a worldview, a strategic map and a policy framework to order Irans regional and global relationships. In their bipolar view of the East (Muslim countries) and the West, Pakistan has been on the other side of their policy and ideological fence. It has not been easy for Pakistan to win real friendship of the post-Shah Iranian leadership.
We dont think Pakistans pragmatic tilt toward the West, more specifically the United States, was or could be a major roadblock in the way of closer relations between Tehran and Islamabad. What causes these hidden tensions, then, are conflicting interests in Afghanistan and horizontal partnerships between feuding Afghan social groups and regional states like Pakistan and Iran. This rivalry has fuelled the fire between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, causing tremendous harm to Afghan society at large.
Conflicting visions of Iran and Pakistan have not changed in the structural sense, but there appears to be a growing agreement on three specific issues that may perhaps help to transform this relationship: the war on terror; the stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan; and energy trade.
These are not ordinary problems. They are critical and have the potential to reshape the development and security paradigms of the entire region. They key to all these issues is closer cooperation between Iran and Pakistan on the one hand, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other.
While stabilising Afghanistan and creating a shared regional interest in the future of this state may take a long time, and the war against terrorism may require greater understanding than we have at the moment, the gas pipeline has a real chance of success. It can be a great infrastructural project, and the first of its kind to connect Pakistani consumers, industries and power plants to Iranian gas-fields.
What are its potential benefits and drawbacks for Pakistan?
A straightforward argument is that the pipeline project is a perfect match between a country with an energy surplus and an energy-deficient country, and that the deal is going to benefit both. It is a win-win situation.
The real potential benefit of energy trade between Iran and Pakistan, with the possibility of its extension to India once New Delhi is on board, is in creating latent interdependence. The reason for naming the proposed gas pipeline as a peace pipeline is because of its value in making the three countries interdependent on one another, and thus subjecting old disputes to the economic rationalism required in this day and age.
Economic interdependence leads to much larger and complex relationships, forming an unbreakable web and creating dense partnerships, and causing a spill-over from one set of issues to another. It is of course not an automatic process, and is subject to critical political decisions.
And those decisions are about how to harmonise conflicting strategic visions that dominate in our region in all other aspects of inter-state relations. We can also approach the issue of energy trade and larger economic cooperation by separating them from conflicting strategic pursuits, and then let the real economic benefits work on reshaping the respective strategic visions of each country.
The outcome will depend on whether it is economic rationalism or divergent strategic views that shape this partnership. It is better to realise economic benefits and let them shape the future course of our relationships than unsettled strategic problems and conflicts. But in a region like ours, competing security interests cannot easily be sidelined from the decision-making process.
Pakistan, however, runs the potential risk of over-dependence on Iranian gas, which may affect efforts to explore and develop our own gas fields. If all or most of the Iranian gas is used for the power sector, as stated by the government, then our energy mix will remain lopsidedly dependent on imported fuel.
Another serious question is why our rulers continue to ignore our hydroelectric power potential and the Thar coal deposits, some of the largest in the world. The lack of consensus that is often cited as the reason for not utilising our own resources is also politically manufactured, as the interests of important political players at a given point in time may demand something else.
Before we find leadership with a national vision and the political will to help ourselves through our own resources, let us do what energy-starved countries do: import.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at
rasul@lums.edu.pk