Xeric
RETIRED THINK TANK
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I promised a response to some comments made by our and perceptions that I believe may be possessed by you reference the U.S. Army and marine/army infantry.
"i forgot you are from the great US military(no sarcsim please) and you don't use infantry and armor as we do in the sub-continent."
First, I'd argue that utilization is a function of need. To that end, most of the central operating tenets of combined arms operations IN ANY BATTLE ENVIRONMENT have been well-covered by our forefathers.
Whether you're engaged in a LIC, MIC, or HIC, we'll need a mix of forces on the battlefield-engineers, artillery, light and heavy infantry, armor, and attack aviation to succeed. These pure companies must be doctrinally inculcated to create "teams" (a formal military term in the U.S. Army's operational lexicon) of mixed infantry/armor platoons at the company level and "task force" at the battalion level. Thus any company or battalion level commander must be prepared to structurally integrated elements from other branches into a team or task force by order of higher headquarters.
This could include the allocation of an M1A2 company to an airborne infantry battalion, for example or vice versa. We routinely practice cross-attachments and do so to always optimize our available forces for the most likely contingencies from mission to mission.
Other armies operate the same from mission to mission. This "combined arms integration" is simply "best practices" management as it seeks to tailor local and flexible solutions to narrow requirements within a given area of operations. Nobody knows the ground so well as the battle commander, so he should have the freedom to shape his forces as necessary.
This is important because...
"For you and your force differentiating these two things might not possible because your forces are trained accordingly and are best suited for a specific type of operation."
This isn't remotely true. We operate to support global policies and obligations of the United States government under constraint of budget and law. We cannot afford to train, with the exception of our SOF, forces allocated to specific operations or mission type at the expense of others.
We are an expeditionary army-an extension of our marine corps, if you will. All of our forces- light, medium, or heavy must train to deploy into any possible contingency from peacekeeping and humanitarian aid (OOTW) through the full spectrum of conflict to global thermonuclear combat.
Our troops must be able to "throw the switch" from directing vehicle traffic in security ops through full blown urban combat back to patrolling a neighborhood at sunset.
A myriad of skills and sub-sets of skills encompassed just there and they must be sufficiently mentally and physically agile to do so quickly.
The army I trained in thirty years ago might have reflected some of your thoughts. We had a goodly number of guys who knew little else besides the Fulda Gap in central Germany and had spent near-half (if not more) of their careers there.
Different ball of wax now. When artillery batteries pull infantry patrols you know that we're adjusting to ground realities off a considerably broader skill-set than once was the case.
Just a couple of thoughts...
Thnx for the detail response!
But you and i have to agree that our militaries do work differently.
If you'll say i will quote you a few examples.