Military cannon’s long journey from Scotland to rural Pakistan
The Great War cannon
First published in
Remember When?
Last updated by
Jim Greenhalf, T&A Reporter
WHY is a 19th century British cannon occupying pride of place in the Pakistani village of Dulmial?
Dr Irfan Malik and Michael Noble (The Centre for Hidden Histories, University of Nottingham) have taken an interest in the subject. The following is their explanation, which has to do with World War One.
"Dulmial is a village approximately 100 miles south of Islamabad, in the Salt Range region of what became Pakistan. A century ago, the area was part of British India, which meant that its inhabitants were drawn into the Great War on the side of the Allies.
A settlement steeped in military history, Dulmial sent 460 of its men to fight in the British Army, including both of Dr Malik’s great grandfathers. The largest single participation of any village in Asia. Nine gave their lives.
In recognition of the significant military service and sacrifice, in 1925 the British Government offered Dulmial an award of their choosing. The man in charge of choosing was Captain Ghulam Mohammad Malik, the highest ranking and most decorated soldier of the village.
The Captain was a man of great experience, having commenced his military life in the Derajet Mountain Battery and participated in Lord Robert’s famous march from Kabul to Kandahar in 1880.
His photograph and achievements are documented in the book by Brig.Gen. Graham ‘The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery’ in 1957. A career soldier, he eschewed the British offers of land, money and water facilities, choosing instead to have Dulmial’s contribution recognised with the presentation of a cannon.
The British agreed and provided Dulmial with a twelve pounder. The cannon itself was made at Carron ironworks, in Falkirk, Scotland, in 1816. Its stand was built in Cossipore Gun Foundry, India, under the leadership of Captain A. Broome, in 1847.
The gun was first collected from the First Punjab Regimental Centre in Jhelum, from where it was carried by train to Chakwal. There the gun was dismounted and loaded in a cart to be pulled by three pairs of oxen for the remaining 28 kms.
The roads were semi-mountainous and the passage was difficult. It would take the ox carts two weeks to cover the distance. From five kilometres out, at Choa Saiden Shah, the route became more difficult still and Dulmial had to dispatch five additional pairs of oxen to relieve the initial six and complete the gun’s journey.
Safely in Dulmial, the gun was placed at the centre of the village and a photograph taken with the local commissioned officers. It remains there today, a reminder of the contribution that Dulmial made in the First World War.
Dulmial is now known within Pakistan as the ‘village with the gun’, but is rather less well known in the UK. This is because little has been written or published about the village in English.
Since that time Dulmial has continued to produce many generations of high ranking, distinguished Army officers. It is our intention to bring this hidden history to a wider audience and help to share the reasons of just what a nineteenth century Scottish cannon is doing in the Salt Range region of Pakistan.
After informing the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London of Dulmial’s significant history, several representatives of the village have been invited to attend the First World War Centenary reception at the British High Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan, to be held in November.
This will be a great honour and privilege for the inhabitants and worldwide descendants of Dulmial."
QW-19 (ANZA-III)
After army chief, Pakistan’s ‘Defendocrats’ woo Washington
Situationer From The National
Security Desk
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
ISLAMABAD: A high-powered Pakistani defence delegation, headed by Defence Secretary Lt. Gen. (retd) Alam Khattak, has reached Washington D.C. to take part in the 23rd US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group (DCG) meeting.
Though the group is one of the five working groups under the broad US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue that was initiated in 2006 when the-then US President, George Bush, visited Pakistan, this is no ordinary conference.
Militarily, Washington and Rawalpindi are closer now than they’ve been in years. There are clear indications from the Pentagon, the State Department and beyond that General Raheel Sharif is someone the Americans ‘can do business with’. The Pakistan Army chief’s recently concluded (and extended) a visit, replete with guards of honour, medals and facetime with America’s top diplomatic and defence officials is only compounded by Washington’s satisfaction over Kabul and Islamabad making serious efforts to warm up to each other, putting words into action in the border areas, and leaving the acerbic and static Karzai-Kayani era behind.
Officially, the Strategic Dialogue provides a platform for the two sides to exchange views on ‘strategically important’ issues like energy, economy, non-proliferation and other security related matters. But actually the fulcrum of US-Pak bilateralism remains defence and counter-terrorism; Operation Zarb-e-Azb’s recent gains against Al Qaeda, the Haqqanis, the Gul Bahadur group form the base of improved regionalism; the US’s drone targeting of elements linked to Pakistan’s most wanted man, Mullah Fazlullah, that too on Afghan soil, build-up on the ‘ties warming up’ narrative; and NATO/Kabul’s recent handover to the Pakistani military of Latif Mehsud, once the right hand man of Hakimullah Mehsud - within days of the Chief of Army Staff’s trip - cleared the runway for the DCG to be conducted with a cordiality not seen between Washington and Islamabad/Rawalpindi in many years.
That the meeting comes at the heels of army chief General Raheel Sharif’s US trip, where no ‘goodies’ were sought, but the basis for a lot of upcoming business was laid out. A defence official explained on the condition of anonymity that Pakistan would be going into the discussions with two broad concerns of key importance. Firstly, convincing the US that as it transitions from the ‘sunset’ phase of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill (which was a wrap, officially, as last September lapsed), there needs to be some level of ensconcing and/or embedding of Pakistan in a Middle East-centric financial counter-terror mechanism - like the Counter-terrorism Partnership Fund, as has been established for supporting some of the nations fighting the Islamic State under the Jeddah Communiqué. Secondly, and more typically, the acquisition of defence equipment crucial for Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts, as well as access to arrears from the fast drying up Coalition Support Funds is going to be on the ministry of defence’s to-do list in D.C.
Emphasis will be laid out on contingency planning for the ISIS threat. Defence officials concede that some 4000-5000 fighters from FATA have transitioned out of the Af-Pak theatre and are currently fighting for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The evidence of these fighters was somewhat established when the World Health Organisation confirmed last year that polio virus strains from North Waziristan were found in the sewers of Damascus.
Thus, the pitch to the Americans is going to be simple. Pakistan is concerned that if and when these ISIS fighters return, the Taliban threat will only be compounded because of the explosive mixture of IS ideology and ‘Tango tactics’, as the army calls the Taliban’s insurgent operations. It is evidently clear that IS threat is too big a threat for any one nation to tackle alone and requires a transnational effort.
So if ISIS comes to Af-Pak, Pakistan would like to be preemptively participating in the transnational anti-ISIS regime as its security concerns align with that of those under the Jeddah Communiqué. With the end of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill term and the US forces drawdown from the region, the ISIS threat offers an opportunity for Pakistan to continue to stay ‘looped in’ with the Pentagon to work mutual security issues. It is with this understanding that Pakistan would be seeking accommodation in a new, Middle East-focused counter-terror financial regime.
About chances of an ISIS-style insurgency in Pakistan, Western officials maintain a simple thesis: the graffiti and pamphlets are disturbing, but the conditions for ‘ISIS-in-Pak’ are yet to take shape. The Pakistani military, they argue, is not like the Iraqi military; it is a more popular as well as a more representative force. That ISIS came into existence to fill the gaps created by the civil wars in Iraq and Syria which were a result of vacuums of dissatisfaction created by the ineffective and non-representative Iraqi and Syrian governments/militaries, it is contended that similar dynamics don’t exist in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s ministry of interior agrees with this assessment, and contends that much of the pro-ISIS statements from various Taliban splinter cells are ‘marketing efforts’ in the post-Zarb-e-Azb world of reduced relevance of terror groups.
During the visit, the Pakistani side can be expected to engage with senior Capitol Hill figures, particularly those who have expressed concerns regarding President Obama’s Afghan drawdown plan, which is morphing into an aggressive ‘training/hunting’ phase in these ‘end of days’ in Afghanistan. These may include Senator Bob Mendez, chairman of the powerful Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senator John McCain.
But back to the business of the DCG, where Pakistan is also expected to urge the Americans to sell the upgraded versions of the AH 1F Cobra helicopters. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) arms trade database suggests that US provided Pakistan some 26 Cobra AH1-Fs between 2007 and 2010. These helicopters form the backbone of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts in the northwest.
The United States further provided $750,000 in 2010 to upgrade the Cobras but extensive usage in the ongoing offensive against the militants has caused considerable wear and tear of the entire fleet. According to the INP, Pakistan has already asked the US to provide it with the AH1-Z (Zulu) versions of the Cobra series, a request that is yet to be facilitated, as the Americans don’t have excess hardware available.
With the Mi-35 helicopter deal with Russia already in sight - a foot in the door to one of the world’s largest arms exporters that was shut for decades due to Cold War era distrust - coupled with the need to modernise its aging helicopter fleet, Pakistan will try its luck and push for the acquisition of the Cobra Zulu, again. The United States has already disclosed its intent to provide Pakistan eight Global Response Cutters, eight 25 mm or 30 mm naval guns, 32 M-2HB 0.5 mm caliber machine guns, 32 7.62 mm guns including other command and control, navigational and technical equipment all worth around $350 million. But arrears from the Coalition Support Funds, and forecasting a financial arrangement beyond the KLB, is the front and centre of the agenda of Pakistan’s ‘Defendocrats’ in Washington.
