Considering a future conflict, the entity which has benefited the most from this skirmish, is the one that got to learn the most. Glaring holes in IAF's armor were exposed by PAF, while on the other hand IAF employed relatively simpler tactics during the Balakot strike, exposing next to nothing of PAF. Resultantly, IAF will now go for better BVRs, more AWACS & AEWs, more ECM equipment etc. Overall, this skirmish has a lot of similarities with PAF's dominance over IAF in '65, which led to complacency.
It is true, but sometimes things boil down to a simple fact that whether you have enough resources to buy new equipment. India can sustain plugging the chinks in its armor, Pakistan can't. Like I gave an example, IAF's bases are a lot well protected than PAF's, and PAF still hasn't found a way to conduct anti-airfield ops without getting shot down in huge numbers.
This is exactly the sort of feel-good bravado that led to '71.
The recent engagement may even prompt a greater arms procuring spree along with increased training on their side which will make it impossible for us to repeat the events of the 27th.
History shows that for 65 where we snatched “defeat” from the jaws of victory in the air against a flying club of an airforce in India.. in 71 we faced a skillful organized opponent that nearly outfought us.
This incident is 65 except we had our victory.. They are not looking for the 71 and will double that effort.
Yes, indeed IAF already had plans of purchasing and up-gradation all across the fleet. But if you've noted, those plans have been marred by painfully slow bureaucracy and decision making.
Allow me to rephrase. IAF will now AGGRESSIVELY address its short-comings. Better BVRs for its Su-30MKIs, Meteors for Mirage-2000s, a squadron of MiG-29s (surplus from Russia), production of Netra AEWs in larger numbers, fast-tracking the delayed 02x Phalcon AWACS induction, immediate construction of HASs for the Su-30MKIs, additional 36x Rafales (totaling 72x)...and so on. We have sort of 'opened their eyes', so to say...not saying that it shouldn't have been done, its just an undesirable outcome of the entire episode.
I do agree that in order for the particular operation to succeed, all the assets that were employed were necessary, and that there was no 'overkill'. However I believe that the DA-20 was an ace up our sleeve, the employment and resultant exposure of which might provide undesirable lessons to the enemy.
My apology in advance for raking up an old thread.
I have a question for
@Socra and you. I request your critical thoughts on the following:
There is a slow but steady, potentially fundamental, churn happening across the Indian military (all three services) with respect to the military assets and command structure:
1. Military assets: The transition of military equipment from Soviet origin to American origin
There are three aspects to this:
a. Effectiveness
Personally, I believe that nobody makes weapons for war like the Americans do. A single weapons system of PAF acquired decades ago (F-16, upgraded over the years) led India to acquire 5 different planes (MiG 23, MiG 27, MiG 29, Mirage 2000, Rafale). This is not even mentioning the fact that till the Rafale enters operational service, the F-16 still outguns everything in IAF.
In contract after contract in India, when in open competition, US systems are the decided winners vis-a-vis Russian equipment. This has borne out in attack choppers, maritime patrol aircraft, heavy lift choppers, transport aircraft, among others. All this even without the foundational agreements signed. COMCASA (India specific version of CISMOA) was signed in late 2018 and now that BECA (last of the 3 agreements) is about to be signed, the process of induction of US equipment will only hasten.
b. Availability
(i)Availabilty of over 75% of all new platforms
I am sure you are aware that Su's and MiG's and in general most Indian military equipment has availability of around 50% (dropping down to 30% for many critical platforms), which has led to India never being able to truly leverage its advantage in numbers. Pakistan on the other hand has had a leaner but available and effective force mobilized for war.
Exposure to US military has led IAF to move comprehensively towards Performance Based Logistics contracts for every platform it now buys. Every platform, from Boeing C-17, Chinook, P-8I to even the Rafale now involves a PBL contract for availability of a minimum of 75%. In fact, to execute this Boeing now has embedded technical teams at designated airbases. What this means is that, going forward the military will be able to bring substantially more assets into play than it historically has been able to.
c. Training
(i)Processes: Traditionally, IAF training (for an overwhelming majority of its platforms) was driven by Soviet training patterns. This changed very slightly over the last decade as India started getting invited to participate in international air exercises leading to more exposure to American / Israeli / French forces.
It seems likely that most equipment that India procures now will be of US origin as the military services find it better than Russian. In tender after tender, all three services have declared US equipment as more capable than their Russian counterparts. Therefore, the training pattern will also start reflecting the practices of US military / USAF for the new gear and will percolate across all three services.
(ii)Platform longevity: This ranges from measures like TTL (Total Technical Life) of US weapon systems being significantly higher than Soviet ones that India is used to. An example, Su-30 has <3000 hours while an F-16 has >7000 hours of TTE. Among other aspects, this percolates down to how much an AF would use their planes to train. And to use this example further, PAF has usually (other than in sanctions period) given more flight hours to its pilots than IAF has.
(iii)Technology aids like simulators: Every aircraft and system that India is acquiring now involves simulators and training equipment of the kind that the military has never had before. An Indian defence analyst used the word 'revolutionary' for what the simulators and other training equipment IAF is getting now with its deals over the last 5 to 6 years.
(iv)Regular military exercises: Regular exercises with US, Australia, Japan, France and US
2. Command Structure: Change in higher command structure - CDS
Right now, the CDS is barely a first among equals but his intended task is to
(i) Unify the military training
(ii)Build theater commands for joint operations
(iii)Bring some level of synergies in the absurd procurement procesess of the three services
For historical, political reasons the three Indian services have been kept very siloed from each other. The CDS's singular goal is to reduce the siloes. In comparison, while the Pakistani military does not have a CDS, the CoAS acts as the de-facto CDS to enhance effectiveness.
As all of you are aware and as
@The Deterrent has starkly mentioned, all military procurements and changes in India are slow. Though the changes mentioned above are in their early stages, they are potentially fundamental in nature. The impact will only start becoming visible after a decade from now.
If I can summarize - I see the Indian military slowly moving towards the American pattern of military equipment, training, and philosophy which the Pakistan military has, historically, taken to with gusto.
What impact, of all the above aspects, do you see on future India - Pakistan military scenarios? I keep an open mind and if you feel what I have written above is not accurate, please do not hesitate to let me know.
@fatman17 ,
@Xestan ,
@Signalian,
@Mangus Ortus Novem your thoughts would be most appreciated as well.
